THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02457015
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01153
• Publication Date: April 4, 1950

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CLASSIFICATION ,a,F69r7
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFOR ATO rtPOT CD NO.
COUNTRY Poland
CONFIDENTIAL DATE DISTR. 4 APR 50
447
(b)(3)
SUBJECT
The Polish Communist Party
NO. OF PAGES
5
PLACE
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ACQUIRED
(LISTED BELOW
DATE OF
SUPPLEMENT TO
INFO.
REPORT NO.
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SOURCE
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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1. The Polish United Uorkerst Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partja Robotnicza PZPR),
or the Polish Communist Party, is no oreanized that the actual members of the
party have little or no opportuaity to influence the lino of action or policy
to be taken. All tactics and decisions are handed down from the top and auto�
matically agreed to. In the case of the Polish Comnunist Party, the Central
Committee holds only a small amount of the authority generally delegated to
this body.
2. In addition to the Central Committee other principal subdivisions of the Party
in Poland are as follows:
a. The Politbureauluhich is composed of the following merbers: Boleslaw
Bierut� jakub Berman, Jozef Cyrankieuicz, Franciszek Jozwiak, Hilary lane,
Stanislaw Radkiweicz, Adam Rapacki� Marian Spychalski� Henryk Swiatkouslii,
Roman Zambrayski, and Aleksander Zauadzki.
b. The Secretaries of the Cent al Committee are: Jozef Cyrankievicz� Roman
Zambrowski� and Aleksander-Zawadzki.
c. The Bureau of Organization, composed of the following: Bole claw Bierut,
Jerzy Albrecht, Antoni Alster, r'tefan Arski, ranks Baranowski, Jakub Bo _ n�
Hilary Chelkowski, Tadeusz Culk, Jozef Cyrankiemicz, 71adyslavrDuorakowski,
Henryk Jablonski, Leon Kasman, Julian Kole, Franciszek :"azur, Hilary Mine,
Zenon ffouak, Edward Ochab, Ulodzimierz Reczek, Marian Rybicki� Henryk Sulatkow�
ski, Boman Zambrowaki, janusz Zarzycki, Aleksander Zavadzki, and Stanislaw
Zawadzki.-
d. There exists also a Central Committee of Party Control, but its merbership
list ip not available to informant at this time.
The Party subdivisions named above represent the official hierarchy. It is a
common mistake to attach too Much importance to these various Party organs; it
CLASSIFICATION
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This document N hireby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in c�dance with the
letter of 16 Oclober 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.
Next Review Date: 2008
Document No.
Na Change In ss
Declasti
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
should at all tires be euemibered that the iMportance of any subdivision or
individual in the case of Poland is Wholly dependent upon the attitude and �
support from flbscow. It may also be pointed out that What may be a responsible
Important position within the organization of the Russian Communist Party may
not be of any significance at all in the Polish Communist Party, in spite of
the fact that it is en identical organ or position.
4- Behind the official facade of the Polish Communist Party there is much discord,
animosity, jealousy, and struggle for imaginary power and position among the
members of the Polithureau and other lesser officials of the hierarchy. It is
also a great mistake to presume that any one of the Politbureau members enjoys
the boundless confidence of Stalin or even has a direct channel of comnuniaation
to him. The individuals of the Folitbureau of the Polish Communist Party are
being used by the Kremlin in the way which bast =its the purposes of the Soviet
Union.
5,
only fragmentary information is available concerning
tne apparatus teat is organized for the purpose of governing the satellite
countries. One of the more plausible and frequently reported arrangenents is
the existence of National Departments for each of the satellite countries
within the Foreign Section of the Russian Communist Party, and that it is from
these departments that the satellite governments receive their immediate direc-
tion. In the case of Poland it is reliably stated that such a Polish department
does exist.
6. This being the case, the authority of the Politbureau of the Polish Communist
Party is third in line; first, the Politbureau of the Russian Communist Party
on matters concerning top policy; second, the Polish Department of the ?oreign
Section of the Russian Communist Party, and finally, the Politbareau of the Polish
Communist Party, From the nature of the above arrangement it is spite clear that
the members of the Polish Politbureau are not informed of all pending actions nor
are their desires and suggestions honored in the formulation of plans or decisions.
The oreans of the Polish Communist Party should not in any way be considered
capable of formulating an independent program or policy. They are actually only
organs for the execution of the orders received from Moscow.
