THE SECRET LIFE OF THE A-11

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02202927
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02619
• Publication Date: April 23, 1964

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The Secret Life of the A-11
THERE was a measure of jubilation
in certain parts of Washington
when President Johnson decided last
month to release the secret of the
fantastic new airplane known as
A-11. This manned craft, whose
photograph rather resembles a mis-
sile lying on its side, can reportedly
fly at more than three times the
speed of sound, attain heights above
twenty miles, and traverse vast
stretches of the earth's surface in a
single swoop. As a multipurpose
weapon (unlike the U-2, which was
essentially a spy plane), it seems likely
to delay the time when the military
must turn irrevocably to the missile
�a weapon which, once fired, can-
not be recalled. On such postpone-
ments, some experts believe, man's
fate could depend.
A more immediate reason for the
jubilation was the speed and secrecy
with which the A-11 arrived on the
scene. Conceived in 1959 and then
contracted to Lockheed Aircraft,
until the President's announcement
the veil of security was held to a de-
gree believed possible only during
wartime. Dummy corporations han-
dled the subcontracting, and aviation
specialists in the press who became
aware of the A-11's existence were
persuaded to exercise self-censorship.
The plane has reportedly been in
operation for more than a year, and
by now at least eleven or twelve have
been completed at a cost rumored to
run as high as $1.5 billion.
Johnson's decision to go ahead
with this partial unveiling�the
plane and many of its characteristics
are still kept tightly guarded�ended
ajengthy -dts p u te
officials, who favored disclosure,
those in the Central Intelligence
- Agency who were opposed. A cowe -
=lent was that too many air-
line pilots had glimpsed the weird
monster in flight to keep the secret
much longer. But a strong additional
motive in the timing of the news re-
lease was to beat off efforts in Con-
DOUGLASS CATER
gress to disregard the administration's
defense budget by voting funds for
the rich variety of projects for future
aircraft boosted by various congress-
men. As an immediate consequence,
it prompted a House-Senate confer-
ence to reject $40 million allocated
to the IMI (Improved Manned In-
terceptor), approved by the House
of Representatives against Secretary
of Defense McNamara's wishes. The
triumph of the All undoubtedly
silenced a number of politicians
who have been boratirg McNamara
for failure to sjxcd work on new
weapons systems.
BUT it has far from ended the grip-
-LP ing in Congress. Senator Gordon
Allott (R., Colorado), a Member of
the Defense Appropriations subcom-
mittee, announced angrily in the
Senate chamber that there had not
been one word about the A-11 dur-
ing his group's protracted closed-
door hearings on the military budget,
adding: "I think every American has
a right to ask what is going on in
this country, when we in the Senate
vote for expenditures of the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars involved
in the development of an aircraft
about which these who have occa-
sion to know seem to know nothing."
Frank J. Becker (R., New York),
a member of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee, attempted unsuccess-
fully to challenge the conference's
deletion of funds for the manned in- �
terceptor. "Despite all of the an-
nouncements about the A-11 we have
no real information on it," he told
his colleagues.
Senator John McClellan (D., Ar-
kansas) joine t e attack from a
slightly different angle. As chairman
of the Permanent Investigations sub-
committee, McClellan has waged a
long war with Pentagon leaders over
their decision to award the TFX
(tactical fighter, experimental plane)
contract to the General Dynamics
Corporation rather than to the
Boeing Company. McClellan was
stirred to new fury by President
Johnson's statement that "One of
the most important technical achieve-
ments of this [A-11] project has been
the mastery of the metallurgy and
fabrication of titanium metal. . . ."
One reason McNamara had cited
for rejecting Boeing, McClellan w-
eaned, was that it planned to make
extensive use of titanium in its vet,
sion of the TFX.
Though the agitation in Congress
may subside, this episode does
raise fundamental questions about
the way government conducts the
secret and not-so-secret business of
defense. Not more than ten members
in each house, by one insider's esti-
mate, had been told about the A-11.
In each of the two Armed Services
Committees, the chairman and the
ranking minority member were con-
sulted about which of their col-
leagues would be informed. Appar-
ently it is committee practice for
groups of varying size to be briered
on projects, depending on the de-
gree of secrecy.
An even more delicate problem of
consultation lies with the powerful
Appropriations Committees, which
hold the purse strings. Though pro-
cedurecsitis known
th Chairman Clarence Cannon
(D. issouri) of the House co
tee hea committee
numbering five members who review
the top secret spending. In a recent
interview, Cannon, a spry man of
eighty-five, refused to describe this
group's current activities but will-
ingly reminisced about its origins.
During the Second World War, he
had chanced to discover $800 mil-
lion tucked away in various parts of
the budget that had not been ac-
counted for. The military officials
he queried about this discrepancy
refused to discuss it beyond saying
that it involved a life-and-death race
with the Germans. After consider-
able soul searching Cannon decided
16
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to grant these funds and, the follow-
ing year, an additional billion dol-
lars without receiving a word of ex-
planation. He recalls believing that
some sort of death ray was in the
works.
But when the third year brought
still another huge request, Cannon
was adamant. "Enough's enough,"
he remembers telling the military.
Next day, a deputation from the
I 'f�n tagon arranged for the chairman
.ifid four of his colleagues to make a
i(luight flight to inspect the cause of
his outlay�Oak Ridge. The con-
.;t-essinen were impressed by the vast
establishment that had been secreted
away in Tennessee, but were great-
ly disappointed to learn that the end
product was to be simply another
explosive. "Next day, when we met
to vote on the funds, we didn't even
look at each other," the old chair-
man recollects. Only public knowl-
edge of the atomic bombing relieved
him of his burden of secrecy.
� THIS
same subcommittee, with re-
placements for three of the orig-
inal five members, monitored the
funding of both the U-2 and the
A-11. By the accounts of those who
have appeared before it, the group
is hard-working and gives a pains-
taking review to these activities
ept hidden from other members of
Congress. Cannon, who remarks
cryptically that he has made only
one mistake in his choice of mem-
bers, professes no qualms about such
bypassing of the regular legislative
process. He states matter-of-factly
that it is a question of how to deal
with the enemy. "What makes the
Russians a menace is the proclivity
of members of Congress to talk about
everything they know," he cam-
mented.
