<SANITIZED>

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02062642
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 90
• Document Creation Date: July 11, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-00311
• Publication Date: November 1, 1971

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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
THE UBIQUITOUS KGB
"At the rate KGB agents are flowing back to the motherland,"
quipped one magazine, "Mbscow's perennial housing shortage may
soon become critical." In September Oleg Lyalin, member of the
Soviet Trade Mission in London exposed the espionage activities,
including plans for sabotage, that sent packing 105 Soviet officials.
Then, early in October Anatole Chebotarev, a reputed friend of
Lyalin's and a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Brussels,
first disappeared and then five days later surfaced in England to
give Western intelligence officers a list of KGB and GRU (special
military espionage) agents operating out of Brussels. By mid-month,
the Belgian Foreign Ministry announced that, as a result of
Chebotarev's revelations, Soviet officials would be quietly
expelled.
In England, Lyalin exposed and Her Majesty's Government
expelled, officials in just about every phase of Soviet activity
in that country: the Embassy, Trade MiSsion, Inturist Travel Agency,
Moscow Narodny Bank of London, Sovexportfilm, and other commercial
organizations. In Belgium, NATO circles have confirmed that
Chebotarev and his former coworkers from the Trade Mission and
such commercial organizations as Sovflot, Aeroflot, SovexportfiIm,
the Scaldia-Volga (a Soviet-Belgian "joint venture" enterprise) auto
plant, Belso, etc., were snooping around NATO in Brussels and the
headquarters of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in
Europe) in Casteau, near Mons. At this writing, it is thought
that, on the basis of information from Chebotarev, The Hague
might act to put an end to Soviet espionage activities in
BrunssuM, The Netherlands, where AFCENT (Allied Forces in
Central Europe) is based.
The decisions to go ahead with the recent mass evictions of
Soviet officials from London with a blast of trumpets instead of
removing them quietly a few at a time, was undoubtedly taken in
the hope that this would shock the Soviets into behaving less
presumptuously. Britain had already announced the expulsion of
three Soviet spies earlier in the year.* And, according to the
London Daily Telegraph of 21 April 1971, the year before Britain
had demanded the witrndrawal of seven Soviet diplomats (one from
the Embassy and six from the Trade Mission) and had refused to
*Daily Telegraph, London, of 22 and 23 June carried articles
describing the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats:
Dmitriy.Sorokin, Lev SherStnev, and Valeriy Chusovitin.
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accept ten others (four for the Embassy and six for the Trade
Mission). The expelled diplomats were thought to have been
after industrial rather than military secrets and the ten
refused admittance were suspected of having similar missions.
Their exclusion was a clear signal to Moscow that British
security services were not only alert to the activities of Soviet
officials already in London, but also that they had dossiers on
other Soviet officials being groomed for espionage of one kind or
another. In Moscow, the signal was either ignored or misinterpreted.
Many Western government officials have expressed the opinion
that Soviet espionage activity in Western Europe was increasing in
direct proportion to the USSR's growing economic involvement with
that area and its stepped-up propaganda and political action pro-
grams in support of the Soviet version of "European Security."
The September and October revelations cannot help but bolster
this argument. Nevertheless, based on other instances of ex-
pulsions announced so far this year, Soviet spying and subversion-
fomenting on a world-wide scale has not been curtailed because of
the KGB's stepped-up activities in Western Europe.
Signals from Kinshasa's General Mobutu have also been
misread in Moscow. Soviet meddling in internal Congolese affairs
has already twice caused the Congo to sever diplomatic
relations with the USSR. Yet, again this year General Mobutu was
forced to take action: in mid-July some 20 diplomats and non-
diplomatic staff members of the Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and
other East Bloc foreign missions were expelled because of their
suspected involvement in the June Kinshasa University disorders
that eventually resulted in mass arrests and the temporary shut-
down of the university. The existence of a subversive student
network and the role of European Communist functionaries in
fomenting trouble within them were revealed by Agence CongOlaise de
Presse on 5 August, but the names of those expelled were not
revealed.
Accra still remembers Soviet Embassy influence over former
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and how the only opposition
to the coup of February 1966 --- which was staged largely to
prevent any increase of that influence --- came from the
Soviet-trained Presidential Guard that had been set up outside of
army control. Twenty members of the Soviet Embassy were then
expelled along with nearly 1,000 Soviet technicians and their
dependents. In 1967, Ghana was forced to expel two Soviet press
representatives from Novosti and Pravda because they were
"committing slanderous propaganda�TOariSt the country" and
working to get Nkrumah back in power.
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This year, so far, the Government of Ghana has again been
driven to the extreme measure of ousting two Soviet diplomats.
The first deportee was Embassy Counselor Valter Vinogradov who
was apprehended in Accra with cabinet documents in his pocket.
After much diplomatic bargaining, the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry
agreed not to publicize the Vinogradov case in exchange for the
Soviet Ambassador's pledge that his staff would refrain from
further subversion in Ghana. However, as the Accra Daily
da
gger
episode hicreported on 23 July, "before this cloak and
episo e:could be buried," another Soviet spy, Trade Mission
official Gennadiy Potemkin had been caught red-handed with
secret documents ferreted out of special branch files.
Although Potemkin was not a diplomat, he was using a diplomatic
car at the time of his arrest and at first claimed diplomatic
immunity, giving his name as Butsan. Potemkin had a diplomatic
identity card in the name of Anatoliy Butsan, who left Ghana in
1966 and who had been deported from the Congo in 1963.
In: late July the Sudanese Communist Party, evidently with
the advice and support of Soviet officials, staged a coup against
the Numairy regime. After being restored to power, Numairy had
the chief plotters, including the leaders of the Sudanese
Communist Party arrested, courtmartialed and executed. Some
1,500 Communists reportedly were arrested. In the face of
harsh Criticism of the purge by the Soviet press, the Numairy regime
charged the Soviets with complicity and expelled the Soviet
Ambassador, Anatoliy Nikolayev and Embassy Counselor Mikhail
Orlov. . Nikolayev was reportedly the only foreign envoy to have
met with the coup plotters during the brief period that they were
in power and Orlov was charged with contacting the local
Communists who staged the coup.
During March the Government of Mexico expelled five Soviet
diplomats involved in training students in guerrilla warfare.
They were Minister-Counselor and Charge d'Affaires Dmitriy A.
Dyakonov, First Secretary Boris Kolomyakov, Second Secretary
Oleg M. Nechiporenko, and member of the Soviet Commercial Office
Aleksandr V. Bolshakov. On 15 March just preceding the govern-
ment's:expulsion action, Mexico's Attorney General Sanchez
Vargas announced that the Mexican police had broken up a Communist
plot against the government and had arrested 19 terrorists at
"guerrilla acadepies" and hideouts. The Mexican students had
been sent to East Germany and the Soviet Union and from there
to a military base in North Korea for training in sabotage
and terrorism. Some had received scholarships to Patrice
Lumumba University under the Mexican-Soviet cultural exchange
program. Soviet involvement in this case is vividly told by John
Barron in "The Soviet Plot to Destroy Mexico," Readers Digest,
November 1971.
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In Ecuador it did not take long for the heavy hand of Soviet
subversion to reveal itself following the establishment of
Soviet-Ecuadorian diplomatic relations in June 1970. By July of
the next year, the Government of Ecuador had to expel three Soviets
"for interference in internal affairs." They were: Embassy
Counselor Anatoliy M. Shadrin and Embassy First Secretary,
Robespier N. Filatov, both of whom left Ecuador on, 6 July. The
Third, Soviet Permanent Trade Mission Chief Economist Valentin
A. Gbluzin, was on home leave at the time and was not permitted
to return. Following the announcement of the government's ex-
pulsion action, Guayaquil daily El UniVerso reported that the
government had proof that the Soviet intelligence officials
had financed a strike planned by the Confederation of Ecuadorian
Workers (GTE), with the objective of bringing down the Government
of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra and replacing it with
a left-wing military dictatorship0 It was revealed that the
Soviets had passed money to the GTE through Jose Solis,
correspondent of TASS news agency in Guayaquil.
In Italy, Milan's Corriere Della Sera of 5 September 1971,
reported that the Soviet Commercial Attache in Rome, Ilya
Butakov, had been quietly expelled from Italy three months
previously. After his departure, security officials had found
out that Butakov was a missile expert who had been sent to Italy
to gather data on electronic systems in missiles and tanks.
Earlier in the year, the 19 February issues of Rome dailies Il
Tempo and Messaggero carried the announcement that Italian
security police had uncovered evidence that Valenin P. Kovanov,
Soviet Embassy First Secretary, was involved in espionage activities.
Kovanov had been officially expelled two days before.
Thus, as of the end of October, close to 200 Soviet agents have
been sent home this year to face the wrath of KGB Chief YUriy
Andropov, who in turn must face the wrath of his chiefs on the
Politburo. The London spy purge, of course, has been the most
devastating for the Kremlin with other West European actions coming
in a very close second. There will be an element of calculation
in whatever the Kremlin decides to do in retaliation -- but the
overriding objective will be to try to sow dissension among
Western allies. Brezhnev's almost obsessive interest in the
projected European security conference suggests that reprisals
against West Europeans will not be on a scale to prejudice this
pet objective. Reprisals elesewhere would be minimal -- Moscow
risks losing too much if London's "spy purge" becomes too
popular a diplomatic gambit. The way, of course, for the Soviets
to keep expulsions at a minimum is simply to voluntarily trim their
representations down to acceptable size. Of course, to Yuriy
Andropov, espionage is an end in itself -- and, in the long run,
Soviet reaction is going to hinge on how firmly Brezhnev can talk
to Andropov.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
November 1971
SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG)
February- October 1971:,.
Country of Orlgin. Type of
(USSR) an&Name: Assignment:
AKIMOV, Anatoliy
Ivanovich
AZAROV, Ivan
Pavlovich
BUTAKOV, Ilya
Petrovich
CHERNETSOV, Yuriy
Yevgeniyevich
CHUSOVITIN, Valeriy
Stepanovich
FILATOV, Rpbespier
NikolayeviCh
FILATOV, Vladimir
GerasimoviCh
GENERALOV,Vsevolod
NikolayeviCh
GOLUBOV, SergOy
Mikhailovia
GOLUZIN, Valentin
Andreyevich
KARYAGIN, Viktor
Vasilyevich
KHODZHAYEV., Yuriy
Tigranovich
KOLODYAZHNYY, Boris
Georgiyevich
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Commercial
Attache
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Trade Mission
Diplomatic
Sovexportfilm
Diplomatic
Country from Month:
which expelled:
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
Italy Jun
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Jun
Ecuador Jul
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
Ecuador Jul
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
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KOVANOV, Valentin
Pavlov ich
KUTUSOV, Yevgeniy
Ignatiyevich
KUZNETSOV, Georgiy
Aleksandrovich
LAPTEV, Igor
Konstantinovich
LFONTIYEV, Leonid
Antonovich
NIKOLAYEV, Anatoliy
Nikolayevich
ORLOV, Mikhail G.
PETROVICHEVA,
Emilya
Alekseyevna
POTEMKIN, Gennadiy
Petrovich
PRONIN, Vasiliy
Ivanovich
SHADRIN, Anatoliy
Mikhaylovich
SHERSTNEV, Lev
Nikolayevich
SKOPTSOV, Ivan
Vasiliyevich
SOROKIN, Dmitriy
Ivanovich
VAYGAUSKAS,
Richardas
Konstantinavich
VINOGRADOV, Valter
Vladimirovich
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Publisher,
Embassy weekly
Soviet News
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Trade Mission
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
2
Italy Feb
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Sep
Sudan Jul
Sudan Aug
United Kingdom Sep
Ghana Jul
United Kingdom Sep
Ecuador Jul
United Kingdom Jun
United Kingdom Sep
United Kingdom Jun
United Kingdom Sep
Ghana May
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STERLIKOV, Aleksey Diplomatic
Petrovich '
Switzerland
1970
STUDENIKOV Igor Diplomatic Congo (Kinshasa) 1970
TARASENKO, Sergey Embassy Engineer Ghana 1966
IvanoviCh
TIKHOMIROV,
Aleksandr
Vas ilyevich
Translator United Nations 1970
TSYGANOV, Vladimir Diplomatic
Ilich
TUMANOV, Boris G. TASS
UTKIN, Stanislav
Grigoryevich
VALYALIN, Fedor
Fedorovich
VASILYEV, Vladimir
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Attache, Soviet
Trade Mission
YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Commercial
Ivanovich
YANGAYKIN, Sergey Diplomatic
Alekseyevich
YELISEYEV, Viktor Diplomatic
Alekseyevich
YUXALOV, Yuriy
Alekseyevich
ZAKHAROV, Albert
M.
ZAKHAROV,
Venyamin P.
ZAMOYSKIY Lolliy
Petrovich:
ZHEGALOV� Leonid
Nikolayevich
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Novosti
Izvestiya
Press Corps
9
West Germany
1969
Congo (Kinshasa) 1970
--Norway 1970
Congo (Kinshasa)
Lebanon
Kenya
Uruguay
Kenya
Kenya
Greece
Kenya
Italy
United States
1970
1969
1966
1966
1969
1966
1967
1968
1970
1970
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ZINKOVSKIY, Commercial Ghana
Yevgeniy V.
ZUDIN, Aleksey Diplomatic Uruguay
Aleksandrovich
10
1966
1966
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THE RUSSIAN SECRET POLICE, Excerpts
Ronald. Hingley
Hutchinson & Company, LTD
178-202 Great Portland Street, London'
Late 1964. saw an important change in the public posture of the
KGB as the organisation embarked on an intensified publicity
campaign designed to glorify exploits hitherto shrouded in secrecy.
This involved advertising the deeds of Soviet spies who had so far
rated as unspies�as when, for instance, the British defectors
Burgess and Maclean had been paraded (in 1956) to proclaim in
all solemnity that they had never engaged in espionage.1 Now,
twenty years after his execution by the Japanese, the Soviet
master-spy Richard Sorge had his cover blown by the Soviet
advertising machine and was posthumously created a Hero of the
Soviet Union for his wartirne and pre-war spying exploits. He also
had a tanker and a Moscow street named after him, and appeared
full-face on a new four-copeck stamp specially designed in his
honour.2 Thus, from having no spies at all, the Soviet Union
suddenly turned out to have the best spies in the world, no doubt
as part of a campaign to encourage Soviet agents still in the field
after their morale had been shattered by the revelation of Pen-
kovsky's revelations, as also by the arrest of their colleagues George
Blake and Gordon Lonsdale in England, and of Stif Wennerstrom
in Sweden. Another Soviet hero-spy was acknowledged when
Chairman Semichastny wrote in honour of Colonel Rudolf Abel
in Pravda of 7 May 1965�the first occasion on which Abel was
officially honoured, an exchange having been effected between
him and the American U2 pilot Gary Powers in 1961.
Another exchanged Soviet spy, Colonel Konon Molody alias
Gordon Lonsdalc, published a book in English, Spy, about his
professional activities after an unsuccessful attempt had allegedly
been made to trade two British-held Soviet spies, the Krogcrs, for
_ a promise to withhold these inflammatory memoirs from publica-
tion.2 Lonsdales.crudely propagandistic saga has a certain import-
ance as the first example of such material emanating from an
avowed Soviet agent. That the entire text has been KGB-vetted
may be inferred, and it need hardly be said that the material must
be treated with caution. The same is true of My Silent War, the
more polished memoirs of the formerly English Soviet intelligence
agent Kim Philby. These received publication in 1968, five years
after the author had obtained political asylum in the USSR and
Soviet citizenship, as announced in Izvestiya on 31 July 1963. On
1. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 'The Philby Affair', Encounter
(London), April 1968, pp. 3-26).
2. Deakin and Storry, p.350 (Deakin, F.W. and Storry, G.R.; The Case of
Richard Sorge (London, 1966).
3. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (op. cit.)
