PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND RADICAL DUALISM

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The Relentless Question
to which a skeptic is now driven when confronted with evidence for which there
is no plausible counter-explanation. Lastly, if in the future new cases of a spec-
tacular nature should arise, the basic believer will be in a better position and
better prepared to deal with them.
Notes
a. I discussed the logical status of Hume's argument in my previous paper (see
p. 142 and note f). See also the final paper of this volume.
b. For a recent reassessment of the Hodgson Report on Blavatsky, see Har-
rison (1986).
c. It is all the more ironical in that Carrington went to the trouble, prior to
Palladino 's arrival in the United States, of circulating prospective sitters details of
her detected frauds and of the best methods of controlling for them. See Car-
rington (1954).
d. Since I wrote my paper, Adrian Parker (1988) has drawn my attention to
an adverse report by a German researcher (Lambert 1954) who had originally been
impressed by the Eva C. phenomenon but had been shown certain stereoscopic
photos by Eugene Osty at the Institut Mitapsychique after Geley's death that were
strongly indicative of fraudulent constructions. Undoubtedly Lambert's disclosures
detract from the case for Eva C. and, indeed, her reputation never recovered from
them, but do they demolish it? Inglis himself discusses at length the Lambert
evidence (1984, pp. 240-2) but comes to the conclusion, which I would endorse,
that it cannot cancel out all the arguments for thinking that Eva C., like Palladino,
was a genuine physical medium.
Parapsychology and Radical Dualism
Having in a previous paper in this volume (pages 123-132) given my
reasons for doubting whether there could be a physical explanation for psi, I
now take up the theme again in this paper and argue that, since this disposes
of physicalism-4e., the doctrine that every real event must have a physical
explanation� the existence of psi, if it does exist, leaves us with no viable op-
tion other than radical dualism �i.e., the doctrine that the domain of mind
is radically different from the domain of matter.
The paper was originally presented at the 26th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association held at the Fairleigh Dickinson University at
Madison, New Jersey, in August 1983. An abstract duly appeared in Research
in Parapsychology 1983 but, in the course of the convention, I was approached
by Frank Tribbe who asked if the paper could be published in full in the Jour-
nal of Religion and Psychical Researchfor which he is chairman of the publica-
tion committee. I duly consented and the article eventually appeared in their
January 1985 issue. It was there followed by papers from Alan Anderson,
Steven Rosen, Frank Tribbe and Evan Walker (in that order) each of whom had
been invited to comment on my contribution. I was not asked in turn to reply
to my distinguished critics but a final commentary was provided by the
eminent philosopher-theologian Hywel D. Lewis who, as I knew, shared
my dualistic standpoint. With the reprinting of this article in this context, I
am taking advantage of the occasion to reply to my critics with an "Epilogue
1990."
By "radical dualism" I mean the view that mind and matter denote
separate domains of nature which, nevertheless, interact with one another at
certain critical points. I use this term in preference to the more familiar "Car-
tesian Dualism" in order to avoid such criticisms or misunderstandings as may
be attached to Descartes' own formulation of the problem. Radical dualism
thus stands in opposition to the view that mind is no more than an aspect of,
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Radical Dualism 167
a function of, an attribute of, certain brain activity. On this latter view, while
mental concepts may well be necessary if we are going to talk intelligibly about
our own or others' experience or behavior, they can have no real explanatory
force since everything we do or say or think is ultimately dependent on the state
of the brain conceived as a purely physical system. We may call this the
physicalist position since it is based on the idea that all explanation, in the last
resort, rests on the laws of physics, and it is, unquestionably, the orthodox
position on the mind-brain relationship at the present time in neurophysi-
ology, psychiatry, experimental psychology and, even, philosophy of mind, at
any rate in the English-speaking world. This position must be distinguished
from pure materialism, that is the idea that there is no such thing as mind or
that mental processes are reducible without remainder to physical processes or
to behavior. Pure materialism is, I contend, a philosophical mistake and
therefore not a genuine option at all. The choice, as I see it, is between radical
dualism and the weaker forms of dualism which merely deny any autonomy
to the mental component of the psychophysical organism. As for idealism, the
idea that mind alone exists, which is the only other monistic option, while it
is logically unassailable, it is so fantastic that there are today few explicit
idealists although, as we shall see, it underlies a good deal in current thinking
especially where this concerns the interpretation of modern physics.
