HANOI'S APPRAISAL OF ITS STRATEGIC POSITION

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02441759
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 27, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Ro
This paper impresses me as being
worthy of your scrutiny.
Richard Helms
Attachments - 2
Copy Nos. 1 and 2 - Hanoi 'a Appraisal of its
Strategic Position Prior to the Current
Offensive.
27 February 1968
(DATE
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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1.
NrilW 11111W
27 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Hanoi's Appraisal of its Strategic Posi-
tion Prior to the Current Offensive
1. CIA has reviewed key Communist documents
captured in Vietnam in order to bring into sharper
focus Hanoi's own appraisal of its strategic posi-
tion prior to the Tet offensive. One North Viet-
namese document used for indoctrination of middle-
level cadre seems to us to spell out Hanoi's argu-
ments in particularly clear and explicit terms.
This document, entitled "Clearly Understand the New
Situation and Mission," was captured in late Novem-
ber but was not available in Washington until the
end of January.
2. The North Vietnamese assessment has the
ring of authority. Issued on 1 September for in-
doctrination purposes, it was drawn from an analysis
prepared by a high-level party committee in Hanoi.
The document reviews the development of the war
from the summer of 1965, when US forces were intro-
duced on a large scale, through each campaign sea-
son to the summer of 1967. Each stage of the
struggle is represented in terms of Communist gains
and allied reverses. Hanoi sees every step in the
strengthening of US forces as a vindication of Com-
munist strategy, and points to its success in keep-
ing pace with the buildup.
3. Hanoi argues in this analysis that it has
brought the conflict to a new stage, not because
its "protracted war" strategy has failed but be-
cause it has succeeded. The introduction of the
document describes in plain terms the opportunities
now open to the Communists: "the immediate situa-
tion becomes increasingly more favorable for us
and detrimental to the enemy." This will enable
the revolutionary movement in the South to "secure
SET
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great victories in a rather short period of time."
These victories will entail the destruction of a
"large part of the US combat forces" and the "main
body of the Puppet Army."
4. Hanoi's confident assessment of the strength
of its position clearly is central to its strategic
thinking. Just as it provided the rationale for the
Communists' "winter-spring campaign," it probably
will also govern the North Vietnamese response to the
present tactical situation. If Hanoi believes it is
operating from a position of strength, as this analy-
sis suggests, it can be expected to press its military
offensive--even at the cost of serious setbacks.
Given their view of the strategic balance, it seems
doubtful that the Communists would be inclined to
settle for limited military gains intended merely
to improve their bargaining position in negotiations.
5. A few excerpts from the North Vietnamese
document show how the Communists arrive at their
conclusion that the time has come for "a great step
forward" on the way to "complete victory."
"In the winter-spring of 1965 and 1966,
after pouring more than 200,000 US and Allied
troops into SVN to join more than a half mil-
lion puppet troops, the US imperialists
launched their plans of strategic counterof-
fensive in the dry season, hoping to destroy
a large part of our main body, disperse our
troops, destroy the revolutionary organiza-
tions in our military installations, sup-
press the struggle of our people, wipe out
the party forces and guerrilla forces, oc-
cupy our land, and reduce our area. Concur-
rently, they reinforced their air force and
escalated the war in the North, hoping to
prevent us from reinforcing the South....
They could not destroy any element of our
forces and they were badly worn down...."
"In the rainy season of 1966, the enemy
did not have enough strength to launch great
attacks against us... .they were actively pre-
paring to reopen greater strategic counterof-
fensive phases with larger forces in the com-
ing dry season."
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S E Cal T
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"In the dry season of 1966-1967,
with an increased US force of more than
400,000 troops or more than one million
including the Allied forces and the pup-
pet troops, using modern weapons, aircraft,
artillery, and mechanized means which had
been increased four or five fold, the US
imperialists launched a much fiercer coun-
teroffensive phase than they had launched
previously. They applied the tactics of
"pincers" to seek and destroy our main
force and concurrently launch raids to
pacify and herd the people, hoping that
they would be able to regain the initiative
on the battlefield and avoid great defeats.
They deployed all their forces and launched
dozens of operations at a time, ranging
from regimental level to army corps level
on all battlefields. The most important
of these operations was OPERATION JUNCTION
CITY, in which they committed 45,000 of
their troops against the northern part of
Tay Ninh. They had concurrently pushed
forward their pacification plan and stepped
up their psywar and Open Arms activities...
In the North, they increased the rate of
destruction to a high degree and on a
broader range...."
"They failed to achieve their goal of
destroying us and they suffered an unpre-
cedentedly high number of casualties and
material losses. They boasted that with
their great strength and their numerous
weapons, aircraft, tanks and bombs, they
would surely wipe out all our main units
and installations. But our main installa-
tions remain intact, our armed forces con-
tinue to develop, and our rear bases and
installations continued to fill the re-
quirements for fighting the enemy. More
importantly, we have also opened many spe-
cial fronts and battlefields, especially
the Tri Thien //DMZ// battlefields, in
which we have destroyed many of the enemy.
We have attracted the enemy toward such
battlefields and caused confusion to them
-3-
SECXET
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as well as prevented them from implement-
ing their plans of bringing US troops to
the Mekong Delta..."
"Their pacification plan, a program
highly boasted by the US imperialists and
puppet regime and carried out at the ex-
pense of 90 percent of the puppet forces
with the assistance of the US imperialists,
has also proven to be a failure. They
themselves recognize their pacification
failure. They are suffering political fail-
ure and they are striving to consolidate
and stabilize the puppet army and regime,
but these deteriorate steadily. Puppet
troops have been degenerated from organic
mobile soldiers to pacification and defen-
sive troops. They have proved to be inef-
ficient, have demonstrated pronounced de-
featism and are continuing to disintegrate..."
"In the North, they have stepped up
their destructive activities through intense
deployment of their air force and navy.
They have launched fierce operations, hop-
ing to be able to scare our people and pre-
vent us from reinforcing our brothers in the
South. However, we remain unshakable in
our determination. On the contrary, we have
fought bravely and destroyed more than 2,000
of their aircraft, and right now we are
standing side by side with the people in
the South and are doing our best to support
their revolution and to liberate the South.�
"In spite of the cunning plots of the
US imperialists and their cruel henchmen,
and in spite of their mammoth strength,
their great firepower, and all their su-
perior war means, the strategic objectives
which had been selected by them could not
be achieved. The defeats they are suffer-
ing become more burdensome and occur more
frequently...."
"On our side.. .even though we have met
a certain number of great difficulties...
�4�
SEriKET
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'WOO
we have caused the first phase of the
greatest limited war ever waged by the US
imperialists to fail...."
"At present, the situation has devel-
oped in such a way that it is very favorable
for us and a critical deadlock for the enemy.
After the failure of two major strategic coun-
teroffensive campaigns, the leaders in the
United States have become pessimistic over
their war escalation policy in South Vietnam.
The increase of combat troops in SVN met
with many difficulties...."
"This is a perfect opportunity for us
to emphasize attacking the enemy in all fields
and taking advantaae of the victories to push
the SVN Revolution a great step forward....In
this historical period, if our entire party,
army, and population will fully understand the
situation and rush forward to fight without
fear of hardship and sacrifice, then we will
certainly be able to bring about a turning
point in our confrontation with the enemy and
also cause the US limited war policy to be a
failure which can no longer be carried out.
From that situation, we can proceed toward
realizing our immediate objective and secure
a complete victory."
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