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1 9 December 1067 the same newspaper published an article
`Hello, Comrade Philby', quoting the veteran master-spy in praise
of Dzerzhinsky as a 'great humanist'�the formula commonly
applied in Soviet parlance to successful sponsors of mass killings.
Philby's views on his own former chiefs MenZhinsky, Yagoda,
Yczhov and Bcria arc unfortunately not available. They would
have been particularly valuable in the light of. certain circum-
stalces outlined in earlier chapters, for it was at about the time of
Philby's original recruitment that his ultimate superior Yagoda
was, according to official Soviet record, engaged in murdering or
attempting to murder Menzhinsky and Yezhov, his immediate pre-
cursor and follower as security police, overlords. Meanwhile the
future police chief Bcria was (again .cording to official doctrine)
secretly in league with Britain�the very country which his under-
ling, the still youthful Philby, had so blithely congratulated him-
self on betraying. In this context Philby's comment on his reason
for enlisting as a Soviet intelligence- agent (`One .does not look
twice at an offer of enrolment in an dlite force') 4 seems to carry a
certain pungency all of its own.
13e that as h: may, the main purpose of the new publicity given to
Philby and to the KGB in general was to demoralise and intimi-
date the non-Communist world by creating the impression of an
'ubiquitous KGB man. . . dedicated servant of an international
government', who 'moves like a superior being, irresistible, among
the ill-guarded, guilty secrets of the divided West'. In this cam-
paign by the KGB various 'capitalist' newspapers showed an
eagerness to co-operate which appeared to confirm Soviet claims
of western decadence in an alarming degree.
The iz-vest/ya interview with Philby formed only a small part of
elaborate celebrations staged on and about 20 December 1967 in
honour of the Soviet security machine's fiftieth birthday. Along
with eminent spies, domestic agents too were honoured, including
four elderly Chekists�survivors of the anti-Leninist White Terror,
as also of the Stalinist great terror in which so many of their
colleagues had fallt!.n. Probably selected for their benevolent facial
expressions, thes3 former hunters of Bruce Lockhart and Boris
Savinkov beam down like elderly uncles from the pages of Pravda
as if in assurance that all is for the best in the best of all possible
worlds. So much for the small fry. On a more august level the
crowning point of the KGB's jubilee was a speech by Chairman
And ropov in the presence of Politburo-members, including
Shelepin and other notabilities. Shelepin. received no personal
tribute in Andropov's speech. Nor was any other head of the
4. Philby, p. xxi (Philby, Kim, My Silent War (New York, 1968).
5. Trevor-Roper, p.25 (pp. cit.)
6. Pravda, 20 December 1967.
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YASAKOV, Vyacheslav Diplomatic United Kingdom Sep
Aleksandrovich
ZAVORIN, Ivan Inturist United Kingdom Sep
Panfilovich*
ZOTOV, Konstantin Diplomatic United Kingdom Sep
*An article in the Daily Mail, 9 October 1971, erroneously
lists ZAVORIN as "ZURARIN."
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG)
A total of 95 officials,
or other non-diplomatic
1966-1970:
of whom 55 were under commercial, trade,
cover.
Country of Origin.
Type of
Country from
Year:
(USSR) and Name:
Assignment:
which expelled:
ABRAMOV, Valdimir
Trade Mission
Ghana
1966
Mikhaylovich
AADZHANOV, Eduard
Commercial
Kenya
1968
B.
AKHNEROV, Robert
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
Isaakovich
ALEKSANDROV,
Embassy employee
Italy
1970
Vladimir Ivanovich
ANDREYEV, Igor
Diplomatic
United Nations
1969
Ivanovich
BOROVINSKIY, Petr
Diplomatic
West Germany
1970
Fedorovich
DOGOMATSKIKH,
Pravda
Kenya
1969
Mikhail Georgiyevich
DUSHKIN, Yuri A.
Trade Mission
United Kingdom
1968
FEDERENKO, Gennadiy
Diplomatic
Austiia
1969
Gavrilovich
GLADKIY, Nikolay
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
Ivanovich
GLOTOV, Viktor N.
Diplomatic
Uruguay
1968
GLUKHOV, Vladimir
Aeroflot
Netherlands
1967
A.
GLUKHOVSKIY,
Trade Mission
Ghana
1966
Vas iliy
VasiIyevich
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IVANOV, Nikolay
Iosifovich
Diplomatic
Uruguay
1966
KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy
Borisovich:
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
KATAYEV, Valeriy
V.
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
KAZANTSEV, Aleksey
N.
Novosti
Ghana
1967
KHOMYAKOV,
Aleksandr
Sergeyevich
Press Officer
Lebanon
1969
KISAMEDINOV,
Maksut
Mustarkhovich
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
KISELEV, Ivan
Pavlovich
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
KOBYSH, Vitally
Ivanovich
Izvestiya and
Brazil
1966
Radio Moscow
KOCHEGAROV,
Yevgeniy
MikhaYlavich
Official of
International
Telecommunications
Union, United
Nations
Switzerland
1969
KODAKOV, Vladimir
Alexsandrovich
Diplomatic
Kenya
1966
KOPYTIN, Viktor
Vas ilyevich
TASS
United States
1969
KOROVIKOV,
Valentin I.
Pravda
Ghana
1967
KOZLOV, Yuriy
Nikolayevich
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
KRTVOLAPOV, Viktor
S.
Trade Mission
Ghana
1966
KURITSYN, yuriy
Vas ilyevich
Novosti
Kenya
1966
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LADYGIN, Anatoli
IC
Attache/Press
Information
Officer
Uruguay
1968
LAPUSHENKO,
Nikolay
ivanovich
Instructor
Ghana
1966
LAVRUSHKO, Igor P.
Technical Expert
India
1968
LEBEDEV, Sergey
Mikhaylovich
Diplomatic
Norway
1970
LEMZENKO, Kir
Gavrilovich
Trade Mission
Italy
1966
LOGINOV, Vladimir
A,
MALININ, Aleksey
Romanovich
Engineer on
Trade Mission
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
United States
1968
1966
MAMONTOV, Yuriy
Leonidovich
Trade Mission
Argentina
1970
MAMURIN, Leonid
Aleksandrovich
Commercial
Thailand
1966
MATUKHIN, Georgi
G,
MATVEYEV, Viktor
Ivanovich
Trade Mission
TASS
Uruguay
Ethiopia
1968
1969
MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy TASS
Nikolayevich
Ghana
1966
MEDNIKOV, Viktor
Nikolayevich
Labor Specialist
on TDY
Mexico
1969
MESROPOV, Valeriy
Moiseyevich
Commercial
Norway
1970
MONAKHOV,
Konstantin
Petrovich
Diplomatic
Italy
1969
NETREBSKIY, Boris
Pavlovich
Novosti and
Netherlands
1970
Diplomatic
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RANOV, Nikolay
Aeroflot
Cyprus
1967
REVIN, Valentin
Diplomatic
United States
1966
Alekseyevich!:
ROZHKO, Gennadi A.
Trade Mission
Italy
1968
RYABOV, YuriY
Inturist
Argentina
1970
Ivanovich
SAVICH, Boris
Commercial
Belgium
1970
Trofimovich
SAVIN, Nikolay
Diplomatic
Switzerland
1970
Andreyevich
SERGEYEV, Vladimir
Yefimovich
Labor Specialist
on TIDY
Mexico
1969
SHARAYEV, Vladimir
ivanovich
Interpreter at
Soviet Permanent
Ethiopia
1969
Exhibition
SHAROVATOV,
Embassy Employee
Netherlands
1970
Vladimir
Semonovich
SHELENKOV, Albert.
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
A.
SHPAGIN, Mikhail
Trade Mission
West Germany
1966
Mikhaylovich
SHVETS,
Diplomatic
Uruguay
1966
Fedorovich
SILIN, Boris. A.
Attache's Driver,
Ghana
1966
SIMANTOVSKIy,
Diplomatic
Congo (Kinshasa)
1970
Oleg
ViadimirOvich
SMIRNOV, Leonid
Diplomatic
Tunisia
1966
Vasilyevich!
SOLYAKOV, Leonid
TASS
Kenya
1966
Dnitriyevich
8
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NOMOKONOV,
Vladimir P.
Technical Expert
India
1968
NOVIKOV, Mikhail
Novosti
Ethiopia
1969
OBOLENTSEV, Fedor
R.
TASS
Libya
1966
OBUKHOV, Aleksey
Aleksandrovich
Diplomatic
Thailand
1966
OGORODNIKOV,
Anatoli T.
TASS
Belgium
1967
OREKHOV, Boris
Mikhailovich
Pravda
United States
1970
ORLENKO, Vladimir
Ivanovich
Doorkeeper
Ghana
1966
OSHURKOV, Ignor
Pavlovich
Commercial
Greece
1967
OVECHKIN, Vladimir
Yevgenyevich
TASS
Ghana
1966
PASHKOV, Y.V.
Technical Expert
India
1968
PETRIN, Boris M.
Diplomatic
Cyprus
1967
PETROV, Ivan
YaklovleviCh
Official of
International
Telecommunications
Union, United
Nations
Switzerland
1967
PETRUK, Boris
Georgiyevich
Instructor
Ghana
1966
PODKILZIN, Boris
Diplomatic
Congo (Kinshasa)
1970
POPOV, Nikolay
Sergeyevich
Diplomatic
Ghana
1966
PUCHKOV, Aleksandr
Nikolayevich
Press Officer
for World Health
Organization,
United Nations
Denmark
1969
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security machine so honoured, excepting only the organisation's
first: two chiefs: Dzerzhinsky and Mcnzhinsky, the saintly and the
unobtrusive Pole. Thus Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria were passed
over in silence apart from an oracular reference to political adven-
turers in the NKVD who had once committed unlawful acts,
attempting to remove the State security agencies from the Party's
control. In stressing the primacy of Party over police, Andropov's
statement was especially typical of post-Bcria etiquette for KGB
Chairmen. Characteristic too was the devotional language in r
which Andropov referred to the typical Chekist as `a man of pure
honesty and enormous personal courage, implacable in the
struggle against enemies, stern in the name of duty, humane and
prepared to sacrifice himself for the people's cause. Such was the
post-Stalinist projection of the KGB officer�that of a jovial padre
with a core of steel, an image reinforced by the numerous hagio-
graphies of the butcher Dzerzhinsky which began to flood the
presses. �
In the summer of 1969 the KGB brought off yet another notable
coup by prevailing on the British government to exchange the
Krogers (Soviet spies who had received long prison sentences in
Great Britain in 1961 for their part in the Portland Case) for a
British lecturer in Russian, Mr Gerald Brooke, who had been
condemned to five years' imprisonment in 1965 by a Moscow
court for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Since his release
from the Soviet Union Mr Brooke has published newspaper
_ _
articles describing how his arrest and trial came about.21 At the
behest of NTS, the Russian anti-Soviet organisation of which men-
tion has been made above, he had smuggled into the Soviet Union
certain material concealed in a photographic album and dressing-
case. He was, accordingly, guilty as charged, though the possi-
bility cannot be discounted that the mysterious 'George' (who
had. recruited him to carry this compromising material to Russia
in the first place) was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of the
KGB. Be that as it may, the KGB appears to have set itself from
the start to usc Brooke as a human lever to extort the release of
thc Krogcrs. As part of this campaign he was deliberately pro-
duced in emaciated condition during one of his wife's visits, and
was also prevailed upon by his captors to write to some London
newspapers urging the Krogers' release in exchange for his own.
When these tactics failed, the prisoner was threatened with -a new
trial on the more serious charge of espionage. He was informed
that this would be backed in court by the evidence of the formerly
English KGB spy Philby (now resident in Moscow), who would
testify that the NTS was in the pay of British intelligence. These
newly concocted espionage activities related to conversations be-
21. Brooke, passim (Brooke, Gerald, Articles in The 'People (London),
3, 10, 1and 24 August 1969.)
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twcen Brooke and certain other prisoners in a concentration camp
sick-bay at Potma. Here he was surrounded by other patients who
paraded anti-Soviet views, but who appear from his own descrip-
tion to have been agents provocateurs, even though he himself appar-
ently did not recognise them as such. Had the Soviet authorities
persisted with the new charge of espionage, Mr Brooke could con-
ceivably have faced a death sentence. In the end, however, the
British government capitulated to this long sequence of threats
from the KGB by agreeing to release the Krogcrs. Right or wrong,
the decision would appear to put all British visitors to the Soviet
Union at hazard during the foreseeable future. So far as the history
of the KGB is concerned, the episode is an instructive illustration
of the extraVagant lengths to which the organisation will go to
rescue its agents from foreign imprisonment.
Valuable further confirmation of certain features in KGB
methodology .is provided by a recent defector to the West,
Anatoly Kuzrietsov. On 24 July 1969 this well-known Soviet
novelist happened to travel from Moscow to London in the same
plane as the released Gerald Brooke. On arrival he eluded the
personal escort provided by the Soviet authorities, sought refuge
with a leading British daily newspaper, proclaimed his intention
of emigrating from the Soviet Union and published articles in the
British press describing the particularly close surveillance which
the Soviet political police maintains over all Soviet writers. n his
own case this had included ostentatious shadowing by agents, the
bugging of his fiat, the recording of his telephone conversations
and sundry attempts at 'provocation'. On one occasion a certain
student had sought him out and delivered a tirade against the
Soviet Union, describing it as a Fascist country, after which Mr
Kuznetsov found himself in trouble for failing to report the inci-
dent to the authorities. On another occasion a young woman in-
formed him that she had been instructed to become his mistress,
and to report all his activities on pain of expulsion from the insti-
tute at which she was studying. Kuznetsov also confirms many
accounts by previous Soviet defectors when .he speaks of the pro-
longed and elaborate vetting process to which all Soviet citizens
are subjected before receiving the rare and coveted privilege of
foreign travel. Out of every fifteen members of one Soviet 'delega-
tion' on which he had travelled, at least five were under KGB in-
structions to report on the other members' behaviour, apart from
which each member of the party was obliged to supply a political
report on himself and his fellow-travellers. Kuznetsov also des-
cribes how he had compromised himself in various ways in the
past by failure to co-operate fully with the KGB,, but had then
decided to work his passage back by simulating a degree of docility
sufficient to qualify him for an exit visa. He had therefore pan-
23. Kuznetsov, passim (Kuznetsov, Anatoli (A. Anatol), 'Russian Writers
and the Secret Police', The'Sunday Telegraph (London), 10 August 1969).
24. Nabokov, p.263 (Nabokov, Vladimir, Speak; Memory! an Autobiography
Revisited, revised edition (New York, 1966).
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&red to official conspiracy-mania by inventing an imaginary plot
by Certain fellow-writers to bring out a new clandestine literary
journal, and had then clinched his return to favour by promising'
to write a novel about Lenin.23 Such methods finally took him to
London and put him in a position to start a new career as an
dmigrd writer.
The tactics employed by Mr Kuznetsov to effect his escape have
incurred sporadic criticism from-Western writers not themselves
subject to comparable pressures�an example of self-righteous
censoriousness such as is all too easily engendered in societies free
from totalitarian police control. So far as the present study is con-
cerned, Mr Kuznetsov can only be saluted for his success in extri-
cating himself from the long line of literary victims of the Russian
political police�the list which also includes such illustrious names
as Alexander Radishchev, Alexander Pushkin, Nicholas Cherny-
shevsky, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Isaac Babel, Osip
� Mandelshtam, Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
As is stressed by Vladimir Nabokov, himself in youth a potential
victim of Russian police terror, Russian history can be considered
from two points of view: 'first, as the evolution of the police . . .
and second, as the development of a marvellous culture.'" That
these strands arc intimately intertwined, and that the second can-
not be understood without an appreciation of the first, was one
reason for attempting the study now concluded. Though its pur-
pose has been to record the past, one prediction of the future may
be risked as a parting word: that between the completion of this
book and its appearance in print new scandals will have further
enriched the annals of the developing Russian political police.
