CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/16

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02066868
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RIPPUB
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U
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15
Document Creation Date: 
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
May 16, 1959
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787488].pdf691.81 KB
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V7/I f/Z /id rf /I 1 Z/ZZ/ZZZ/Z/ZYZ/1 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 NNW T95 -ECRET 11 3.5(c) /-14-''Ij3.3(h)(2) 16 May 1959 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 000l WENT NO NO el IANc-;F: Cl c'q : or. cl CLAS!'H. cH4N(0 TO TVA" fv, NEXT HE V[i= DATE, fr WI AUTH 1 7 9e,2 DATE.it riE VIEWER ZA/746 fiZZZIri; � e7d +Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C 020668687ZZ' yjr, � ed "My, eZZA Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 TAD r�OCT Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 16 MAY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev continues to show irrita- tion over Nasir; Cairo informe0 of Soviet leader's latest criticismi II. ASIA-AFRICA Nasir not hopeful of UAR rapproche- ment with Jordan and Tunisia. Yemen seeking improved relations with Saudi Arabia.r Thai and South Vietnamese officials to hold mid-May meeting to plan covert operations against Cambodia. South Korea's allegations that US supports "Rhee line" reported damaging American interests in Japant III. THE WEST De Gaulle indifferent to advice of French officials that he permit US atomic storage sites in France. Argentina - Economic stabilization program encountering intense op- position; Frondizi reorganizes cabinet. TOPSFJCRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 16 May 1959 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-UAR: Khrushchev continues to show irritation with Wasir and his policies, although the flow of Soviet mil- itary and economic aid to the UAR continues. The editor of the Indian lettiSt magazine Blitz, who interviewed Khrushchev on 7 May, told the UAR chair in Moscow that Khrushchev had compared Nasir with "a frog which believed it had become a bull." The charge has reported this statement to Cairo, and Nasir, who has reacted strongly to Khrushchev's public crit- icisms, may again be provoked into denunciations of bloc activities and intentions. (Page 1) II. ASIA-AFRICA UAR: aL'resident Nasir apparently does not intend to con- ciliate other relatively pro-Western Arab and North African states, such as Jordan and Tunisia, in order to rally support for his anti-Communist campaign. In a reflective discussion on 9 May, Nasir gave Ambassador Hare the impression that the main obstacle to such a reconciliation is the personalities of the other leaders. Nasir took the general position that while he would not ohieet to a rapprochement he was not par- ticularly hopefug (Page 2) Yemen - Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince :Badr, turning cooler toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, is seeking to improve his relations with Saudi Arabia as part of the general re- orientation of Yemeni foreign policy which has been taking place recently. II WA 11 TOP RET A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868r A / � : 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 log/ 4,440 Argentina: President Frondizi's cabinet reorganization, in- cluding thus far the ministers of foreign affairs and agriculture and the secretaries of commerce, finances and transportation, probably presages no change in the US-backed economic stabili- zation :program. Opposition to the program is more intense than Frondizi anticipated and is being exploited by Communists and extreme Peronistas to promote labor agitation and violence. (Page 7) 16 May 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP A 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 N., AZ MIL I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev Again Disparages Nasir Soviet Premier Khrushchev has again criticized the UAIt's policies and Nasir personally--most recently in an interview on 7 May with Russy Karanjia, the generally pro-Communist editor of the Indian magazine Blitz. Karanjia told the UAR charg�n Moscow that Khrushchey's comments about Nasir were "marked with bitterness" and that he had compared the UAR President with "a frog which believed it had become a bull," according to an 8 May message from the charg�o Cairo. Khrushchev re- portedly was most aroused over the UARts attacks on Communist doctrine, accusations that Arab Communists are agents of Moscow, and Nasir's statement in late March that during the Suez crisis the UAR "stood alone." Karanjia's interview with Khrushchev follows his widely publicized interview in mid-April with Nasir in which the UAR President accused bloc leaders and Arab Communists of working to establish a "Red Crescent" in the Middle East. While the Soviet press and radio have continued to answer other charges emanating from the UAR press, Moscow has not given publicity to this attack by Nasir. Nasir reacted very strongly to Khrushchey's public criticisms in March. Khrushchev apologized for some of his remarks�including the claim that Nasir had used the "language of imperialists, '9 Having been informed by the UAR Charg�f IChrushchey's more�recent aspersions, Nasir may again be provoked into denouncing bloc activities a7d intentions in the Mid- dle East. 