INFLUENCE OF ATOMIC BOMB ON INDIRECT METHODS OF WARFARE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02220017
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2023
• Case Number: F-2023-00824
• Publication Date: August 18, 1945

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'-..r-C4W:XES-CX4LY
Office of nrategic arvice
India-3arma Theater
aro;!i'1432,
19V
General Donovan
Clorwl J. G. Covhlin, ;.trategic Officer, VS/IT
Iofluenpe of Atomic ';'3omt) on Indirect fl,thods of :jrare
1. l'ith the invention and small scale demonstration of the
atomic bomb, it becomes essential to consider the probable than-es in
r�ho m thods o w4r which must follow from tols technical advance. We
can be sure that the nation which nays most int, llience attention to
this problem will benefit (Troatly and that any nation which allows itself
to he lulled into ina o ntion to these problems will suffer.
2. To forecast these detail is, of course, impossible.
It is Pos-iblc, howo- r, to foresee certain radical changes in the role of
such agencies as 0.q.f. for Force 136 wh'ch are majokly concerned with
psychological wtrfaroo clandestine: onerationo and strategic intelligence.
The pros nt e x)raochLr. is concerned solely with these aspects of the matter.
Cor..oAin voro goneral facts about the manufacture o atomic
nboOed in ordor to make the position clear:
a) Tho f:(noral principles upon which them: bombs 000ratc are
aleLx11 'mown to a very large number of ohysioists in all
couniorios, and several hundred physi,ints, including nrlioh-
mon, omricans� rofuoeo scientists and probably Ros dans,
1-1.VC eon sn'ooed in the recent intensive research and brooa-
ration of the actual bombs. '4o kolcm also that the oorman
phys'oists were o close to the same discoveries.
b) The oain requirements for the making of atomic bombs ao)ear
to be accoos to a s,.1.1)1 of Uranium ores containing the ap-
proprito isotosc, and access to very large supplies of hydro-
(loco-oicHowcr. The +Uranium isoOopo is apparently not e ces-
olo. ly rare and the need, for hydro-oloctric 000er in ore
a dela ng factor than the lack of -Jranimo
-) The ne d for lar-o spnolles o' hodro-, lecOoric no: for the
-"o,elotion of "hca-y,w1Oer" may disa ,pca - in the ne-t few
when it becnncs oos-4ible to aoeNie unerTy for
trn
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The very small quantities of radiaa, which are probotly
neceoSory to arm these bombs ,.tro already aoueloolo to
all major nations.
L. From those facts it an tors that no high degree of sccority
in roaard to the atomic bomb can be expected an that all the major
POJerS are likely to have woalons of this sort within the next te, zaors.
5. Lsseatially these weaoons may be descri ci as ohae- :lc
relation between ea,ack and defense. It may have been true 000rti_ atar
the last war that=a-droanta'te lay with d:f,nce, but since then the
aothods of attack have steadily improved, outdistancing the a. thods of
defence. Today with the use of rocket aircraft and atomic bombs, at�ek
may be said to have finally outdistanced defence and we may be fairly
sure that this balance of advantage on the side of attack will remain :or
a considerable time, and will be a governing factor in shaninr interna-
tional relations in the next ten or twenty years.
6. 'loth ,krxrican anA, Froland - the countries lelloh at oresont
control the atomic bomb - ace nocoliar in the unwillin,ness to embark
unoo uonro-7oked attacks and we can he sore that those nations will en-
deavor (with a minimol: of noona hyprocrisy) to use the ato,c, ,omb
only as a dis.iplinary threat to restrain the aaa:resaion ci other nations.
oeithor Am.rica nor ntland will resort easily to using the bomb as a
moans of naoional eooansion or as a means of destroying other nations.
(The obviout fact that the invention o the bomb has averted the destroc-
tion of Japan is an iadicAion of this trend.)
7. The amount of provocation required to draw these two uations
into war do-ponds. in large measure
a) upon their distaste for overt ag-r ssionl and
b) upon their eoagaerated sense of their own oo.Jor and security.
Now that they losnoss atomic wcanons we Jilt e Tpect them to be oven more
reluctant to indaloe in overt aaorossion ecause agorossion hos become
so much more dcstructive. In addition the will be even more nrone to
believe themselves sc urc through the 110CS ion of what ao,cars to be
an invincible reply to the ag-ression of others. The amount of pro-oca-
tion ncceosary to draw Is into acts of war will therefore incr.. aoe.
8. As re7aras other nations, who yet not 00 es 20a o-ob�
we can be fairly sure
a)
b)
th3ct if they It t y-WC,111.. be a good deal less ret.
about its nse a7aaFt lcs well equi',-)ned ncillbors;
that, not --,-)s-.1es;71.ry the hnfo
rathor than ce n,-thafirl
their ea1rt wfith rclaTi a:A
sort to on fl ag res onuntil thi.
us ro b;v. nr0000anda,
coY=Ic ctc.