That the final epitaph of this gigantic and historic organisation
will not be written by anyone now living also seems probable.
Conclusion
In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to describe the
operations of Russian political security organisations while quot-
ing sources of information in detail, as is particularly desirable in
a field of study so riddled with obscurities and difficulties of various
, kinds. An attempt will now be made to sum up certain aspects of
the material in a manner somewhat more speculative and wide-
ranging. This discussion will take the form of a general comparison
between the two main historical phases concerned: the Imperial
and the Soviet.
One striking difference between the imperial and Soviet secret
police lies in the size of the organisations concerned, in the num-
ber of personnel involved, and in the extent of resources allotted
to political security operations. During the centuries the Russian
secret police has expanded from relatively tiny beginnings until it
has come to swamp and penetrate every corner of society�
possibly the most impressive example of the working of 'Parkin-
son's Law' on record. Of all the organisations concerned, Peter the
Grcat's Preobrazhensky Office�perhaps the first true Russian
political security force�holds pride of place for the economic and
efficient use of resources. As stated above, it conducted political
security operations throughout late Muscovy and in the first
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years of Imperial Russia with a strength of less than a dozen clerks,
though admittedly military units�the Preobrazhensky and Sern-
yonovsky Guards-could bc co-opted to an unlimited extent to
effect arrests and act as couriers. Since then a gradual but inexor-
ably sustained expansion in security personnel has been observed.
In the late eighteenth century perhaps only a few dozen or score
were so employed, but under Nicholas I the figure soared to some
ten thousand, including the Corps of Gendarmes. Further expan-
sion occurred after the foundation of the Okhrana and Police .
Department in 1880. It becomes increasingly difficult, however,
to estimate the precise number of persons working for the secret
police at any given Moment, since so many gradations of bribed,.
bullied, blackmailed or terrorised part-time informants were to be
found in the middle reaches of police operations�between�tile
inner ring of full-time salaried police officials or agents, and ordin-
ary citizens liable to be summoned for questioning at any time
and under an obligation to denounce any manifestation of
political opposition which might have come to their notice.
If one asks how many Soviet�not to mention foreign�citizens
arc in some .sense working for the Russian secret police at the
beginning of thc 19705, it must be answered that the reservoir of
potential KGB informants includes practically the entire Soviet
population, though dotards, infants and rustics are less likely to be
so employed than town-dwellers in the prime of life. Those who
encounter Soviet citizens, whether on Soviet or non-Soviet soil,
would be well advised to regard all their contacts, however
amiable, smiling and sympathetic, as potential KGB informants�
not necessarily willing ones�owing to the obligation liable to be
Placed on all Soviet citizens to furnish detailed political reports on
their conversations with foreigners. On this elementary fact of life
many western governments now warn businessmen and others
travelling to the USSR, apart from which diplomats posted to
Moscow necessarily receive detailed and intense briefing on the
highly sophisticated and persistent techniques of espionage to
which they are certain to be exposed. Owing to the growing refine-
ment of 'bugging' devices, many foreign embassies in Moscow and
other Communist countries maintain elaborately constructed safe
rooms in which, it is hoped, conversations and transactions of a
particularly confidential nature may take place without the
danger of eavesdropping by KGB and Soviet military intelligence
operatives primed with the latest scientific devices. .
So far as the ordinary tourist is concerned, he would be wise to
allow for . the possibility that any Soviet hotel room, restaurant
table, taxi, train or aeroplane which lie occupies may be 'bugged'
�though of course even the KGB's huge resources, and seemingly
unslakcd appetite for trivial information, do not extend to the full,
recording and processing of all remarks uttered by all visitors to
the Soviet Union at all times. It is the possibility�not the cer-
tainty�of such surveillance which should be allowed for.
Now under-employed since the restrictions on terrorism or-
dained after Stalin's death, Soviet intelligence by no means con-
fines the collection of information, whether abroad Or on home
ground, to political, military and economic matters, though these
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endemic feature of the Russian, and perhaps of all political police
organisations, has been the inability of the authorities to work out
any , stable chain of command or system of administration.
Repeated switches and .changes of balance arc, perhaps, an
essential when one is administering what is, after all, potentially
the most dangerous institution in the State�dangerous to its own
masters as well as to its enemies.
, Fortunately or unfortunately, the KGB seems, at the moment of
writing, to show greater signs of long-term stability than any
preceding Russian secret police force. Yet these words could easily
be 'belied by events through - sudden unforeseen developments
occurring between the preparation of this study and its appearance
in print.
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naturally receive high priority. The private lives of individuals
also form an object of scrutiny, particularly as such inVestigation
may create an opportunity for recruiting agents through black-
mail by threat of exposure. It is also a common KGB practice to
compromise potential foreign informants by various techniques�
not least by the 'provocation' of individuals earmarked as particu-
larly vulnerable. This has frequently involved the photographing,
if necessary through one-way mirrors, of the victim in an embar-
rassing posture deliberately engineered and implying or recording
some combination of drunken, drugged, homosexual or hetero-
sexual misbehaviour.
By Contrast with the treatment of political prisoners under the
Third Section and Okhrana, the political police of Soviet times
has de facto, if not de jure, generally acted as detecting, arresting,
imprisoning, judging and sentencing authority in political cases.
These functions arc, moreover, retained to a large extent by the
present-day KGB, although determined attempts arc now made
to impart a veneer of legality to political security proceedings by
creating the simulacrum of trial by independent courts. Thus the
secret police still occupies, at the beginning of the 197os, a domin-
ant position never held by Third Section or Okhrana�and this
despite a significant though by no means total retreat from insti-
tutionalised as practiied under Stalin.
It is above all in the creation of systematic political terror on a
nationwide scale that the Soviet police system may claim to have
advanced far beyond its Tsarist prototype. Unless he was extreme-
ly lucky, an ordinary unheroic citizen of Imperial Russia could
confidently expect to escape persecution on political grounds by
keeping his mouth shut, by abstaining from officially disapproved
activities�and perhaps by changing his religion. The essence of
Stalinism was to destroy such possibilities, leaving no haven of
- security even for the most timorous and terrorised. In the deliberate
intimidation of the entire population, in the wholesale saturation
of society with spies and informers, and in the systematic use of
pre-emptive arrest to forestall possible trouble by immunising vast
sections of potential trouble-makers in advance�in all these
techniques the .Imperial police lagged far behind the Soviet . . .
and this despite the earnest pioneer efforts of certain Tsarist police
chiefs born before their time, among whom Actual State Council-
lor Liprandi and General Strelnikov have been given special
mention above.
All improvements and changes in techniques notwithstanding,
certain devices have remained common to both phases of the
Russian secret police. Prominent among these has been 'provoca-
tion'�the procedure of destroying hostile political organisations
and individuals by subjecting them to undercover police agents
posing as sympathisers. This method, so successfully pioneered by
Rachkovsky and Zubatov in the Imperial period, has continued
to the present day as a staple feature of Soviet practice. Another
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
VIETNAM PULLOUT
SOME FACTS ON U:S. DISENGAGEMENI-INYIETNAM
-- at the peak of U.S. military involvement (mid-1969) there
were more than 543,000 American servicemen in South Vietnam including
97 combat battalions and support troops, plus a vast air armada;
today there are under 200,000 American servicemen in Vietnam.
-- the present withdrawal plan calls for U.S. troop strength
to be at or below 184,000 by the 1 December reduction deadline;
it is anticipated that President Nixon may step-up the present
14,300 monthly withdrawal rate of U.S. servicemen to 20,000.
-- only one Navy aircraft ,carrier (the 85,000-ton nuclear-
powered Enterprise) is now on station in the Gulf of Tonkin where
three carriers were in constant operation at the peak of the fighting;
the U.S. Navy has already transferred 1,400 other craft to the
South Vietnamese.
-- the U.S. Air Forces's peak force of 35 squadrons of attack
jets (a squadron normally has 18 planes) has been reduced to 12;
this includes withdrawal of all 16 squadrons of F-100s, formerly
the backbone of the air war in Vietnam.
-- the entire Marine air wing, with 10 attack squadrons has
been withdrawn.
--- although a few Americanshave stayed on at the DMZ fire bases
to tend complex optical and radar equipment, the South Vietnamese
are substantially defending their own northern border for the first
time since heavy North Vietnamese infiltration across the DMZ began
in 1966.
-- the gradual turnover of 16 newly-built U.S. radar Sites to
the South:Vietnamese has caused Saigon papers to discover that the
radar sites are under surveillance by a Soviet intelligence-gathering
ship off the coast of South Vietnam; sometime in June this year, the
intelligence ship was added to the Russian trawlers monitoring
American aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Vietnamization has become tangible - in the communiques,
the casualty lists, the combat outposts - to the point where it
is clear that the South Vietnamese are taking back control of their
country; if some of their reactions are frustrated, even hostile,
their "withdrawal symptoms" are human and hnderstandable to some
degree.
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-- the U.S. is not pulling out irresponsibly, nor abruptly;
in addition to the time, political energy, money and lives already
spent in South Vietnam, it is estimated that American economic
aid will have to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary
spending willstart with about $700 million for the first few
years and end:up costing the American taxpayer about $4 billion
over the decade. It is easy to shrug this off because America
is rich but America is also beset with serious domestic problems
to which monies spent in South Vietnam might have been applied.
-- U.S. "Operation Retrograde" encompassing the distribution
and disposal of vast stores of U.S. weapons and other materiel
now amassed in Vietnam is an instructive reminder of the myriad,
practical ways in which Asian allies are receiving U.S. assistance.
2
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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1971
To End Involvement in Vietnam'
Last Tuesday, largely unnoticed, Mr. Nixon made
what may be his most important statement on Viet-
nam. By the time he goes to Moscow next May, he
said, the United States will have "endEedl American
involvement in Vietnam. . . or at least have made
significant progress toward accomplishing that
goal."
Three aspects of this statement were distinctive.
First, he spoke of ending '(American involvement,"
a phrase which surely goes beyond ground combat
forces into the uncertain but negotiable area of ad-
visers, logistical personnel,. "residual force" and
"supporting air." Second, he defined the ending of
involvement as a "goal," which it properly is; pre-
.viously he hadl tended to discuss his war aims in
terms of bringing about a certain political 'result
in Vietnam. And third, he inched closer to setting
a specific date for ending the American involve.
ment. By May, he said, "we trust that we will have
accomplished that goal, or at least have made
significant progress" toward it.
In short, President Nixon has lent his personal
authority and prestige to a public pledge to remove
the United States from the war, perhaps within
seven months. Though he left himself a large loop-
hole ("substantial progress"), he has gone further
towards doing what the bulk of, his responsible crit-
ics have long pleaded with him to do: set a reason-
able final limit on American participation in the
war. This is surely the thrust of his words.
Now, we realize that Mr. Nixon strongly urged us
all not to "speculate" about what he will say in his
long-scheduled Vietnam report on Nov. 15. In the
'joint interests of communicating with our readers
and of encouraging the President to proceed along
the path he now appears to have chosen, however,
we will press cautiously on.
Two broad developments permit, if they do not
require, Mr. Nixon to leave the war.
Inside Vietnam, events thoroughly justify the
conclusion that the United States has given South
:Vietnam that "'reasonable chance" to survive on its
, own. President Thieu, freshly re-elected by an emi-
nently Vietnamese electoral process, is seated more
firmly than ever; Saigon has made "great progress"
towards representative government, Mr. Nixon ob-
served last week. Ambassador Porter recently told
the Vietcong: "Of the 300 or so district and province '
capitals of South Vietnam, you do not hold a single
one after these many years of war and your best
military efforts. You are, in fact, further from mili-
tary victory than ever." Politically, he said, the
Vietcong are similarly disabled. We realize well that
such judgments as Mr. Nixon's and Mr. Porter's are '
not indisputable. But we see no reason to dispute
them. The important point is that the administra-
tion itself chooses to portray devel' l'Pnts in Viet-
nam in a way indicating that the A- yaission
there has been successfully accomplished. We could
not agree more.
Outside Vietnam, of course, the President's forth-
coming trips to Moscow and Peking have entirely;
altered the international context of the war. That
Peking and then Moscow invited him can only mean
to the Vietcong and Hanoi that their principal allies
� have other and larger fish to fry, as indeed they
have. It need not mean a Chinese or Soviet sellout
of their Vietnamese clients. It unquestionably
means a judgment in Moscow and Peking that their
clients are now within striking distance of a deal
which they, the patrons, believe ought to be
.grabbed.
What kind of a deal? Back in August, Mr. Nixon
said: "The record, when it finally comes out, will:
answer all the critics as far as the activity of this,
government in pursuing negotiations in established;
channels." Now, 'this could merely mean that the
record will show that the Nixon administration gave'
it an honest try. Or it could mean that something is
brewing, perhaps something which is intimately tied
into Mr. Nixon's larger dealings with Peking and
Moscow. By the nature of so delicate and difficult
a diplomatic undertaking, it would he impossible
at this point for any but a very few insiders to
know. What is clear is that the President, when he
talks about "ending American involvement" and
claims that his negotiating record will "answer all
the critics," is taking upon himself a tremendous
responsibility to produce positive and conclusive re-
sults well in advance of his rendezvous with the
electorate a year from now. He is creating his own
political imperatives and this is perhaps the strong-
est assurance he could be expected to give at this
point' in time of his determination to deliver on''
his promises.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1971
For the Record.
U.S. Disengagement .
And Asian &ability
From an address by H. E. Nobuhiko,
TJshiba, ambassador of Japan to the U.S.,
before the City Club of Portland, Oregon,
September 24:
How the American strategy evolves, fol-
lowing the "winding down" of the Indochina
war, and with the application a the Nixon
Doctrine, is probably the most Important
single element In the equation of future
Asian stability. Indeed, the American stra-
tegic posture will undoubtedly affect
'China's future outlook.
It is a foregone conclusion that the United
States will soon be disengaged from any
combat responsibility in Vietnam, probably
by sometime in 1972. The Nixon Doctrine
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
20 September 1971
O r
has put Asia and the world on notice that
the United States�while maintaining its
treaty commitments and the umbrella of its
nuclear deterrent�will not again commit
American troops to� the defense of friendly
states, except in cases of massive aggression
in which the vital interests of the United
States are threatened. According to the Doc-
trine, America will provide material assist-
ance, when requested, to threatened nations
which accept ultimate responsibility for
their own defense.
WHERE U.S. WILL MAKE
ITS "LAST STAN " IN VIETN
Indo-China war will be over
for most American soldiers in
1972. But not for all. Job al-
ready is being cut out for those
who will remain.
SAIGON
Now becoming clear is the shape of
U. S. military power that President Nixon
intends to maintain in South Vietnam�
perhaps for several more years.
By December, U. S. strength in Viet-
nam will be down to 184,000. According
to Pentagon projections, this figure will
drop to about 45,000 toward the end
of 1972.
After that, unless the White House
changes signals, American forces will re-
main at roughly that level until two
U. S. objectives in Vietnam are achieved:
� Release of all prisoners of war held
by the Reds in Southeast Asia.
� Development of South Vietnam's
military capability to defend itself
against a Communist take-over.
2
Among the first major American
bases built in Vietnam, Da
Nang's big port and airfield
facilities will support opera.
lions in endangered Northern
Provinces.
U.S. spent 142 million
dollars to transform the
sandy Cam Ranh Penin-
sula into a deep-water
port, a first-rate airfield
and a 17,000-acre supply
center.
With its airfield, helicopter pads and sup-
ply depots, Long Binh is heart of the
American military complex clustered
around the capital of Saigon.
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Three enclaves. By the time U. S.
forces are reduced to 45,000 men, most
GI's will, with virtual certainty, be con-
centrated in three American enclaves:
Da Nang in the north, Cam Ranh Bay
in the central sector and Long Binh in
the south near Saigon.