For a good many members of Con-
gress, it is a question whether the
business of defense, even when not
clothed in secrecy, has not gone be-
yond the reach of their tralitional
review process. It has become too
massive and many-sided, too depend-
ent on complex judgments of timing
and technology. Congress lacks the
expert resources to form a truly in-
dependent appraisal of what consti-
tutes adequate military prepared-
ness for the nation. Instead, its
members often resort to borrowing
specialized knowledge from within
and without the Pentagon in seeking
to contradict the appraisal reached
by the Secretary of Defense and his
experts. Subcommittees are apt to
ride off on separate hobbyhorses, sel-
dom bothering to reconcile their par-
ticular interests with the general
defense interest.
The year-long inquest of the Mc-
Clellan subcommittee into the TFX
contract, not yet formally finished,
provides a dramatic case study in
frustration. Granting certain failures
in human relations by McNamara
and his deputies, the hearings con-
ducted by the senators have gone
beyond all limits of judicious in-
quiry. They have not produced evi-
dence of either venality or bad judg-
ment that would warrant such a
prolonged ordeal. It has become sim-
ply a question of who decides.
Secretary McNamara, whose original
ambition was to save a billion dol-
lars by providing a fighter plane
suitable to both Air Force and Navy
needs, may well wonder whether it
was worth the endlc.s hours of rear-
guard action that had to be diverted
from management of a defense econ-
omy spending a billion dollars a
week.
CHAIRMAN MCCLELLAN now threat-
' ens to reopen hearings so as to get
to the heart of the titanium 'matter.
During an interview conducted, out-
side the Senate chamber as the civil-
rights filibuster was getting under
way, he asserted that his case against
McNamara had not been inspired
by animus or sell-interest. He would
have been quite willing to drop the
investigation, he said, if the secre-
tary, instead of resorting to arrogant
technical arguments, had pleaded
that General Dynamics needed the
contract in order to survive. The
senator seemed to be claiming that
he . would have deferred to McNa-
mara's politics but not to his tech-
nical competence.
McNamara has had good reasons
for his 'obstinacy. Dliring the latter
years of the Eisenhower administra-
tion, there was distressing evidence
that pressures on the Pentagon were
leading to increasingly fragmented
decision making. Despite the rigid
budget ceilings, there was wasteful
proliferation of weapons systems.
The ill-fated atomic-plane project,
for example, consumed more than a
billion dollars without even produc-
ing a prototype. Secretary Neil Mc-
Elroy could beseec h a Congressional
committee to "hold our feet to the
fire" in order to iorce a choice be-
tween two nearly equivalent missile
projects. Amid such competition,
mainly focused on super war de-
vices, the urgent need for non-nucle-
ar limited-war capabilities was seri-
ously neglected.
Though McNamara has not
spared costs in seeking a more bal-
anced military force, he has also
felt obliged, his associates point out,
to impose strict limits to prevent his
defense budget from getting com-
pletely out of hounds. This has
meant making ruthless choices
among the myriad weapons systems
of the future. McNamara has also
been ruthless in overriding those in
the Pentagon who try to sabotage
these choices,
Even among the admirers of this
first Secretary of Defense to get on
top of his job, there is vague dis-
quiet about what lies ahead. There
are too many tough decisions of na-
tional strategy and purpose to be
left to one man or to a small group
of men in the Pentagon. As the de-
fense budget levels off, the pressures
of special interest are bound to mul-
tiply. As technology becomes ever
more intricate, secrets like the A-11,
making much of the public argu-
ment obsolete, will grow in number
and variety. �
How does Congress play a role?
In the past, a few thoughtful men
on Capitol Hill�Carl Vinson, Rich--
ard Russell, Stuart Symington, Lev-
erett Saltonstall, Leslie Arends,
George Mahon, and Gerald Ford,
among othen�---have performed more
valuable fxrvice in exerting Congres-
sional control of our military pro-
gram than all the noisy circuses in
the style of the McClellan hearings.
Theirs has been a quiet, informal
review according to what in their
judgment was the public interest,
though the public was frequently
uninformed as to their activity. This
has required more use of political -
wisdom than matching of techno-
logical expertise. As the secret life
of the A-11 makes clear, the future -
state of the defense establishment
will depend to an even greater de-
gree on the quality of the men who
bear this personal burden.
April 23, 1964
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AIR FORCE MAGAZINE
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The official pictures and statements
tell very little about the A-11. But the
technical literature from open sources,
when carefully interpreted, tells a good deal
about what it could and, more importantly,
what it could not be. Here's the story ..
�Illustration by Gordon Pbillips
Bern the Skulk Works, neared hi Secret,
It Blazes New Heights in Aircraft Perfor mice
By J. S. Butz, Jr.
TECHNICAL EDITOR, AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST
HE dramatic disclosure last month that the United
LIStales has manned airplanes that are secretly
cruising at speeds above Mach 3 was good news to
the aviation community.
President Johnson, in revealing the Lockheed A-11
program, showed understandable pride in this im-
portant US "first." He said that "several" A-11s were
being flown "at more than 2,000 mph and at altitudes -
in excess of 70,000 feet," and are "capable of long-
range performance of thousands of miles." The Presi-
dent added that the A-11 "has been made possible by
major advances in aircraft technology of great signifi-
cance for both military and commercial application."
He mentioned only one specific application. He said
that the A-11 was being tested extensively to deter-
mine its suitability as a "long-range interceptor."
Former White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger
and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara stressed
the interceptor role in their brief expansions of the
President's remarks. However, Mr. McNamara, in
response to insistent questioning by reporters, has
indicated that the A-11 was not designed originally
as an interceptor but that he has considerable con- '
fidence that it can be adapted to that role.
Beyond these minimum remarks, the secrecy lid has
been clamped on. The Administration opened the door
on the most tantalizing aviation news since the X-1
proved there wasn't a sonic barrier. But the door was
slammed shut immediately.
AIR FORCE Magazine I April 1964
From the technical viewpoint, the A-11 clearly is the
most important aircraft since the X-1. It is by far the
most efficient airplane yet to fly at supersonic speeds.
It is the first to have adequately high aerodynamic
efficiency (low dyag) and high powerplant efficiency
to allow it to carry enough fuel to sustain flight above
Mach 1 for more than thirty minutes or so. In the
President's words, the A-11 also is extremely important
because it led to "the mastery of the metallurgy and
fabrication of titanium metal which is required for the
high temperatures experienced by aircraft traveling at
more than three times the speed of sound."
