CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02444308
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: March 2, 1961

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2 March 1961
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in thi publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793,794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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2 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Congo:- Luluabourg under UN control; Gizenaa repeats
demands for aid from UAR and bloc.
(Page i)
2. India-Congo: Nehru warns Khrushchev solution to Congo
problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's
status and the Congo are separateu. (Page t)
4. France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed
US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. (Page tit)
5. Communist China: Peiping revives "100 flowers" con-
cept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of
expression. (rage tit)
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7. Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga threatens to resign;
opposes President Velasco's increasingly favorable policy
toward Cuba. (Page tv)
8. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page iv)
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Brazzaville
SUDAN
390
@Luanda
31594 A
IN
TUNISIA
2,600
MALAYA
610�
MALAYA
150
G e in en. a
MOBUTU
7200, Scattered Forces
�
Leopoldv
ysville
MOROCCO
GHANA
1,900
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
fl Gizenga
tttf Kaionji
Tshombk
X United Mations Forces
- Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
0 STATUTE MILES
400
H*Usumbura
C) MENTAL
Batoko.,-
-
anleyville
ETHIOPIA
.0paia 1,800
� Lodia
Francqui
Luputa
IRELAND
655
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
600
al-m[1a
GIZENGA
7,000
V Li
ukav
NIGERIA
500
Kongolo
AlbertviHe
NIGERIA
1,300
hville
-SE-CRZT,
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Sagequent discussion by the subcommittee indicatecF
that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in
terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of In-
dian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits
assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in
fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is
awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in
which the Indi 1
r
aui1t1y0 rei orcin e I forces in e ongo. Furthermore,
'Nehru is reporte � especia y conce7rra'Z'Ouf avoiding clashes
between Indian troops and any African troops which might be
sent unilaterally to suilport the Gizenga regime.
2 Mar 61
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France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the
Sahara is ex ected to be a tower shot in late March or A ril.
The test will coincide with U -UK-U SR test ban talks which
,arc n. ue uaulle,
ermine o o a u mem ers ip in the atomic club,"
continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban
unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of
nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face
the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African
and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the
United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will
be underground is unlikely to calm this'hodtiTe reaction.
Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a
limited liberalizatioi,i of scientific thought pdAll incrgaise
freedom orex ression amon the co tr 'n eeials. An
e 'tonal pu lished in the 28 February issue of the party journal,
Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states
that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they
lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists
have recently released and allowed to appear in public several
prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of
the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign
against those who had expressed themselves too freely before,
the intellectuals will be extremely wary about the new invitation
to "bloom and contend."
2 Mar 61
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Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga
intends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3
March, unless President Velasco a rees to chan e his
in-
creasingly favorable policy toward.,Cub, a. hiribogas resigna-
tion cou provo e a ca ine crisrg. 'The foreign minister's
stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-
Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel
Araujo, a key lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced
Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant."
Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have
gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies
toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos dur-
ing the last week. T
munist forces in the Plxine des J'arres intend to launch
2 Mar 61
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a counter-offensive in the immediate future alt
tkty_lays.e.czp.p..u.y.So o so. T ere is an uncon-
firmed report that the Communists have a plan to
initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south
of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such ac-
tion on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao -
Kong Le resources. Large-scale action watila rwire
outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to
be urPolv at this time. 1VIeanwhne, tge Communist bloc
continues its build-up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal"
prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate
except on its terms.
D. None of the contending factions in the Congo seems able
at nresent to s military soluticin, aUhi��g e
situation appears to favor whichever action is willing
to -take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and dis-
trust of the N the factions tFie tILfl
tralize their f�i� Und�h&fniji�is Utli�s�bu-
the start of political com-
promise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is
willing to enter into olitical ne otiations with the other
factions.
2 Mar 61
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TUP-5EGICELL
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Situation in the Congo
The threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared
to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of
ICasavubu's government to the point of being willing,for the first
time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be
urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1,500 men,
to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open
fire." It is questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces
would fight even if such an order were given, especially since
the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced.
Hammarskjold said that the Luluabourg episode was not a
military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegra-
tion of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation
is now shaping up in Equateur Province, where Stanleyville troops
easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward
Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the
Leopoldville governmEnt because Mobutu has taken most of its
garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say
that Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to Gizenga.
Hammarskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation
to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal
to Kasavubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken personally with
Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had
started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and
slowest--military offensive in history" and then last week told
UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only
for defense against infiltrators from Stanleyville. Hammarskjold
felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu
and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might b7 nlanninv a mili-
tary grouping directed against all politicians. (b)(3)
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Foreign Minister Amos has publicly suggestea
a Tito visit to Brazil.
Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic
and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959
when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven
Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high re-
gime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting
in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.
Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the
West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and
provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In
January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange
reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer ac-
cord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an
official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues
publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international af-
fairs.
Tito is currently in Ghana, the first stop on a two-month
African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia,
Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR
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President Nasir. This is the third tour Tito has made to in-
crease Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdevel-
oped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were
made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close
identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense
against possible future political and economic pressure from
East or West and the best possible platform from which to
voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session
last fall, the UAR's Nasir--long Yugoslavia's closest collab-
orator�Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's
Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease East-
West tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the
neutrals confer more often, collaborate more closely, and
act in concert more frequently.
In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party rela-
tions, Belgrade has generally satisfactory relations with the
Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and
Communist China. Tito and Ithrushchev held conversations
in New York last fall, one result of which was an agreement
to exchange visits by their foreign ministers. Moscow and Bel-
grade hold similar views on most international issues, such as
disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China
disapprove of close state relations with Yugoslavia and maintain
them at a minimal level.
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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue
Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February
that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political
situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh
Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He
noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with
Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action
against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.
The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indi-
cated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both
Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against
Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The
Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particu-
larly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing
boundary dispute with Peru.
Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 Febru-
ary that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such
an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-
ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army com-
mander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated
last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused
these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political
controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although
Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he
might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government
position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga
said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday
Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail
if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was
certain Velasco will not follow through on this.
Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he
has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy
in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he pos-
sibly contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.
2 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
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The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
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The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
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The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
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The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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