CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/16
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02066868
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date:
February 27, 2020
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 16, 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787488].pdf | 691.81 KB |
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16 May 1959
CENTRAL
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16 MAY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev continues to show irrita-
tion over Nasir; Cairo informe0 of
Soviet leader's latest criticismi
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir not hopeful of UAR rapproche-
ment with Jordan and Tunisia.
Yemen seeking improved relations
with Saudi Arabia.r
Thai and South Vietnamese officials
to hold mid-May meeting to plan
covert operations against Cambodia.
South Korea's allegations that US
supports "Rhee line" reported
damaging American interests in
Japant
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle indifferent to advice of
French officials that he permit US
atomic storage sites in France.
Argentina - Economic stabilization
program encountering intense op-
position; Frondizi reorganizes
cabinet.
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, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-UAR: Khrushchev continues to show irritation
with Wasir and his policies, although the flow of Soviet mil-
itary and economic aid to the UAR continues. The editor of the
Indian lettiSt magazine Blitz, who interviewed Khrushchev on
7 May, told the UAR chair in Moscow that Khrushchev had
compared Nasir with "a frog which believed it had become a
bull." The charge has reported this statement to Cairo, and
Nasir, who has reacted strongly to Khrushchev's public crit-
icisms, may again be provoked into denunciations of bloc
activities and intentions. (Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR: aL'resident Nasir apparently does not intend to con-
ciliate other relatively pro-Western Arab and North African
states, such as Jordan and Tunisia, in order to rally support
for his anti-Communist campaign. In a reflective discussion
on 9 May, Nasir gave Ambassador Hare the impression that
the main obstacle to such a reconciliation is the personalities
of the other leaders. Nasir took the general position that
while he would not ohieet to a rapprochement he was not par-
ticularly hopefug
(Page 2)
Yemen - Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince :Badr, turning
cooler toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, is seeking to improve
his relations with Saudi Arabia as part of the general re-
orientation of Yemeni foreign policy which has been taking
place recently.
II
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Argentina: President Frondizi's cabinet reorganization, in-
cluding thus far the ministers of foreign affairs and agriculture
and the secretaries of commerce, finances and transportation,
probably presages no change in the US-backed economic stabili-
zation :program. Opposition to the program is more intense
than Frondizi anticipated and is being exploited by Communists
and extreme Peronistas to promote labor agitation and violence.
(Page 7)
16 May 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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N., AZ MIL
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Again Disparages Nasir
Soviet Premier Khrushchev has again criticized the UAIt's
policies and Nasir personally--most recently in an interview on
7 May with Russy Karanjia, the generally pro-Communist editor
of the Indian magazine Blitz. Karanjia told the UAR charg�n
Moscow that Khrushchey's comments about Nasir were "marked
with bitterness" and that he had compared the UAR President
with "a frog which believed it had become a bull," according to
an 8 May message from the charg�o Cairo. Khrushchev re-
portedly was most aroused over the UARts attacks on Communist
doctrine, accusations that Arab Communists are agents of Moscow,
and Nasir's statement in late March that during the Suez crisis the
UAR "stood alone."
Karanjia's interview with Khrushchev follows his widely
publicized interview in mid-April with Nasir in which the UAR
President accused bloc leaders and Arab Communists of working
to establish a "Red Crescent" in the Middle East. While the Soviet
press and radio have continued to answer other charges emanating
from the UAR press, Moscow has not given publicity to this attack
by Nasir.
Nasir reacted very strongly to Khrushchey's public criticisms
in March. Khrushchev apologized
for some of his remarks�including the claim that Nasir had used
the "language of imperialists, '9 Having been informed by the UAR
Charg�f IChrushchey's more�recent aspersions, Nasir may again
be provoked into denouncing bloc activities a7d intentions in the Mid-
dle East.
16 May 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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vie*
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir Comments on Relations With Arab States
(41 an interview with Ambassador Hare on 9 May, Nasir
indicated that he does not contemplate seeking a reconciliation
with such Arab states as Jordan and Tunisia in a bid for support
of his anti-Communist campaign. Ambassador Hare received
the impression that "the main obstacle to reconciliation was a
question of personalities," with Nasir's personal dislike for some
Arab leaders supplementing more basic differences over questions
affecting the Arab world. However, steRs toward a rapprochement
would probably not be rebuffed by Cairo.'