As reported by Claude Witze on page 16 of this
issue, a tight information clamp has forestalled mean-
ingful public discussion of the A-11, its genesis, or its
proper role in civil and military aviation.
The following questions are typical of those which
should be asked, for the answers concern the use of a
very large sum of the taxpayers' money. Congress and
the public have a legitimate right to frank answers.
e How much did the A-11 and its engines cost?
Judging from previous pioneering programs that
fought their technical battles out beyond the "state of
the art," the A-11, with its Mach-3-plus performance,
titanium construction, and high-temperature engines
cost at least $500 million and possibly $1 billion. That
is $100 to $200 million per year for the five years the
program has been active. (President Johnson said the
(Continued on following page)
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Window arrangement of A-11 may indicate a three-man crew. The large ventral fin shown here raises the possibility of
zero-length launch. This takeoff technique may be used for high-performance aircraft to conserve fuel and increase
range. Openings at the rear of the nacelles feed air to convergent-divergent nozzles needed for efficient engine operation.
A-11
Voi��^=.1.=�����war,
A-11 design work started in 1959. The J58 program
was initiated several years earlier by the Navy.) This
kind of money is in the cost range of the much-criti-
cized and now-defunct nuclear airplane, and programs
of this magnitude should get a thorough working over
by the Congress.
e The "obvious"
information
develo
sance
reache
e drawn from the
-11 was originally
-altitude reconnais-
U-2. Most reporters
supported largely by the
close seer e airplane, Mr. McNamara's re-
fusal o divulge the original design objective, and the
fact that the project was not handled in normal man-
agement channels. If this conclusion is correct, sev-
eral questions arise immediately concerning the past
and future expenditure of large sums of money:
( 1) Does the fact that a given airplane can cruise
� at Mach 3 also mean that it automatically has a multi-
purpose capability � reconnaissance, interceptor,
bomber without a major design change for each
type of miss'
� (2) I e nswer is no, was there coordination be-
tween e CIA an he DoD at an early stage to make
certai that A-11 was not hopelessly boxed into
one role?
(3) Can the A-11 development expedite the super-
onie-transport (SST) program?
(4)� Have reconnaissance satellites eliminated the
iced for reconnaissance aircraft such as the A-11, and
will it therefore end up only as a high-cost experi-
mental aircraft with limited capability?
Precise answers will require the most candid discus-
sion of the current version of the A-1I and its design
and development history. Certainly no one can judge
the exact performance or mission capability of a super-
sonic-cruise airplane using only the two side-view
photographs and brief statements currently available
On thc A-1:.
Estimates of this type are riskier for supersonic-
cruise airplanes than they are for subsonic aircraft or
for those that are capable of only short dashes at
supersonic speed.
�
�
. a le: at t
for the CIA as a If
airplane to replace
this conclus'
�
CONTINUED
Basically, supersonic-cruise airplanes involve ex-
tremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range
performance is extremely sensitive to engine weight,
structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic
efficiency (lift/drag ratio, written LID). Small mis-
takes in predicting these values can lead to large errors
in payload and range.
Fortunately, the supply of technical literature con-
cerned with these problems is large. This literature
points to some general conclusions about the A-11
and places some broad limits on the possible perform-
ance of this new aircraft.
The difficulties described in this literature also pro-
vide the best tribute to Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson
and his "Skonk Works" colleagues at Lockheed, who,
with, the J58 engineers at Pratt & Whitney, led the
team that first achieved supersonic cruise.
Here is what can be deduced about the A-11, based
on this literature:
� Size. The airplane is about ninety feet long based
on scaling of the A-11 pictures, using published data
on the J58 diameter and estimating the size of the
pilot's helmet visible in the front window. There is
room in the slim fuselage and in the wing stub areas
for more than 70,000 pounds of fuel, with space left
over for substantial mission equipment. Since efficient
supersonic-cruise airplanes have to carry at least fifty
percent of their weight in fuel, the A-11 takeoff weight
apparently is more than 150,000 pounds. This is
roughly the same as that of the B-58 bomber.
� Wing. Densely loaded aircraft such as the A-11
need large wing areas; otherwise their wing loadings
will quickly rise above 100 pounds per square foot and
severely reduce both cruise altitude and flight effici-
ency.
The side-view photographs obscure most of the
A-11 wing, and published drawings of the A-11 have
not indicated a large lifting surface. However, the
aircraft must have an effective wing area in the neigh-
borhood of 2,000 square feet. This includes not only
the area outboard of the engine nacelles (see draw-
ing on the front cover) but also the area between the
engines, and the area of the long, very narrow wings
34 . �_
FORCE Magazine � April 1964
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3
purpose. The Swedish Saab Draken, the Mach 2 fighter
operational for several years, was the first of the so-
called "tailless" ( no conventional horizontal tail and
no canard) airplanes to use the double-delta planforrn.
� Design Mach Number. The centerbodies of the
engine air inlets on the A-11s in the photographs re-
leased by the White House appear to have a ramp
angle suitable for a maximum economical cruise speed
slightly above Mach 3.
� Cruise Altitude. Most press reports have placed
the A-lrs maximum cruise altitude between 90,000
and 125,000 feet. This appears to be a serious error.
There is a well-established procedure for checking
maximum cruise altitude. It indicates that the A-11
must cruise between 70,000 and 80,000 feet or its
range will severely suffer. Thus, the A-11 can be ex-
pected to get its maximum range while cruising about
5,000 to 10,000 feet below the U-2. The U-2's superior
wing and lower wing loading give it better altitude
capability in unaccelerated flight. But in a zoom climb
the A-11 would outperform it.
(Continued on following page)
Twist and camber in outboard wing section is visible in this photo of A-11 configuration rigged for conventional
takeoff with standard-length landing gear and minus the large ventral fin shown on model at left. Flight tests of
the X-15 revealed that X-15 did not need its large ventral fin for adequate directional stability at supersonic speed.
on the fuselage, which have been referred to in some
reports as fairings. The long and narrow wings form
the forward section of a large double-delta wing simi-
lar to that used by Lockheed in its supersonic-trans-
port proposal. At supersonic speeds these long, narrow
wings plus the fuselage area between them generate
much more lift than they do at subsonic speeds.