The thesis that I shall try to defend in this paper is that if we admit the
existence of psi phenomena, the orthodox-physicalist position becomes very
hard to sustain and radical dualism then becomes the most plausible alter-
native. Conversely, if we reject or ignore the existence of psi phenomena, then,
while there may still be good philosophical reasons for doubting the truth of
physicalism, we lose the only empirical grounds we have for challenging the
orthodox position. This is important because physicalism claims to represent
the scientific standpoint and draws support from advances in brain physiology
and artificial intelligence whereas radical dualism appears by contrast as old-
fashioned, unscientific and barren. My thesis is not, of course, new. On the
contrary, right from its inception, one of the strongest appeals of psychical
research was precisely the prospect it afforded of vindicating the autonomy of
mind against what then appeared to be the teachings of science. Nevertheless,
it is a thesis that is constantly contested, not least by critics who are themselves
active parapsychologists. I make no apology, therefore, for restating in my own
way the case for radical dualism given the reality of psi. Obviously, in the space
available, I cannot hope to rebut all the possible objections that could be
brought against my thesis but I am hopeful that I can draw attention to the
principal arguments in its favor.
The crux of the argument is this. For my thesis to be false we would have
to show either (a) that physicalism could survive the acknowledgment of psi
phenomena or (b) that such phenomena do not, after all, involve any special
mental powers or functions, hence their existence, whatever else it implies,
lends no support to the doctrine of radical dualism. Hence, if neither proposi-
tion (a) nor (b) can be upheld, my thesis stands. Let us start, then, with pro-
position (a).
Those who study the brain would, I take it, agree that nothing that we
have so far learnt about the brain would lead us to think that the brain might
be capable either of paranormal cognition (ESP) or of paranormal action (PK).
For example, while many cognitive processes can already be simulated using
a suitably programmed computer, we obviously would not even begin to know
how to program the computer to exhibit ESP. Now it could, of course, be
argued that this limitation is due entirely to the rudimentary state of existing
brain science. However, I propose to show that it follows inevitably from more
fundamental considerations. To make my point I shall discuss the case of
telepathy since, of all the varieties of psi phenomena, it is widely believed that
telepathy should be the most amenable to a physicalistic interpretation. At all
events to discuss precognition or PK in this context would merely compound
the difficulties which physicalism would face. If, then, we find that not even
telepathy can be understood in terms of brain activity we can feel more con-
fident that the same is true a fortiori of the other manifestations of psi.
Let us start, then, by asking how, in normal communication, an idea in
the mind of A is conveyed to the mind of B? To this question the answer is
not in doubt: it is done by means of language. The idea is first expressed in
some linguistic form by A, using a language that is familiar both to A and B,
the signals are then duly perceived by B who interprets them as expressing the
original idea. Let us next ask what would have to be the case if telepathic com-
munication depended likewise on the transmission of physical signals of some
sort? We might imagine that the idea, suitably encoded in A's brain, was
somehow able to modulate radiation emanating from A's brain which in due
course was picked up in B's brain where it was duly processed and decoded.
But then the inescapable question presents itself: how did B manage to decode
correctly the relevant telepathic signals? Was B, perhaps, born knowing the ap-
propriate code or did he, at some stage of his development, learn the code?
Either answer rapidly reduces to an absurdity. How could the brain be innately
programmed to recognize the coded equivalent of any idea that might arise
in another person's mind or brain? What if the idea in question was some
human creation that does not exist in the natural environment, how, in that
case, could evolution have equipped our brains to respond to such a concept?
Obviously the telepathic code would have to be acquired just as we have to ac-
quire knowledge of our native language. But then, when and where and hack
is this knowledge acquired? It is only necessary to pose this question to realize
that such an acquisition, of which at no time are we ever aware, would be an
absurd fiction. Moreover, even if we were to assume that, in telepathy, it is not
ideas but words which are transmitted (which would imply, incidentally, that
telepathy could never function across a language divide even then we get nc
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Radical Dualism 169
nearer to an explanation. For the letters or phonemes as encoded in A's brain
would still have to be transferred to B's brain and, once again, we would have
to decide whether B's brain was innately programmed to recognize the coded
equivalent of these linguistic signals or whether B's brain acquired the capacity
to decode them in the course of its development and, either way, we reach an
impasse.
