HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING MARITIME TRAINING 1949 - 1954

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02344440
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-01723
• Publication Date: May 1, 1969

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Iry
Iwo
WIN
SE RET
SS Historical Paper
No. �TR-3
SUPPORT SERVICES
HISTORY
(TITLE OF PAPER)
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING
MARITIME TRAINING
(Pum)
1949 - 1954
DO NOT DESTROY
Controlled by - OTR
Date prepared : May 1969
Written by
; Robert B. Shaf
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NOTICE
I. This historical paper is a permanent part of the Support Services History and
may not be destroyed.
2. It is included in the "Catalog of Support Services Histories" maintained by the
Support Services Historical Board.
3. If this Jocument is moved from the office of control appearing on the front of
this cover, the Chairman of the Support Services Historical Board should be
notified of the new office of control.
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HISTORY
of the
OFFICE OF TRAINING
Y.ARITIME TRAINING (1949 - 1954)
Prepared by: Robert B. Shaffer, May 1969 (b)(3)
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I - The Beginnings of Maritime Training
Page
1
.2
1 - Early Attempts to Identify Requirements
2
2 - The First Organization and Staff
5
3 - The First Training
9
4 - The Search for a Maritime Training
Base
11
CHAPTER II - Project
14
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Interest in
I - First
(b)(1)
2 - Chronology
of the Acquisition of
16
10k0�0)
(b)(3)
3 - The Termination of Interest in
21
(b)(1)
(b)(31
CHAPTER III - Project
31
(b)(1)
1 - The
Search for Another
Training
Site
31
(b)(3)
2 - The Development of
34
(b)(1)
J '" The Termination of
Interest in
38
(b)(3)
ku)(i)
(b)(3)
CHAPrER IV - The Development of Alternatives:
CHAPTER V - The Human Side
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A - A Note on Source Material
42 (b)(1)
48 (b)(3)
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INTRODUCTION
The efforts made during the period 1949-1954 to
establish a training program in support of clandestine
maritime operations are worth relating in some detail
because they provide an excellent illustration of the
difficulties that were encountered at that time in what
was essentially a pioneering effort. It so happens that
the files of that period are almost intact, thereby pro-
viding a well documented case history of the problems of
establishing a new training program in those early days
of the Office of Training.
Although OSS had used swimmers and small boats for
some clandestine operations, the know-how was largely
lost with the break-up of OSS in 1945. The OSS instructors
and training sites were likewise lost, and such training
materials as survived were out of date and not entirely
pertinent to the post-war situation. As a result, opera-
tions officers as well as training officers were faced
with formidable problems in terms of requirements, per-
sonnel, and facilities when it began to seem in 1949
that some kind of maritime training would be needed.
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CHAPIER I. The Beginnings of Maritime Training
1. Early Attempts to Identify Requirements
By March, 1949, the new Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)
had an Acting Chief of Training
Training Officers
and two
and James Cross). There is
evidence that bone thought was already being given to maritime
training: in a memorandum of 23 February 1949 to
Mr. Cross reported his researches on the OSS Maritime Unit Train-
ing Programs, summarizing the content of a six-weeks Basic Course
and an eight-weeks Advanced Course.
By August 1949,
had. been hired as
Chief of a proposed OPC "Advanced Course," which would be primarily
paramilitary in nature. Shortly after, the training units of OSO
and OPC were amalgamated to
TRD
joined
Charles Smith (USN) and
form the Training Division (TRD) under
On 25 May 1950, the Deputy Chief of
in a meeting with Commander
of Staff II, OF, to learn
the extent of a so-called amphibious program that they had heard
about, and to find out what would be expected of TRD.
Nothing further seems to have happened until 5 July 1950,
when wrote a significant memorandum to the Chief of
asking for a conference to provide
Staff II, OPC
guidance to TRD on anticipated maritime training requirements and
effective training methods.
pointed out that a year
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would be needed to recruit and train personnel for a maritime
unit, and suggested that ten men be recruited as soon as possible,
to be trained as an expandable nucleus which could be used for
training and research in maritime techniques. TED had only two
positions for naval personnel; USN, was
being processed against one of them to conduct a maritime orien-
tation of about six hours: in the so-called Area Training Program.
emphatically pointed out that TED badly needed
to find out the following:
a. OPC requirements in the maritime field (both for
peace and for war);
b. TRDIs responsibility for maritime equipment;
c. staff relationships and procedures;
d. the requirements for facilities and equipment;
e. the requirement for use of Navy training facilities.
The Training Division was still searching for definitive answers
to these questions a year later.
reported for duty in August 1950. He was
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
assigned the responsibility of getting maritime training started.
It was clearly a frustrating experience for him. TED asked OPC in
December 1950 to give authority and approval to hold (b)(3)
discussions with the Navy on maritime training matters. Approval
was granted the following February. TED prepared a set of proposals
for training which it submitted to Staff II, OPC on 27 December 1950.
A reply dated 27 January 1951 indicated that Staff II was engaged in
computing over-all requirements for services support of OFC training
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programs, and expected to complete this study by I March; it
stated that stimate of ten Naval personnel for
maritime training was reasonable and suggested he start procure-
ment action. spent this period preparing various
studies for the organization and employment of a maritime training
branch, and aired his frustration in several "progress" reports to
On 25 January 1951, for example, he wrote that he had learned
that OPC had taken no positive action and that it had no concrete
ideas regarding either the use of maritime operations or of the
related training. He felt that to delay the commencement of the
creation of a training program until after over-all requirements
had been established would be a serious error because of the loss
of lead time as well as the unfounded guesswork on which the estimates
would be based. He doubted that anyone in OPC appreciated the poten-
tial of maritime operations, and showed his irritation with bureau-
cratic delays by quoting from a memorandum submitted by a naval
officer to General Donovan under similar circumstances: "This office
has suffered a great deal by baying to go through a large number of
channels, none of which had any experience in our field and merely
delayed the prosecution of our work."
LIIIIIJs11ed out the problems in detail in a memo-
randum of 18 April 1951 to Chief, TED. As of that date, no estimates
of training requirements had been received. There still was no
answer from OPC regarding the comprehensive proposals of 27 December
1950. He had been unable to determine the situation regarding the
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procurement of the military personnel requested for his unit.
He could not find out what maritime operations had been conducted
in the recent past, what ones were contemplated, where and with
what kind of equipment, personnel, or targets. He was forced to
conclude that a
"deplorable condition of ignorance, indifference,
lack of coordination, and ineffectiveness with regard
to maritime operations prevails throughout the operating
divisions. All efforts on my part to solve and improve
the situation have resulted only in a circuitous return
to my office confused and empty handed."
He felt that the lack of communication and coordination
within the Agency represented an impossible situation, and recom-
mended in effect that the maritime training program be abandoned
unless some concrete positive actions were taken to determine the
requirement and to procure the necessary personnel.
2. The First Organization and Staff
first proposal for the establishment of a
ositiona,
"Maritime Training Branch" had called for
of which were to be filled by Navy officers on active duty. This
group was to conduct research, get trained, prepare to give train-
ing, and establish an organization that could be readily expanded
if needed. By February 1951,
of a unit of
was planning in terns
people. As the situation continued to change, other
tables of organization were
(successor to
of Personnel to allocate an additional
prepared. On 14 November 1951,
requested the CIA Director
Naval officers and
enlisted men to the Maritime Training Unit in addition to the
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officers already authorized.
stated that this number represented about
number of
which was
later, in January 1952,
be reduced to
memorandum further
of the total
men who would be required for the training program
expected to begin in November 1952. But two months
proposed that the T/O
In any case, the acquisition of qualified individuals pro-
ceeded slowly.