This generation of additional lift up forward is
important in maintaining control over the airplane
above Mach 1. The controllability problem arises be-
cause the rear portion of the double delta acts like a
� conventional lifting surface at supersonic speeds, and
its center of lift moves abruptly aft, a long distance
away from the center of gravity. This can make the
aircraft so stable that it can't be controlled by a nor-
mal-size horizontal tail. In any event, it calls for a large
deflection of the tail and an unacceptably big trim
drag, which eats into range. On the A-11, lift on the
long, narrow wings counteracts the shift of center of
lift on the main surface and keeps the center of lift
near the center of gravity. On some designs a small
canard (horizontal) surface near the nose serves this
Mn
A-11's modified double-delta wing shows in this three-view drawing. -The forward delta extends straight back fr
just ahead of the pilot's canopy, rearward to the engine air inlets (letter "A"). The rear delta is outside of the
engine nacelles (letter "B"). A cutout similar- to that shown at "C" must be used to keep low-energy boundary layer
air passing along the forward delta from entering the engine inlet, lowering engine efficiency and creating heavy
unbalancing forces on the compressor. Such a cutout would be critical in creating favorable flow on rear fuselage ramp.
s AIR FORCE Magazine � April 1964
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A-11 4
CONTINUED �
To figure maximum cruise altitude you have to
know two characteristics of any aircraft�the wing
loading (written W/S and equal to the gross weight
divided by the wing area), and the lift coefficient
(written CL, a dimensionless number indicating the
lifting power of the wing) generated when the aircraft
is flying at the proper angle of attack for maximum
range (maximum aerodynamic efficiency). When the
W/S is divided by the CL, it equals the dynamic
pressure required to keep the aircraft in level flight.
The dynamic pressure is the term that fixes the alti-
tude of flight for any given speed.
There is enough information on the A-11 to put the
above relationships to work. For instance, when the
A-11 is flying at Mach 3 at 70,000 feet, the dynamic
pressure is nearly 600 pounds per square foot. The lift
coefficient for maximum L/D is about .1 (this has been
confirmed in many NASA reports on aircraft similar
to the A-11). So 600 may be multiplied by .1 to give a
maximum possible wing loading of about 60 pounds
per square foot. This is about the wing loading the
A-11 would have if it had a 2,000-square-foot wing
area, weighed 150,000 pounds at takeoff, and burned
about one-third of its 75,000-pound fuel load during
its climb to altitude. �
This procedure can be run through again to show
that the A-11's wing loading would be a little better
than thirty pounds per square foot once it had burned
all its fuel. It, therefore, would end its cruise at Mach
3 at 80,000 feet.
Speed would not change this picture too much. If
the A-11 were capable of Mach 4, it would begin its
cruise at about 82,000 feet and in the lightened condi-
tion at the end of cruise would be flying at nearly
95,000 feet.
The press reports of 125,000-foot altitude com--
pletely ,fall apart under check. If the A-11 flew at
that altitude at Mach 4 it would need a wing loading
� of less than ten pounds per square foot. In other words
its structure could not be any heavier than that of a
Piper Cub.
Or, if the A-11 tried to fly at 125,000 feet at a wing
loading of about thirty pounds per square foot, cor-
responding to an end-of-cruise weight, its speed would
have to be at least Mach 8 to maintain level flight and
to keep it from stalling out.
The same procedures can be used to show that the
U-2's altitude during maximum range cruise will vary
from about 75,000 feet to a little more than 90,000
feet.
Another check on the operational altitude of the
A-I1 can be made by examining the engine air inlets
which appear to be about six feet in diameter at the
most. Therefore, the maximum capture area for both
inlets to take in air is between fifty and sixty square
Photo shows early model
J58 turbojet. One of few
showings of this engine was
at AFA's' 1959 Convention
in Miami. Soon afterward
project was highly classified.
Thrust is at least 30,000
pounds Without afterburner. -
Efficient use of this engine
in a Mach 3 cruise aircraft,
requires both variable-
geometry inlet and exhaust
nozzle. A-11 seems to have � .
such systems with a movable
centerbody in the inlet and
a nozzle that changes the
exit area. Altitude perform-
ance would improve if
the inlet lips opened to
enlarge the "capture" area
and admit more air.
feet. This is just about enough to fly an airplane like
the A-11 at 80,000 feet at Mach 3. At 100,000 feet at
Mach 3 the required capture area goes well over 100
square feet. At 125,000 feet the inlets would become
truly gigantic.
In recent years, the ability of Century-series fighters
to zoom higher than 100,000 feet has tended to distort
the picture as far as maximum cruise altitude and
maximum level flight altitude are concerned. Most of
the Century-series fighters cruise best between 35,000
and 45,000 feet, and their maximum level flight alti-
tude is around 60,000 feet. Therefore, the A-lrs abil-
ity to cruise in the 70,000- to 80,000-foot level is cer-
tainly not to be disparaged. With the A-11 cruising at
Mach 3 at those altitudes, on a gentle dog-leg course,
it would be essentially impossible for any operational
fighter in the world to intercept it. And it is doubtful
that any existing ground-based missile system could
down the airplane.
o Aerodynamic Efficiency. The A-11 came along in
time to benefit from several years of inspired aerody-
namic research during the middle and late 1950s. By
1960 the unclassified literature had made it clear that
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the old idea that L/D (aerodynamic efficiency) was
certain to be less than five at Mach numbers above 3
had to be discarded. There were strong indications.,
that L/Ds of seven and eight and possibly higher.:
could be attained.
These were still well under the L/Ds of eighteen to
twenty-three at which subsonic transports and bomb-
ers operate. However, an L/D of eight is enough to
bring the total flight efficiency (and range) of a super-
sonic airplane up close to that of the subsonic jet
because propulsive efficiency increases rapidly at
supersonic speeds. The idea that an economical super-
sonic transport (SST) was possible grew out of super-
sonic L/D research in the late 1950s, and the idea of
the A-11 undoubtedly had the same beginning.
