COMMUNIST CHINA INCREASES SUPPORT TO NORTH VIETNAM'S AIR DEFENSES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02400588
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 15, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
01) ecie
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist China Increases Support
To North Vietnam's Air Defenses
op ecru
3.5(c) Copy No. 73
SR IM 67-15
3.5(c) December 1967
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WARNING
This document contains classified information all the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 December 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist China Increases Support
to North Vietnam's Air Defenses
Summary
Communist China has recently stepped up its
support of North Vietnam's air defense effort by
permitting North Vietnamese MIG's to take refuge
in China after combat missions. Earlier assistance
included the delivery of fighter aircraft to Hanoi,
the deployment of Chinese antiaircraft artillery
units in North Vietnam
. In addition, Communist
improved its own air defense posture in the south.
China has
The Chinese are expected to continue, and
perhaps to expand, their aid to the North Vietnamese
air defense effort while bolstering their own air
defense system along the border. In permitting North
Vietnamese MIG's to take refuge in China after combat
missions, Peking probably envisions a risk of US air-
craft pursuing these fighters across the border.
Past experience indicates that intrusions by US air-
craft would almost certainly be challenged.
China's posture still appears to remain basically
defensive and cautious. The air defense augmentation
in south China has not been accompanied by other
moves--such as the deployment of bombers or ground
forces closer to North Vietnam--which would indicate
a more ominous intent.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research
and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intel-
ligence, National Estimates, and Scientific Intel-
ligence.
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1. Communist China's support of North Vietnamese
air defense has grown significantly since the first
US air strikes on North Vietnam in August 1964. This
support has extended into many facets of air defense
and has included
supply of jet fighters, movement of antiair-
craft units into North Vietnam, and the use of Chinese
airfields as a safe haven for North Vietnam's reserve
aircraft (see the map, opposite page). In the past
several weeks, Peking has permitted North Vietnamese
fighters to take refuge in Chinese air space and land
at Chinese airfields following combat missions over
North Vietnam.
2. In the past several months, the Chinese have
steadily bolstered their own air defenses along the
North Vietnamese border by sending more jet fighters,
additional antiaircraft units, and at least one SAM
unit to the area, and by improving radar and ground
control capabilities.
Fighter Defenses
3. Just one day after the first US air strike
against North Vietnam on 5 August 1964, Peking
delivered about 35 MIG-15 Fagot and MIG-17 Fresco
aircraft to North Vietnam�clearly in response
to an earlier agreement with Hanoi. Concurrently
several Chinese fighter units in south China moved
to forward bases along the border.
4. Subsequent deliveries of MIG's to North
Vietnam are believed to have come from the Soviet
Union, but China's support of the North Vietnamese
Air Force continued to develop. In December 1965,
North Vietnam began flying some of its aircraft out
of the country to Pei-tun/Yun-nan-i airfield for
safekeeping and probably for maintenance and repair
as well. The number of North Vietnamese aircraft at
this field remained fairly constant until June 1967.
5. On 21 June, some two months after the first
US strikes on North Vietnamese airfields, Hanoi began
to send most of its fighters into Pei-tun/Yun-nan-i.
In October, Peking began allowing the Vietnamese to
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use Meng-tzu, Nan-fling, and Ning-ming airfields in
ferrying their aircraft to and from China. Today
south China airfields provide a safe haven for
approximately 130 North Vietnamese aircraft, about
90 of them MIG's. In addition, the Chinese probably
supplied about two dozen of their own MIG-17's to
North Vietnam in 1967. Most of these aircraft subse-
quently returned to China.
6. In November, for the first time, North Viet-
namese MIG's were permitted to take refuge in China
after combat missions over North Vietnam. On three
occasions they landed at Ning-ming airfield just
across the border and after a brief layover returned
to North Vietnamese airfields. Other times they
remained airborne after entering China and returned
home when the danger of further encounter with US
aircraft was minimal.
7. During the past two months, the Chinese also
have increased the number of MIG's in south China.
Approximately 38 MIG's have moved to south China
since 10 September, and there are some indications
that more may be sent soon. Currently there are
about 300 MIG-17 Fresco, 170 MIG-19 Farmer, and
10 MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft in south China--representing
about 20 percent of China's total fighter force.
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Radar Facilities
11. The Chinese have established at least two,
and possibly three, radar units in North Vietnam
They have also steadily improved their radar capa-
bilities in south China by adding several new long-
range radars of native Chinese design along the border
and on Hainan Island.
Antiaircraft Artillery
13. In August 1965, China moved two AAA divisions
into North Vietnam, probably to provide defense for
construction projects being undertaken by Chinese
engineering troops. Since then, the number of Chinese
AAA divisions in North Vietnam has risen to four, and
several rotations have occurred.
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14. One AAA unit is at Yen Bai airfield in
northwestern North Vietnam, an airfield which
Chinese engineer troops have been constructing since
late 1965. The other three AAA divisions are in the
Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, and Hanoi areas for the
defense of rail lines and related construction
projects.
15. AAA forces on the Chinese side of the
border also have been augmented recently. The
number of AAA divisions along the northeast segment
of the frontier has risen from three to as many as
six during the past two months. Some of these units
eventually may replace or augment the Chinese AAA
forces currently in North Vietnam.
16. China is believed to have provided some of
the AAA guns in the hands of the North Vietnamese,
although the main source of these weapons continues
to be the Soviet Union.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
17. North Vietnam's SAM units have been equipped
and supported strictly by the Soviets. On the Chinese
side of the border, only one SAM unit has been con-
firmed--about seven miles north of the border near
Chin-chou, where it apparently shot down a reconnais-
sance drone on 17 September. In October, however,
photography revealed that the site had been evacuated.
The equipment probably has been moved to another
location along the border in accordance with the "hit
and move" tactic which the Chinese have used with some
of their SAM units elsewhere to ambush reconnaissance
flights.
Outlook
18. Peking probably will continue to support
North Vietnam's air defenses, and it is possible
that this support will grow. Additional Chinese AAA
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forces may be sent to North Vietnam if Chinese
construction activities in North Vietnam expand,
and North Vietnamese MIG's may use Chinese air
space and airfields with increasing frequency.
19. In permitting North Vietnamese MIG's to
take refuge in China after combat missions, the
Chinese probably envision a risk that US aircraft
will pursue the North Vietnamese fighters across the
border. The recent acceleration of the fighter
buildup in south China may have been designed to
meet this contingency. Past experience indicates
that intrusions by US aircraft would almost certainly
be challenged. Chinese fighters generally patrol
the border during US air strikes over North Vietnam
and have consistently tried to engage any US aircraft
that penetrate the border.
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20. Nevertheless, China's posture appears to
remain basically defensive and cautious. The air
defense augmentation in south China has not been
accompanied by other moves--such as the deployment
of bombers or ground forces closer to North Vietnam--
which would indicate a more ominous intent. Propaganda
attention to Vietnam remains moderate in volume and
follows long-standing positions.
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