Each already is a key base with air-
fields, nearby port facilities and vast
stockpiles of war materiel. As the U. S.
combat role winds down,
they will be used to speed
training of South Vietna-
mese troops, to funnel sup-
plies to Saigon's forces and
to confront the Commu-
nists with what military
experts term an "active
defense,"
U. S. ground troops as-
signed to the so-called "re-
sidual force" will be drawn
in the main from major
units still in Vietnam: the
Americal and the 101st
Airborne divisions, one
brigade of the 1st Cavalry
THE WASHINGTON POST
16 October 1971
Division and one squadron
from the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment.
Other Americans will
come from the 9,500 U. S.
advisers now working with
South Vietnamese units.
Some of the 500 Air Force
and Navy planes and near-
ly 3,000 helicopters that
are presently stationed in
Southeast Asia will furnish air support.
Main responsibility of American infan-
trymen in the future will be defensive�
to guard Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and
Long Binh from Communist attack.
Still some casualties. U. S. officers
emphasize, however, that American GI's
still will fight and suffer casualties. To
guard the bases, they say, heavily mined
patrols will have to sweep the areas
around the enclaves, and they are certain .
to run into the enemy.
American military men concede that
the concentration of GI's into three en-
claves will increase the danger of Red
assaults. According to ..Col. John 0. En-
U.S. Orders
Vie Pullout
0: Z.2 Units
Associated Press
The war in Vietnam fell
back into small and scattered
fighting yesterday and the
U.S. Command in Saigon is-
sued orders for 12 more army
units with a total strength of
4,650 men to return home be-
fore Christmas.
The cutback was the second
largest to be announced at one
sor, deputy commander of the Cam Ranh
Support Command:
"As the level of combat drops in the
field, our fixed bases become more at-
tractive targets to the enemy. We must
expect that the Viet Cong will begin to
center his attacks on our enclaves."
For all the danger, new construction
at Da Nang, Cam Ranh and Long Binh
promises relatively comfortable garrison-
type duty for most Americans assigned
to the U. S. residual force.
New recreational facilities at Long
Binh,. for example, include a $425,000
theater, a $425,000 swimming pool and
a $153,000 craft shop.
. Cam Ranh Bay already has two skeet-
shooting ranges, tennis courts and a
marina equipped with powerboats for
water skiing.
A special-service- officer expresses
American intentions to remain in South
Vietnam& this way: "We don't plan to
build expensive new facilities . just to
turn them over to the Vietnamese."
time since the 'United States
began to disengage from the
conflict in mid-1969.
It was exceeded only last
July 1, when the U.S. Com-
mand announced that 40 units,
with an authorized strength of
6,095 men, were pulled out of
combat to prepare for rede-
ployment.
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971
U.S. COMBAT ROLE IN VIETNAM-FADING FAST
,.----TROOP STRENGTH: DOWN 60%
536,100
485,600
385,300
184,300:
543,400
(peak)
\X1,72,800
American troops
in Vietnam
337,900
219,000
59,900
July Dec. 0 c. Dec. Dec.Aptil Dec. Dec. NOW
19651 1966 11961 1 1968 1969 119/0 11971
\.
In South
Vietnam's
four
military
regions�
WHERE U. S. FORCES REMAIN �Th
Bulk of
remaining
combat
if
troops
Combat
forces
nearly all
withdrawn
Relatively
-5-t-de� few fighting
units left
All combat
troops removed
If President Thieu wins big, as expected, his opponents
will certainly charge fraud. If he falters, there could be a
wholesale upheaval of the entire machinery of provincial
government and a sweeping military shake-up as. well.
WAR FRONT: STILL HOPE
The military picture appears not too grim over all, com-
pared with what is found on the political and economic fronts.
That is true despite the steady pull-back from combat of re-
maining U. S. forces.
At the peak of the U. S. involvement, American troops in
South Vietnam numbered 543,400. That force included 97
combat battalions plus all their support troops and a vast
air armada.
U. S. forces are now down to 27 front-line battalions, and
these have been pulled out of major combat operations.
Total American strength is down to 219,000 men.
The regular armed forces of South Vietnam number ap-
proximately 525,000.
At one time there were four full U. S. infantry divisions
and an armored cavalry regiment plus support troops in
Military Region Two, the Central Highlands area. Strength
then was about 200,000, half of whom were front-line men.
Now there are only three U. S. combat battalions of per-
haps 3,000 men in the area. They aren't out looking for the
enemy. One unit guards convoys that move along Highway
19 and the two others protect the Tuy Hoa Air Base and
the big port and air-base complex at Cam Ranh Bay.
Reds play waiting game. Says an American military
spokesman: "Obviously, the South Vietnamese have had to
spread out their forces to cover the territory once occupied
by U. S. units." So far, neither the North Vietnamese nor the
Viet Cong have made any major pushes to fully test how
determined the South Vietnamese are.
A drive in Military Region One, below the Demilitarized
Zone in the Northern end of South Vietnam, is seen as
likely. There U. S. ground troops have turned a string of
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CASUALTIES AT 6-YEAR LOW �Th
14,592
5,008
1,369
9,378
9,415
American troops
killed in combat
I I I
4,221
1,500
\,Source: U.S. military officials
1965 1966 196/ 1968 1969 1910 1911
(projection)
Copyright ,C) 1971, U. S. News & World Report, Inc.
fire-support bases over to the South Vietnamese. American
forces have moved back to three enclaves near the coast.
The U. S. pullout is also affecting its advisory efforts.
Formerly, teams of American Army advisers were out
with every South Vietnamese battalion. No more.
Advisers now serve only with regimental and division-
level staffs. The number of men in such teams has also
been trimmed. A division advisory team that formerly had
40 Americans makes do today with perhaps half that number.
This is not necessarily bad, in the opinion of some Ameri-
cans. Says one: "There's not much a young American captain
.or major can tell a South Vietnamese battalion commander
who has probably been in combat against the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese for nearly 10 years."
Mostly, the U. S. advisers co-ordinate air strikes and help
with arrangements for helicopter and other supply support.
Weakness in the air. The South Vietnamese Air Force
is considerably less advanced than the ground forces, although
important strides have been made. In three of the country's
four military regions, South Vietnamese airmen are now in
charge of the important Direct Air Support Centers which
control all tactical air strikes in the country.
Over the past two years, Saigon's Air Force has expanded
from 23,600 men to 42,000. By mid-1973, the force should
level off at about 50,000 men.
There's not much that can be done to speed up the Viet-
namization of the air war. Nearly two years is required to
train a young Vietnamese high-school graduate to become a
qualified pilot.
At Nha Trang Air Base, about 8,000 men will be gradu-
ated this year as tower controllers, aircraft mechanics, com-
munications specialists and fliers. However, only , through
actual experience can they be trained to do the technical
jobs required�and that takes time.
At Pleiku Air Base in the Central Highlands, Lt. Col.
Robert L. Nicholl, as a U. S. advisory-team chief, has watched
South Vietnamese take over from the Americans. Since No-
vember of last year, when they started with a bare field,
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they have built a four-squadron tactical wing into what U. S.
advisers consider a first-rate outfit.
While the youngish-looking South Vietnamese pilots are
rated as "hot shots," often as good as their American fighter-
bomber counterparts, ground support isn't up to standard.
Vietnamese crews take as long as three hours to ready a
fighter-bomber for another mission after it has returned from
a strike. American ground crews do the same job in one hem.
With the tempo of ground combat now at a record low,
the South Vietnamese arc able to handle about SO per cent
of the 3.500 air strikes being flown monthly.
Should there be a sudden return to large-scale fighting,
however, Saigon would be hard put to provide even a frac-
tion of the fighter-bombers and helicopters thrown into action
bv the U. S. at the height of the war, in 1968 and 1969.
Then the U. S. Air Force had 21 squadrons made up of about
400 fighter-bombers available for attack. In addition, the
Marines and Navy threw in hundreds more.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971
To run the country, feed its population and pay for nec-
essary imports, South Vietnam, in the year ended June 30,
1971, received about 600 million dollars in U. S. aid. About
220 million of this was . used to buy fertilizer, fishing nets,
chemicals and electrical, equipment considered vital to the
economy.
Cloudy future. There seems to be little planning for the
day when GI spending Will end.
Many tens of thousands of Vietnamese working for the
U. S. military will soon be out of work. Although a number
have gained valuable technical skills, it's not clear how the
civilian economy will be able to use their talents.
Foreign investors have hardly found South Vietnam a
promising place to put their venture capital. The Saigon
Government has done little to attract ;.-,:aspects.
- A. new, presumably much more liberal foreign-investment
law has been long in the works. It has yet to be passed by
the legislature.
In addition to the 'direct-aid contributions, the U. S.
through its military and civilian agencies, has -supported
most of the country's utilities and public services.
American Army engineers have widened and paved a
new highway that now. linics many Mekong Delta towns to
the Saigon market. In the Northern Provinces, where U. S.
Now that the Marines are gone, the Navy has greatly
re-
cluced its missions over South Vietnam. The Air Force is
r. down to jive attack squadrons, about 100 supersonic F-4
Phantom jets.
By way of comparison, the South Vietnamese have only .
six jet attack squadrons. They are equipped with the A-37
Dragonfly jet and the F-5 Freedom Fighter jet. Three other
)squadrons fly the reliable but 20-year-old A-1. Skvraider
propeller planes. South Vietnam's other transport, liaison,
reconnaissance and gunship units add up to 15 squadrons,.
a total of about 500 fixed-wing planes.
The South' Vietnamese have 14 squadrons of about 350
helicopters. At its peak, the U. S. Army's helicopter force
numbered more than 4,000. Despite the troop pullout, the.
U. S. still has nearly 3,090 of its copters in South Vietnam.
Even with a planned build-up to perhaps 500 helicopters
in two years, the South Vietnamese will have to learn to op-
erate without the luxury of great fleets of helicopters to. air-
lift troops around. -
. Marines and Army troops ranged widely for years, all-
weather roads link once-isolated districts and modern bridges
span streams and rivers.
The U. S. maintains and operates a network of ports and
airports used by the civilian economy, but at no cost to the
Saigon Government.
When the United States ends its military presence here,
South Vietnam will find itself responsible for these facilities
for the first time.
Says one expert: "As the tempo of the war slows down,
there is a desperate need for budget planning and attention
to fiscal problems; there must be a new sense of priorities."...
Another authority estimates that American aid will have
to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary spending for the
first few years is estimated at about 700 million dollars. Af-
ter that, it could taper off to perhaps 400 million a year.
Projected economic-aid bill for the next decade: 4 billion
: dollars.
� Mostly, the mood of Americans from one end of South
Vietnam to the other reflects a sense of finality. They feel
the U. S. has done all it can to prepare the South Vietnam-
ese to keep their country afloat. The way most Americans
sum it up: "What happens from here on out is up to them."
5
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BALTIMORE SUN
10 September 1971
IV CHARLES W. CORDDRY
ingtOn BUTCatt of The Sun
'Washington � Government
yeurees predicted yesterday that
:no military situation in Viet-
team will favor a substantial
.e)ced-up in American troop
-!:vitleirawals-e-possibly by close
io 50 per cent�when President
Nixon announces the next phase ;
in mid-November.
Some sources consulted freely
l'erceast that the American
;rood strength would be down to
-die 40,000-range in mid-1972,
constituting the long-promised
� visory group with certain nec-
e3sary support elements. The
:,eiTent strength is about 216,000
eici is to be at or below 184,000
ellen the present reduction
deadline, December 1, arrives.
"Most Difficult War"
in looking ahead to the Presi-
dont's next move, and recalling'
eis belief that the war will not
voi election issue next year,
a1-.'72 Cut To 40,000
'tange In Vietnam
Is Predicted �
eilservers noted the assertion in
address to Congress yester-
day that this country "is bring-
ing to a conclusion the longest
and Most difficult war in its
history."
Discussing the outlook for the
South Vietnamese armed forces,
a high-ranking officer recently
in Vietnam said that what re-
mains to be done by the Ameri-
cans "will leave them with the
wherewithal, if they have the
Wilt" to go it alone.
Mr. Nixon has not come to
grips with decisions on the next
withdrawal phase, informed
eources said, but there, is no
cluestion that the U.S: forces will
be "sitbstantially disengaged"'
1iext summer.
Next Summer Target
Since it is clear that the target
is to get down to the "residual" I
force of advisers, with certain
support troops, next summer,
one of the chief decisions Mr.
iNIX011 has to make is how to President Would choose, in mid-!
handle the withdrawal process ! November, to announce a "date!
in the intervening months� certain" for the total pullout
from the point of view of his from Vietnam.
� administration's prospects and He has refused to do that: .
from the military point of view linking the final withdrawal to
in Vietnam. negotiations for prisoner release
The present pullout phase , and the readiness of the South
calls for removing 100,000 Vietnamese to handle their own'
troops in seven months up to defense�saying last April 7 that
December 1, for an average setting such a date would. "serve
monthly rate of about 14,300:
An increase to about 20,000 a
month�close to 50 per cent.--:-for
the following seven month's
would reduce the force to the
40,000-range by mid-1972, should
'Mr. Nixon decide on a with-
drawal phase of that duration.
That Could have the U.S. com-
mitment down to the advisory
role prior to the Republican Na-
tonal Convention, and officials
-haw. portrayed --the :advisory
Tole, as one that, itself, would go
on diminishing,
Most sources doubted that the ! South Vietnam.
! the enemy's purpose and not our .
own."
Meanwhile, the United States
Is in the process of -removing
elements of .the Americal Divi- !
, sion--one of the two, divisions I
(there 'is also a separate bri-
gade) remaining in Vietnam
and, it; was learned, considera-
tion is being given to withdraw-
ing 'in a-month or so an F-4 jet
!squadron that previously was
slated to leave next spring.
! The latter is one of but five
such squadrons remaining in
NEI 20 July'U.S. Giving Radar Sites to Vietnamese
S:lecial to The New York Times
' VUNGTAU, South Vietnam,
July 13�The United - tes
Navy is building 16 radar sites
for surveillance of ship move-
ments along the coast of South
Vietnam and plans to give them
to the South Vietnamese Navy
by next spring.
, The first of the sites, on a
mountain peak here 50 miles
southeast of Saigon, has re-
cently been turned over to the
South Vietnamese.
A Soviet intelligence-gather-
ing ship, meanwhie, has been
spotted off the coast of South
Vietnam and is presumably
watching the new installations.
Only, a month ago the intel-
ligence ship supplemented a
Russian trawler that has for
years kept a close eye on the
activities of American aircraft
carriers operating in the Gulf
of Tonkin, according to United
States Navy pilots.
According to high-ranking
United States naval officers,
the radar installations will "en-
hance the coastal defense and
counterinfiltration capability of
tee Vietnamese Navy."
Interception Is Planned
Supplementing the radar
sites, surface craft are to be
assigned to identify and inter-
cept any unidentified ships.
One United States naval ad-
viser, who asked not to be
named, said here that the radar
system has a "multitude of pur-
poses." He refused, however,1
to say what those purposes are.!
Nine of the 16 sites span
an area in which United States
and Japanese petroleum compa-
nies are expected to bid for oil
rights, perhaps late this year
or early next year, after the
presidential elections early in
October.
It is understood that foreign
oil cOmpanies are eager to get
some assurance from the South
Vietnamese Government that
security will be provided before
they begin drilling.
A spokesman for Rear Adm.
Robert S. Selzer, commander cif
United States naval forces in
Vietnam, said that he "couldn't
talk about the cost a the elec-
tronic equipment being installed
because it would give away to
the other side a good idea of
the capability of it."
me radar sites are being'
built under contract with the
United States Government by
R.M.K.-B.R.J., the American
construction consortium, and
by navel construction engil
neers.
Running from Hue, below the
demilitarized zone, to Hondoc
island, near the Cambodian:
border, the 16 radar installa-
tions are strung out on high
hills and mountain peaks near,
the sea and on islands along
the southern coast.