The basic rules for obtaining high L/D have been
discussed exhaustively in NASA reports and the publi-
cations of the technical societies. The A-11 appears to
use all of them. First, the wing leading edges are as
sharp as possible, even sharper than those of the F-104. ,
Second, the fuselage has a fineness ratio (length di- . .
vided by diameter) of around eighteen, which gives it ,
a very high internal volume for carrying fuel and
equipment. Such design was found to be the optimum
means for carrying any given weight at supersonic
speeds, and the A-11 has the highest fineness ratio yet
used on any aircraft.
Third, proper distribution of the pressure forces, the
lift and drag forces, is a key to getting high L/Ds with
any airplane. Several important techniques which
bring pressure distributions closer to the ideal were
developed during the 1950s. They primarily involved
"twisting" and "cambering" the wing. The side-view
photographs of the A-11, both looking endwise at the
wing, clearly show its "twists" and "cambers."
Supersonic vehicles offer designers one unique op-
portunity for reducing drag and improving L/D. This
is to arrange the vehicle components (fuselage, wing,
tail, nacelles, etc.) so that they "interfere favorably"
with each other. At subsonic speeds interferenCe effects
are negligible at a distance of more than a few inches
away from any surface.
however, at supersonic speeds strong shock waves�
and pressure fields spread away from all objects. Pres-
sure fields spreading from an aircraft's components
can combine unfavorably to make the total vehicle
drag much higher than the drag of the components
taken separately.
Happily, this situation can be reversed. The com-
ponents can be arranged so that their pressure fields ,
and shock waves "cancel" out each other and reduce
total drag. For instance, an engine nacelle outboard
from a fuselage can throw a high-pressure field on
the curved aft side of the fuselage to create a "thrust"
force and reduce fuselage drag. The "ultimate" in
favorable interference is a theoretical supersonic bi-
plane postulated by Adolph Busemann in the 1930s.
This was an arrangement .of two -wings, properly
shaped and spaced apart, which canceled all of each
other's wave drag at one particular Mach number.
In the 1950s supersonic interference effects were the
object of intensive research, notably by Antonio Ferri
of the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and A. J.
Eggers, Jr., of NASA. Their basic information was ap-
plied pn the /3-70, which is arranged so that a power-.
ful positive, pressure field is created on the lower wing
surface by the engine air duct during Mach 3 cruise
to increase lift and improve L/D. Design techniques
for favorable interference have been under continu-
ous refinement and are very important in the SST pro-
posals now being evaluated by the FAA.
On the A-11, the area on the back of the fuselage
between the engine nacelles is a highly critical flow
area in which several strong pressure fields meet.
Undoubtedly, the fuselage slopes off continuously in
this area and forms a gentle ramp ending in the sharp
point visible in the photographs. It would be possible �
to reduce drag, improve LID, and increase the effec-
tiveness of the vertical tails by creating favorable pres-
sure fields along this ramp. The slope and contour of
the ramp, the spacing and shape of the engine nacelles,
the location of the vertical tails, and the flight speed.
all would be important in creating a favorable flow
field and a high L/D. This leads to the conclusion that
the A-11 is a single design point airplane, That is, it
has a high L/D at its cruise Mach number, but its
aerodynamic efficiency falls off at both lower and
higher speeds. Consequently, the airplane probably
doesn't have much growth potential in speed and
would be in serious trouble about making its range if .
one engine were lost.
� Structure. The extent and the manner in which
titanium is used in the A-11 has not been disclosed.
However, the President's remarks hinted that titanium
was the main load-bearing metal. If this is true, the
A-11's airframe must be relatively light and efficient
for a high-temperature structure. According to data
from the SST program, it would have been possible to
design the airframe for Mach 4 temperatures with
only a slight increase in weight and probably the
installation of new leading edges made of higher tem-
perature material. The refractory metal alloys devel-
oped in the Dyna-Soar program, for example, would
have a long life on a Math 4 airplane.
After the heating problems the. most important
structural question about the A-11 is its design load
factor. If the load factor were low, say two. Cs at
cruise, the structure would. be extremely light, and
amount to only about twenty percent of the.
airplane's total weight, or even less. Consequently,
maneuverability would be sharply limited and the air-
� craft certainly would be marginal as an interceptor .
even if its missiles were extremely maneuverable.
However, the light structure would result in a low-
wing loading and a high cruise altitude, and it would
allow a greater percentage of the airplane's weight to
be carried as fuel, which would increase range.
If the design load factor were high, to allow seven-
G turns, for instance, the structural weight would go
up sharply. Such design would make the aircraft very
useful as an interceptor or a bomber, but it would sub-
stantially reduce maximum cruise altitude and range.
� The question of adapting the A-11 to an.interceptor
or a bomber mission depends largely upon the design
�� _ .
����� V�':: � � �� c�P ��1��?�,� ��� ,
'�� �� � �
Coatinued
AIR FORCE Magazine � April 1964 �
� --
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A-11
CONTINUED
load factor, which, of Course, is a closely held secret.
Structural strength is more importan: in this case than
the problem of incorporating the necessary electronics
and missiles, for the A-11 is big enough.
� Engine. Official reports dating back several years
describe the Pratt & Whitney J58 as a simple super-
some turbojet with an afterburner. An early version
lost the B-70 compeiLion to the General Electric J93.
If an early version is powering the A-11, the specific
fuel consumption (SFC) is high and the range is low.
Simple turbojets of the middle 1950s all ran on after-
burner at Mach 3, and their SFC was more than two
pounds of fuel consumed per pound of thrust per hour,
compared to an SFC of about 0.8 for the best fan
engines on subsonic jet transports.
However, great strides have been made in engine
design, and it seems highly unlikely that a 1955 vintage
supersonic engine would still be in the A-11. The J58
undoubtedly has been improved in many ways
through higher operating temperatures, the use of
advanced turbine-cooling techniques, better com-
pressor Wading, and possibly the addition of a fan
and new thrust-augmentation systems.
If such engine improvements have been incorpo-
rated in the A-11, the SFC during cruise is down near
1.5 pounds of fuel per pound of thrust per hour. Fig-
ures almost this low are being quoted for the SST en-
gines, And, in 1962, three Lockheed engineers�F, S.
Malvestuto, Jr., P. J. Sullivan, and H. A. Mortzschky�
in a most interesting paper before the Institute of the
Aeronautical Sciences gave Lockheed's views of what
could be done in the way of optimizing supersonic
and hypersonic-cruise configurations in the near fu-
ture. On the key question of achievable SFCs they
said, "Propulsive efficiency [Mach number divided by
SFC] of 2.0 . . . appears to be a reasonable value for
any chemically-fueled pure-turbojet or dual-cycle pro-
pulsive system now available or projected in the near
future." According to this estimate, the best expected
SFC is 1.5 in the near future for Mach 3 airplanes.