7. Of the personalities concerned, Berman is the individual enjoying the greatest
confidence of the Soviet leaders, and he is considered one of the most important
figures in Poland's government today. Another individual known for his obedience
to the Soviet Union is Bierut. In many circles ho is known as."Moscow,e megaphone"
in Poland. Other individual Communists who have been educated in the Soviet Union
are Zambrouski and Zamadzki.
8. Zambrowski is the individual who has been selected
GO carry out en� long range program for the sovietization of the Polish state. The
former Socialists who were taken Anto the Politbureau for appearances only and who
are nourulthout importance are Cerankiewicz and Papackl.
9. The group of native Polish Communists includes Jozwiak, Mine, Padkiemice� Spy-
chalski� and Swiatkowski.- The status of these individuals is unclear, but it
is believed, with perhaps the exception of Radkiewicz, that they are not cone
sidered worthy of responsibility for the future Communist-Soviet _cooperation in
Poland.
10. Minc's noaition was considerably weakened the spring of 1949.
it is learned that his weakened position was due to the following
reasons:
a. Personal intrigues developed against him by a number of his colleagues.
b, Hi8 moderation concerning the economic matters in Poland; specifically, the
protection and retention of specialists in their positions, and his aversion
and opposition to rapid socialization of the industry and total rapia celiac-
iivization of Polish agriculture.
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a. The fact that ho Is of Jewish origin.
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Subsequent developments, developments, believed to be a result of his visit to Moscow in
May 1949 have shewn that nine has survived that phase of economic disgrace
and retained hisloonitiono This does not indicate that Mine is in personal
favor with anyone in the Kremlin, but rather thet there has been a change
in the plans and that these plans happen to correspond to the theory and
plan outlined by Mine, meaning in effect a slowing down of the socializa-
tion and collectivization programs in Poland.
11. The election Of Cyrankiewiez as one of the secretaries of the Central Come
mittee does not mean that he is considered of any. importance. In reality,
the General Secretary of the Party is Bierut, but for reasons unknown this
fact is not officially reported; officially the others are listed and cone
dUct the duties of the secretary's office, but they are presided over by
Bierut.
(b)(3)
12. The problem of Gomulka is considered worthy of special attention. As back-
ground information it is necessary to recall that at the Party congress of
August 1948, Gomulka was known as a promoter of Marshal Tito. During the fol-
lowing three days he refused to deny his Statements, but subsequentlya because
of heavy pressure, he was forced to do so under the threat of severe penalties,
At a Party coneress in December he spoke against the Soviet conception of
absolute rule by the Russian Communist Party. Gomulka's views are interpreted
to mean that each Party, in relation to all other Communist Parties, should be
. independent and have the right to decide its own program of action and the best
methods of activation of any program in its own country. This opinion was
severely condemned by Bierut� but for a long time strangely supported by Kliszke
and Loga-Sowinskie As the attitude of the Kremlin became evident, these indi-
viduals soon joined in the condemnation of Gomulka. Gomulka refused to withdraw
his etatemente but agreed that in the future he would adhere to the decision of
the majority of the Party Coneress. In spite of this episode, peculiarly enough,
Gomulka was elected to the Central Committee. Later, however, he was dismissed
from this position and demoted to a secondary position in the General Control
Office. Before the trial of Rajk, Gomulka was allowed to make a statement to
the press disclaiming any sympathy or admiration for Tito. Recently he was
pointed out by the press as one of the personalities who had returned medals
previously received from the Yugoslavian Government. There is no. indication
that he has been arrested, although it in reliably known that Spychalski has
been arrested. It is obvious that there have been strong tendencies to protect
Gomulka� he was dismissed on a direct order from Rokosovski.(e)(i)
In the Polish Politbureau the case of Gomulka was under consideration for a long (b)(3)
time, with no decision being rmached. The continuing systematic puree of indi-
viduals has continued, but in each instance the direct implication of Gomulka
M s been avoided.
13. The native Communists of the satellite countries, except those educated in the
Soviet Union, generally consider the development in their own country superior
to that of the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, a prevalent feeling also that
the Soviet Union should respect the decisions and opinions of the local Communist
Government. The local leaders consider themselves more competent to adninister
the affairs of their country than the imported leaders designated by the Soviet
Union.
