THE UNCERTAINTIES OF U.S. SUPPORT TO THE THAI SGU IN FY 74

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02197307
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01079
• Publication Date: March 13, 1973

Approved for Release: 2018/01/29 CO2197307
Noy'
Q,7c 73
.S MAR 'Toll
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT The Uncertainties of U.S. Support to the
Thai SGU in FY 74
1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your
approval in paragraph 11.
2. Summary. The American missions in Laos and Bangkok,
with strong support and under increasing (W(1)
pressure from the Thai Government, have asked for assurances (b)(3)
that the U.S. will fund a Thai SGU contingency force in
Thailand through FY 74. All concerned agencies agree in
principle that a U.S.-supported Thai SGU force should be
maintained in Thailand for possible deployment to Laos in
the event of major ceasefire violations but there has been
no firm policy decision to this effect. State has taken the
position that a definitive policy decision should be delayed
until a specific source of funds has been identified and
approved by Congress. We agree with Defense that since
Congressional action cannot be expected until well after the
deadline established by political and operational require-
ments in the field, policy approval should be granted now
with the understanding that a source of funds will be identi
fied regardless of legal complications. The State and
Defense positions are contained in the attached draft
messages. While we prefer the Defense draft, we feel that
references in the Defense message to the possibility of
CIA funding of the proposed contingency force should be
removed and that alternative funding possibilities should
be explored by the Administration.
3. The Laos and Bangkok Missions have asked for
assurances from Washington that the U.S. will continue to
Lund and otherwise support a Thai SGU contingency force in
Thailand through FY 74. Their proposal calls for maintain-
ing fifteen Thai SGU battalions (8,250 men) through
31 December 1973 and a reduced force of nine battalions
(4,750) for the remainder of FY 74. There are currently
thirty Thai SGU battalions (17,808) deployed in Laos.
4.
The projected Thai SGU force would require
in new obligational authority for FY 74.
5. The rationale for supporting a Thai SGU contingency
force in FY 74 is based upon Thai Government representations
SECRI-;.T[;-4',Li'MTIVE
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II 1 4,1
141.0f
and the operational need for a combat-effective irregular
force that could be deployed to Laos if the ceasefire breaks
down. Dr. Kissinger has taken the position that the Thai
SGU should not be disbanded until there is convincing evidence
that the North Vietnamese intend to abide by the ceasefire
agreement for Laos. During his late January visit to Bangkok,
General Haig told the Thai leadership that the SGU should be
kept intact in Thailand for some time and in a state of
readiness that would facilitate their return to Laos in the
event of serious violations of the ceasefire.
6. There is general agreement among the concerned
agencies, including the NSC staff, that for political and
operational reasons a contingency Thai SGU force, along the
lines proposed by the field, should be maintained in Thailand
with U.S. support. There is considerable difference of
opinion however, particularly between State and ISA/OSD,
concerning: the relative importance (in terms of congression-
al equities) of a Thai SGU contingency force, the availability
and legality of U.S. funding for such a force, and the
duration of U.S. support.
7. State has taken the position that a definitive policy
decision to support a Thai SGU contingency force should not
be taken until a specific source of funds has been agreed
upon among all agencies and approved by the Congress. (The
Thai SGU are currently funded by Laos MASF but it is at least
doubtful /even if Laos MASF is continued through FY 74/ that
Laos MASF funds could be used to support Thai SGU in Thailand.)
State is also opposed to supporting a Thai SGU contingency
force beyond 31 December 1973 in any case.
8. ISA/OSD feels that a policy decision approving the
field proposal should be made now and communicated to the
Thai Government as soon as possible so that the Thai Govern-
ment will be reassured on this point and planning for the
contingency force can get underway. According to the ISA
position, the policy decision and Congressional approval
aspects must be separated because we cannot realistically
expect final Congressional action on this question until
well after the deadline established by political and
operational considerations in the field. ISA has also taken
the position that the contingency force should be supported
throughout FY 74 rather than for only six months as suggested
by State.
9. The State and ISA positions are outlined in the
attached draft messages that have been forwarded for CIA
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*me
clearance. The ISA message is much more responsive to the
field proposal and is generally in line with FE Division
views but it reflects more optimism than is justified con-
cerning the continuation of Laos MASF and it raises the pro-
spect of CIA funding. We agree with ISA that the field
proposal should be approved now as a matter of policy and
communicated to the Thai Government even though a specific
source of funding cannot be identified at this time and
there is no assurance now of Congressional approval.
10. CIA funding of the proposed contingency force could
put the Agency in the position of being accused of violating
the sense if not the letter of legislative restrictions,
especially if Congress again precludes the use of MASF or
other DOD funding to support Thai SGU in Thailand and includes,
as it has in the past, language to the effect that this
restriction applies to the use of funds appropriated under
other legislation. Vientiane Station has suggested that
leftover FY 73 MASF be used to fund the FY 74 Thai SGU
contingency force but this approach is also fraught with
obvious legal complications.
11. FE Division feels that continuation of Laos MASF
through FY 74 (including provisions to support Thai SGU in
Thailand) and, alternatively, the possibility of a
million add-on to MAP for Thailand should be fully and
energetically explored by the Administration in lieu of CIA
funding or CIA use of leftover FY 73 MASF money. We therefore
recommend Agency concurrence in the ISA draft with the
understanding that references to the possibility of CIA
funding will be removed and that some of the State language
about scenarios, material support and disposition of Thai
SGU weapons be included in the ISA version.
Chief, Far East Division
Attachments: as stated.