One point, continually emphasized in the literature,
is that the "match" between airframe and engine on
'supersonic-cruise airplanes is much more critical than
on any aircraft of the past. Engine weight becomes a
larger percentage of the total airplane weight, and
fuel consumption rises sharply compared to subsonic
powerplants, so the engine becomes relatively more
important in achieving long range. Consequently,
tailoring the airplane to achieve the best possible
engine air inlet and exhaust flow conditions has a large
payoff. This tailoring must be balanced by airframe
considerations, however. On the relatively narrow-
span supersonic airplanes the placement of engine
nacelles, inlets, and exhaust flows can seriously affect
the total flow pattern over an aircraft, which is the
determining factor in achieving a high L/D.
On the A-11, the fuselage and the forward and aft
portions of the double-delta wing apparently ride at an
angle of attack of about four to five degrees during
cruise. This angle gives maximum L/D for the A-11
type configuration. The openings of the engine air
inlets and the inlet spikes are canted forward through
AIR FORCE Magazine � April 1964
Lockheed proposed a double-delta wing for its supersonic
transport (above). This is a Mach 3 aircraft weighing
more than 400,000 pounds and capable of carrying 218 pas-
sengers more than 3,500 miles. A-11 can play a vital role
in development of the SST by serving as systems test bed.
the same angle to face directly into the airflow and
maximize inlet efficiency during cruise. The engine
exhaust flow, however, nearly parallels the fuselage
and is directed downward at an angle of about four
degrees to the line of flight. Therefore, about seven
percent of the thrust force is realized as lift to im-
prove L/D and range.
In addition, the A-11 powerplants apparently have
been placed so their thrust line is slightly below the
airplane's center of gravity during most of the cruise
flight. Therefore, the engines produce a nose-up pitch-
ing moment and reduce the amount of elevator de-
flection needed to trim the airplane. NACA reports
have estimated that the proper placement of the en-
gine thrust line to reduce trim drag of the elevator can
increase range five to ten percent in aircraft of the
A-11 type.
� Fuel. Several years ago there were reports that
the J58 was being tested with boron fuel. If pentabor-
ane were burned in the J58 afterburner�and research
has shown this to be possible�then a thousand miles
or more could be added to the A-irs range.
US production of borane fuels has been stopped,
but Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara last year
told the Congress that enough was stockpiled to sat-
isfy projected needs for the foreseeable future. The
boranes are now being used in rocket-engine research,
primarily by the Air Force, and conceivably the A-11
could draw from this reservoir.
Borane fuels are expensive compared to the hydro-
carbons, and this is a major reason why the use of
pentaborane was dropped from the B-70 plans. How-
(Continued on following page)
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Air Force Associa-
tion honored the
designer of the
A-11 last fall for
earlier U-2 work.
Here Lockheed's
Clarence L. (Kelly)
Johnson accepts
von Kiirrmin
Trophy from USAF
Vice Chief of Staff,
CCM W. F. McKee,
at AFA Convention.
50�A
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7
CONTINUED
ever, on a relatively small aircraft such as the A-11,
with relatively limited numbers involved, the extra
cost could be justified by the large performance im-
provemen t.
o Range. Maximum range on the A-11, if it is hy-
drocarbon fueled and powered by a J58 model only
slightly better than the original version, probably is
around 3,500 miles. This assumes an L./D of six, an
SFC of 2.0, and fifty percent of the aircraft weight in
fuel, with about one-third of it being consumed in
the climb to altitude. Boron fuel would add around
1,000 miles to the range.
If it has been possible to achieve the maximum
L/Ds and SFCs suggested in the Lockheed paper men-
tioned above, the range would go over .5,000 miles on
hydrocarbon fuel. This assumes an L/D of eight and
an SFC of 1.5. But this level of performance probably
will not be achieved for some time.
� Development Schedule. It has been reported that
the A-11 was delivered and flown for the first time in
1961; that is slightly more than two years after design
The world's first operational double-delta aircraft is the
Swedish Air Force's SAAB J-35 Draken, a Mach 2 all-
weather interceptor and ground-attack aircraft whose
prototype first flew in October 1955. The aircraft, still
in production, entered military service in early' 1960.
work started. The same report also claims that the
A-11 has been operational for two years, meaning 1963
and most of 1962. That would leave about one year,
early 1961 to early 1962, for flight testing.
If this report is true, it would have been necessary
during this one year to move in relatively small speed
increments toward Mach 3 to make sure that all sys-
tems were responding properly to all speed, tempera-
ture, and vibration conditions. The inevitable "fixes"
would have been made and the modified systems re-
checked. Finally, it would have been necessary to
move slowly toward maximum-range flights, by cruis-
ing at Mach 3 for longer and longer periods to ensure
that all systems were withstanding the high-tempera-
ture "soaking."
Under any conceivable set of circumstances, design-
ing, fabricating, flight testing, and bringing a pioneer-
ing, first-generation, Mach 3 cruise airplane to opera-
tional status in three years would be an almost miracu-
lous achievement. True, the CIA-type management
system is conducive to rapid developments. In effect,
.e CIA simply says to the contractor, "Bring us one
of 'these.' We are making you responsible for perform-
ing all tests and making all technical decisions."
50-B
The U-2 was designed this way and delivered for
first flight in little more than one year. But the U-2
was a completely straightforward project with a well-
known type of wing, aluminum construction, and a
slightly modified version of a well-developed turbojet.
The A-11 designers were breaking new ground in
every department, although they did have access to
development data from the B-70 and J93 projects.
It seems reasonable that design, fabrication, and
ground testing of the A-11 and its systems took nearly
four years and that the first flight took place in 1963.
Less than a year of flight testing probably would have
allowed President Johnson to say that the aircraft "has
been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000
mph," and is "capable of . . . long-range performance
of thousands of miles... ." He didn't say the range had
been achieved.
But if the shorter development time reported is true,
the SST program certainly bears review. If any Mach 3
cruise airplane can be brought to operational status
from scratch in three years, then maybe the FAA is
correct in taking the position that SST costs, technical
uncertainties, and development time will be much
lower than industry estimates.