USN, and
reported in June 1951;
USNR, both underwater de-
molitions instructors, reported in September 1951, and
AUS, arrived in October 1951. In a memorandum of
mid-October 1951/
pointed out that the shortage of
personnel in the Branch was becoming an "exceedingly acute" problem.
As for any training to be conducted before a full staff was
assembled, had found out by February 1951 that the
Navy Department was willing to help, if it received a statement
of requirements, including either a list of Navy courses the
trainees were to complete or the skills the trainees were ex-
pected to acquire.
visited the Naval Amphibious
Base at Little Creek, Virginia during 24-26 April 1951, and
learned that the Base had been instructed by the Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to be prepared to provide training as
requested by CIA, and that this had been authorized by the Chief
of Naval Operations. Base personnel indicated their willingness
to implement any training requests within their capabilities;
they could integrate Agency people into regular courses, or let
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them attend selected portions of regular courses, or conduct
special courses if necessary. They could not, however, accept
any one who was not a U.S. citizen. They reiterated their need
for a statement of requirements.
In a memorandum dated 14 June 1951 and addressed to the
Staff and Division Chiefs of OSO and OPC, Rolfe Kingsley (acting
Chief of the Training Division) summarized the maritime training
situation up to that date. Four kinds of training seemed to be
needed:
a. small boat handling and operation;
b. underwater demolitions and swimming;
c. amphibious and beach intelligence;
d. general orientation.
For the time being, he said, this need would be met through use
of the facilities at Little Creek, where arrangements had been
made to enter a few Agency people (under cover) in a two-week
course which was being run every few months for Naval Reservists.
This course, (which was later called by OPC/YE)
had trainees from the Agency in June and September 1951 and in a
few subsequent runnings.
In view Of the confusion regarding requirements and act a9
(b)(
field operations, first-hand knowledge was obviously desirable.
accordingly spent the period 25 July - 30 August
1951 visiting several field installations in
and
to
Observe some actual maritime operations. His trip report pointed
out what he considered to be woeful deficiencies both in the
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support and in the conduct of maritime operations. He recommended
changes in headquarters organizations: and called again for a
survey of present and future requirements for training and equip-
ment, as well as for the assignment of experienced officers to(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Training Division. He also had taken positive action while on this
he had gotten two maritime case officers
interested in joining the Naritime
trip.
While in
ma
Training Branch, which they later did.
After
return, most of the rest of 1951 was
devoted to the planning and installation of maritime facilities
at the new domestic training base
which was expected
to be ready for occupancy by November 1951. Here was a different
kind of problem; in this instance, the
clear. The plans called for
general paramilitary training by 30 June
time training was to be included.
requirement had been made
a memorandum of 7 November 1951 that
for some aspects of maritime training,
be made as to the best way to meet the
to receive
1952; some kind of marl-
pointed out in
was not suitable
and that decisions had to
requirements not only for
this training but for research and development as well.
In reality, this huge group of students never materialized.
Nevertheless, the requirement had been presented, and it consti-
tuted a strong argument for the establishment of a maritime training
base.
Other maritime training requirements were beginning to come
in at this time. The Maritime Training Branch received firm
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requests from OSO and OPC for the following training in 1952:
underwater sabotage -
maritime operations -
3. The First Training
One specific requirement had emerged by this time from a
series of discussions between representatives of the covert
Offices and of Training. This was for a "Maritime Operations
Staff Course" for case officers who would have to plan, direct,
or support maritime operations, rather than actually participate.
had submitted a detailed proposal for such a course
in April 1951. It was to be a one-week course, given at Headquarters.
On 30 September 1951, the OPC Training Officer signified that OPC
had a requirement for such a course; on 16 October 1951 the OSO
Training Officer asked that such
October,
a course be developed. On 30
who had just joined
develop and present this course.
directed
the Maritime Training Branch, to
The pilot running (one-week duration) began on 21 January 1952
for
selected OSO and OPC staff officers. Three years had
elapsed since James Cross had researched maritime training for
the Chief of Training, OPC. Staff Maritime Operations Course .#1
then was presented 17 March 1952.
Another specific request occupied much of the time of Messrs.
and
during January and February 1952.
case officers from Foreign Division S (FDS) of OSO were
given training in the techniques of clandestine infiltration and
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exfiltration. This involved a week of tutorial orientation in
Washington, two weeks at Little Creek, followed by a week of
training on a PT boat. The PT boat was a reconditioned one
belonging to FD6; when representatives of the Maritime Training
Branch saw it, their reaction was one they later described as
"hopeful but somewhat skeptical." Arrangements had to be made
for renovation and shakedown trials, as well as for temporary
Navy ownership of the boat; special financial and requisitioning
procedures had to be set up. The Navy provided a boat crew,
equipment, a base at Little Creek, and cover; the training was
successfully accomplished by mid-February. But
concluded from this experience that the severe problems imposed
by conducting such training on an active Navy base were too
limiting. On the other hand, the Agency did not have the staff,
the equipment, or the training areas to do a proper job.
Some training requirements caused problems at this time
by leading other elements of the Agency to take action without
the knowledge of or anyone else in the Office of
Training. In a memorandum of 2 January 1952 to the Acting Director
of Training (Covert), said that several months pre-
viously, FE/OPC had initiated independent negotiations with the
Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek for special training (i.e.
for some of its people. This venture had re-
sulted in considerable confusion and embarrassment before the
situation was rectified.
�
In another instance, at the instigation of this same unit
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(FE/OPC)� the Military Personnel Division (MPD) had persuaded
the Navy to agree to put
Navy officers through Underwater
Demolitions Team (UDT) training at Little Creek, after which
they would be assigned to CIA. The time, place, and nature of
the training happened to conflict with other arrangements which
had been made by
independently. In his memorandum,
made a strong plea for the coordination of training
requests through one focal point, particularly where Navy assistance
was needed, to avoid duplications of requests and over-commitments.
4. The Search for a Maritime Training Base
These events and situations, as they developed in the latter
part of 1951, plus the expanding estimates of the number of students
to be trained, led to serious consideration of the acquisition of
a site where maritime training, tailored to the needs of the Agency,
could be conducted effectively and securely. This move was almost
inevitable as a precedent had been set. The Training Division,
faced with a similar problem in the staging of paramilitary train-
ing, had selected a site for this activity in May 1951
and begun construction in the following October. This site, however,
was not considered suitable for maritime training; it lacked, for ex-
ample, surf conditions and suitable beaches.
The identification of a suitable site proved to be difficult.
An undated study of the problem, compiled at about this time, listed
the requirements which a suitable site had to meet, and discussed
possible locations.
Northeastern United States was considered basically unsuitable
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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by this study because of climatic and hydrographic conditions.
The Chesapeake Bay area offered no location which even came
close to meeting the needs. Several bases in Virginia and
North Carolina were seriously considered, but again the physical
conditions were not right. Jacksonville, Fort Pierce, and Key
West, as well as the west coast of Florida,were all considered,
but ruled out not only for physical reasons but also because of
the overcrowded beaches and towns.
The 'Bahamas were rejected because the fact that they were
British territory would mean international negotiations and in-
creased security hazards. Cover and logistics would also pre-
sent severe problems. The Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay did not
have sufficient space, and the weather was too good to be con-
sidered favorable. The rest of the Caribbean--Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and Vieques were considered but rejected because
of the difficult logistic problem, poor security conditions, un-
favorable weather and hydrographic features, as well as the
problems relating to local labor.
The Gulf of Mexico was not seriously considered because of
known undesirable features. The coast of California was scrutiirt---4
(b)(1)
closely, but suitable places were too built up and too heavily (b)(3)
populated. The one place that came closest to meeting all the re-
quirements was
Not only did
have the right conditions; the owner
was known to be willing to make the land available at reasonable
cost, and already existing structures and utilities would reduce
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the cost of necessary construction. Furthermore, it would appear
that activation of a base would materially improve the local
economic situation and promote a favorable reaction from the
local populace.