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 vie* I I. ASIA-AFRICA Nasir Comments on Relations With Arab States (41 an interview with Ambassador Hare on 9 May, Nasir indicated that he does not contemplate seeking a reconciliation with such Arab states as Jordan and Tunisia in a bid for support of his anti-Communist campaign. Ambassador Hare received the impression that "the main obstacle to reconciliation was a question of personalities," with Nasir's personal dislike for some Arab leaders supplementing more basic differences over questions affecting the Arab world. However, steRs toward a rapprochement would probably not be rebuffed by Cairo.' (I�__Tasir again protested that Bourguiba's accusations against the UAR were unjustified, stating that the Tunisian President feared the growth of Arab nationalism among his people. Regard- ing Jordan, he claimed the UAR was acting with restraint, but had no intention of ever appearing "cozy" with the government of King Husayn. He added that the recent change in government there had made the situation more difficult because of the "poor record" of the new prime minister, Hazza Majalli, but the "last thing" the UAR desired was the "burden" of taking over Jordan and its problems:I Diasir brushed off relations with Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia as posing no immediate problems. However, he suggested that trouble with Saudi Arabia might follow if King Saud resumed an active role. On relations with the Sudan, he complained that "foreign influence" was the main difficulty, and the current mili- tary crisis had also retarded efforts to solve the maior problem of an agreement on division of the Nile waters SECRET 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 _ _ _ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 'Noir Developments in Yemen The Yemeni regent, Crown Prince Badr, appears to be continuing his gestures toward a general reorientation of his country's foreign policy, and is seeking to improve relations with Saudi Arabia. an emissary of Crown Prince Badr told a Saudi iplomatic official in Cairo that Badr wished "to clear the air," and that if anything were wrong between the two nations, Badr "would like to put it right." The Yemeni emissary, implying that Bades assumption of power as regent when the Imam left for Italy was respon- sible for the reorientation, noted that Badr had already sought an understanding with the United States and Britain. Yemen's relations with Saudi Arabia have been cool for the last year and a half, partly as a result of King Saud's efforts to subvert tribes in northern and eastern Yemen. Saud's action grew out of his alarm over Yemen's increasingly close relations with the Soviet bloc. Badr announced unprecedented reforms aimed at making the govern- ment administration efficient and eliminating "bribery" and "embezzlement" All government officials were given notice to put their affairs in order, pending issuance of new direc- tives. The Yemenis are reported to have begun to curtail bloc ac- tivity. Some Soviet doctors have been sent out of Yemen, and the bloc aircraft pilots are reported to have been placed under closer supervision. Basically, the Yemeni shift reflects an attempt by the Imam and Badr to line up with Nasir without sub- mitting completely to Egyptian control. Badr was informed by that a group of "Russians" there had taken down the Yemeni flag and thrown it on the ground. Whether or not the report is true, it could serve as a pretext for further curtailment of bloc activity in Yemen, and facilitate development of a ess favorable attitude toward the USSR by the Yemeni public. 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/0/21 CO2066868 South Vietnam and/Thailand Contguie Intrigues Against Cambodia (Thai and South Vietnamese officials are to meet secretly in Vietnam this month at Saigon's initiative to plan future covert operations against the Sihanouk regime in Cambodia, The meeting was arranged during talks last month at the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok. Gen- eral Prapat, one of the most powerful figures in the Sarit gov- ernment, subsequently was contacted directly by Saigon. He approved the general aims of the conference and appointed an emissary.] (=South Vietnam and Thailand both have continued to assist Cambodian dissidents, led by expatriates Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh in anti-Sihanouk activities following the abortive Dap Chhuon plot last February. These efforts have included the printing and distributing of revolutionary tracts in Cambodia and anti-Sihanouk broadcasts over mobile clandestine transmit- ters. Vietnam has taken the lead in this and previous efforts against Sihanouk, while Thailand has been more circumspect lyietnamese and Thai interference in Cambodia has had the effect of further consolidating Sihanouk's position and increas- ing his tendency to turn toward the Communist bloc. Moreover, Cambodian awareness of these intrigues forms the basis of Phnom Penh's present strong suspicions of the United States SEC T 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 VIP "Rhee line" Damages American Interests in Japan Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo believes that United States interests