Thre American advisers are
to be placed at each site as it
opens to make sure the South,
Vietnarnese become familiar;
with the equipment. The Amer-
leans will stay at the radar
sites "for only a limited period,
of time,"
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971
No
ba
VIETNAM PULLOUT
d ned Arsenals This Time
. SAIGON
While Americans debate the pace
of the U. S. troop withdrawal from South
Vietnam, a massive pullout of another
kind is taking place.
Billions of dollars' worth of American
military equipment�from shoelaces to
50-ton tanks�is being hauled out, no
longer needed in Vietnam by. the dwin-
dling force of GI's.
One top U. S. official here calls the
operation "the most elaborate military-
property-disposal drive in history."
The U. S. already has shipped out of
Vietnam more than 1.4 million tons of
surplus supplies, valued at :about 3.5
billion dollars. Officers estimate that up
to 2.5 million tons remain, about half of
which will be given to the South Viet-
panics� Government.
Basic goal of the program: to save
the American taxpayer money by avoid-
ing costly mistakes of the past.'
Walking away from it. After World
War II�and to some extent after the
Korean War�the U. S. discarded over-
seas vast stores of weapons and other
materiel. Much of this abandoned arsenal
weathered away. Some made rich men of
the traders�many of them former GI's�
who rehabilitated the castoff gear or sold
it as junk.
American commanders are determined
to avoid a similar situation in Vietnam,
where U. S. forces are being cut from a
1969 peak of 543,400 men to about
45,000 by the end of 1972: According
to a military-supply expert in Saigon:
"There aren't going te . be any junk
islands filled with rusting . equipment
after this war. We are going to bring
the stuff back."
U. S. officials are equally determined
that no equipment or scrap metal falls
into the hands of the Communists. "We
don't want the scrap to be made into
bullets and fired back at us," says one
military source.
Code name given to the disposal pro-
gram is Operation Retrograde, a com-
plicated exercise in supply and .lemand,
screened by computers to insure That
surplus equipment goes where it is
needed most.
Sliding scale. Under a priority sys-
tem, U. S. troops remaining in Southeast
Asia get first call on all surplus. Next
come the South Vietnamese armed
forces, then other U. S. allies in Asia,
followed by American
units in other parts of the
world and in the U. S.
After these primary
needs are filled, equip-
ment goes to such second-
ary "customers" as the
U. S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the
World Health Organiza-
tion, or South Vietnamese
Government departrnents.
Even U. S. federal prisons
and Indian reservations re-
ceive excess supplies. The
leftovers are sold to civil-
ian bidders, usually for
scrap. Since 1967, these
surplus sales have totaled
nearly 21 million dollars.
Vietnam commanders
emphasize that Operation
Retrograde saves the U.S.
military-aid program money by supply-
ing Asian allies with used equipment
instead of more costly new gear. Cam-
bodia now is an important recipient.
At Long Binh, near Saigon, U. S. Aril-1)i
trucks, cleaned and repainted, wait in
neat rows to be picked up by troops
from Thailand. Rifles and radio equip-
ment are being shipped to South Korea
and Taiwan.
As of June 1, South Vietnam had re-
ceived more than 1,600 surplus artillery
pieces and tanks, 835,000 small arms
and other weapons, 45,000 trucks and
jeeps, 575 airplanes and helicopters, and
43,000 radios.
A major U. S. problem is how to
avoid giving the South Vietnamese ma-
teriel they do not need or do not know
how to use. Says one American officer:
"We don't want to hand the Vietnam-
ese maintenance and training nightmares
by rushing them into using equipment
that is too sophisticated at this stage."-
About 60 per cent of the 400 instal-
lations built by the U. S.�total cost, 1.8
billion dollars�have been given to South
Vietnam or are in the process of being
turned over. Most of these are small
camps. All so-called permanent struc-
tures on the bases are in fact tempOraiy.
' One supply officer observes: "They
were designed so that, ideally, when the
.last American gets aboard an airplane, -
the building collapses."
Getting Operation Retrograde under
way was not easy. An officer explains:
"We had no guidelines, and few if
, any precedents to go by. We've had to
play it by ear. But we've learned a lot,
- and now things are working fairly
smoothly."
Volume of materiel moving out of
Vietnam, officers claim, nearly equals
that which came in when the big U. S.
build-up began in 1965. The .79th Main.'
tenance Battalion stationed at Long
Binh alone received and processed near-
ly 900,000 items between last November
and mid-June.
"At one time," says the battalion com-
mander, Lt. Col. Byard W. Rife, "we
had literally acres of . guns, trailers,
trucks, small arms and communications
gear waiting to be checked in, cleaned
and shipped out."
Checking out. As each American
unit is ordered to "stand down" from
combat, it immediately returns to the
nearest .supply depot virtually zdl sup-
plies and equipment, except the clothes
on the backs of GI's. Tanks, armored
personnel carriers and other vehicles dam-
aged in combat often have to he drag-
ged in.
If they can he repaired, they are.
Otherwise, they are stripped of guns, en-
gines, transmissions and axles and sold
for scrap.
To meet American import re,z,dations,
all pieces of major equipment shipped
to the U. S. are first cleaned with high-
pressure hoses on sites resembling giant
ear-washes. Then most equipment is sent
to Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay or New-
port, a U. S. Army port outside Saigon,
to await shipment. Says Sfc. Carl Chris.
ner at Newport headquarters:
"Ships used to come out tO South
Vietnam full and leave empty. You don't
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see a ship leave the Far East empty
any more."
Inventory control for surplus goods in
the Far East is located in Honolulu.
Various depots in the Pacific region han-
dle different equipment. Tracked ve�
hicies from Vietnam go first to Sagami,
Japan. Small trucks and jeeps are ship-
ped to Taiwan.. -
Computer decisions. Heavy-duty
trucks, generators, electronic and com-
munications equipment, and some arms
and medicine go to the Second Logis-
tical Command on Okinawa, where a
.bank of six computers�rented for $117,-
000 per month�decides what equip-
ment goes where.
From July, 1968, through April, 1971,
the command disposed of 938 million
dollars' worth of equipment�more than
2 million different items ranging from
10-cent cotter pins to $15,000 trucks.
Savings to U. S. taxpayers from the
Okinawa operations are estimated at
about 310 million dollars a year. ,
Wrecked or damaged vehicles also are
shipped to Okinawa for repair�provided
that repair and transportation do not
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971
UHOLit
1..unst 1.;asai ''
Not only the U. S. is pulling
up stakes: Other "free world"
allies�with 70,000 men�have
concluded that their own mis-
sions are nearly completed.
America's combat allies' in Vietnam�
Thailand, Korea, Australia and New
Zealand�are following the U. S. lead
in withdrawing troops from the war.
Thailand, with a division of about
11,000 men in Vietnam, will pull, half
of its force out by the end of this month.
The remainder are likely to follow later
this year. That was announced on July 8.
Korea is now proposing to withdraw
part of its 50,000-man force�the biggest
Allied contingent supporting the U. S.
and South Vietnam. Both. Australia and
New Zealand have already made re-
ductions, with more to come.
"Static" positions. At the peak of
their involvement, the Allied nations�
_
exceed '65 per cent of the cost of a new
vehicle.
In 1968, the command repaired 463
trucks: This year, the total should reach
2,730 and next year, 5,058.
Realizing the risks' involved in the
selling or giving away of surplus Govern-
ment property, U. S. officials have set
up complicated safeguards to prevent
fraud or profiteering. For example, the
U. S. has the right to check back for up
to two Years on property turned over to
the South Vietnamese Government to
make certain it has not been sold on the
civilian market.
Scrap Metal also is sold on the condi-
tion that it cannot be resold, a regula-
tion designed to keep it away from
Communist countries.
Gathering brass. One item the U. S.
does not sell to anyone is brass shell
casings. They are so valuable .they are
gathered after each battle�sometimes
by villagers who are paid 40 cents for
each 2.2 pounds of brass they turn in.
Despite the safeguards against fraud,
no supply authority here claims the sys-
tem is foolproof. One official says:
X.V3S19
?INN
Loma
"We have elaborate machinery set up
to prevent the unauthorized use of our
excess material. We're trying to prevent
thievery and diversion, but who knows
how successful we are?"
About 450 civilians, representing com-
panies in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore
and New York, are permitted to buy sur-
plus. Agents for or from Communist
countries are excluded. Most of the bid-
ders are well-established businessmen,
yet one Saigon trader says: "Some �are
only as honest as they have to be�and
as dishonest as they can be."
Some shady dealers have been barred
from further bidding after trying to bribe
officers or rig the bidding.
Not all scrap is piled in disposal
yards. River boats and barges suyik by
the enemy are sold on condition that
buyers pay the costs_ of raising them.
Says Col. Norman J. Le Mere, com-
mander of the Property Disposal Agen-
cy in South Vietnam:
"This is a business. It's our job to got
the very best return we can from our
sales for the U. S. taxpayer."'
PA ADE h
loosely grouped into the Free World
Military Assistance Command�fielded a
total of nearly 70,000 men, exclusive
of U. S. forces. Those remaining are
manning defensive positions described by
officials as "static."
This command grew out of U. S. hopes
in 1964-65 that many nations�particular-
ly Asian�could be mobilized in a show of
battlefield solidarity against Communist
aggression in South Vieniam. That is
what happened in Korea when the South
was invaded by the Communist North in
1950. Fifteen countries from Europe and
the Far East sent combat units into action
in Korea under a United Nations com-
mand.
But no such widespread international
rescue mission was mounted in Vietnam.
The Philippines, Nationalist China and
Spain provided small semimilitary units
�but restricted them to noncombatant
duties. In the case of Spain it involved
seven Army doctors.
- Those that did send combat troops:
South Korea. The Republic of Korea's
ME
involvement in Vietnam began with a
mobile Army hospital in September,
19(34, and grew to two infantry divisions
with their supporting artillery and supply
units, plus one Marine brigade. The
U. S. picked up a major part of the bill
�more than 1 billion dollars to date.
The Koreans also insisted on being
equipped with some of the best U. S.
arms, including the M-16 rifle, and the
latest in communications gear.
How effective have they been? ROK
officers claim they have expanded their
area of control from 1,300 square miles
in early 1965 to 7,500 at present and
have more than doubled the number of
South Vietnamese under their protection.
The Koreans, who are acknowledged
to be tough fighters, have won a variety
of battle honors. In a long series of en-
gagements, they claim to have killed
35,406 of the enemy, with losses tu
their forces of 3,254 men killed and 7,334
wounded. Discussions are now going on
between South Korea and the Saigon
Government that are expected to lead to
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the withdrawal of one Korean division
before June, 1972.
Thailand. The Thai division of 11,000
men�all volunteers�operates in Bien Hoa
Province east of Saigon. Civic-action
projects, more than combat, are their
main missions. Contacts with the enemy
mostly has been minor. The Thai have
suffered fewer than 40 dead.
Testimony before a U. S. Senate com-
mittee last year indicated that, under a
secret agreement signed in 1967, the
United States has paid Thailand 50 mil-
lion dollars a year to cover costs of its
contribution to the Vietnam war.
Australia. A team of 30 Army advisers
began Australia's assistance to South
Vietnam in 1962. Transport planes and
bombers followed.
In 1965 ground-combat .units were.
introduced, and by 1968 the total Aus-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 July 1971
�
tralian commitment in the conflict had
grown to a task-force organization of
more than 8,000 men.
Australians have seen their share of
action. For its part in the 1966 battle
of Long Tan, one company received the
U. S. Presidential Unit Citation.
Since first coming to Vietnam, the
Aussies have suffered "slightly over" 400
dead and "several thousand" wounded,
according to their records.
Recent cutbacks have reduced the
Australian force by 2,000 men.
New Zealand. From a detachment of
25 Army engineers in mid-1964, the
New Zealand forces in Vietnam grew to
a peak of 800. Officials claim that this
number is no mere token contribution� �
that in relation to New 'Zealand's total
population it is one of the largest in
,J 153 -eg GIs
7�,7 �
.,s5mpfer gets
7-111.
4 a terms
By Daniel Sontherland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
President Thieu would have no objections
to a moderate step-up in American troop
withdrawals from South Vietnam if the
losses of troops were compensated for by
adequate U.S. material aid.
This is view Mr. Thieu expressed to
Henry A. Iiissingcr, President Nixon's top
security adviser, during a meeting between
the two here Sunday, according to informed
sources in the South Vietnamese capital
Dr. Kissinger, who just completed a three-
day fact-finding visit to Saigon, declined to
comment on the substance of his 21/2-hour
talk with President Thieu.
But it was understood that he asked Mr.
Thieu's opinion on a variety of subjects, in-
cluding the new seven-point Viet Cong peace
South Vietnam.
An artillery battery and two rifle
companies made up the main muscle of
the New Zealand force. Most of the time
it served with the Australians in an
Anzac command. Now New Zealand's
force has been cut back to 280 men.
One distinction Anzac officers make:
"We paid our own way." Neither country
got military support funds from the
U. S. Both paid for all supplies and
equipment the U. S. provided.
Behind the pullout�. Each of the
four Allied countries makes the same as-
sumption: With the help provided, the
South Vietnamese have grown strong
enough to cope with the Red threat.
Whether that hope proves out, there
seems little doubt that this mission is soon
to windup.
plan. And Tin Song (Living News), a news-
paper that closely reflects President Thieu's
views, said Messrs. Thieu and Kissinger
. spent a "lot of time" discussing the troopr
withdrawal question.
Constant review
"The point of view set forth by President
Thieu is that the United States can with-
draw troops at any rate, but he emphasized
that we believe the United States will not
�withdraw in an irresponsible manner," the
paper said.
The withdrawal program is under con-
stant review, and the United States is ap-
parently considering some moderate step-
ups in the withdrawal rate, which is run-
� ning at about 14,300 men a month.
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SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR FUTURE ARMED FORCES
South Vietnam is moving toward a military establishment of 1,100,000
men. The army's field force has now reached 427,500 of its scheduled
strength of 450,000 men. The field force will be organized into 10 infantry
divisions and one airborne division.
The Regional Forces, comparable to the United States National Guard,
are formed into about 1,000 companies trained and equipped to assist the
field army within their home regions.
Strength of Supporting Forces
The Popular Forces, with a lower scale of equipment, are organized
into 7,000 platoons and are trained for village security. The total
strength of the two forces will be about 500,000 men. The Peoples's
Self Defense Forces, composed of boys and older men, is to be employed
as a home guard.
Of the 50 squadrons planned for the air force, 37 are now active.
and more than 34,000 of a planned total of 45,000 airmen have been trained.
The air force is scheduled to have 1,200-aircraft.
Naval strength will be 1,600 vessels and 40,000 men. The United
States has already transferred more than 1,400 craft to the South Vietnamese.
The Government, assisted by Americans, has organized a,training
program that has graduated 108,000 men from a wide variety of service
schools ranging from the War College to a school for dog handlers.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
MOSCOW AND TILE ARAB WORLD: A TURNING POINT?
The USSR, as the only major power bordering on the Near East,
believes its national interests require that this area fall within
the Soviet sphere of influence. (The activist assumptions of Communist
ideology obviously demand something more.)/ To,- this end, the USSR
has steadily expanded its influence following the withdrawal of
Britain and France from the area. The key to Soviet expansion has
been Egypt When Nasser was seeking financial support to construct
the Aswan Dam, Moscow proved more than willing to provide the funds.