(I�__Tasir again protested that Bourguiba's accusations against
the UAR were unjustified, stating that the Tunisian President
feared the growth of Arab nationalism among his people. Regard-
ing Jordan, he claimed the UAR was acting with restraint, but
had no intention of ever appearing "cozy" with the government of
King Husayn. He added that the recent change in government there
had made the situation more difficult because of the "poor record"
of the new prime minister, Hazza Majalli, but the "last thing"
the UAR desired was the "burden" of taking over Jordan and its
problems:I
Diasir brushed off relations with Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi
Arabia as posing no immediate problems. However, he suggested
that trouble with Saudi Arabia might follow if King Saud resumed
an active role. On relations with the Sudan, he complained that
"foreign influence" was the main difficulty, and the current mili-
tary crisis had also retarded efforts to solve the maior problem
of an agreement on division of the Nile waters
SECRET
16 May 59
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'Noir
Developments in Yemen
The Yemeni regent, Crown Prince Badr, appears to be
continuing his gestures toward a general reorientation of his
country's foreign policy, and is seeking to improve relations
with Saudi Arabia.
an emissary of Crown Prince Badr told a Saudi
iplomatic official in Cairo that Badr wished "to clear the air,"
and that if anything were wrong between the two nations, Badr
"would like to put it right."
The Yemeni emissary, implying that Bades assumption
of power as regent when the Imam left for Italy was respon-
sible for the reorientation, noted that Badr had already sought
an understanding with the United States and Britain. Yemen's
relations with Saudi Arabia have been cool for the last year and
a half, partly as a result of King Saud's efforts to subvert tribes
in northern and eastern Yemen. Saud's action grew out of his
alarm over Yemen's increasingly close relations with the Soviet
bloc.
Badr
announced unprecedented reforms aimed at making the govern-
ment administration efficient and eliminating "bribery" and
"embezzlement" All government officials were given notice
to put their affairs in order, pending issuance of new direc-
tives.
The Yemenis are reported to have begun to curtail bloc ac-
tivity. Some Soviet doctors have been sent out of Yemen, and
the bloc aircraft pilots are reported to have been placed under
closer supervision. Basically, the Yemeni shift reflects an
attempt by the Imam and Badr to line up with Nasir without sub-
mitting completely to Egyptian control. Badr was informed by
that a group
of "Russians" there had taken down the Yemeni flag and thrown
it on the ground. Whether or not the report is true, it could
serve as a pretext for further curtailment of bloc activity in
Yemen, and facilitate development of a ess favorable attitude
toward the USSR by the Yemeni public.
16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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South Vietnam and/Thailand Contguie Intrigues Against Cambodia
(Thai and South Vietnamese officials are to meet secretly in
Vietnam this month at Saigon's initiative to plan future covert
operations against the Sihanouk regime in Cambodia,
The meeting was arranged during
talks last month at the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok. Gen-
eral Prapat, one of the most powerful figures in the Sarit gov-
ernment, subsequently was contacted directly by Saigon. He
approved the general aims of the conference and appointed an
emissary.]