An objection that could be raised at this point�and I am indebted to
Michael Thalbourne for bringing it to my notice � is as follows. Let us suppose
that what is involved in telepathic communication is not any kind of semantic
operation but rather the transmission of an image, a form or may be a sensa-
tion. After all, many ESP experiments suggest that what is apprehended is not
any sort of conceptual idea but rather some purely formal aspect of the target
picture or scene. Let us suppose that A is thinking about, or looking at, an ap-
ple. As a result certain centers of A's sensory cortex are activated and this might
set up some kind of a resonance which then served to activate corresponding
centers in B's sensory cortex so that B became aware of something round and
green in his imagery. We might perhaps invoke Sheldrake's morphic resonance
as the mechanism responsible. This may not be the kind of physics that the
physicalist would welcome but we can let that pass. Now, however, a different
question presses down on us: how is- B able to resonate with A's brain rather
than with the brain of C or D or indeed any other living brain? Certainly
nothing in Sheldrake's concept of morphic resonance suggests an answer. On
the contrary, the whole point of Sheldrake's theory of learning is that the
changes that take place in one brain automatically facilitate similar learning
in all other brains of the same species and that irrespective of time and place.
Unless, therefore, some mechanism could be suggested to explain the kind of
selectivity that telepathy would require we do not have even a glimpse of a
tenable physical theory. There is, for example, nothing in the situation that
could correspond with the tuning mechanisms whereby a radio receiver picks
up the signal from a specific transmitting channel and sheer proximity, the ob-
vious factor on the analogy of sensory communication, would clearly be inap-
plicable in the case of telepathy.
Would the prospects of a physical theory be any better if we took clair-
voyance as the critical phenomenon rather than telepathy? We would at least
be dealing then with a single brain, one that presumably would have to be en-
dowed with something like a radar system. The difficulties here are manifold.
For, even if the requisite energy were available to operate such a system it could
only work if the scanning beam could be suitably modulated by the target ob-
ject in such a way that the reflected signal could then be decoded in the sub-
ject's brain. But one has only to spell out what would be involved if we took
the radar analogy literally to realize how irrelevant it is to the case of the stan-
dard clairvoyant test situation where one is dealing with pictures or symbols
inside envelopes.
Some of you may, at this point, feel that I have already spent too long
belaboring a communication model of ESP considering how few para-
psychologists still take it seriously. Those who are still intent on finding a
physical theory of ESP tend nowadays to turn to quantum theory to point the
way. At the subatomic level we encounter many strange phenomena that pro-
vide counterparts to phenomena which at the macroscopic level would be
deemed paranormal, for example, the property known as "nonlocality" that is
said to govern the behavior of two particles which, though no longer in contact,
remain nevertheless in a correlated state. Could ESP exemplify this principle
of nonlocality? But the most comprehensive and developed theory of psi to
take quantum theory as its point of departure is the so-called observational
theory. This is based on the assumption that every physical system persists in
a state of indeterminacy up to the instant when it is observed and so becomes
determinate. All that we can know about such a system prior to the interven-
tion of an observer is the distribution of probabilities with respect to the possi-
ble values that it can assume when it is observed. If, then, we allow our
observer the power to influence that distribution in a given direction, we have
all that, in principle, we need to account for those nonrandom effects we
identify as a psi effect. Such an observer is then said to represent a "psi
source."
Whether observational theory is scientifically or even logically sound,
whether, as some critics allege, it generates insoluble paradoxes, whether it
derives from a misinterpretation of quantum theory stemming from an idealist
metaphysic, these are all still matters of fierce controversy which are, perhaps
best left to the experts to resolve. The question we have to consider for our pres-
ent purposes is whether, granted that such a theory is legitimate, it would pro-
vide a physicalistic explanation of psi phenomena? To answer this question it
should help if we first ask what exactly we are to understand by the key concept,
"observation"? Does an observation necessarily imply conscious awareness? Or,
can the observation be performed by any suitable recording instrument, by
which term we may include in this context the brain itself? If consciousness is
essential� and physicists, I may say, appear to be very much divided on this
issue in quantum theory � then it follows that there is at least one mental func-
tion, i.e. conscious perception, which would possess a power that is not that
of the brain itself, namely the power to produce retroactive PK. And this con-
tradicts the thesis of physicalism. The attempt to assign a physical meaning to
consciousness by calling it a hidden variable (whatever that may mean in this
context) as E.H. Walker has done, seems to me to beg too many questions to
save the situation for physicalism. If, on the other hand, consciousness is not
essential, then we are left without any explanation as to what it is about brains
that could make them potential psi sources. And without at least some vague
indication as to how brain activity might produce retroactive PK nothing in
observational theory would lend any support to the physicalist thesis.
