ASSESSMENT OF THE 'DANANG DOCUMENT'

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02412668
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 14, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2412668
2.43.1;�Srd-r-M
14 February 1968
MEMORANDUM rOR: Honorable Walt Rostow
SUBJECT Assessment of the "Danang Document"
CIA has prepared the following assessment of the "Danang
Document" in response to your reqUest to Mx. Helms last night.
You will have received, via the White House Situation ROOM,
a-full translation of the document.
1. Our examination of the document (in translation)
suggests that it is p7obbly a communication oriuinating from
Viet Coi-Ki cn Viv,i It is an assessment of the-,..1.,
j
'failure of the Tet o'fersive irtended for subordin7lte
uthor-
iti-posib1, a tacticn1 corn.:;n6 center�and contains in-
structions for fulre operation5. The original document,
-oweveri-f6-Still in I Corps, and bs officials in Saigon state
that they are unable at this time to make an accurate deter-
mination of its authenticity. Moreover, some questions re-
main unanswered as to date of document and circumstances of
its capture.
2. The d9c4Ment_appears-generally to agree- with iother
evidencee;gleaned from interrogations of prisoners taken during
the Tet offensive and on what is known of the enemy's advance'
planning, that the, ConullA4sts_achieved less than they:naVan-,e
ticipatf:d._-This evidence has suggested that -the enemy believed
they -WOuld meet greater success in sparking a "general up-
rising," although the extent to which they expected genuine
popular support is still not clear. Prisoners of officer rank
have stated that they believed most of the population would
support them, but their own statements and documents from the
pre-Tet period indicate rather strongly that the uprising was
to be "motivated and organized"rather than spontaneous.
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3. Although the exact sequence in time of the "general
Offensive" and the "general uprising' has not been fully clear,
there are strong suggestions in statements by other prisoners
and in captured documents that the two were to be simultaneous,
with the 'uprising" at least being initiated during the Tet
attacks. Certain troops or cadres apparently were specifically
assigned to organize support, to begin in the form of public
demonstrationS. We know that such demonstrations were started
during attacks on several cities in the central coastal area--
including Tam Ky--but that they were dispersed by police.
Some prisoners have linked the public's lack of cooperation
to the failure of the attacks themselves.
4. There has been no evidence as to whether the Commu-
nists actually intended attacks throughout the country to be
simultaneous or to take place on successive days. T'ee,alidt
this document. provides the first good indication ,that "N-Day"
wag-in-tended to be naticnwe aud that the full ilepact may
have 1 ipetecl thiouifh poor coordination.- It also ries
the-possibilitv that us boring attacks successfullY t_lerew off
the timetable in-the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, e. Had the Communists
genuinely expected to score complete successes in some areas,
they almost certainly would have had to act everywhere at once.
5. The document, however, does_not appeareconclusive
as,t0ethether-larger-North Vietnameee uaits were to participate
in the initial attacks, or were to be corvitted in follow-up ee.
efforts where_suceeeallponed promising. Neither does it make
clear wheth6r all North Vietnamese units or only some elements
were to have been committed.
6. Although the document clearly su9gests. failure:m.1*
the need fee,e",ecision-onaa:fUture course action, it does
_ s
FloE-seem to rule out the possibility that the Connunists_h
maximum anderinimUm .goaLe, at -least by- drea7-nor-does-it-neces-
sarily-rh-dicate a "go or broke',eOrt., All of-the future
'courses-cited-in the document point to ceatinuing the-strugsele
in Military Rego Five partj.cularly in the urban areas.. Al-
though as might be expected, the-daa9er.g..2tomorale anderesources
areJlighlightedierqlatively strong assets are deemed still in
place.
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7. We would concur with_CanSMACV's_cautionArY advi.oe
concerning both sna: intorpretation5 _of. Communist verbiage,
especially in Li J na the possible relevance or�t
signifioance-Pf thiri document to the thinking and overall
strategic planning o: hiuh-lavel Communist- authoritiesAn
COSVN or Hanoi.
8. US officials in Saigon are endeavoring to clarify
the circumstances surrounding the capture of' the document and
to establish as precisely as possible its authenticity.
BY DIRECTION OF THE DCI:
-3-
Senior Duty Officer
CIA Operations Center
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