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CHAPTER II. Project
1. First Interest in
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The Office of Training then proceeded to take the steps
necessary for acquiring this site as a training area. It first
ascertained that a requirement for training actually existed.
On 19 February 1952, the Acting Assistant Director for Special
Operations reported that OSO expected to have
1953 an
students in
in 1954. On 18 February 1952, the Acting Assistant
Director for Policy Coordination reported an expectation of
students in 19531 an
staff employees).*
The case for acquiring a specialized site was strengthened
by a requirement of the Technical Services Staff (TSS). Its
Research and Development Division wanted a site it could use in
connection with the development of special equipment and operational
techniques.
in 1954 (this included both agents
and
visited St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands in early
March 1952 to acquaint himself with the UDT equipment being used
by the Atlantic Fleet and to survey that island as a possible site
*These forecasts were to change many times in the next two years--
generally downward. The papers relating to numbers of students to
be trained are confused and inconsistent. Two years after the
above estimates were made the Clandestine Services Training Committee
(on 4 February 1954) had] tiorospective" students available for
maritime training before 1 June 1954.
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for maritime training. It was judged undesirable because the
weather did not present a variety of conditions and adequate
security could not be established.
2. Chronology ,of the Acquisition of (b)(1)
(b)(3)
On 21 March 1952, the proposal for a maritime training base
was presented to the Project Review Committee. According to the
report to the DCI dated. 24 March 1952, the Committee raised three
questions during the presentation:
a. What is the over-all need for special maritime
training? The Committee recognized that clandestine mari-
time operations play an important role in supporting certain
activities, and concluded that the line divisions of OSO and
OPC had submitted realistic requirements.
b. Are trainees available? The Committee determined
that a sufficient number of headquarters employees and re-
turnees would be available to justify the establishment of
the planned training area.
C.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
In light of these considerations, the Project was approved. It
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would be necessary, of course, to secure appropriate support from
the Navy, which had not yet been approached (the first contact was
on 4 April 1952).
The history of the Project, which was assigned the code name
is best reviewed by drawing the sequence of events from
the weekly reports compiled within the Office of Training.
26 May 1952 - The Deputy Director for Administration
(DDA) has signed the letter to be sent to the Department
of Defense, detailing the support that will be needed from
the Navy Department.
16 June 1952 - The office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
is still studying the statement of support needed by the Agency.
An official reply from CNO will have to wait for a policy de-
cision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the training of
aliens.
23 June 1952 - Rolfe Kingsley (the Deputy Director of Training,
Special) has met at length with officers in the office of the
NO to work out an agreed basis for the Navy to provide cover
and logistics support. The JCS have approved the inclusion of
aliens in the project. A lengthy discussion has led to an
agreement that the project can be established within the
framework of the
4 July 1952 - The CNO has directed the Commandant
to provide cover and support.
14 July 1952 - Messrs. Kingsley,
of
(Chief of the
OTR Support Staff at that time) leave for the West Coast for a
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(D)(1)
(b)(3)
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conference with the Commandant of
21 July 1952 - A memorandum to the Director of Training
(Mr. Baird) from Mr. Kingsley summarizes the accomplish-
ments of meetings in
on 16 and 17 July.
8 August 1952 - A memorandum formalizing the Agency position
and requesting certain actions is transmitted to the CNO.
8 August 1952 -
reports on his participation in a
maritime training project staged by the SR Division in
for some agents (the so-called
feels that the effort was poorly planned, quite confused in
the execution, and carried out under the wrong conditions
with the wrong equipment. He had previously written (on
26 June 1952) a lengthy and detailed account of a running
battle with SR Division over this training and his participa-
tion in it, where the confusion over Who was responsible for
what was so great that the Chief of the SR Division finally
decided it should do the training without
is convinced as a result of this experience that training of
this kind must be done under Maritime Training Branch control,
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and in an MTB area.
14 August 1952 - A meeting is held with CNO and Bureau of
Ordnance (BuOrd) representatives, at which it is agreed
that CNO will designate BuOrd to
support for the Project.
15 August 1952 - A meeting is held with
control the provision of
a repre-
sentative of the owner, to discuss arrangements for the
lease of the property.
27 August 1952 -
5 September 1952 - Further conferences have been held with the
owner regarding the lease, and with the
on procedures.
12 September 1952 - The Office of Training (Special) and BuOrd
have worked out cover arrangements for the architectural
and engineering survey which BuOrd expects to conduct during
the last week of September at
17 September 1952 -
tive Officer-in-Charge of
September 1952 - An undated Project Outline which appears to have
been drafted in September 1952 describes the Objective of
to be
enters on duty as prospec-
"to provide a program for training and development
in the clandestine maritime field so that CIA will
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(31
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
T
tam
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have the capability for effective prosecution
of clandestine maritime executive and support
operations. This objective is in direct
furtherance of the mission of the Office of
Clandestine Services (sic) and the related
responsibility of the Office of Training and
the Technical Services Staff."
This paper estimates the cost
for FY1953 at
(b)(3)
and for FY1954 at
(b)(3)
It calls for a staff of
including
civilian
instructors
(b)(3)
and military instructors.
1 October 1952
-
(b)(3)
enters on duty as prospective
chief instructor.
3 October 1952 - The table
of organization is approved in part.
Approval of remainder is withheld, pending final approval
of the project.
20 October 1952 - A one-week Maritime Orientation Seminar begins
for
individuals from NE Division and
from Air- (b)(3)
Maritime Division (AND).
31 October 1952 - An architectural and engineering survey of
was conducted during the period 13-22 October by
Navy Public Works officers accompanied by the following
Agency representatives
and
of 0Th, accompanied by
Mr. Chandler, the Chief of Real Estate and Construction.
Their cost and time estimates for the rehabilitation of the
base have been submitted.. The Air-Maritime Division is
making a re-study of the requirements of the operating
divisions of the Clandestine Services. The Secretary of
the Navy has approved the establishment of the Navy activity
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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at the site as requested.
4 November 1952 - Efforts to obtain data from PD on require-
ments are reported "unfruitful." The Project is to be sub-
mitted to the Director for a final decision on 26 November,
inasmuch as the owner of the site has requested a decision
by 1 December 1952.
20 November 1952 - A group of PP, PM, and Fl officers meet to
determine the extent of a requirement for Some (b)(1)
(b)(3)
0Th officers attend as observers.
21 November 1952 - On this date Mr. Walter Reid Wolf, the Deputy
Director for Administration, addresses a memorandum to the
Director of Training requesting that no further expenditures
be made in connection with the acquisition of the
site without his approval. As a result of the survey party's
findings in October 1952, he is convinced that a complete
restudy would be advisable, in view of the difficulties re-
garding staff housing in the area and other problems surfaced
by the survey.
21 November 1952 - The Director of Training airs his frustration
in his weekly report to the Director:
"The Office of Training feels that it has done
about all it can in attempting to meet CIA
requirement S for a Maritime training site. At
the request of authorized operating office
officials, and based upon firm requirements for
maritime training, OTR has spent nearly two years
in locating and negotiating for a suitable training
site and developing courses of training, in recruit-
ing a specialist corps of instructors, and in con-
ferences with Navy Officials from the CNO down. The
PRC approved the project in March 1952.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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The DCI authorized further exploration and
negotiation.*
We have received complete Navy approval and
cooperation. We have the site; we have detailed
cost figures on construction, equipment and opera-
tion. But as of 20 November 1952, there still seems
to be no clear cut basic policy decision on:
(1) Whether CIA is to engage in Maritime
operations;
(2) Whether CIA will train personnel to
man such operations;
(3) Whether CIA will establish and maintain
a maritime training school.