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4170 The Relentless Question
Radical Dualism 171
The collapse of physicalism that must inevitably follow the recognition of
psi phenomena would not, however, suffice to establish radical dualism unless
we can show that such phenomena are definitely attributable to mind. At the
present time there are various models of psi which challenge what has been
called the "psychobiological paradigm." I have space here to consider only the
two which I believe are the most influential. According to one school of
thought, which I like to call Flewism, in honor of its most articulate exponent,
the English philosopher Antony Flew, nothing of any philosophical import
would follow from the mere existence of paranormal phenomena and, a for-
nothing of any relevance to the mind-body problem. The main argument
to which it appeals is that paranormality can only be defined in negative
terms, in other words it is, precisely, the inexplicability of the phenomena that
makes them of interest to the parapsychologist. But, from such purely negative
characteristics, we cannot hope to derive any positive conception such as would
be implied in calling them manifestations of the mind. A secondary argument
stresses the capriciousness and unpredictability of the phenomena which make
them quite unlike the manifestations of any other known mental ability or
skill.
Flewism has a superficial plausibility, especially for those of a positivistic
turn of mind. Extrachance scoring, it is sometimes said, it just extrachance scor-
ing and we have no right to capitalize on such statistical anomalies by dignify-
ing them with concepts like ESP. This view, however, misses some crucial
points. I will try to illustrate what I mean with the help of an analogy. From
the bald fact that someone has been officially designated an "alien," it does
not follow that that person is without ethnic identity of any kind. All that
follows is that from the official scientific standpoint, it is necessary that
paranormality be defined in negative terms in the first instance and treated as
an anomaly pending discoveries concerning the basic nature of the phenomena
in question. The subsidiary argument of the Flewists fares no better. It is true,
of course, that those who are credited with psi ability seem to have precious
little control over its manifestations. But psi is by no means unique in this
respect among the known range of human abilities. We have very little control
over our intuitions or our occasional creative inspirations and none whatever
over our ability to dream. These are all vital aspects of our mental activity but
they are largely at the mercy of our unconscious. It might indeed be less
misleading if we were to refer to psi as a gift rather than an ability insofar as
the latter may suggest skill and achievement, but that is very far from saying
that it is not a property of mind. Moreover if we leave aside the fact that this
putative ability is, in the existing state of knowledge, neither controllable nor
trainable, we will find abundant evidence from the parapsychological
literature that it behaves much like any other psychological variable. Thus we
find that there are marked individual differences, that performance is highly
sensitive to the prevailing psychological conditions and atmosphere and we
find, above all, that it displays in some degree that unfailing sign of genuine
mental activity, intelligence and purposefulness. This last point is true even
of routine laboratory tests considered a somewhat degenerate manifestation of
the psi faculty.
The other main school of thought which I shall discuss in this connection
is that which takes an acausal view of psi phenomena. It urges us to reject the
commonsense view that there must be a causal connection between, say, the
choice of ESP target and the successful ESP response or between instructing the
subject to aim at a certain PK effect and the production of that effect. Such
causation, it insists, would have to be essentially magical. We should recog-
nize, instead, that the relationship in question is strictly coincidental. But the
coincidence, in this case, is not, as the skeptic would conclude, a mere acci-
dent, it is one imbued with profound psychological significance. Under the
rubric of "synchronicity" psi phenomena are thus, at one stroke, taken out of
the arena of mental activity and transferred to a realm of what one can only
call "cosmic destiny." Astrology and the various rituals of divination involve
similar significant but acausal correspondences which it is assumed are some-
how embedded in the web of our personal lives.
As expounded by a Jung or a Koestler it is a seductive idea but does it yield
a viable and comprehensive theory of psi? As Bob Brier remarked recently in
reviewing a new book on precognition, synchronicity is not so much an ex-
planation of phenomena as a redescription of the puzzlement which they pro-
voke and Flew has rightly pointed out that we do not talk about something's
being a coincidence unless the conjunction in question has some subjective
psychological meaning for us. It is not, therefore, at all easy to say just what
we add to an account of a given psi phenomenon by calling it an instance of
synchronicity. The nearest that I can come to grasping this concept is to take
a literary analogy. Coincidences are common enough in works of fiction
because they are deliberately put there by the author for the sake of the plot.