4 1,1
1
will rort to "ooacolul"
::.ntcrational n.v-enur fn
r-'ho7,: will � at re-
3 hay, torour7,h1:,, softe:Aed
sabotae, hb:Lontic serif
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9. The in,7, tion of the atoic oonb ;;A.11 thorofor: c�auoc a
shift in the btlance letu( n 4,3E-a efu11 nI -waolko othods o, coort-
inz nt ro,,lonal uro, anq k ,cct a t,r.r, ploo'oc: jnoo( asc
in the in)omanck. of the !taofu1 t oi-. will be coon
froel- than 1..=o..y oorc 1i 1.1J3 to so.00to and
exert economic preo-oros u-on u-, ani :o ours., lver eaLLo, nor, cit-
ing to bear these affronts an ourselves to in(1:170 in such m_thods -
An our eagerness to avoid at all costs the traody of op :n war.
10. In war itself, 1,rje conecntro,c,Is of oroo o oill cease
to he the nalor instrumonts of attack. L-Ind ar.,e- will -till ( ne-
cessary for monono no, nolicin and occupyinoterit.ca7 but th 3r
aggressive functions will ''iminish. the last feu nonths we have
seen hod our armies in ',wont, have hocomo in some derre secondary to
the air borne attack which acl'i(-es a preliminary softening un of in-
dustry and military installations, anl n the future we must e-ipect a
very groat further charre in tll's direction. Armies, military instal-
lations and large industrial concentrations have become vulnerable to
the new destructive inventions.
11. 'Tota,ly� the atomic bomb is now rless aoa3nst certain t:pes
of on rttions. 'Lrnies of occunation will b im-une, so 1on7 as he oc-
cupied nItion is unvillim-, to sa if cc ti civilian opulttion living
in the occuoied area, ani this iIniroinit?; may he of considora imoort-
ance in determ:nin3 thin functions.
12. In aldition, atomic wcaons arc ooworleso a ainst the
"peacefla" methods of -all-. loorrilla tactics, wlite and dac orc)a-
gaoda, sub'orion� social o._.3 cconomie zoi-)olation� �liolomatic
sure, etc. - all of these are immune, to atomic attack.
13. ,,rmics c) ocouoation, uhil to ato ic a,tack, are
;=tulnera lc to and must cooect a large a .caat or uhe "paace-
ful" oiot ads. 'uch ol-m'os� s. ni�i fro their h mus in a period
which they ro!pard as tpeace anJ attonl, tho !oliotIcal a .d osycno-
lo,ical rcmodellinz oi a 171'1�1, onemy nation, are thelas%lvo(1 eniya ed in
Psycholo:7ical larfare of a mor,, recial ieni, and th,ir 000rations will
meet wl,th resistance Ach mast inosto ly aie the '''Ioacefull forms.
IL. Prom the above nraoraohs, it a000aro that we mast look
forward to a very rat increase in imoortance of the "peaceful"
techniques of international nres�ore in tmcs of pre-war oftenino up,
in times of actual c''t-crt war and in times of nest-war naninulation.
1% It is ne exagorAion to say th,a.: for the,. neat twenty y(Jar$,-
tho nest lortat int-roational and wir-:;iak:In aencies of .t. United
States, in or-ter of inocrtance will he:
(1) The r0,: ::cal la -c.rarics -3ed
rAtAl atcoic weaoons;
!!". Coo''IC I
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(2) The air force and its resea.ch and ,roduction indus-ziesv
Sorii-agency acting under the State Department and combining
the func4ons of 0.S.%, O.W.I. and F.E,,A.;
The Janci and naval for-es.
16. To establish this third agency, m.,ntioned in the paragraph
above, will be a matter o very great difficulty in the face of the
present trends in Am,,rican feeling. Already even the best p,,rson lel in
C.S.S. are beginnlnj, to think that their job i finished, and powerful
fortes in government are already aligned to get rid of the agencies con-
cerned with clandestine operations, psychological warfare, international
economic controls, and the collecting and analysis of the strategic in-
tellinence necc-sary for these types of warfare. Even in time of war it
has been hard for the 0.S.. to do its proper job without beinf side-
tracked into military intelligence, and in the immediate future the dif-
ficilties in our way will be even greater. The importance of the type
of work for which the 0..S., the and the F.E.A. were originally
designed is, howev r, 1nfinit4y greater than it has even been. Hitherto
we h.ve ben al)le to let the Army and the Navy do most of the job for
us. This is no longer possible.
/s/ '.'.regory.T.iateson
GROaORY TITE OU
ri244/SLAC
Distribution:
General Donovan
Colonel Coughlin
General Magruier
Mr. Shepeodson
Dr. Langer
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