OTR cannot make these decisions."
26 November 1952 - Navy officers in the Maritime Training
Branch ask to be released for return to the Navy. Request
granted.
9 December 1952 - On this date, the DDCI meets with the DDP:
the DDA: the Chief of PM, the Director of Training, and
members of their staffs. There is no disagreement as to the
need for a maritime training school in CIA. The site already
selected is confirmed, and in view of the urgent need to get
the lease negotiated as soon as possible, the DDCI directs
that this be done. Procurement of personnel is to be
recolamenced. Lists of costs and equipment are to be re-
viewed by the DD/A in preparation for submitting the
*Other memoranda make clear that the DCI not only authorized this,
but ordered it. The cost estimates in the original ma proposal
were rough figures only; for lack of suitable cover, 0TH officers
had not been able to look at the site in detail, but had to rely
on a general statement from the owner as to charges and length of
occupancy. The DCI had therefore made his approval contingent upon
the answers to two questions: (1) the extent to which the Navy will
support the project; (2) how much money is actually required, based
on estimates obtained by an on-the-spot survey.
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project to the DCI. The DD/A raises several questions:
Is there a better site somewhere else? Can this activity
be located at
Will the use of
present
a critical housing problem to the staff and dependents?
The Director of Training states that
does not
provide the required water conditions, and that extensive
surveys have not found any better location than
12 December 1952 - A lengthy meeting is held on this date by
members of the Office of Training and of the Office of
Procurement and Supply. The Chief of Procurement and
Supply (James Garrison) says that he has been given this
project and told to proceed with the leasing of the
property, so he wants to hear what it is all about. Mr.
Kingsley reviews the entire history of the efforts to
date.
He also says that there are a number
of sticky problems coming up in connection with proposed
construction.
7 January 1953 - A memorandum of this date from DTR to DCII
concurred in by the Chief of Administration for DIVpand
by the DD/A, requests approval to go ahead with
at an estimated cost of
for FY53 and
for FY54, subject to review of all construction contracts
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and other major expenditures by the WA. Implementation
of Project
is approved by the DC1 (Gen. Smith) on
7 January 1953. Navy is informed that CIA expects to be
ready to accept previously selected Navy personnel as
they become available. The first increment is due to
report about 1 February.
16 January 1953 - A memorandum for the record of this date,
signed by of the Office of the General Counsel,
describes the lease which has been signed on 8 (or 9?)
January. It was negotiated in
by the Chief of
Procurement and Supply with officials of
It now needs the signature of
a representative of the Navy Department, but first it must
receive the routine approval of the Armed Services commit-
tesof Congress. The lease begins on 1 March 1953 and is
renewable from year to year at the option of the govern-
ment. The annual rental will be
16 January 1953 - A meeting is held in the Office of the Chief
of Procurement and Supply (Mr. Garrison) before a proposed
trip to to study costs at the site. It is agreed
best to go ahead with a minimum amount of construction to
get the job under way, with expansion taking place later if
necessary. Housing is being planned for
answer to
people. In
question about housing for
families, Mr. Garrison states that no survey of this has
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been made.
19 January 1953 - DTR initiates requests for the canannica-
tions and medical personnel deemed necessary for
Logistics and security officers are also being sought for
the project.
23 January 1953 - The Navy Department is making plans to
handle
the public relations aspect of this project when the lease
is approved by the Congressional Committees.
31 January 1953 - Mr. Baird, Colonel White and Mr.
have returned from
Garrison
where they spent two days ex-
amining the site. On-the-spot agreement was reached on
construction problems affecting housing and messing; it
appears that the original Navy estimates can be considerably
reduced. The Haase Armed Services Committee is expected
to approve the lease shortly; the Senate Committee is
yet ready to consider it.
6 February 1953 - A TDY of about four months in the
area is being arranged for
not
to give him first-
hand experience in current clandestine maritime operations.
Only one instructor assigned to Maritime Training has EEL
clandestine operational experience, and his experience is
not recent.
9 February 1953 - On this date, Senator Saltonstall notifies
the Secretary of Defense that the Senate Armed Services
Committee is withholding its approval of certain real estate
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transactions until the new administration has indicated
that it considers them essential.
10 February 1953 - The Navy has been advised that the Agency
does not want nominations of regular Navy officers to fill
24
the vacant job of Commandant,
and to provide a
replacement for the Chief of Maritime Training
will
have served three years by July 1953). Action is being
taken instead to find qualified persons within CIA.
February 1953 - Logistics problems are forecast at
The existing pier is not suitable for loading or unloading
supplies. The project does not yet have an assigned supply
officer.
February 1953 - Word has been received that the House Armed
Services Committee has approved the lease.
February 1953 - The Navy disapproves the request that Lt.
USNR, be recalled to active duty
for assignment to
3 March 1953 - On this day, Mr. Dudley of the Bureau of Yards
and Docks and Captain Nixon of the Bureau of Ordnance, meet
with Congressman King of California, at the request of the
House Armed Services Committee. Mr. King needs an explanation
of the nature and necessity for the BuOrd tastallation� because
he has been receiving mail from his constituents that requires
an answer. Mr. King shows no interest in the classified as-
pects of the project, and does not intend to oppose it. He
has been considering holding public hearings, however.
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WV
4 March 1953 - The Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Armed Services sends a letter to the Chief of the Bureau
of Yards and Docks telling him that the Subcommittee on
Real Estate and Military Construction has approved the
Project, notwithstanding some reservations as to the
maintenance of adequate security. "The Subcommittee
accepted the assurance of Navy Department representatives
that adequate security can be provided under the contem-
plated arrangement, but it is desired that you be fully
advised of the SUbcommitteets concern over the project."
This communication has been signed by Senator Saltonstall.
5 March 1953 - The Navy Department signs the lease.
The Termination of Interest in
The men in the Office of Training who had worked so long
to acquire a training site may well have thought for a brief moment
that their troubles were over. Not so:*
At the same time that the lease was signed, the Navy Depart-
ment made a public announcement to the effect that a Naval in-
stallation was to be activated in one specified part of
for experimental ordnance work of a classified nature, with
some restrictions to be imposed on contiguous waters. The following
day (6 March) the Under Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas,
informed Colonel White that the press announcement had caused a
*The story of the following hectic days can be pieced together
from the DTR's weekly reports to the Director and from a memorandum
for the record by Colonel White, dated 10 March 1953.
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violent reaction from Congressmen and individuals on the West
Coast. He said that he did not like to yield to pressure,
and if it was absolutely essential for this project to be
initiated, the Navy would do so. But it could hurt the Navy
badly on the West Coast, and he requested that the Agency posi-
tion be re-examined and that there be absolute certainty that
no other location would be suitable. Colonel White agreed to
this re-examination.
The same day, an officer from the Navy Office of Information
came to Mr. Dullest office with a proposed press release, saying
that Mr. Thomas felt that he must issue another press release
without delay, inasmuch as there had been such a violent reaction
from fishermen and yachtsmen who would have no place to anchor in
that area. Colonel White then worked out a press release with the
press officer. This announcement appeared the next day, 7 March,
saying in effect that no further development of the property at
that location would be undertaken pending a re-examination for
absolute necessity.
On 9 March, Mr. Baird and met with the Secre-
tary of the Navy, Mr. Anderson, and with the Under Secretary,
Mr. Thomas. Mx. Anderson strongly urged that the Agency not
proceed with the project. He said that he would appoint an officer
immediately to assist the Agency in every possible way to find a-
nother site and to develop it. Mr. Anderson also said that if the
Navy vent ahead with the present project, it would be forced to
hold public hearings in at least five towns, including Los Angeles.