14. Gomulka is considered one of the most intelligent of the Polish Communists, and
it in well known that he considers installation of collectivization on the Soviet
mitten as economic and political nonsense. Gomulka does not entirely oppose the
collectivization plan but claims that this plan must be implemented in accordance
with the plannine and decisions of the local Politbureau. In all cases he has
opposed rapid collectivization which, in his opinion will lead to unnecessary
ruthlessness, to Which the peasants would be most averse and will destro:i the Polish
agricultural econdmer;
15. In the summer or 1948 orders were issued by Mescon to enfore the collectivization
program throueheut the satellite countries, This caused friction within the
inner circle of Polish Corriunintre At this time Gomulka defied the authority of
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Moscow to dictate auch conditions or orders to Poland. There also arose the
question of Tito, and Gomulka was opposed to any condemnation of him in the
name of the Polish Party. At this time it was understood that a great many
of the party members shared Gomulka's views but mere afraid to express their
opinions. Gomulka was severely attacked by Bierut, who at all times is ope
posed to the questioning of any directives received from Moscow. During the
congress of August 1948, Gomulka refused to retract his statements for three
days, but was finally forced into submission.
16. One of the fundamental differences between the Polish Communist Party and the
Russian Communist Perty is the feeling of Russian superiority which, through
its leaders, the Russian CP wishes to exert over Poland and other satellite
Communist parties. It is the contention of Gomulka and an unidentified num-
ber of Polish Communist Central Committee members that there should be equality
between all Communist Parties; that it is contrary to the Comeunist principle
that the Russian CP should dictate the program, terms, planning, etc. of the
other parties. In this struggle Gomulka is quoted as saying that he will bow
to the will of the majority of the Central Committee of the Polish CP, but not
to dictates handed down by the Russian Communist Party, as this is contrary to
the national integrity and eelfare of Poland.
17. Gomulka's electlon to the Central Committee is an indication that his views are
suprorted by name Later, however, he was forced to leave this position; he
was not arrested but instead removed to a position in the General Control office.
Gomulka's resistance has borne some fruits as the rapid collectivization origi-
nally intended for Poland has been slowed down and the entire collectivization
plan is now in danger of losing !Tomei. At the present time this program is
at a standstill.
18. It is considered a moot question whether or not Gomulka will be allowed to re-
turn to the fold. There are indications that this is not an impossibility as
Gomulka was not touched during the Pajk trial; he was allowed to publieh a
letter in which he dicelaired his previous statements in favor of Tito and, as
previously mentioned, he was named as one of the persons who returned a medal
previously received from the Yugoslav Government; all attacks against him have
been very diffuse and weak. On the other hand, it is difficult to envision Mos-
cow's plans for him in view of his strong nationalistic views and his open re-
fusal to be subordinated to the Russian Comrunist Party. The most logical ex-
planation is that the Russians realize the strength of Gomulka's silent followers
and therefore dare not risk making him a martyr and thus further consolidate na--
tIonaliet opposition.
19. Another question of concern at the present time is the position of the economist
Mine. He is considered a practical economist who does not wish to have his pro-
gram subordinated to political maneuvers. As an economist, Vine mould not object
to Poland's participation in the Marshall Plan but naturally understood that this
would not be allowed by the Soviet Union. As remunerntion for Poland's abstinence
from the Marshall Plan, Stalin is voted as having promised to deliver to Poland,
on a credit basis, the Gigant steel works� with a production capacity of one and
a half million tons a year, several complete chemical morks, etc. Nowever, when
It came time to effect this transfer after considerable procrastination, numerous
Russian specialists and stratelests came forward with the objection that it would
be unwise for the 'doviet Union to deliver such valuable industries to such a vul-
nerable forward point as Poland. To date no further attention has been given this
proposal, nor Is any expected.
20. Mine is a firm believer that cautious action must be instituted In order to pre-
serve the remaining Polish agriculture. ne is net bagatelly opposed to the idea
of collectivization but is of the opinion that it must be 4 gradual process geared
to the econom5c and productive revival of the occupation. He contends that rapid
collectivization at this time will ruin Polish agriculture and that at all costs
this must be prevented. He is likewise opposed to the rapid socialization of all
Polish industry and retail trade, fearing ruination will result if the program is
not conducted at a reasonable pace.
refiefig?
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CEUTEAL IUTELLIGE703 AGEUC -
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21. The position ofIline is considered precarious, as it unuld only require a direct
order from Moor= to demand the enforcement of rapid collectivization and sociali-
zation, and thus force Mine from his tosition, place him on the side of the oppo-
sition to the Soviet Union, and eause the end of his career. Another factor
whlch may influence his early retirement is his ill health. It is entirely pos-
sible that the llussians are counting on this natural cause to remove him from
their path.
22. In conclusion it Is fully realized that developments may progress in an entirely
different pattern as a result of the appointrent of Marshal Rolcosayski.-
liBefter
-COWMEN-RAE
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