More important, the Soviet Union also agreed at that time to arm
and train Egyptian forces for their confrontation with Israel. The
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which Nasser's successor,
Anwar Sadat, signed with Moscow in May of this year may have marked
the apogee of Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Two months after the treaty was signed, the local Communist
Party in neighboring Sudan attempted to seize power. Bulgaria, known
for its role as Moscow's proxy in the Arab world, was implicated in
the coup attempt. And the Soviets found themselves in the embarrassing
position of having praised the coup (in the Moscow weekly NOW Times
and in thepro-Soviet weekly 'Link in New Delhi) during the short
period before Nimeri was restored to power. The failure of the coup
was in part a result of Egypt's prompt support of General Nimeri which
paved the way for government reprisals and the subsequent destruction
of the Sudanese Communist Party. By coming immediately to Nimeri's
aid (Thereare conflicting reports of the extent to which 'Ioviet-
equipped Egyptian troops participated.), Sadat made it clear that
despite Soviet military aid and the 15-year treaty, Egypt would
continue to play an independent role in Arab politics and would
not countenance a Communist state on its borders.
The SOviet Union has probably had few illusions about the short-
range potential of Communism in the Arab World. Moscow has been
reminded on more than one occasion of the basic incompatibility
between Islam, with its fatalism and its strong emphasis on the
family, and Communism. However, the events surrounding the Sudan
coup have probably also cast doubts on the ultimate rewards of
supporting Arab nationalist governments.
Two other developments related to the Sudan incident of July
probably served to strengthen Soviet doubts. China was quick to
exploit Moscow's dilemma in the Sudan. The Peking People's Daily
of 27 July reported that Sudanese armed forces had crushed an
attempt byia "clique" to overthrow General Nimeri. On 15 August
the same paper conveyed to Nimeri China's support for Sudan's efforts
to "preserve her independence and to cope with all forms of pressure."
The latter message also offered development aid.
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On 20 August in Damascus, leaders of Egypt, Syria and Libya
approved the constitution of a Federation of Arab Republics. The
constitution emphasizes that Islam is the official religion of
the Federation and that one-party governments are the order of
the day.
Since 1956 Moscow has given clear, if temporary and tactical,
A
prevedence to establishing close relations with nationalist Arab
regimes. In so doing, it has found itself on several occasions
in the position of helpless witness to the destruction of Communist
apparatuses and agents in which it had also heavily invested. The
Communist Party in Egypt has been banned during the entire 15 years
of Soviet presence. Soviet agents of influence in the Egyptian
government are currently on :trial for treason. In the Sudan, as
a result of the abortive coup, the strongest Communist party in
Africa has been destroyed and its leaders executed, -despite (on
this occasion) Moscow's protests and threats. In Syria and Iraq,
where there is a large Soviet military presence, the Communist
parties are illegal but tolerated. Recognized Communists serve
in the respective Ba'th Party regimes of both countries; this is
permitted, largely, to appease the Soviets.
However, it is not only the local Communist parties that
understand they can no longer depend on the Soviet Union to support
them or save them when they get in trouble. The younger generation
of Arab radicals, who grew up with Nasser's aspirations and Nasser's
promises ringing in their ears, and who today have risen in the
ranks of the military and have taken power in certain countries,
are eager to fulfill their political dreams. The watchword of the
radicals is Arab unity and revenge against Israel, (Sadat,- whose
base of power rests in part on Egyptian army support, is not
immune to the pressures from this group.) Arab radicals, who
have become disenchanted with Soviet counsels of patience and
restraint, are increasingly looking eastward to China.
Thus, the price the Soviet Union is paying for its support
of "national bourgeois" regimes is the alienation of that very
group normally most responsive to Soviet blandishments. Particularly
galling to Moscow is the fact that China is moving to exploit this
radical group at Soviet expense.
Fifteen years of expanding Soviet influence in the Arab world
may have reached a turning point this summer. The 'Sudan affair
served to increase Arab suspicions and to dampen Moscow's enthusiasm.
Nimeri's reprisals against local Communists over strong Moscow
objections resulted in an acrimonious exchange between the two
countries, the expulsion of the Soviet Counsellor and the Bulgarian
Ambassador, and almost caused a break in diplomatic relations
between the two countries. In Egypt, following the ouster of the
pro-Moscow group from the government and the events in the Sudan,
the prevalent mood of the government and the military is more anti-
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Communist than ever. The Egyptians recently announced that following
President Sadat's trip to Moscow, he will talk with President Tito.
The latter' is known to be concerned about the effect of Soviet
initiatives on Egypt's "non-aligned" posture.
The delicate relationship between Moscow, Arab nationalism
and Communism has been upset, although it has not necessarily been
broken. Moscow is undoubtedly trying to digest and evaluate the
events of this summer in terms of their meaning for Soviet Near
East policies. Will Moscow in the future continue to give the same
priority to support of national Arab regimes at the expense of
the local Conununist and the radicals? Will it continue its current
outsized military investment in Egypt? Or will it exert pressure
on Egypt to arrange a modus vivendi with Israel -- and how much
pressure is It capable of exerting? What new tactics can Moscow
devise to protqct its stake in the Arab world from Chinese encroach-
ments? The answers to these questions are not yet apparent. However,
Sadat's trip to Moscow and Belgrade, as well as UN discussions of
the Arab-Israeli issuevmay provide some clues as to Soviet inclinations.
Meanwhile, the recent Visit of sic left-leaning Israelis to the USSR
as guests Of the Soviet Peace Committee is an indication that Moscow
intends to open a Channel of communication to the other major party
in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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SWISS REVIEW OP WORLD AFFAIRS
September 1971
adicaliza lion of
Arnold Hettinger
The attempted coup' ,in, Morocco, the putsch and
.
counterputsch in Sudan, the eviction of the fcricoicen
�from their bases in Jordan and the subsequent
conflict over the future relations between-the guer-
rillas and Amman, are events v;Phich were not directly
li`ttked to one another but all served .to substantially
heighten the tension hi the Arab world 'and had a
generally radicalizing effect. This is most clearly
shown by , the .case of. the Libyan leader Colonel
Gliadhafi, who had k hand in all those bloody
events, even if only peripherally. In the process he
drew his chief ally, Egyptian President Sadat, into the
turmoil and prompted him to take a harder line. v.
In view of Gliadhafi's premature support for the
Moroccan rebels, Sadat hoped at first to exert a
moderating influence on his Libyan colleaglie. But
after 'a meeting in Marsa Matruh he let himself be
per'suaded so far by his. junior partner that the three
heads of the 'planned Libyan-Egyptian-Syrian federa-,
*11 issued a very �sharp communiquinwhichthcy,:
expressed their concern at conditions in Morocco
Gitac.lhafi then played the role of the leading
opponent of the "leftist,' coup in Khartoum. He even
went so far as to have ,rivo' leaders of the Sudanese
"revolution," an-Nur and Hamadallah, taken from a
British aircraft and arrested. At the same time in
Tripoli there was a coordination Of the.-iivailable
Libyan, Egyptian and Sudanese military forcps which
obviously played an important or Oen decisive role
in triggering the' ttiuntet-Putsch in Sudan. 'Sadat
accepted in silence his junior Partner's radical move
With regard to the British' airliner. Shortly thereafter,
in his speech to the Egyptian party congress, he
praised the enthusiasm and energy of the young
Libyan revolutionaries ;who, as he said, have con-
firmed-his faith' in the "Arab revolution." In the
question of what the Arab states coUld do to "punish"
King Hussein for his moves against the Palestinian
guerrillas and force him to observe the treaties of
Cairo and Amman, which guarantee the fedayeen
freedom of movement in Jordan, Ghadhafi once more
took the initiative in that he called a "summit
meeting" in Tripoli. After initial hesitation Egypt
quite suddenly agreed to this step. � ,
In all three' cases a similar sequence may be
observed: Ghadhafi makes a strong move; Sadat
seems to hesitate at first, with the intention of urging
the Libyan leader to moderation, but then chooses
to go along with his young colleague and more or
rzib Po
he phase of Sadat 's Egypt first" policy, of
'The
above all else, is
apparently nearing its end. This, political line, whose
� chief advocate was Egyptian Premier Fawzi, was
based on the premise that a � "peaceful solution"
could be found to the conflict with Israel � a
Solution embracing a return of all occupied territories
and a "recognition of the rights of the Palestinians."
It had been assumed in Cairo that Washington
could be moved to put pressure on Israel. But the
belief in this Possibility is dwindling steadily as
peace efforts drag on lOnger and as the '1972
election year in the USA approaches, It may be that
Vawzi and Sadat would prefer to continue pursuing
the road of. a "peaceful solution" and of promoting
Egyptian interests, if they did not have to reckon
with Clhadhafi's age peers in their own country.
The Libyans have given their military leaders
the . eloquent generic title of ."the generation' of
Saut al-Arab.17 This is a new generation of politicians
who grew. up under the influence of Abdel Nasser's
famous radiO station, '"Voice of the Arab8;" which
has now been largely tamed, at a time when its
commentaries; songs and agitprop speeches were able
to bring tile entire Arab world to a boil. This made
many of' them, including Ghadhafi; into "Nasscrites"
� more radical -than Nasser himself was, at least
following the Sinai defeat of 1967. The major themes
of that agitation were 'Arab unity and a campaign
of revenge against Israel. At that time "Arab social-
ism" 'was still in its infancy, having been worked
out only after the separation of Syria from Egypt
� in 1961 pointed to the beginning of the end of the
� early Nasserite dreams.
Today, having risen in the ranks of the military
and taken power in certain countries, the Saut
� al-Arab generation is trying to fulfil its youthful
political dreams; This is obvious in the case of
Ghadhafi. And there must be such "Nasserites" in
the Egyptian armed forces as well. In their minds
the deterrent memory of the 'defeat suffered itt the
Six Day War is dwindling steadily. After all, Egypt
now has new weapons, newly trained troops and
stronger Soviet cover than in 1967. Army officers
know that, without a "victory" against Israel, they
! will be unable , to get away from their present
: uncomfortable positions in the western desert and
! are condemned to have more and more training
" --nder Russian tutelage.
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Since the end of the power struggle last spring
Sadat is dependent on being able to rule his country
in harmony with the Egyptian army, which supported
him against the party strongmen and has since been
his chief source of strength. There are undoubtedly
various schools of thought in the military, some more
aggressive and others more cautious, but there are
ample signs that the sum total of these divergent
opinions is increasingly that Egypt is now ready to
take on Israel again. It may be presumed that it is
largely internal pressure from the army which is
forcing Sadat to give his support and acquiescence to
Ghadhafi's policies.
Iraq and Algeria, the "radical" Arab countries
which have made it a basic policy goal to outdo
Egypt, find themselves constrained by the harder
Egyptian line to be even more "revolutionary," at
least in their propaganda, and the Syrian regime also
feels compelled not to appear laggard in this regard
in the eyes of its subjects.
�
/ �
rrhe fact that there is now hardly any hope left that
-I- the fedayeen� can accomplish anything Significant
against Israel is contributing to a situation in which
the Arabs are losing their patience and growing more
eager for ;the "decisive struggle."- As long as the
guerrilla movement appeared to be growing and the
Arab masses could bask in the illusion that it would
ti111:11ely, :t "revolutionary force," sweep away
.evetything including Israel waiting was- not
too difficult even for the radical intellectuals. But
today evt tt Cot tiler advocates of a "peaceful solution,"
such as 1 ia!;sancin Heikal, arc beating the drums of
BALTIMORE SUN
24 September 1971
Beirat, Lebonation tio�.1Vfaj,
COnfar, at-Ntlitialry Su-
#lan s president, has charged
he Soviet Union with master,-
minding both the, abortive coup
logainst hint in July and the OM
;against Anwar Sadat, EgyPt's
vrcsident two, months earlier.
He claimed that all the,Com.
Inunist couritrieS of Eastern
frope, extePt, 'Yugoslavia were
to the unseceessful: leftist
:bid to bust hint and that they
},vere acting on orders from Mos-
Cow. '
; General NUrtialoos charges,
his., most direct against the So-',
fiet Union sine� the July coup,
War, Thc \,,,knion-orientcd majority of intellectuals
now speaks of the necessity of opening urban gucr7
rilla wartare aft,ainst. King Hussein and 'makes no
bones about its distrust of Sadat.- and his "year of
decision." in their opinion-, if .it was tip to the
I '..i,yption leaders the "decision" would he postponed
again and again for a long time to come, so that the
leaders must be forced to wage war through ``rovolu-
tionary acts." .
Naturally the Soviets will also have an important.,
say in developments. Until now the impression
predominated that Moscow did not Wish to let
matters reach the point of open Warfare. In the joint
communiqu& issued after 14Typtian-Soviet conferen-;
cca 01/0 regularly finds a sentence slating Intit owl;
-parties intend to ,continue their efforts to achieve a
just solution 'with "political means." flut during die
- last visit of the Egyptian foreign :minister the Soviets
also spoke of an "action plan'' which has been
established in order to bring about Such a "just
. solution." It is conceivable that a certain heightening
of tension is part of that action plan. But the main
pressure undoubtedly arises front- Egypt's internal
situation. Sadat'S declaration that a solution, whether
by peaceful means or force of arms, must come
during .1.971: was probably something of a surpyise to
the Russians. There., are signs of a conflict of
'interests developing between Moscow and Cairo: the
Egyptians, regard it as urgent to achieve a solution;
whether by war or diplomacy,, while the Soviets can
have little interest in a. "solution" which might
possibly make their tole as the chief supporters of the
Arabs Superfluous. '
Novi('t Backed
Abortive Coup,
SudanCharges
iverc made hi a Apr.erh [if East-
;ereif, near Rhartinda, Septelni.
her 10.' ....
,
f Unreported Speech -. Speech
1 The Speech, part of his, OM'
paign in Sudan's current presi.
dent int referendum, went uhre;
;))rted by Arab news agencies,:
)its remarks have becethe
4known ' through . diplomatic
Zourcest- , , . . , .
1 "Moscow wants its agents to
'seize power nod govern this
4 . �
i!ountry,�" .staa General ' Nu.'
lnalry. "But Moscow was as Stii.
))id as the conspirators wereii.��,:
t Ial Sabry On Tr ' . ' ' ."
4 ,
a "I want to 'tell you. this 'fact: ;
A .
Zrhe conspiracy began in the
1�iled Arab Republic I Egypt]
WO months earlier with All 1
:abry' who Is now on trial there.
' viten they failed there, and were
minded up, they 'decided to try
heir luck with the Hashem Atta
imp." �
i The 'former Egyptian vice
:resident, Ali Sahry, and 11 oth-�
.cr former Ministers and top po.:.
3itical..leadera, tire on trial It
I'laire' for their lives, accused of
j.) le tl i ng to'twer throw President
4, eclat. i ,!, -,'� , .
:Ma I j. lashetn � Alta, , -wild
:paged the coup against General
.1\luniairy, was executed by fir-
lig squad,T,T f
2
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THE LISTENER, London
5 August 1971
Godless Rigmarole
Going from Western Europe to the Orient,
a traveller may well feel that after some
three thousand miles he is midway on his
journey and entitled to call this strange
new area the Middle East. But in Russian,
the term is the Near East. It's not only
near: it's a neighbour. The Soviet Union
is the only major power which borders on
the Near East. Soviet soldiers stand watch
on the frontier with Turkey and Persia, and
for a decade after the war the Soviet Union
could do little but watch the success of the
-United States in making these countries
advanee bastions of American defence. But
since then, the Soviet Union has carried
out two counter-moVes. The first has been
a programme of economic aid in Turkey
and Persia which has led to friendlier rela-
tions. The Shah of Persia has twice been
received in Russia by the republican com-
rades who ignore the complete ban on the
Communist Party in Persia and Turkey.
The second move has been to outflank both
countries by establishing a Soviet military
presence in the Arab states of Syria and
Iraq. A leaf out of the American book.
The Soviet Union treats Syria and Iraq
as outposts of her home defence. She uses
Egypt as a pivot for expansion in the Medi-
terranean, down the Red Sea and in Africa.
Yet throughout Russia's 15 years in Egypt,
she has had to accept the ban on the Com-
munist Party there. Even when Khrushchev-
was welcomed triumphantly to the Aswari
Dam, the most Nasser conceded was the
release of some hundreds of Communist
prisoners�who remained under police sur-
veillance. Yemen was even more striking.