The recommendation contained in
paragraph 11 is approved:
41-t"/&d
Deputy Director for Operations
-3-
srcarTtsrmslTivF
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/01/29 CO2197307
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT The Uncertainties of U.S. Support to the
Thai SGU in FY 74
DDO/ADCFE/TBLi /mh/x1405 (13 March 1973)
Distribution:
Orig 1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - OGC
2 - CFE
2 - CFE/TBL
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/01/29 CO2197307
D
SUBJECT: The Uncertainities of U.S. Support to the
Thai SGU in FY 74
1. The Laos and Bangkok Missions have asked for
assurances from Washington that the U.S. will continue to
Lund and otherwise support a Thai SGU contingency force
through FY 74. Their proposal calls for maintaining fifteen
Thai SGU battalions ( men) through 31 December 1973 and a
reduced force of nine battalions ( men) for the remainder
of FY 74. There are currently thirty Thai SGU battalions
men) deployed in Laos.
2. The projected Thai SGU force would require
in new obligational authority for FY 74.
The rationale for supporting a Thai SGU contingency
force in FY 74 is based upon Thai Government representations
and the operational need for a combat effective irregular
Force that could be deployed to Laos if the ceasefire breaks
down. Dr. Kissinger has taken the position that the Thai
SGU should not be disbanded until there is convincing evidence
that the North Vietnamese intend to abide by the ceasefire
agreement for Laos. During his late January visit to Bangkok,
General Haig told the Thai leadership that the SGU should be
kept intact in Thailand for some time and in a state of
readiness that would facilitate their return to Laos in the
event of serious violations of the ceasefire,
5-EMIT/5ENSITIVE
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/01/29 CO2797307
4. There is general agreement among the concerned
agencies, including the NSC staff, that for political and
operational reasons a contingency Thai SGU force, along the
lines proposed by the field, should be maintained in Thailand
with U.S. support. There is considerable difference of opinion
however, particularly between State and ISA/OSD, concerning:
the relative importance (in terms of congressional equities)
of a Thai SGU contingency force, the availability and legality
of U.S. funding for such a force, and the duration of U.S
support.
S. State has taken the position that a definitive policy
decision to support a Thai SGU contingency force should not
be taken until a specific souce of funds has been agreed upon
among all agencies and approved by the Congress. (The Thai
SGU are currently funded by Laos MASF but it is at least
doubtful (eVen if Laos MASF is continued through FY 74) that
Laos MASF funds could be used to support Thai SGU in Thailand.)
State is also opposed to supporting a74 Thai SGU contingency
force beyond 31 December 1973 in any case.
6. ISA/OSD feels that a policy decisiOn approving the
field proposal should be made now and communicated. to. the
Thai Government as soon as possible so that the Thai Government
will be reassured on this point and planning for
force can get underway. According to the ISA position,
policy decision and Congressional approval aspects
SEGIETISENsiTIVE
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CR T
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- 3
separated because we cannot realistically expect final
Congressional action on this question until well after the
deadline for the required political and operational action
in the field. ISA has also taken the position that the contingency
force should be supported throughout FY 74 rather than for only
six months as suggested by State.
7. The State and ISA positions are outlined in the
attached draft messages that have been forwarded for CIA
clearance. The ISA message is much more responsive to the
field proposal and is generally in line with FE Division views
but it reflects more optinism than is justified concerning the
continuation of Laos MASF and it u-fortftatcly raises the
prospect of CIA funding. We agree with ISA that the field
proposal should be approved now as a matter of policy and
communicated to the Thai Government even though a specific
source of funding cannot be identified at this time and there
is no assurance now of Congressional approval.
8. CIA funding of the proposed contingency force could
put the Agency in the position of being accused of violating
the sense if not the letter of legislative restrictions,
)1110A
especially if Congressspecifically precludes the use of MASF
or other DOD funding to support Thai SGU in Thailand and
includes, as it has in the past, language to the effect
this restriction applies to the use of funds appropriated
under other Legislation. Vientiane Station has
SECRETI5ENSIT1Vii
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suggested that
Approved for Release: 2018/01/29 CO2197307
^
leftover FY 73 MASF be used to fund the FY 74 Thai SGU
contingency force but this approach is also fraught with
obvious legal complications.
9. FE Division feels that continuation of Laos MASF
through FY 74 and, alternatively, the possibility of a
ti A i2
add-on to for Thailand should
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
be fully and energetically explored by the Administration in
lieu of CIA funding or CIA use of leftover FY 73 MASF money.
We therefore recoMmend Agency concurrence in the ISA draft
with the understanding that references to the possibility of
CIA funding will be removed and that some of the State language
about scenarios, material support and disposition of Thai SGU
weapons be included in the ISA version. As a practical matter,
we feel that the funding problem for FY 74 wil take care of
itself in Congressional action on Laos MASF is again delayed
so far into FY 74 that the concerned committees of Congress
can be persuaded that it would work too much of a hardship if
inflexible limitations on military assistance to Laos including
the Thai SGU are imposed well after the fiscal year has begun
and operational commitments have been made in the field.
SEUZEtik:NS1Ii.u.
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UNCLASSIFIED
ri in 'ML
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USIN�kiNLY Li CONFIDJIAL
Oe-- 7 3 O XLAer
SECRET
: �
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
The Uncertainties of U.S. Support to the Thai SGU in FY 74
FROM:
CFE
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
OGC
44/
73
SECRE
OGC SUBJ: APPROPRIATIONS
2.
3.
4.
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