Development of an economic supersonic transport is
a much more difficult problem than the A-11, but if
the CIA's hands-off management concept can indeed
get us a Mach 3 airplane in three years, this concept
certainly should be considered for the SST. And the
Pentagon could benefit from this example as well.
� Supersonic Transport. The A-11 probably can
spell the difference between success and failure in any
US Mach-2.5-plus supersonic-transport program. The
A-11 provides an immediately available means of get-
ting vital flight-test time on all SST systems. It will
yield data on the performance of titanium structure at
Mach 3 that could not be obtained by any other
means. And, when the SST engines are ready, the A-11
will allow them to be exhaustively tested in flight in a
known vehicle and not an unproven SST airframe. By
allowing such testing, the A-11 will fill a gap in the
government's SST plan that has worried many in
industry. The A-11 experience should make it possible
to go ahead in an orderly manner and build the SST,
which must be a true second-generation, supersonic-
cruise airplane that has high aerodynamic and propul-
sive efficiency at all subsonic and supersonic speeds,
and an extremely rugged titanium structure which can
last through ten years of airline flying.
By any standard the A-11 is a magnificent technical
achievement. Quite obviously it can outfly any known
aircraft in the world by a substantial margin. It is a
natural for reconnaissance. However, if the A-11 is
from the U-2 mold and built with an extremely light
airframe, it will not have significant combat potential
as a bomber or an interceptor without major redesign.
Even if such redesign is not forthcoming, the A-11
will play a key research role in building the tech-
nology of Mach-3-plus cruise airplanes of all types�
transports, fighters, and bombers. In this role its ulti-
mate importance to aviation and the nation may be
as great as any aircraft ever built. �END
AIR FORCE Magazine � April 1964
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APRIL 1964
By Claude Witze
SENIOR EDITOR. AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST
Less Than the Whole Truth
WASHINGTON, D.C., MARCH 18
. There are substantial reasons why public pressure should
be maintained for the revelation of more facts about the
new Lockheed A-11 Mach 3 airplane. And none of the
facts that should be public property in this democracy
will menace national security if they are disclosed. The
A-11, like the TFX, the RS-70, and the Skybolt missile
before it, is involved in arguments about concept and
policy that are properly the subject of public discussion.
1 The general capabilities of the A-11 and the mission
for which it was designed can be aired before Congress
and the voters without disclosing any specific information
about the technologies involved and the precise threat it
presents to a potential enemy, If the A-11 is undergoing
tests to determine how good it is as an interceptor,
which is what we were told (by the White House, the
threat to the enemy will not be real until the system is
combat ready. The A-11 is far from that state and may
. never reach Details of of President Johnson's announcement that the
A-11 exists and an analysis of its technological significance
appear starting on page 33 of this issue. Of equal im-
portance is the Administration's insistence that the A-11
is an interceptor aircraft and that it meets the Air Force
requirement for an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI).
So long as the news about the A-11 is carefully managed,
' the Administration is not likely to get a serious challenge
to its assertion, but the atmosphere on Capitol Ilia_is
charged with ske deism. When Gen, Curtis E. LeMay,
UgAF- Chief o tTIwas testifying a few weeks ago
before the House Armed Services Committee, he said,
"We need a new long-range interceptor and we feel that
$40 million this year will move us in an orderly program
toward producing it." Asked at what point we are in the
MI program, he said, "We are doing some work -in this
field, but we are not going fast enough to have an orderly
program to produce it." He made a further statement that
was deleted from the published record. ,
11( Whatever the General told the committee in confidence,
the House included the $40 million in its version of the
defense authorization bill. 'there is no evidence in the
record that Chairman Carl Vinson or any ofThis collgagues
knew 01 the A-lI or con � �fi rototvne _of an
interceptor i eyJ . now about it. Chairman Melvin
Price of te u committee on esearch and Development
voted with the majority in favor of granting the money.
Three Democratic members of his subcommittee, Repre-
sentatives Samuel S. Stratton, Jeffrey Cohelan, and Otis
G. Pike, voted against it and signed a minority report.
in this, they argued the money had not been requested
from the subcommittee but indicated they knew of progress
made toward an IMI. They then picked up the argument
of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara that there are
several airplanes which could take on the IMI mission,
citing the F-106, the F-4, and the TFX or F-111. General ,
LeMay already had. said he wants something _better, i
' Approved for Release:
There was a strange change of attitude in the Senate.
The $40 million item was dropped from the bill
the A-11 was uncovered Senator Richard B. Russell. floor,.
mana er for the bill, bolstered the Plvident's portrayal.
of it a's"�alliini77577=s-aTd he hae. been privy to all
of its history and that what has been learned has ap-
plicability to other types of aircraft. The Senator said
the $40 million was taken out of the bill because the
A-11 already is past the research-and-development stage
and is undergoing test and evaluation. He said he did
not know why the Air Force, meaning General LeMay,
asked for the money.
Secretary McNamara was the next witness in Wash-
ington. He told a press conference, "The A-11 is an inter-
ceptor aircraft it is being develo cd as such, and be on .
t at I have nothing further to say on its use. e said
the Air Force naturally knew all about the A-11 and that
there was a misunderstanding about what was requested.
This was not new money, he said, but a request "to have
the authority within the total funds budgeted to reallocate
funds to increase the expenditures on the IMI and to
reduce expenditures on certain other projects." He said
there is no doubt that the A-11 is the plane USAF has
in mind for the IMI mission.
One of the more significant sentences in Mr. McNamara's ;
remarks was his comment that "hopefully, we can have
multi-use aircraft evolve from the single-purpose designs."
It is this conviction of his, first brought to fruition in
the TFX joint USAF-Navy project, that has not been
accepted by experienced airmen in any branch of the,
services. The A-11, it has not been denied, was laid down
in 1959 as a high-flying and fast reconnaissance ir lane
and the undisc ose amoun o money t at as gone into
it would be hard to disguise in USAF's budget. It coul4
have been finazsjil�b_y_tke Central Ipteffzence Agency,
rirt-ihat is npLamportant as ire fag; that the irecop-
naissance and interceptor missions cannot b pp formpri
efficiently by the same airplane. It is obvious that the tech-'
nofOgies overlap Ili such areas as propulsion, materials,.
human factors, and aerodynamics, but weapon systems
differ according to their missions.