To secure her foothold there, the Soviet
Union gave small arms lavishly to the old
Imam, who ruled in medieval tyranny until
the revolution of 1962. The Russians built
this tyrant a new port and an airfield, use-
ful then, and now, as Soviet staging-posts to
the Indian Oco an. Across the Red Sea,
Sudan came voluntarily into the Soviet
sphere with the advent of President
Nilmeiry, and the country is now equipped
'with Soviet guns and aircraft. But Numeiry
may be remembering the anxious advice
given to Nasser by his Chief of Staff during
one of' his quarrels with Khrushchey:.
Gamal, Gamal, please remember' the
spares.' The Arabs know well that the Soviet
Union does use sanctions against delinquent
*states. She can withhold spare parts for
aero-engines, ammunition for guns or
equipment for economic development. Even
so, the Communist Party, proscribed
throughout the area, is from time to time
ferociously attacked, and the' Soviet re-
action is usually mild. Why is this? Well,
the pact between Stalin and Hitler should
have made it clear, once for all, that a mere
ideological difference would never be
allowed to stand in the way of Russia's
national interests. Russia, Communist or
Czarist, has always felt that her national
interest and security _demand a powerful
sphere of influence in what is, to her, the
Near East.
The present Russian rulers, continually
diSputing with Peking, are probably satis-
fied with socialistic regimes in the Arab
republics, regimes which use Communist
jargon, nationalise foreign capitalist com-
panies, but do not give doctrinal alle-
giance either to Lenin or to Mao. Moreover;
the Russians ,realise that the Arab repub-
lics, proud of the independence they have
achieved from colonial rule, are in no mood
to accept those limitations. of sovereignty
which Moscow can impose on East E'uro-
pean states. They will not even forgo,
national independence to achieve Arab poll-'
tical unity of which they talk so much.
The Russians are also well aware that a
real, more subtle Arab unity already exists
and presents an innate opposition to Com-
munist ideology. It lies in the whole heri-
tage of Islam. The most obvious opposition
is between the Muslim's submission to God
and the Communist's exaltation of man, but
� there's very much more than that: Arab
individualism, the strong sense of duty to
: the family, and also a sense of fatalism. I
; had a drink recently with an Egyptian
'engineer at Aswan�he was not an orthodox
Muslim�and a likable Russian engineer.
As the Russian left, the Egyptian said:
Those people, they were barbarians when
the Arabs were laying the foundations of
modern learning; and they come to us and
ask us to believe a godless rigmarole
elaborated by a renegade German Jew! '
PETER FLINN: Radio 4
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THE WASINGTON POST
24 October 1971
Sc
The writer is director of the Institute
of Contemporary History in London and
author of "The Soviet Union and the
Middle East." This article is adapted
from his testimony last week before two
House Foreign Affairs subcommittees.
r RillE INTEREST of the Soviet
-a- Union in the Middle East ,is that of
a superpower (which, unlike the
United States, is not�or not yet�a
status quo power) in an adjacent area
that offers good prospects for extend-
ing its political and military influence,
Several circumstances have favored
these designs: The area is militarily
weak, politically unstable and divided,
economically, with a few exceptions,
underdeveloped. Unlike Western Eu-
rope, the Middle East�with the excep-
tion of Turkey�is not part of the
Western defense system. The risks the
Soviet Union is likely to incur in its
forward policy in the area are therefore
less than in Europe, or indeed in
many other parts of the world.
Nevertheless, direct Soviet military
involvement in the area at present is
not very likely; at any rate, not sub-
stantially in excess of what there is al-
ready. While the Chinese danger is up-
permost in Soviet minds, Moscow has
other, more urgent preoccupations: To
neutralize Western Europe on the
basis of the status quo, to pursue an
active role in the Indian subcontinent,
to bring about the withdrawal of
American forces from Europe and
other parts of the world.
This is not to say that the Middle
East no longer enjoys high priority in
Soviet strategy. It simply means that
at present the Soviet leaders want no
more than controlled tension in the
area. Direct Soviet military involve-
ment there, quite apart from the risk
of a wider conflagration, would defeat
some of their designs elsewhere, such
as the European Security Conference
to which they currently attribute
ereater importance. The Soviet leaders
w'siVii
Tra ve
ly Walter Laqueur
seem to have realized that it is impos-
sible to combine a detente even in the
limited sense (as they interpret it),
with a war involving Soviet forces in
the Middle East.
But two caveats should be added to
this seemingly reassuring perspective:
Once the Soviet Union will be under
less pressure from China, once it has
made more progress in Europe, once it
has restored "order" as far as the un-
ruly satellites are concerned, it will no
doubt pursue a more determined, high-
er-risk policy in the Middle East. The
second caveat is this: The Soviet
Union is not in full control in the-
Middle East, not even after having
concluded a pact with Egypt which
provides for very close ties indeed be-
tween the two countries. The tension
may get out of control; one can imag-
ine more than one such scenario.
The attractions of the Middle East
as far as the Soviet Union is con-
cerned can be easily defined. Geo-
graphically, proximity is an obvious
factor. Ten years ago, or even five, one
would not have mentioned oil in this
context, for until recently the Soviet
Union was self-sufficient in this re-
spect. But Soviet (and East European)
consumption is now outstripping pro-
duction and there is little doubt that
toward the end of the present decade
Middle Eastern oil will figure as
\ ity
major factor in Soviet strategy.
But more important than economic
and even military factors (such as
bases in Egypt and elsewhere) are po-
litical considerations, even if these
may appear at first sight somewhat ab-
stract and intangible. Expansion in a
southward direction has been one of
the constant factors in Russian foreign
policy for more than 200 years. Fur-
thermore, and more concretely, if the
Middle East became an exclusive So-
viet sphere of influence this would
have far-reaching repercussions on the
situation in Europe as well as in Africa
and Asia. It would constitute, in fact, a
east
radical change in the global balance of
power.-
Great Expectations
OyIET POLICY in the Middle�East
at resent aimyer'y briefly.
neutializurieev and Iran and
at --ejaistamLimethe_ Arab world of
regiTmes on which it can rely_for clos.e
calaboration on the ern
lishe under President Nasser. The
general assumption behind this policy
was that power in the Arab countries,
despite occasional setbacks, is bound
to pass gradually into the hands of
people even more closely identified
with Soviet policies.
There is no denying that events in
Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other coun-
tries in the 1960s seemed to bear out
Soviet expectations, There was a pro-
gressive radicalization in domestic af-
fairs in these countries as weli as
growing identification with Soviet poll-
'cies: Factories and banks were nation-
alized, important sections of the state
apparatus were revamped according to
the Soviet model, etc. But beyond a
ce :eain point the Soviet Union has so
far failed to make progress, and there-
fore more sober thoughts have pre-
vailed in Moscow about the rate of po-
litical progress, not only in the Middle
East but in the Third World in gen-
eral.
The intrinsic weakness of the area�
political, military, and economic�has
been mentioned. To this one should
add the shortsightedness and political
inexperience of some of its leaders.
These are no doubt absolutely genuine
in their frequent professions of un-
swerving devotion to national inde-
pendence. But the result of the policies
they have pursued has not been to
strengthen their independence; on the
contrary, they have become dependent
upon the Soviet Union to a growing
degree.
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True enough, there have been grow-
ing misgivings in the Arab world�not
only since the recent events in the
Sudan. But to assuage these misgivings
it is usually argued that the Soviet
Union is a disinterested country which,
in contrast to the Western imperialists,
i has no desire to interfere in internal
Arab affairs. The simple geopolitical
facts of life have not yet been fully ac-
cepted in the Arab world: The mis-
taken idea still persists that the Soviet
Union is not only a well meaning but
also a geographically distant country.
(The distance between Egypt and the
Soviet border�not to mention Iraq
and Syria�is in fact less than that be-
tween Cairo and Khartoum or between
Cairo and Tripoli.)
The countries of the Middle East
have been sidetracked by their inter-
nal quarrels to such an extent that the .1
.question whether an Egyptian (or Syr-
ian or Iraqi) victory over Israel would
:he worthwhile if it could be achieved
:only at the price of Egypt's independ- �
ence is brushed aside as irrelevant.
Whatever Arab feelings about Israel, it
does not constitute a serious threat to
the independence and sovereignty of
the Arab countries, for the simple rea-
son that a small country cannot
threaten their very existence. More-
over there is, for obvious reasons, no
"Israeli party" in Cairo, Damascus,
and Baghdad which could seize power
from within.
' But there is a "Russian party"
which, as recent events have shown, is
a strong contender for leadership. Yet
in most Arab eyes Israel is. still the
main, not the lesser, danger: Somehow,
it is argued, they will get rid of the
Russians once Israel is defeated and
the world will then regain its full
independence and freedom of action.
A is a striking example of what some
Marxist philosophers call "false con-
sciousness."
Getting In Deeper
I.UT THE MORE DEEPLY the So.
viet Union has become invo!-.:,-'d in
tie Middle East, the more comp;icated
its position. To a certain extent this
was an inevitable process: While the
West was "in" and the Soviet Union
"out" in the Middle East, Moscow did
not have to take sides�just as it could
be on .friendly terms with both India
and Pakistan. The West had the mo-
nopoly of committing mistakes,
whereas the Soviet Union could do no
wrong.
Progressive Involvement in Arab af-
fairs meant that Moscow has had to
choose sides in the main existing con-
flicts. The existence of communist par-
ties and pro-Russian factions in the
Arab world is the main bone of conten-
tion but by no means the only one. The
Soviet Union cannot at one and the
same time support the Suclaen-
eral Nimert and those who want to
overtERViiis regime; it can be tried
�but the attempt is bound to fail.
- If the Soviet Union were just a big
power such a dilemma would not exist.
But since it is also the head of the
world Communist movement, it cannot
opt out entirely from its commitments
to its local followers without causing
fatal damage to the legitimacy of its
claims for leadership�and this at a
time when its authority as the leader
of the Communist camp is in dispute
anyway.
Soviet policy makers have become
reconciled to the fact that political
power in the Arab world will remain
for a long time to come in the hands of
military juntas, rather than political
parties supporting Moscow. This, from
the Soviet point of view, r�_notindtself
a major disaster. Anyivay, the Soviet
Uniob -elfin� longer count on the auto-
matic support of other Communist par-
ties, unless it also happens to be in
physical domination of the country
concerned. Albania is Communist and
Fin,land is not, but there is little doubt
that Soviet policy makers vastly prefer
the Helsinki over the Tirana govern-
ment. To give another example: Many
Communist parties dissented from the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968 whereas the military governments
of Egypt, Syria or Algeria supported it
without reservation. Unlike purely
Ideologically motivated supporters, the
clients can he relied upon to support
Soviet policy in a critical situation, be-
cause they need Soviet help,
And yet, there is a basic element of
uncertainty with regard to the political
orientation of these military regimes.
Ten years ago Soviet policy makers
wc. far more optimistic about the in-
tentions and political prospects of the
military dictatorships in the Third
Ifforld than at present. The reasoning
at the time was briefly this: Military
leaders such as Nasser were "radical
democrats in uniform." Even though
their outlook was as yet beclouded by
certain "petty bourgeois" prejudices, it
was assumed that the "objective logic"
of events would carry them into much
closer collaboration with the Commu-
nists and the Soviet Union than they
had originally envisaged and intended.
For they were not acting in a politi-
cal vacuum; once the means of produc-
tion had been nationalized and capital-
ism was on the way out, the ruling offi-
cers, needing a political mass basis,
were bound to turn to "scientific so-
cialism"; i.e., to the Communists. For
only these could provide the doctrine
and the political know-how needed for
the mobilization of the masses.
In recent years it has been realized
that this appraisal has been overopti-
mistic. Military leaders can turn "left"
and "right" in rapid succession, with
equal ease, to apply terms of classifica-
'ton which should be used as sparingly
as possible with reference to Middle
Eastern politics. As as result thire is
now hardly veiled disappointment in
Moscow about the agonizingly slow
progress made by communism in parts
of the Third World, about the fact that
army officers may be power-hungry, or
"career motivated" even if they con-
stantly use the anti-imperialist politi-
cal rhetoric of the Communist camp.
These shortcomings and "inconsist-
encies" of the juntas are more fre-
quently attributed to the "petty bour-
geois background" of the military rul-
ers. But there is nothing "petty bour-
geois" about a man who was born ;n a
Bedouin tent and now disposes
= �
bil-
lions of dollars such as Libya's Colonel
Khadafi.
The real explanation for the appar-
ent "inconsistencies" is much easier:
In the struggle for power between
rival officers' groups, ideological con-
siderations usually play a secondary
role. Wonalization of industries and
banks_ aticri=a- rtan reform -1?y_ no
means IWd to socialism oi comnrunk:m.
The decisive issue in the Third World,
Including the Arab ccuntries, is not
whether the banks have been national-
ized but in whose hands political power
has come to rest: who is running the
state.
Series of Dilemmas
IN THIS CONTEXT Soviet po;cy
in the Middle East has to face
several dilemmas to which so far it
has not been able to find a satisfactory
answer. The first has already been
hinted at: According to the Soviet
blueprint the progressive military rul-
ers/ were gradually to "democratize
political life," i.e., hand over power to
the avant-garde, the Communists. But
in fact the colonels and the majors
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have not shown the slightest inten-
tion to do so. They have been deal-
ing ruthlessly with those challenging
their power. According to Soviet ex-
pectations the military were to be poli-
ticized, i.e., made to share power with
civilian leaders, In fact, the opposite
has happened: Political life has been
militarized, with Syria as a striking ex-
ample.
True enough, in view of the weak-
ness of political structures in the Arab
world a handful of determined people
stand a good chance to make a success-
ful bid for power, provided, of course,
they are in control of army units or
the political police. And, with a little
luck, they may keep it. But a pro-Com-
munist or pro-Russian coup in one
country is almost certainly bound to
provoke suspicion and antagonism in
others and to give rise to counter-
forces: Victory in one country will
mean defeat elsewhere. In other
words: Unless the pro-Russian forces
make steady and even progress in all
the key countries of the Arab world,
the overall balance as far as the Soviet
Union is concerned may be negative.
The Arab-Israeli dispute has become
increasingly problematical from the
Soviet point of view. Earlier on it un-
doubtedly facilitated the Soviet 'ad-
vance in the Middle East. It was not
the only, nor the single most impor-
tant factor. The forces supporting the
Soviet Union have made their greatest
strides' in those parts of the Middle
East least affected by the Arab-Israeli
dispute such as the Sudan. But in re-
cent years the conflict has become a
major obstacle as far as the further
progress of communism is concerned.
While the conflict lasts, the overriding
aim of defeating the common enemy�
Israel�narrowly circumscribes Com-
munist action or tends altogether to
prevent it. For the Communists cannot
afford to ignore the appeals for na-
tional solidarity and for a truce both
inside the Arab countries and between
them. Soviet observers assume, not
perhaps altogether wrongly, that but
for the continuation of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, power in the Arab capitals
may well have passed from the "bour-
geois nationalist elements" into the
hands of the "radical democrats" if not
the Communists. Ceetainly the Arab
world would be in a state of Tar
greater internal turmoil' but for the
struggiehich acts as a
stahlfiTing factor.
Soviet leaders could have instructed
their followers according to the basic
tenets of Leninist strategy to trans-
form the war against Israel into a "rev-
olutionary war." They have not done
so, partly because the Communists are
too weak, given the present balanee of
power in the Arab world, partly be-
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cause sucn a course ot action, ii mute
cessful, would result in a state of an-
archy which might well benefit the
pro-Chinese rather than the pro-Soviet
elements among the radicals in the
Arab world.
Options Are Limited
rrHESE ARE SOME of the sources
I. of conflict facing the Soviet Union
in its policy vis-a-vis the Arab coun-
tries. There is every reason to assume
that these contradictions will loom
even larger in the years ahead.