VIP
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kig
UN
This might even lead to a full-scale Congressional investigation.
The public reaction had been unprecedented, and even if all Obstacles
could be overcome, the hostile attitude of the local citizens would
make successful operation of the project extremely difficult. As
an interesting footnote to this situation, it should be mentioned
that, during the meeting, Secretary Anderson indicated that neither
his office nor that of the Chief of Naval Operations had any prior
knowledge of this project!
project. After talking to
Colonel White to convey the news that
were not inclined to accept this turn of events and in fact had
prepared a rather strong press release of their own which they
At the conclusion of this meeting, Mr. Baird called
to let know about these
developments and express the Agency's willingness to make any reason-
able settlement, since it would now be unwise to proceed with the
Mr. Baird then called
proposed to issue the
gp his turn at trying to
later reported that
1111
Ivo
next day. Under Secretary Thomas then took
explain the situation to
was extremely disappointed and had
completely failed to understand the Navy's position. He seemed to
feel that it was the Navy and not CIA which had caused this un-
pleasant and undesirable turn of events.
The records show that numerous other telephone calls were
flying back and forth on this particular day. Among others, Mr.
Thomas advised Colonel White that the White House was putting on
pressure to get the matter settled. He therefore requested
29
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
)
(b)(3)
Mr. Baird (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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permission to issue a statement that the project would be
located elsewhere. This was agreed to. And the final call
of the day was one to Mr. Frank Wisner from who (b)(1)
(b)(3)
indicated that he believed that the public would resent the
yachtsmen and fishermen who were putting pressure on the Navy
to cancel the lease. He hoped that the Navy's press announce-
ment of the cancellation of the project could be delayed for
several days.
Colonel White summarized the sitnpltion for the DCI in a -
memorandum of this same day, 9 March. He pointed out that it
would be unwise to proceed without the willing support of the
Navy, and that insistence on holding to the original agreement
might seriously jeopardize the Agency's over-all relations with
the Navy. But any further delay in this project (18 months
having already gone by) would cause not only a serious curtail-
ment of planned operations but would also create a morale problem
to the Naval personnel on duty with the Agency and working on this
project.
The Navy press release of 10 March 1953 said that the Navy
would not use and that "the
ordnance project previously planned there will be transferred to
another site."
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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CHAPTER III. Project
1. The Search for Another Training Site
The following day, 11 March 1953, Navy and Agency
representatives (from Training and Logistics) met to dis-
cuss alternate sites. Only one location appeared to be
reasonably suitable.
Plans were made for a party to survey the area
about 19 March.
was surveyed 23-26 March by the
following team: Capt. E. E. Saunders from the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations,
from Maritime Training Branch of 0Th, and
from the Coordination and Requirements Staff of the Office
of Logistics. This group's attention was also given to
This group
and
specifically recommended the acquisition of
for
By mid-April 1953, the decision was made in OTR to locate
*As of 17 March, the basic requirements for a maritime
training site had been given not only to the Navy, but to
the Army and the Air Force as well, and all three services
were presumably trying to identify a suitable base from
among those under their control.
31
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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the maritime training in
and the DCI's approval
was asked by the DTR in a memorandum dated 13 April 1953.
Col. White (the Assistant DD/A) replied to this on 17 April,
stating that the Director had approved in principle, but
would withhold final approval until after the proposal had
been fully staffed out to show feasibility, costs and other
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
data, in comparison with the costs of
This
memorandum (b)(1)
(b)(3)
directed the Office of Logistics to develop detailed cost
estimates in conjunction with the Office of Training.
The next two months were occupied with the assembly
of
cost figures and with the making of a choice between
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
and
The Office of Logistics favored the latter, (b)(1)
(basing
this view on
the survey made in March), but OTR wanted
(b)(3)
the former. The Acting Chief of Logistics, in a memorandum of
5 May 1953 to
the Director of Training,
specifically recommended
the choice of
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The DTR's
reply on 8 May presented numerous arguments for
Contrary to the opinion of the
Office of Logistics, (b)(1)
he said, there
should be no difficulty in
f(L60)
(b)(3)
The DTR did not believe that the
additional costs of using
would be as great as the (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Office of Logistics had implied.
Furthermore,
the OTR experience
with conducting training at
had been a convincing
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
demonstration of the undesirability of operating a CIA facility
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within a military installation, and the proposed arrangement
at
at
would be even less favorable than the one
In conclusion, the DTR urged that
be confirmed as the location of the project, and that the
implementation proceed as quickly as possible.
At this same time, OTR was also evidently having a little
difficulty with the Clandestine Services over the site selection,
as evidenced by a memorandum written by DTR to the DD/P,
Wisner, on 29 April 1953. The DR expressed surprise to hear
that
informed and
the DD/P was unaware of recent developments on Project
inasmuch as both the DCI and the DD/A were fully
(DD/P Administrative Officer) had
attended meetings on this subject. The DTR described the
negotiations being conducted with the Navy to acquire the site
as approved by the DCI, and pointed out that the acquisition of
the site as well as the subsequent modification and construction
were the specific responsibility of the Office of Logistics,
with which the Office of Training was in daily communication.
He said that the training requirements which had been firmed up
by
(the Chairman of the Clandestine Services Training
Committee) had been given to the Office of Logistics.
The DTR also said in this memorandum that
recently made a presentation urging that a site
had
be considered for maritime training: but that this had
been rejected as being less suitable for staff officer training
(b)(1)
(b)(3)1)
(b)(1 )3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(2(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Training on 18 May 1953 by
employee of CIA with a Navy
just in time to take on the
in
recall his right-hand man,
than
Several days later,
had suggested a site in
which was being used at the time for other purposes.
This suggestion had been rejected because it was deemed un-
suitable from the hydrographic viewpoint. The DTR ended his
letter by apologizing for not having kept the DD/P informed
and said in conclusion:
"May I take this opportunity of suggesting that I
would be glad formally to inform your Office of
all training developments, and in turn hope that
you will inform me of any training requirements
from the offices under your jurisdiction."
The Development of
was officially replaced as Chief of Maritime
a civilian
background, who reported to 0TH
problem of establishing
About the same time, the Navy agreed to
to active duty
with the rank of Commander, effective 1 July 1953. He was to
be the Commanding Officer as well as the Senior Instructor at
final approval.
an inspection party
as soon as the project received
During the week of 18-22 May 1953,
which included Messrs.
Officer) from 0TH, and
and
(Security
from the Real Estate
Division of the Office of Logistics, met with Navy representatives
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the estimate for
would be about the same for
Of the three sites)
they
(b)(1)
in where
examined and
(b)(3)
to obtain an
estimate of the cost of setting up a
(b)(1)
maritime training
base. Their findings were reported
to the
(b)(3)
DD/A on 8 June.
The cost
of establishing a base at
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
was estimated at
which was about half of what the
(b)(3)
base would have cost initially) but
The cost,
and for
more than
after establishment)
was felt to be clearly
(b)(1aj))(3)
(b)(3)
)
(b)(3)
ku)k )
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(h)C11
superior for training purposes. was
unacceptable
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
for security reasons; only classroom work could be
done there.
The inspecting party felt that could also
be used
(b)(1)
for Agency activities other than maritime
training)
and in
(b)(3)
their opinion) the area was superior to
for training
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
purposes. On the basis of cost, suitability
for training pur-
poses) and security, was recommended
by the inspecting
(b)(1)
party. It offered beaches and other geographic
features, a pier,
(b)(3)
dependent housing) and buildings suitable for instruction, admin-
istration, and recreation.
At this point in time) events speeded up, as indicated by
the weekly reports and various memoranda.