(=South Vietnam and Thailand both have continued to assist
Cambodian dissidents, led by expatriates Sam Sary and Son Ngoc
Thanh in anti-Sihanouk activities following the abortive Dap
Chhuon plot last February. These efforts have included the
printing and distributing of revolutionary tracts in Cambodia
and anti-Sihanouk broadcasts over mobile clandestine transmit-
ters. Vietnam has taken the lead in this and previous efforts
against Sihanouk, while Thailand has been more circumspect
lyietnamese and Thai interference in Cambodia has had the
effect of further consolidating Sihanouk's position and increas-
ing his tendency to turn toward the Communist bloc. Moreover,
Cambodian awareness of these intrigues forms the basis of
Phnom Penh's present strong suspicions of the United States
SEC T
16 May 59
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"Rhee line" Damages American Interests in Japan
Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo believes that United States
interests are being jeopardized by Seoul's "consistent and willful"
allegations that the United States supports South Korea's unilat-
erally established "Rhee line." The most recent instance of this
is the circulation of a South Korean Foreign Ministry memoran-
dum to all foreign mission chiefs in Seoul which cited lines estab
lished by US authorities during the occupation of Japan and the
Korean war as precedents for the "Rhee line," South Korea for-
bids Japanese fishing inside the lines, claiming that conservation
of fishery resources and the inherent right of self-defense justify
its position]
Oapanese leaders accuse Rhee of resorting to "hostage diplo-
macy" in seizing Japanese fishing boats and holding the fisher-
men in an effort to force Japan to settle outstanding issues on
Korean terms. Prime Minister ICishi has said that these ques
tions must be solved before relations with South Korea can be
normalized. If South Korea continues its present policys, increas-
ing domestic pressure may force the Kishi government to carry
the matter to the United Nations. Such action has already been
suggested by some diplomatic missions in Tokyo`.-1
in
efforts to seize Japanese fishing boats operating in the
vicinity of the controversial "Rhee line." Seoul may have issued
such an order in retaliation for Japan's failure to break off the
repatriation talks at Geneva between Japanese and North Korean
Red Cross officials.
South Korean Coast Guard vessel failed in an
attempt to seize Japanese boats well outside the "Rhee
the capture of a Japanese fishing boat
over 120 miles off the Korean coast in the boundary area of the
"Rhee line." Another ship reported the pursuit of ten Japanese
boats in the same area.
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16 May 59
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Still Unlikely to Approve Storage of American Atomic
Warheads in France
CP_resident de Ga ienasruDuxrecurigrenc o icials who
have urged him to permit storage of American atomic warheads
in France for the use of the nine US Air Force strike sauadrons
there,
De Gaulle reportedly
gave short shrift to a plea of Chief of Staff General Ely and
said to Premier Debi* "Who cares if the Americans remove
three squadrons to Great Britain?" When Debre argued that
removal of the squadrons would weaken France's defense posture,
De Gaulle reportedly replied, 'We will build our own ICBM.s.1
[Even though this information was probably designed to reach
US officials, the French President has long opposed foreign con-
trol of nuclear weapons in France, and he is not likely to change
his mind because of the Berlin crisis. He has stated that he does
not expect the Berlin crisis to erupt into war. His decision to with-
draw the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control
was taken against the advice of his top military and political adviserS1
LHis opposition to integration of French national forces in
NATO and to foreign control of atomic weapons depots in France
is based on the grounds that it is a derogation of French sovereignty.
De Gaulle also hopes that his adamant position on this issue will
further his primary objective of attaining French "equality" in West-
ern tripartite global policy determination-.1
16 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Argentine Cabinet Reorganization
The Argentine economy minister's statement to Ambas-
sador Beaulac that the present cabinet reorganization does not
presage a change in the US-backed stabilization program is in
line with recent policy pronouncements which underscore the
need to press the program. He admitted that opposition to
Frondizi's program was more intense than had been anticipated.
Thus far Frondizi has accepted the resignations of the minis-
ters of foreign affairs and agriculture, the secretaries of fi-
nance, commerce, and transportation, and his trusted personal
adviser, Rogelio Frigerio. Other resignations, especially of
lesser officials, are expected before replacements are named
next week.
The reorganization, contemplated earlier by Frondizi,
was probably timed to counter recently renewed military
charges that some officials are inept and too complacent about
Peronism and Communism in government. Such charges are
being played up by various discontented military elements,
especially retired naval supporters of former Vice President
Rojas, to gain support for a coup. Most active officers, how-
ever, still prefer constitutional government.
Frondizi's dependence on the military has been increased
by continuing labor agitation and violence, led mainly by Com-
munists and extremist; Peronistas.
Communists were issued bottles of gasoline to
force bus drivers to comply with the illegal general strike called
on 15 May, and the press reports one bus was actually burned.
In addition, the discovery on 14 May of serious sabotage of tele-
phone installations and fire-fighting apparatus has reportedly
raised fears that saboteursiublic
utilities.
SEC
16 May 59
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CONFIDEWRAL
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N100` `1"
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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