are being jeopardized by Seoul's "consistent and willful" allegations that the United States supports South Korea's unilat- erally established "Rhee line." The most recent instance of this is the circulation of a South Korean Foreign Ministry memoran- dum to all foreign mission chiefs in Seoul which cited lines estab lished by US authorities during the occupation of Japan and the Korean war as precedents for the "Rhee line," South Korea for- bids Japanese fishing inside the lines, claiming that conservation of fishery resources and the inherent right of self-defense justify its position] Oapanese leaders accuse Rhee of resorting to "hostage diplo- macy" in seizing Japanese fishing boats and holding the fisher- men in an effort to force Japan to settle outstanding issues on Korean terms. Prime Minister ICishi has said that these ques tions must be solved before relations with South Korea can be normalized. If South Korea continues its present policys, increas- ing domestic pressure may force the Kishi government to carry the matter to the United Nations. Such action has already been suggested by some diplomatic missions in Tokyo`.-1 in efforts to seize Japanese fishing boats operating in the vicinity of the controversial "Rhee line." Seoul may have issued such an order in retaliation for Japan's failure to break off the repatriation talks at Geneva between Japanese and North Korean Red Cross officials. South Korean Coast Guard vessel failed in an attempt to seize Japanese boats well outside the "Rhee the capture of a Japanese fishing boat over 120 miles off the Korean coast in the boundary area of the "Rhee line." Another ship reported the pursuit of ten Japanese boats in the same area. TOPSFJCRET 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 III. THE WEST De Gaulle Still Unlikely to Approve Storage of American Atomic Warheads in France CP_resident de Ga ienasruDuxrecurigrenc o icials who have urged him to permit storage of American atomic warheads in France for the use of the nine US Air Force strike sauadrons there, De Gaulle reportedly gave short shrift to a plea of Chief of Staff General Ely and said to Premier Debi* "Who cares if the Americans remove three squadrons to Great Britain?" When Debre argued that removal of the squadrons would weaken France's defense posture, De Gaulle reportedly replied, 'We will build our own ICBM.s.1 [Even though this information was probably designed to reach US officials, the French President has long opposed foreign con- trol of nuclear weapons in France, and he is not likely to change his mind because of the Berlin crisis. He has stated that he does not expect the Berlin crisis to erupt into war. His decision to with- draw the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control was taken against the advice of his top military and political adviserS1 LHis opposition to integration of French national forces in NATO and to foreign control of atomic weapons depots in France is based on the grounds that it is a derogation of French sovereignty. De Gaulle also hopes that his adamant position on this issue will further his primary objective of attaining French "equality" in West- ern tripartite global policy determination-.1 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 Argentine Cabinet Reorganization The Argentine economy minister's statement to Ambas- sador Beaulac that the present cabinet reorganization does not presage a change in the US-backed stabilization program is in line with recent policy pronouncements which underscore the need to press the program. He admitted that opposition to Frondizi's program was more intense than had been anticipated. Thus far Frondizi has accepted the resignations of the minis- ters of foreign affairs and agriculture, the secretaries of fi- nance, commerce, and transportation, and his trusted personal adviser, Rogelio Frigerio. Other resignations, especially of lesser officials, are expected before replacements are named next week. The reorganization, contemplated earlier by Frondizi, was probably timed to counter recently renewed military charges that some officials are inept and too complacent about Peronism and Communism in government. Such charges are being played up by various discontented military elements, especially retired naval supporters of former Vice President Rojas, to gain support for a coup. Most active officers, how- ever, still prefer constitutional government. Frondizi's dependence on the military has been increased by continuing labor agitation and violence, led mainly by Com- munists and extremist; Peronistas. Communists were issued bottles of gasoline to force bus drivers to comply with the illegal general strike called on 15 May, and the press reports one bus was actually burned. In addition, the discovery on 14 May of serious sabotage of tele- phone installations and fire-fighting apparatus has reportedly raised fears that saboteursiublic utilities. SEC 16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 CONFIDEWRAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 N100` `1" THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director ,..������� �-� �ft array a Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 I'� l/ji/7:a://7iryy/y/f/r/r/ZZ/Irfr,/Zlf/iZfZlrZ/rs/f/IZ{/;/:47Z/zWZ; r 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2066868 f.if�Azio Aft. 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