15 June 1953 - DTR submits a staff study to the DCI recom-
mending the establishment of the base at with
an estimated initial cost of
35
based on the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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instruction o
holding area for
staff personnel twice a year and a
indigenous agents. The base would
furnish facilities for three purposes: (1) to train
staff and indigenous personnel in clandestine maritime
in-exfiltration and sabotage; (2) to test and develop
specialized equipment and doctrine; (3) to conduct dry
runs of projected maritime operations.
18 June 1953 - The Clandestine Services Training Committee
presents a substantially reduced estimate of the number
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
of students to be trained in Fiscal Year 1954. The
expectation is now for staff employees and gents. (b)(3)
23 June 1923 - TSS reaffirms to OTR its urgent need for a
facility where it can test maritime devices.
24 June 1953 - The DTR, in a memorandum to the Assistant DD/A,
presents a revised cost estimate of
for
in view of the latest, but drastically lowered, require-
ments for training.
26 June 1953 - General Balmer, Chief of the Planning and
Program Coordination Staff, informs DTR that the Project
Review Committee has given tentative approval to the
revised project, and that he is personally convinced that
is justified.
5 July 1953 -
24 July 1953 - Project
36
departs PCS for
is approved by the DCI.
(b)(1 )))(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(D)(] D)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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9 August 1953 - Messrs. Baird and
accompanied by
two members of the DD/A's staff� leave for a week's visit
at
28 August 1953 - men have now left for
11 September 1953 -
is leaving soon for
PCS.
to confer with local Army and Navy authorities. The
Commandant of
and the local
Commanding General have been informed of the establish-
ment of
and that the Army is to grant a use
permit for this site.
17 September 1953
30 September 1953 - Support of the Project is encountering
problems because of existing federal legislation.
Civilians are required to pay for the shipment of their
privately owned automobiles, and for the storage of
household effects in the U. S. The feasibility of
integrating civilian employees into the Navy is under
discussion.
5 October 1953 - The Assistant Secretary of the Navy has
approved the additional Navy and Marine positions
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requested for
strength up to
5 October 1953 -
bringing the authorized military
officers and
enlisted men.
meets with members of the
principal staffs of the Clandestine Services to review
the proposed training program and insure its responsive-
ness to training requirements.
3. The Termination of Interest in
As in the case of the attempt to set up the project at
the fatal blow to the plans came just as it must
have seemed that the desired end was about to be reached.
The Director of Training, Matthew Baird, had left Washington
on 11 September 1953 for a visit (his first) to
other training installations
and
accompanied by
Chief of the Resistance Training Branch
of OTR) and (Training Officer of the Fl Staff of
DD/P). After his return on 5 October; he discussed the use of
with Gen. Cabell, the DDCI.
On 8 October the DDCI suggested to
re-examination of maritime requirements
establishments on
possible abandonment of
maritime training in
and
the DD/P an immediate
and the physical
with a view to the
and the concentration of
Mr. Wisner, the DD/P; in
seems to have been suggested first by
April 1953. See abovelpage 33.
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arklit
reporting this to his Chief of Operations, Mr. Helms, on
12 October, recalled that
was recommended to the
DCI "before the recent developments of drastically lowered
personnel and financial ceilings." Because of these sharp
reductions, Mr. Wisner felt that would
be found unduly expensive and that it would not be used to
the extent originally contemplated. He said that this was
also the view of the Director of Training.
At the request of the Director of Training, the
Clandestine Services Training Committee went to all the
Staffs and Divisions to get their views on the choice of
a base for maritime training. The results were reported to
the Chief of Operations, DD/P1 by the Committee Chairman on
14 October. It was the Committee's understanding that the
proposal to use
fact that
for this training stemmed from the
was not being fully utilized at this time.
According to the Committee report, the FE Division
felt that
provided not only a "convenient" (sic)
location, but also excellent climatic and hydrographic
conditions. As for the other Divisions of DD/P, their
requirements for maritime training as presented in June 1953
had been wiped out by the recent reductions in available
money and personnel, as well as by the more relaxed inter-
national situation. The Staff Chiefs were against moving
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I
the program to
because of security problems, the
limited facilities, and the high cost in time and money.
The CS Training Committee therefore came to the conclusion
that
was the best place for the program, taking
into consideration the need for a place for research and
development and for the acquisition of training experience
in this field by OTR.
The Committee's findings were of no avail. On the
same day, 14 October 1953,
Richard Helms,
epresenting DD/P,
a long meeting was held, with
and
conclusions were reached:
Desmond Fitzgerald, and
and Matthew Baird,
from 0Th. The following
in view of the recent ceilings
and the reduced threat of war, there are not sufficient
requirements for maritime training outside the FE area to
justify setting up an Agency-wide maritime training facility;
FE Division requirements can be met
the Office of
Training will have no further responsibility for maritime
training other than that Which can be offered in Washington
and at The following day, 15 October 1953, the
and to study the
DDCI directed Mr. Baird to cancel
feasibility of offering limited maritime training in
Washington, at
maritime training at
with the addition of advanced
when needed.
4o
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A few days later 14r4 Baird took off for
Where he had the unenviable job of breaking the
cancellation of the project to the Commandant
and to the
men and
news of the
wives who were
already at work at the site. He reported on his return
that, although the disappointment was generally severe,
several of the Navy enlisted men said that they had gone so
far already with the program that they would like to continue
in it in whatever way they could serve. By 19 December 1953,
was able to report that he had successfully -(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
terminated all activities at the
site, with re- (b)(1)
(b)(3)
maining personnel released and with all supplies and equip-
ment enroute to Headquarters.
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CHAPiER IV. The Development of Alternatives:
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Maritime Training Branch loat no time in
adjusting to the new situation. On 16 October 1953, the
Branch Chief,
forwarded to the DTR a propo- (b)(3)
sal for a new curriculum to replace that which had been
planned for
His
plan called for a four-week
(b)(1)
course which could be given
by four instructors, with
(b)(3)
classroom work
problems at
in Washington,
followed by exercises and
Field instruction in underwater
(b)(1)
swimming and
maritime sabotage
would not be attempted.
(b)(3)
0Th should continue to develop maritime doctrine along
with training materials.
By the end of November
1953, arrangements had been
made for the release of
most of the personnel.
(b)(1)
The Maritime Training Branch
had been slimmed down to
(b)(3)
During this same period, October-November 1953, Mr.
Baird was deeply involved in the planning of maritime
training at
Many conferences and memoranda were
necessary to reach a consensus regarding the responsi-
bilities and relationships of all the interested parties ---
The DDCI, the Director of Training, the DD/P, the Chief of
(b)(3))(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Division
FE Division, the Chief of TSS, the Chief of
and the Chief of the Training Base. The
result of this work was a DDCI memorandum of 17 November
spelling out
1953 to the Chief of
the relationships and announcing that maritime training
was to be conducted at
Following this announcement, was promptly
sent to
for several weeks to survey the maritime
training facilities and the instruction being given at that
location. His findings were reported to the DTR on
9 December 1953. He found that a maritime training section
as such did not exist. Two instructors taught a course
entitled "Beach Reconnaisance" when there were students who
needed this particular subject. He felt that conditions on
permitted training in small boat handling through
surf, underwater sabotage, underwater swimming, seamanship,
navigation and the like. He concluded that maritime training
could be given on
but it would be limited for a number
of reasons, and he suggested that basic instruction be given
in Washington and using as an area for
advanced training.
discussed his findings with the Chief, FE
on 16 December 1953.
and the Chief,
His report of 29 December on this conference indicates that
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the Chief, FE agreed that maritime training should be
conducted at
saying that there were
staff employees at various field posts who should have
this training and whom he would arrange to send to
as soon as a course was ready for then. He did not know
if there would be any other requirement. He thought that
maritime equipment needed for
stored in
operations should be
His students could be trained in the use
of this equipment and then request that it be shipped to
their posts as needed. He asked the Chief,
to find
out how many other trainees the Division could make avail-
able for this training. On the basis of this conference,
recommended to the DTR that the Maritime
Training Branch be directed to prepare a course for presen-
tation at
by the end of May 1954. He proposed that
it be five weeks in length', have a maximum of
tudents,
and emphasize in-exfiltration and maritime sabotage.