All through the discussion following the A-11 an-
nouncement there has been an aura of the half-truth
about Administration statements. Asked bluntly whether
the A-11 had been designed as an interceptor, Sec-
retary McNamara replied, "I don't think that I said
that, and I would rather not say." Nobody asked, "Why
not?" It was brought out in General LeMay's testirn -Jay
that all of the Chiefs of Staff favored going ahead with
an IMI and that even the Chairman, Gen. Maxwell Taylor,
� gave it his endorsement. USAF Secretary Eugene Zuckcrt
testified that No formal proposal has gone forward from
the Air Force, that is, from the civilian Secretary [Mr..
� &eked] to the Secretary of Defense. I did write him a
letter in which I said it looked as if we were progressing,
to .the point where we would need a sizable sum of money.
such as the one General LeMay.mentioned.fforl 19645."
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Later Rep. Porter Hardy quizzed the Air Force Secretary
and asked whether Mr. McNamara showed any signs of
"mellowing" or beginning to understand the requirement
for an IMI. Mr. Zuckert acknowledged that his boss was
not "too encouraging." He added that he favors a larger
development program than the Defense Secretary, but "I
have not personally proposed that we build a force of any
particular size leading toward a full defense capability
' with an IMI."
Further quotations are not needed to display the status
of the IMI project, at least as it stood in February. I we
accept the natal date of t it seern,s cleac
t T
the concept probably
a'eon oveita en y more es ing
in space. lithe A-I1 was designed as an IMI t ere was
nu reason to blanket its existence with any more secrecy
than would have surrounded the F-108, interceptor coun-
terpart of the B-70 and also designed by North American
Aviation, if that project had not been abandoned a few
years ago. It was after cancellation of the F-108 that
airmen concerned with the defense mission, most notably
Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, first proclaimed the requirement
� for an IMI. If they knew the A-11 was being developed
as an interceptor, which they should have known if it is
true, their speeches, in retrospect, make little sense.
Since disclosure of the A-11 by President Johnson, most
of the verbiage has been concerned with its place in the
history of aeronautical progress and the fact that the story
was kept out of the public prints, whether by publicists
or patriots. The emphasis has been in the wrong places.
The sophisticated observer, be he aeronaut, editor, or
military officer, knows that USAF does not develop a new,
� .interceptor by starting with a vehicle that flies higher and
faster, with limited maneuverability, and then try to
determine its capability. The interceptor capabilitkr would
� he built in starting on the design boards. There is miler
jufiHition for suspecting that the A-Il has been used
for manipulation of American public 'opinion, possibly to
cast aspersions on Air Force competence in an area of
Air Force specialization. The outlook for national security
is frightening if this kind of manipulation is allowed to
continue, making it look as if technology escaped the grasp
of the men with the mission.
Why Doesn't Anybody Get Mad?
As we write this, the East Germans, who are. Commu-
nists, are withholding information on the condition of
three USAF officers who were shot down a few days ago
when their RB-66 reconnaissance bomber strayed out of
its flight path. A compilation by the Associated Press
shows that in the past fourteen years at least eighty
American military flyers have been killed by Russians in
attacks that ranged from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan.
The airmen have been from the ranks of the US Navy,
Marines, and Air Force.
So far, there has been no sign of official indignation in
Washington other than a demand for the release of our
hen. Our attitude, according to the Washington Post, is
':;tenipered by our "hopes to avoid having the incident dam-
age the relatively moderate climate of present American-
Soviet relations." Indeed, the Post, which should know
.:better, peers around the eighty corpses and poses an
editorial question: -"What is wron with the Air Force
that it cannot prevent its anes
Communist E-a-stterman and e mg s o own Then
The paper- says CfSAF oes no say e iurp ane strayed
but suggests ,it was lured by phony radio signals. _1
. _
Somehow, the lives of eighty American flyers seem to
have been sacrificed in near silence while the climate of
our relations with Russia shows no material change. It
should be pointed out that the Washington Post, which
hesitates to put any blame on the Russians, is a paper that
speaks out loud and clear in favor of avoiding escalation
in any conflict with the Reds. The response should be �
nonviolent to most provocation, according to this school
of thought, and if it must be violent it should be graduated �
to the minutest degree possible. The Communists disagree.
Any responsible reporter could learn by asking that
USAF pilots have strict orders not to resist challenges in
the air, even if they are armed. The Russians, in this case,
destroyed an airplane which they could have had intact
with its airborne equipment if they had told the pilot to
land instead of shooting him down. This indicates
were more intent on murder than capturing the RB-93
to see what reconnaissance e5uipment it was carr in .
responsible reporter also could- Eave came at t e
pilot was following a filed flight plan for a navigation.
training mission that was to be flown entirely in France
and West Germany. An informed reporter would know
that the RB-66 is an obsolescent airplane and it is not
likely it would be sent on a sensitive mission so close to
the Iron Curtain. Even an editorial writer, lacking all
these facts, should be able to recall that in late January
a T-39 jet trainer out of Wiesbaden strayed across the
border and was shot down, killing the crew of three USAF
officers. In this case the Reds merely said it was our fault
because we violated their airspace, and they gave us
permission to retrieve the bodies and wreckage.
It is not generally discussed, but these violations of
airspace have at least one of the characteristics of a
cultural-exchange program. The Russians violate airspace
too. They have overflown Alaska and are reported to have
violated Western airspace in Europe at least twenty times
in 1963. They have been intercepted by our airmen and
warned to go back. There is no record that they have been
fired upon. On top of this, it is no secret in Europe that
Aeroflot, the Russian airline, and Polskie Linie Lotnicze,
its Polish counterpart, treat airlanes with disdain. On
-- scheduled flights to and from such major points as Paris,-
their pilots wander far from their routes as assigned by
traffic controllers. There is a strong conviction on the Con-
tinent that these deviations are not accidental, but are
part of the Communist reconnaissance effort.
� In view of the record, it is difficult to believe we are i
dealing with reasonable people concerned in any way, '
about the climate of our relations. It is even more difficult
to understand how an American newspaper, in particular ;
the Washington Post, can ignore the Soviet trigger finger,
the eighty dead, and the nature of the cold war.
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