To talk of meaningful coincidences in real life is to treat life as a kind of cosmic
drama with the implication that these incidents are prearranged by whatever
agency we hold responsible. When Descartes first put forward the doctrine of
radical dualism in the 17th century, many contemporary metaphysicians
declared that it was inconceivable how two such disparate entities as mind and
body could ever interact. Accordingly some, like Leibniz suggested the idea of
a pre-established harmony, mind and body do not interact but events are
beneficently prearranged so that whenever I perform an act of will my limbs
move in the appropriate way and, similarly, whenever my sense organs are duly
stimulated I experience the appropriate sensations. Synchronicity extends the
idea of a pre-established harmony to the case of psi phenomena and it strikes
me as no less unparsimonious in the assumptions that it has to make. In
both cases, it is far simpler to suppose that a causal transaction is, indeed,
involved.
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172 The Relentless Question
This concludes my case so I will proceed to sum up. The thesis I put for-
ward was that, if we accept the parapsychological evidence, we must abandon
physicalism. Physicalism can be made compatible with normal mental activity
but not with paranormal mental activity. The reason is that every attempt to
account for psi phenomena in terms of brain activity inevitably breaks down.
In the case of a physical communication model it breaks down, not as is often
supposed because we do not know of any suitable radiation that could act as
the carrier of the information but, rather, because there is no conceivable way
in which the message could be encoded at the source and decoded at the receiv-
ing end. The attempt to overcome this objection by appealing to some kind
of morphic resonance linking one brain with another is useless unless there is
some principle that would account for the selectivity that is involved. Resort
to quantum physics and the observational theory brought us no nearer to the
goal of a physical explanation for either we have to invoke consciousness, which
is not a physical variable at all, or we have simply to attribute psi capacity to
the brain without any indication as to why brain activity should have this con-
sequence. Having thus shown that physicalism cannot work, once psi phe-
nomena are admitted, the question then arose as to whether such phenomena
must necessarily be ascribed to the mind. We discussed two alternative posi-
tions: (a) that such phenomena might turn out to be pure unattached
anomalies of nature, trivial hiccups in an otherwise orderly cosmos or (b) that
they could be due to an acausal matching of events as implied by the idea of
"synchronicity" as some basic cosmic principle over and above space, time, and
causation. Since neither of these positions could offer a plausible account of
psi we conclude that radical dualism is the obvious alternative to physicalism
granted the existence of psi.
Epilogue 1990: Reply to My Critics
In a lengthy paper "Pragmatic Dualism and Bifurcated Idealism," Evan
Walker takes me to task for saying that psi phenomena afford the only em-
pirical evidence for challenging the physicalist position. He insists that, what-
ever some physicists may have said to the contrary, QM (quantum mechanics)
does require the introduction of a conscious observer in a way that treats con-
sciousness as a nonphysical variable. I am in no position to dispute what
Walker may say about QM, one way or another, but I find him an uncomfor-
table ally. He says, for example, "But things have now proceeded beyond the
point of an arguable issue. The tests of Bell's theorem now show factually that
the physicalistic interpretation of an outside independent reality apart from
observation is specious." Does this mean, I wonder, that there just was no
universe until conscious observers came on the scene? But, if so, whence came
these conscious observers.? This, indeed, would be idealism with a vengeance
and I must repudiate it.
Radical Dualism 173
Hywel Lewis likewise objects to my saying that parapsychology alone
affords the empirical basis for challenging physicalism. If we reflect carefully
enough, he insists, on the nature of our consciousness, for example on our ex-
perience of pain, it becomes intuitively self-evident that such experiences can-
not be equated with any set of physical conditions. I agree with Lewis and I
share his intuitions. Unfortunately, so many neuroscientists and
"neurophilosophers" that I come across evidently lack such intuitions. On the
other hand, i f psi were to be demonstrated beyond cavil, they would be truly
stymied.