As a result, a, "Field Maritime Operations Course" was
prepared and actually conducted at
to 6 August 1954, by
and
from 6 July 1954
with the assistance of base personnel. It was intended
primarily for field case officers, but as late as the middle
of June, only
had been nominated, with an additional
rom Headquarters. Because of the obvious lack of
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requirement, as well as the unsuitability of
for
this type of training, the course was never given again
for Americans at that location.
During the first three months of 1954, the Maritime
Training Branch was busily engaged in writing training
materials for the
course, and otherwise preparing
for "Maritime Operations Course #1," which began in
Washington on 5 April with
and
students. In addition,
spent some time assisting TSS
in a testing program, while instructors and took
the Air Operations Course and
in a CB Course.
The second Maritime Operations Course began on 1 June
1954 witl tudents, a number of whom were from the per-
manent staff of
helped instruct
At the end of this running, it
was decided that the third presentation (scheduled for 27
September) would be conducted entirely at
rather
than trying to do half of the course in Washington. This
course then became the prototype of all maritime training
at
The meager demand for the Operations Courses and the
,ourse was a confirmation of long-standing 0TH con-
cern over requirements. The DTR had addressed a lengthy
memorandum to the DDCI on 7 December 1953 (just at the time
was surveying the potential of
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subject of "Maritime Training." He noted certain expensive
failures that had taken place in maritime operations because
they had been run by inexperienced individuals who had had
no training in this field. And he pointed out that the
entire 0TH training effort in the maritime field in the
previous two years had consisted of a classroom orientation
provided to
staff employees and
foreign nationals.
He called attention to the apparent inability of the Clandes-
tine Services to project accurate training requirements or to
release their people to meet these requirements.
Before 0Th could proceed with a maritime training program,
said Mr. Baird, it needed answers to certain fundamental
questions:
a. the extent to which the Agency is engaged in
clandestine maritime operations, and the extent to which
it will be engaged in the future;
b. how many individuals in each of the foreign
divisions are presently qualified to undertake the task
of planning, directing, or participating in clandestine
maritime operations;
c. does this pool of trained maritime operators
constitute the entire Agency requirement for such
personnel?
The DTR came to the conclusion in this paper that "it may be
assumed" that the Agency would be engaged in maritime operations
and would need personnel trained in that field. The memorandum
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ended with the recommendations that the DD/P be requested
to provide OTR with a statement of the number of employees
to be trained for maritime operations, and that the DD/P
establish a procedure to make sure that these people would
get the needed training.
General Cabell promptly sent Mr. Baird's memorandum to
the DD/P with a request for recommendations for Agency action.
He stated that Mr. Baird's assumption about the Agency's en-
gaging in maritime operations was correct, in his opinion,
and he specifically requested that the DTR be provided with
an estimate of requirements for training. The DD/P responded
on 30 January 1954 by saying that the Chief of the Paramilitary
Operations Staff had been asked to prepare a comprehensive
analysis of the maritime operational situation by I May 1954,
with this survey providing the base for specific and meaning-
ful requirements. The extant files do not indicate that 0Th
received much significant information as a result of this
effort.
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CHAPTER V. The Human Side
In reconstructing the history of this period: it is
easier to find plans, costs, requirements and estimates in
the files than to learn much about the people involved --
their frustrations, their contributions: their conflicts.
But the attitudes and reactions of the people working on
were an inportant part of that Project: and this
human side was set forth in a number of documents.
The understandably low state of morale in March 1952
OW
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
OW
is reflected in two papers dated
14 March. On this date
to operations (later ex-
(b)(3)
requested a transfer
plained as based on professional
considerations, not
OW
personal dissatisfaction).
endorsed this re-
(b)(3)
quest favorably, saying that
(b)(3)
talents were being
misused: and the expectation that they would ever be used was
remote. He added darkly, "The recent default of certain
officials with regard to their responsibilities in the mari-
time field further accentuates this conclusion."
also requested on the same date his own
reassignment in the Agency or else a return to the Navy.
Addressing his memorandum to the DCI: with a copy to the
Bureau of Naval Personnel, he stated that "responsible
officials have been unable to reach a decision" about establish-
ing an adequate program, and that he had not been properly
(b)(3)
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employed. He did not see how any progress in the develop-
ment of this training could be expected in the foreseeable
future.
noted on one of these papers, "In the
light of the whole situation, I believe that the Maritime
Training Branch should be transferred to the Air-Maritime
Division (of DDP)."
did
and
again requested release
Agency field operations, citing
progress of the
But the Branch remained in 0Th and so
On 23 May 1952,
either to the Navy or to
his dissatisfaction with the
project, and pointing out that he, a
specialist in under-water operations, was doing nothing but
planning and administrative work.
By some means or other, both men were persuaded to stay
until the summer of 1953. But a greater personnel crisis
developed in November 1952 than any that had gone before. On
26 NoveMber (the day the Director had been expected to make a
final decision about
and just after Mr. Wolf had
called for a complete re-study),
the Acting
Chief of MB, wrote a memorandum to the DTR, recommending that
nm embers of the Branch be returned to the Navy or to other
parts of the Agency, that all personnel being processed for the
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Branch be cancelled,
and that the remainder
(b)(3)
be the only ones retained.
He stated that
he had prepared
this
memorandum after consultation with
The reason he gave was the lack of adequate support
(b)(3)
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within the Agency for an effective maritime training program.
On the same day, 26 November,
submitted a (b)(3)
separate memorandum requesting release on the grounds that
neither his time nor his abilities had been used effectively
since he first reported in August 1951, and that "It has been
repeatedly demonstrated that there is no recognized require-
ment for maritime training in general, to say nothing of a
specific requirement for instructors" with highly specialized
skills.
also wrote a personal memorandum on the
same day, in which he stated that he had been thoroughly
disillusioned after three months in the Agency, citing as
factors such bureaucratic problems as: unclear missions, de-
lays in obtaining decisions, lack of long-range planning, and
paralysis of operations by administrative procedures. This
memorandum probably reflected accurately the reaction of
regular Navy officers to the Agency's way of doing business at
that time. It is Obvious that on this particular day, emotions
were at a dangerous point, and 0Th officials did not lose any
time in dealing with the situation.
and
at least ther officers were given written releases the
same dm, November 26.
summed up his views two months later in
a memorandum of 21 January 1953, written to the Director of
Training. In this letter, he pointed out that he had been
ordered to duty with CIA in July 1950 at CIA's request, in
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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spite of his objections for professional and personal reasons.
But once assigned, he had attempted to perform his duties to
the best of his ability. He had wanted to terminate the re-
lationship on several occasions, but each time felt obliged
to subordinate his own desires to the best interests of the
government. He did not concur with a recent suggestion that
his services could now be dispensed with, feeling that to
leave before his mission was accomplished might alienate the
Navy's support of the program. Allegations had been made that
his way of carrying out this program was not compatible with
the organization and functioning of CIA; while these allega-
tions were not without foundation, he did not consider himself
completely inflexible in his methods if the achievement of
results required some modification of his ways.
cited the "frequent shuffling" of Armed
Services personnel into and out of the Agency as having caused
him great difficulty. He stated that of the
officers of
various ranks, both regular and reserve, from three separate
services who were assigned to his own office,
requested
release and return to the parent service within a short tine
after reporting. He claimed that he personally dissuaded
others from leaving.
did not specify the reason
for their leaving, but he evidently felt that the Agency was
dissipating its funa of good will in the military establishment;
them is an implication that the men who left could not tolerate
the Agency's way of handling the Project. In conclusion, he
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questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for
this and comparable programs.
