ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN STATION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02153423
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-01010
• Publication Date: May 2, 1952

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SECVRH1 INFORMATION
2 May 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Stuart Hedden
SUBJECT: Organization of the German Station
1. In recent discussions, the BE Division has pointed out that
the organizational trend in Germany is now toward the establishment
of a substantial headquarters under General Truscott in Frankfurt.
From the SO point of view, this move toward greater centralization of
operating control in Frankfurt is regarded as a retrogression to a
less desirable organizational formula. We would, therefore, appre-
ciate it if, on your visit to Germany, you would go into this matter
with General Truscott and Mr. Stewart within the framework of your
interest in the overall CIA organizational problems in the area.
Set forth below is a presentation of the background and current position
of OSO as it pertains to its operational activities in Germany.
2. At the time OSS was liquidated, there was a large head-
quarters of the German Station in Wiesbaden to which reported the
various operating bases throughout Germany. This headquarters con-
tained a, heavy commitment of personnel and constituted a point through
which everything from the bases funneled. It soon became apparent
that the proper servicing of peacetime intelligence operations could
not be handled from a regional headquarters as had been done during the
war. In order to effect appropriate standards securitywise and in con-
nection with operations in general, it was necessary to coordinate
German activities with those of other countries, a function which could
be performed effectively only in Washington. Further, the increasing
demands placed upon the organization by AFSA, the FBI, the Pentagon,
the State Department, and other customer agencies necessitated policy
decisions and the performance of services on a worldwide rather than
a regional basis. This is a continuing demand on any secret intelli-
gence organization and does not admit of delegation to regional com-
mands.
3. During the ensuing two years, SSU, then CIG, was forced to
operate on the lean side personnelwise, and it became clear that in
order to use operating personnel to maximum effectiveness in Germany,
it was necessary to devise some system whereby case officers could be
placed on the firing line (i.e. in the operating bases) to the greatest
extent possible. This necessitated a reduction in the headquarters
complement of the German Station, a trend which many felt to be de-
sirable not only from an operating standpoint but also from the view-
point of efficiency. The solution adopted was to strengthen the
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individual operating bases and to reduce the size and functions of
the echelon at German headquarters thereby increasing the control
and participation of the Washington organization. This system per-
mitted the bases direct communications with Washington while at the
same time providing for the maintenance of command authority and
responsibility of the Chief of Station. It worked in the following
fashion: The Chief of Station remained responsible for all matters
in his area of command (Germany). To the extent that he and Washing-
ton felt desirable, he determined policy, made operational decisions,
assigned personnel, and was responsible for all moneys expended. To
the individual base chief was delegated the facility to correspond
directly with Washington both by cable and pouch on operational
matters, an information copy of such correspondence being sent auto-
matically to the Chief of Station. After reviewing the material, he
had the responsibility for advising Washington if there were anything
emanating from a base with which he disagreed. If there was such
disagreement, Washington waited until the Chief of Station and the
specific base chief had had an opportunity to confer and forward a
consolidated position on the point at issue. Then Washington would
act if action seemed desirable. On policy matters, the base chiefs
consulted the Chief of Station prior to communicating with Washington;
and in an effort to keep a harmony of views in this field, periodic
base chief meetings were held at the headquarters to insure that common
policies, procedures, and philosophies prevailed throughout the German
Station. It would be too lengthy to set forth in greater detail in a
memorandum of this type the precise workings of this system, but it is
generally agreed that after a reasonable shakedown period, it worked
to everyone's general satisfaction.
4. The trend in CIA Germany today away from this system toward
centralization in the Frankfurt headquarters deserves careful review
from OSO's standpoint since we believe that a continuation of the
system of decentralization to the base chiefs in Germany is not only
practicable but more effective. As pointed out above, it permits
a maximum utilization of available personnel on the actual work of
collection. It keeps down the number of individuals at German head-
quarters who work over papers and projects which eventually come to
Washington for review, thus obviating the creation of a heavily staffed
intermediate echelon. And it permits a degree of operational inde-
pendence to the base chiefs without negating the authority or command
responsibility of the Chief of Station or the legitimate role of the
Washington headquarters where final determinations in most intelli-
gence matters have to be made. In addition, a strengthening of the
individual bases will put them in a position to fend for themselves
when, as a result of an inevitable increase in the exercise of its
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sovereignty, the West German Government creates an atmosphere in
which a large German headquarters will gradually have to be cut back
in size. Last but not least, the delegation of precise responsibility
for specific operations or categories of operations will be simplified
by the placement of primary responsibility on individual bases rather
than by spreading it among a base, a desk officer in Frankfurt, the
Chief of Station, and Washington. It is evident that the actual case
officer has a real function. The Washington desk also has a role
which cannot be delegated. It appears unsound to insert an inter-
mediate control point between these two essential components. It is
recognized that this last may be an oversimplification of this aspect
of the matter, but at the current writing the precise location of re-
sponsibility for some projects in Germany is difficult to determine.
S. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that since General
Truscott's return to Germany after his visit to Washington in March,
the German Station organizational pattern has been in a state of flux
and is probably not yet solidified. For this reason, the degree of
centralization at Frankfurt may not be as great as the EE Division be-
lieves it to be. Nevertheless, your comments and views on this problem
would be greatly appreciated upon your return from Germany.
Richard Helms
Deputy Assistant Director
Special Operations
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SECURIIY 111/11R1i,
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