Frank Tribbe is also of the opinion that "apart from psi there are a numbei
of areas where empirical data support mind supremacy." He discusses certain
fringe developments in the life sciences by way of illustration including the
work of the late Harold Burr and the more recent theories ofRupert Sheldrake
which have been widely publicized. I can make no comment with regard te
Burr, but, with regard to She/drake, who interests me very much, I would agrei
that, if he were to be vindicated, this would indeed necessitate a radical revi
sion of the prevailing scientific world view that has hitherto provided th,
justification of physicalism. For example, the She/drake effect is supposed
apply even to certain inanimate systems such as the crystalization of net
organic compounds. However, all this is still very speculative, at presen
Sheldrakean science is even more controversial than parapsychology itself
Both Alan Anderson and Steve Rosen raise yet again the problem tha
baffled Descartes himself namely how, on a radically dualist position, min,
and matter could ever interact in the first instance. Anderson declares that
set myself "the impossible task of defending a universe divided against itself
while Rosen complains that I fail "to provide the smallest affirmative clue ,
to how mind�radically disparate from body as it is purported to be � can ent,
into causal interaction with the body." Their respective remedies, however, a;
very different. Thus, Anderson, in his brief commentary, defends the ideal;
option which I had the temerity to dismiss as too fanciful. He, on the contra?:
can make no sense of matter conceived as an "independently existing, life/es
meaningless, purposeless something." Rosen, on the other hand, in his mu,
lengthier critique, takes his stand on a monistic or holistic conception of ti
universe inspired, as he tells us, by Spinoza rather than Descartes and by su,
modern thinkers as Alfred Whitehead.
What, then, can I say except that we must agree to differ? I can or
reiterate what I have said elsephere that I know of no logical argument ti
would exclude the possibility that a cause might be of a radically differe
nature from its effect. I would side, here, with Hume who argued that, in pr.;
ciple, anything could be the cause of anything else and only observation c
establish what causes what. As to whether I have been too harsh on idealist
it may be that I have a blind spot in this connection. I would concede ti
idealism does make some kind of sense given a theistic frame of reference a
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The Relentless Question
where I and Anderson part company is precisely that I lack his religious com-
mitment. Hence I have no problem in accepting the stuff of the universe as
"lifeless, meaningless and purposeless" as science appears to indicate. On the
contrary, my problem is why, under some divine dispensation, the world
should have the semblance that it does.
Rosen's universe, on the other hand, insofar as I can make anything of it
and insofar as it may be relevant to psi, strikes me as a reversion to the animistic
universe of the hermeticists, neoplatonists and other practitioners of natural
magic who flourished so vigorously during the Renaissance before the
mechanistic universe of Galileo and Descartes had yet established its
supremacy. Understandably, Rosen, too, clasps Sheldrake to his bosom. I have
some sympathy with this approach inasmuch as I believe that psi is more at
home in the context of traditional magic than it is in the context of science.
Where I would take issue with Rosen is in his attempts to enlist modern physics
to his aid.
Extreme Phenomena and
the Problem of Credibility
In August 1987 , the Parapsychological Association held their annual con-
vention at the University of Edinburgh. Robert Morris, the newly appointed
Koestler Professor ofParapsychology, had been appointed chair of the program
committee and it was he who- invited me to give a talk on a topic of my own
choosing. What follows is based on that talk. The present version is the result
of the revisions I made after I had been invited, by a group of Australian
academics, to contribute a chapter to a book they were editing to be calledEx-
ploring the Paranormal: Different Perspectives on Belief and Experience
(Zollschan et al. 1989).
Here I take further the ideas' put forward in the chapterI had contributed
to the Skeptic's Handbook of Parapsychology (Kurtz 1985) (see pages 147-64).
While I have no quarrel with those who, for reasons of caution or conservatism,
prefer to suspend judgment as to the reality of the paranormal, I wanted to
challenge those who, like Antony Flew, claim on general principles the right
to dismiss all evidence purporting to demonstrate the existence of the para-
normal no matter how strong it may otherwise appear. Here I have selected five
historical cases for which no credible counter-explanation has ever been offered
which are not merely paranormal but outrageously so, thus making it all the
more imperative for the skeptic to try demolishing them. I conclude by discuss-
ing what we are to do with such cases if we do decide to "take them on board
with us as part of our intellectual baggage."
The Problem of Credibility
From time to time one comes across a claim about which one can say only
that it makes one gasp. It goes so far beyond anything in one's experience, it
makes such a mockery of all one's presumptions about what sort of a world it
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