On 2 February 1953, the Military Personnel Division was
advised by orR that it was willing to release
to the Navy for reassignment in June or July 1953.* His
year tour
ruary�
fitness
was due to end on 4 August. Before the
three-
end of Feb-
received orders detaching him in June 1953. The
report written on him by Matthew Baird on 16 April
1953 gave him highest marks, stressing his courage, leadership,
loyalty and tenacity, and saying that
had completed an
important project "under conditions of stress and frustration
which would have broken the spirit of a lesser officer." He
had worked under four Chiefs of Training --
Mr. Kingsley, and Mr. Baird -- at a
the Office of Training as well as the rest of the
time when
Agency was
going through a series of rapid organizational changes.
Soon after
left, 0Th also lost
who had been with Maritime Training since September 1951. He
was released to the Navy Department on 1 July 1953, upon his
return from his TDY in
This willingness to release was exnressed ii the
time when it appeared that the�Lease of
property was practically settled.
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His report to the DTR, dated 25 June 1953, presents a rather
appalling description of the way the maritime operations
which he saw were being conducted; apparently conditions
had not changed much in the two years that had elapsed since
visit in 1951, as he had. described then in
an equally critical report. According to
the
organization for the maritime support of covert operations
presented a "sad picture," and he expressed great
concern over the lack of men trained in maritime activities.
Many of the points he made in his lengthy report were in-
corporated in subsequent training lectures. Just at the
time he returned, the new site of
At about the same time,
was finally selected.
gave some in-
sight on the human side in a memorandum which he wrote to the
Deputy Director of Training (Special) on 12 June 1953, while
waiting for the approval of the use of
to it. On that date there were
Navy men on board) with
civilians and
more civilians and
and move
Navy men
in process. He described all of these men as highly qualified
and highly notivated� having made personal and financial sacri-
fices in the interest of
The Navy men had had more
inconvenience than the others; they had lost their incentive
pay, had trouble about housing, run into security problems,
and suffered by being out of touch with the Navy environment.
Nevertheless, they and the civilians professionally recognized
"the pathetic lack of maritime thinking within the Agency" and
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stood ready to develop a waterborne capability. Their morale
remained high. The setback sustained when
was cancelled was miraculously survived, according to
but he predicted that if this should happen a second
time, the people on board as well as those in process would
all be lost. The high degree of cooperation shown by the
Bureau of Personnel in making requested persons available could
hardly be expected to continue indefinitely. Furthermore, the
assistance rendered by a number of Navy Department bureaus and
offices had been of the highest value to CIA, and as
could not be treated lightly.
These remarks were made a few months before the
was cancelled. The entire history of
an asset
use of
was
characterized by such a high degree of frustration that it is
a tribute to the men concerned with it that they maintained
any morale at all. The tensions and personal problems that
went with much of the Agency work in this period have been
documented and illuminated to an unusual degree in the records
of Project
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CONCLUSION
The problems encountered during the effort to establish
a maritime training program have been related in detail be-
cause they provide an excellent case history to illustrate
what the Office of Training was facing in its formative peri-
od, 1950-1954. Some of these difficulties would not have
occurred in a later and more sophisticated period; they arose
because the Agency and the Training Office did not have either
the people with the needed specific experience or the organi-
zation with established procedures, duties and responsibilities
to cope effectively with the problems. In retrospect, it is
hard to believe that as late as 1952 the Director of Training
and his staff were independently negotiating a lease for
and working out cover arrangements with the
Navy Department with very little guidance or support from
security, logistics, or cover specialists.
But the problem of providing administration and support
for the Project was not as significant a factor as two other
problems which were basic in the case. The first of
these was the question of requirements (which actually con-
sisted of three questions):
a. Was the training needed?
in November 1949 asked operating
officials if there was a requirement for Agency people
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to be trained in maritime activities. Three years
later, in November 1952, Mr. Baird was officially
asking the same question. He asked it again in
November 1953. But during this entire period (1949-
195)-), no authoritative answer to this question was
forthcoming, nor could it be, given the lack of long-
range planning and policy direction which evidently
prevailed at this time. The files of this time sug-
gest that the DDCI, the DD/A, and the DTR were more
concerned with maritime training than the Deputy
Director for Plans, who was not personally aware, for
example, of the steps being taken by these others to
acquire another site after the loss of
The Chiefs of Training had to depend on
staff elements (Staff II, The CS Training Committee,
AMD) to answer the basic question. Using the available
data, 0Th made the assumption that the training was
needed. It then became essential to get the answer to
another question.
b. How many people needed the training?
The number of trainees to be expected was
critical for this Project, but from the beginning it
was impossible to get meaningful figures. The estimates
which were provided changed so frequently that there is
no way now to tell from the records what the basis for
0Th planning was at any particular time. All of the
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Chiefs of Training kept raising the question of
numbers to be trained, and went ahead, using the
estimates provided. But these estimates seem to
have had a flimsy basis. On the day thatIIII
was cancelled (14 October 1953), the CS Training
Committee reported that the area divisions were un-
able to furnish specific requirements or estimate
the number of students to be trained.
c. What did the trainees need to learn?
What skills did they need to acquire? What
would they be called upon to do? Who was to provide
the doctrine? Most of the OSS experience and know-how
seemed to have been lost; it was of doubtful applica-
bility, in any case. OPC offered to prepare training
manuals, but found that it was not able to do so. The
siavyf s approach was not primarily geared to the support
of clandestine operations. In July 1951, 0Th organized
its own "Doctrine Development Staff," but the job of
devising doctrine and preparing manuals still fell to
the individual instructors, who in the case of maritime
operations were unable to find out what operations were
being run or contemplated, with what equipment.
The Earitime Training Branch did its best at
the outset to fill in its own gaps in knowledge and ex-
perience by observing training
Navy schools, and by observing operations
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the operating elements of the Agency were unable to
provide any substantial guidance as to what their people
should be taught.
The second critical problem presented to OTR by was (b)(1)
(b)(3)
the procurement of qualified, instructors. Ideally, an instructor
should have had in his background both operational and teaching
experience. Hopefully, he should have had one or the other. Some
0TH instructors have had neither. For
the Navy and Army
seemed to be the only source of supply of instructors. But this
arrangement left much to be desired, as
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
recognized (b)(3)
in January 1953 (after more than two years in the Project), when
he questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for
the
Project.
After 1952, support problems gradually became manageable, as
Agency routines became established and as specialists in such fields
as logistics and security became more available to 0TH to provide
the assistance needed. The procurement of instructors in the field
of clandestine operations continued to be a basic problem until
1968, when a workable solution seemed to be reached after years of
frustration for 0TH. But the problem of requirements, so well
illustrated by the
history, has never been solved, although
appearing possibly less critical in 1969 than in 1950-54. Through
the years, it has had a direct impact on every part of 0TH.
In retrospect, the history of
and the early days of
maritime training gives an over-all impression of an aggressive
and eager young Office of Training, under the leadership of men
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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with OSS experience, convinced that it should be offering
maritime training for the support of clandestine operations)
pushing a reluctant (or maybe confused) Agency in the direction
of providing trainees and a site for a program for which there
was no really recognized requirement, and no model to go by.
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APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON SOURCE MATERIAL
The information in this historical paper has been
drawn almost entirely from documents in the Office of the
Director of Training or on deposit at the Record Center.
In all cases, they have been identified in the narrative.
There has been a minimum reliance on interviews,
other than the checking of details with knowledgeable
individuals.
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