But what are the options open to .So-
viet policy? Developments in Alggia
over the last few years have been dis-
appointing from the Soviet point of
view, Khadafi's regime .in_Libya and
Nimeri's in the Sudan are at present
openly anti-Communist, and Sadat's
rule constitutes a' retreat in compari-
son with Nasser's. Soviet policy mak-
ers cannot possibly be very happy
about the new Arab federation. For its
political significance, if any, will be
that of a reactionary "Holy Alliance"
preventing revolutionary uprisings in
its component parts. It is the Arab
version of the Brezhnev doctrine�
stood on its head. The fact that it
might be applied against Jordan, for
Instance, does not offer much comfort.
Soviet expectations that military dic-
tatorships cannot hold on to power for
long because they lack political know-
how and a mass basis have not so far
been borne out by the course of
events. These assumptions may still be
correct in the long run; Nasser, toc,
.had his quarrels with the Communists
and the Soviet Union , but mended his
ways towards the end of his rule. But
It cannot be taken for granted that the
present rulers will emulate Nasser;
moreover, there is no certainty at all
that the military leaders in their
search for political allies will turn to
the Communists for help. If the Soviet
Union should decide to support the op-
position to the military regimes, they
will be inviting open conflict, risking
their past gains in the area and even a
restoration of closer relations between
these leaders and the West. For de-
spite the vituperation heaped on the
West, it cannot be excluded that the
help of the West will be looked for by
military dictators facing defeat by the
Communists.
If, on the other hand, the Soviet
Union and its supporters in the Arab
countries should prefer a policy of
wait-and-see, on the assumption that
the political constellation will be,more
auspicious at some future date '(after
another lost war against Israel., or the
continuation of the military stalemate
and the ensuing frustration, or some
economic setback, or the growth
of popular discontent for yet other rea-
sons) they will be in danger of being
outflanked from the left by more ex-
treme factions.
No Guarantee of Control
I T CANNOT BE STRESSED too
often that since the Soviet Union
is not in full control as far as events in
the Middle East are concerned, not
even over the actions of its followers
and clients, there is always a Very con-
siderable elenient 'of uncertainty. It
would be foolish for this, as well as for
other reasons, to assume that the So-
viet,leadership will automatically pur-
sue a cautious policy simply because
this is at the present moment in its
. best interest. Moreover, caution in the
Middle East context means the contin-
uation of "controlled tension"�bta
there is .no guarantee that tension will
not go out of control. Nor is the Soviet
Union condemned to prolonged inac-
tivity. The treaty of friendship be-
tween the Soviet Union and Egypt
concluded in May, 1971, undoubtedly
constitutes a step forward from the So-
viet point of view. More recently, Pres-
ident Sadat had to sign a document
,condemning anti-communism, i.e. the
policy pursued by his colleagues in
'Khartoum dnd Tripoli, not to mention
his own action vis-a-vis the Russian
party in Cairo.
At present the main aim of Soviet
policy in the Middle East remains, to
summarize, the consolidation of its
gains, and at the same time the crea-
tion of a political climate In which the
replacement of the present rulers by
others more closely identified with So-
viet ambitions in the area will be pos-
sible with a minimum of friction. The
longer-range aim is the transformation
of the military regimes into political
coalitions dominated (or � at least
guided by) the Communists. But this
remains; for the time being, a fairly re-
mote prospect inasmuch as the key
countries in the Arab world are con-
cerned..
Soviet policy towards Israel will not
undergo any basic change, though it is
quite possible, and indeed likely, that
there will be occasional friendly ges-
tures towards Jerusalem in order to
impress the Arabs that they must not
take Soviet assistance for granted in
all circumstances.
Altogether, the Middle East is an
area in world politics to which Soviet
commentators apply the term slozhni
(complicated) more and more fre-
quently. Ten years ago they were more
confident of having all the answers.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
WHITHER POLAND? THE DECEMBER PARTY CONGRESS
The Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party
(Communist) will open 6 December, one year before scheduled and
one year after a workers' rebellion toppled the regime of
Wladyslaw,Gomulka, who had come to power as a reformer 15 years
earlier. The unusually early data, the Party says, is to get
new programs underway. It is more likely that the new Party
Secretary, Edward Gierek, wishes to move quickly to consolidate
his position, to distract attention from the upcoming anniversary
of the December rebellion, and to persuade the Polish people,
by sheer busyness that some progress is being made toward improv-
ing the deplorable economic situation.
Guidelines for the Congress have been approved by a
September plenum and made public. The greatest emphasis is on
the same economic problems which brought Gierek to power in
January 1071. The guidelines give at least the appearance of
reform whatever their effectiveness proves to be. Centralized
economic planning is to be retained while production and
executive:responsibility are to lie with regional officials and
industrial associations. The Party's meddling in economic
operations is to be discouraged- Increased productivity and
higher living standards are given a top priority. The guidelines
encouragea "hospitable climate" for the growth of small enter-
prises. There has also been a notable effort to popularize the
regime: people are urged to participate in pre-Congress
discussions and to make suggestions; an effort has been made to
humanize the regime.
Such promises are almost as old as the Polish Communist
regime itself. In 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka was installed as
Party chief in a wave of anti-Stalinism. He embarked on a
decentralizing reform program to undo some of the worst effects
of years of forced industrialization and collectivization
modeled on the equally brutal Soviet effort of the '30's. The
reforms were abandoned by 1959 at the expense of the Polish
consumer. Some familiar Communist jargon in the 1971 guidelines
points to continuing political restrictions which would nullify
any intended reforms: "democratic centralism" (or, Party rule
without popular participation), "strengthening the leading role
of the Party" (or, continued political domination by the Party
of all aspects of Polish life), "no free play for alien political
tendencies" (or, the Soviet Union is to be our model).
It is precisely the degree to which the Poles adhere to the
Soviet model of economic development which will determine the
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success or failure of the program. If Gierek, the clever and
efficient former Silesian Party leader, who is widely regarded as
a pragmatist and a technocrat, has examined Gomulka's failures,
talked with Polish workers, studied production failures and
alternative organizational procedures, he is well aware of the
problems and weaknesses of Polish economic institutions. He will
have found every proof that the Party-dominated economic machinery
(following the Soviet example) has failed to improve living
standards or achieve a viable economy. The failure is as evident
in Poland as it is in the USSR. Yet there is little reason to
hope that Party domination of the economy is to be scrapped.
Many factors will influence the Polish decision concerning
the Soviet model. Reforms worth considering, such as the
decentralization of planning and essential decision-making, giving
workers the right to participate in the management of enterprises
Gas in Yugoslavia), permitting more play to market forces, etc,
all carry risks, Polish leaders dare not relinquish too much
Party control br deviate too far from the Soviet model in other
respects as well, fo fear of Soviet intervention. Soviet
requirements for integration of the East European economies, as
outlined in the August meeting of the Council foT Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon) will also hamper the development of the
Polish economy, no matter what solutions Gierek may wish to
entertain,
It may be that the Soviets will permit Gierek some leeway in
his effort to revitalize the stagnant Polish economy. Last
December's worker revolt against the workers' Party and State
was a traumatic experience for the Communist world -- an experience
which they fear may repeat itself in Poland and elsewhere in the
Soviet sphere.!
In the meantime, Gierek has used the past year to rid the
Party of deadwood.. But in the end, such half-measures, encourag-
ing words, and superficial reforms are not likely to bring about
the radically needed improvements so long as the Soviet model
must be followed in its essential forms.
Publicly Gierek and the new leaders blame all Polish prob-
lems on the Gomulka regime, apparently believing that they will
thereby relieve themselves somewhat of the need to make solid
reforms. Gierek has said that the major weakness of the
Gomulka regime-- and the principal cause of the uprising --
was its isolation and inability to gauge the depth of popular
discontent. Without facing the fact that despots tend to be told
what they want to hear, Gierek implies that public discussion of
Party programsmight improve their content. Yet the man in the
street is well: aware that it is Party control which throttles
progress and that no amount of discussion is likely to lessen that
control.
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A Polish Communist economist, Wlodimierz Brus, writing in
the Italian Communist journal Rinascita of 25 June 1971 described
the deadening effect of following the Soviet model as Gomulka
had done for 15 years (may the same words not apply to Gierek
some years hence):
". . . it is not enough to denounce and condemn even
with the greatest good will, the errors and distortions of
the Stalinist period; neither is it enough to effect certain
changes, if those changes deal only with the surface and neither
attack the root of the problems nor create conditions for a
continual adaptive process."
"In a certain sense, the whole history of the unsuccess-
ful attempts undertaken during the past 15 years to effect
economic reform in Poland can serve as an example of the
negative influence of the existing political mechanism on
the economic processes."
The World will be watching the December Congress and subse-
quent actions to see whether Gierek attacks the roots of the
problem, offers any truly basic and innovative reforms, establishes
any responsive organizations or takes any non-Soviet initiatives
in the political and economic areas. Or whether this regime will
be just another proof of the truth of Polish Marxist philospher
Leszek Kolakowski's observation that "...when the (Gpmaanist)
leaders affirm their. wish to ensure technical progress and an
improvement in the material situation of the population, they
are generally sincere. But these intentions are in contradiction
to their desire to reinforce the monopoly of uncontrolled power
in all fields of social life. (See attachment for other penetrat-
ing observations by Kolakowski on the self-defeating mechanisms
built into the Soviet system of socialism.)
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NEW YORK TIMES
5 September 1971
Polish Party Congress
To Be Held Year Early
Special 10 the New 'rock Times
� WARSAW, Sept. 4�The Pol-
ish Communist party has de-
cided to convene its Sixth Con-
zress on Dec. 6, a. year ahead
.of schedule.
Edward Gierek, the party
leader, announced this today in
Warsaw at a special meeting of
Ithe Central Committee.He said
:the Congress, to be attended by
'leaders of other ComMunist
parties, ' would focus on the
:Polish economy.
Mr. Gierek, who assumed
power from Wladyslaw,Gomul-
ka last December after a week
of riot's protesting economic
conditions, outlined several in-
novations in a major address to
party leaders.
He said the traditional system
of presenting "detailed and
fixed drafts of the proposed
economic plan" had been aban-
doned. Instead, the program
will be open for discussion and
alteration..
The intention, he said, is to
produce a more realistic pro-
gram --- previous preliminary
drafts were "hardly readable,'
he said � and to encourage
wider participation.
Experts to Be Consulted
Non-Communist experts and
others who have assisted in the
draft commissions will be en-
couraged .to remain with the
program as it is given final
shape, he said.
The program will be handled
in its last stages by "problem
commissions," or groups of ex-
perts, Mr. Gierek said.
Previously, delegates have
been obliged to sit through dis-
cussions of the entire economic
program, a time-consuming prO-
cedure that. produced little in
the way of constructive com-
ment.
Mr. Gierek sought to empha-
size that the new Congress
would be considerably more
open than any previous one.
The last was held in 1968.
In the past, he said, party
leaders told delegates "what
would be done." This discour-
aged discussion and action, he
said. "We are trying to present
an analysis of the problems
facing the nation, state and
party," he said.
Since taking over, Mr. Gierek
has altered the economic pro-
gram to aid consumers and the,
lowest paid workers.
' Calls for New Members :I
Today, he stressed the need.
to draw new members into the
party, especially from the ranks,
of workers. He said the Cen-
tral Committee was determined
. to "strengthen the workers' nu-
cleus at all party levels."
His pledge follows the near
completion of a purge of the
party's middle and lower ranks.
Officials have been anxious to
remove indecisive, inactive and
politically unreliable members
before delegates and selected
for the congress.
Party leaders began the in�
tensive stage of their reform'
early this summer. The screen-
ing was conducted throurth in-
terviews with party members
at the factory and village level.
Many party members and:
some officials have since been
removed from the rolls, usually
for inactivity, or have been ex-
pelled, probably for administra-
tive or ideological errors.
The process reached the
county level last month and,
according to accounts in news-
papers, was completed at the
province level in the last few
days.
Indifference is Reported
Unofficial reports in recent
months have indicated that
party leaders are facing indif-
ference and even hostility in
their efforts to introduce re-
forms and to secure pledges of
increased production.
A leading economist who is
!working on Mr. Gierek's reform
.plan said that many middle-
level bureaucrats were reluc-
tant to change their ways. He
told a Western diplomat that
they "are still waiting to see
if Gierek survives."
Some workers who were un-
happy in their dealings with
party leaders under Mr. Gamut-
ka are reportedly responding
'to pleas, for greater productiv-
ity with demands for increased
pay. They are being told that
the higher pay can coma only
.from increased productivity.
� Trybuna Ludu, the official
party newspaper, provided
lengthy accounts of party meet-.
inks this week in Bydgoszoz,
Kielce, Lublin, Szczecin and
Wroclaw. Most of the meetings
were attended by politburo
membera..
The newspaper spoke of the,
Meetings as having revealed
"still existing ineptitude in
personnel policy, bad organiza-
tion work and many shortcom-
ings in human relations." It
said that "higher ideological
criteria" would be required for
admitting new members.
In Kielce, it reported, party
leaders had spoken with every-
third party member or candi-
date. In Opole, where the party
net on provincial level or. Mon-
day, Trybuna Ludu said " a re-
view of paray ranks" had led
to "3,864 people being ceossed
off the. records and 71.9 ex-
pelled from the party."
"Six Months After the Baltic Crisis," by Wlodimierz Brus, inRinacita
(theoretical journal of the Italian Communist Party), 25 June 1971.
Half 4 year has already elapsed. The "December events"
in Poland disappeared some time ago from front pages in the
international press. Yet it would be damaging for socialism
and for the international workers' movement if the great ex-
periences arising out of those events in Poland were to be
erased or blurred by the passage of time. This concern is
not imaginary but reel, not only because the law of "pante rei"
[Everything- is in a state of flux] is universal and inexorable,
but also because of the very understandable tendency to for-
get what is unpleasant and difficult; and the Polish events
were unpleasant and difficult for the Pomtunist Party in both
socialist and nonsocialist countries. Yet it is nevertheless
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necessary to profit by the .,time elapsed to attempt a concrete,
scientific analysis, which can be the more profound and
courageous by being free of the emotions reigning at the
time.
Significance of the Working Class Demonstrations
In the long run, the essential significance of last
December's events in Poland lies in several simple facts:-
1. The demonstrations were authentic workers' demon-
strations; they involved the proletariat of the large indus-
tries. The former government and party leadership's initial
attempt to present the demonstrations as the work of "hooligans
and asocial elements" collapsed noisily. Since then, no one
has ventured to publicly deny the genuine workers' character of
the demonstrations. Furthermore, no one has _sought to connect
the demonstrations with activities of. the circles of domestic
or foreign opposition; in particular, accusations Of revision-
ion have not been made. Leaving aside the problem of the under-
lying origin of the .December events, it can thus be said that
the spontaneous character of the-movement has been recognized,
although at the same time it seemed to demonstrate a -really
surprising capacity, under the circumstances, to organize itself
rapidly and efficiently, and in such a way as to conform to
the traditions of the Polish working clasS.
2. .The immediate effect of the workers' demonstrations
and thetragic bloodshed was a change in Poland's political
leadershin. Wladyslaw Gomulka and his closest collaborators,
the politicians responsible for governing the country for the
last 15 years,\who in a certain sense symbolized that period,
were forced to leave the political scene.
Following the December demonstrations, and under the
pressure exerted by the working class in the succeeding months,
price increaseS were cancelled (although up until the last
moment justification for the necessity of maintaining them
was sought); the policy o2 freezilag salaries and stipends was ,
abandoned (introduced under the guise of a so-called new system
of economic incentives); essential changes in favor of the
consumer were effected in the economic plan for 1971; and so
on. .
These facts taken together testify to the depth and
range of the social conflict with which Poland was afflicted.
We are no longer dealing with the theoretical problem of re-
cognizing the existence of conflicts within socialist
countries in an abstract way; but with a concrete framework,
a tangible one for these conflicts -- a framework which im-
poses conclusions of a general character. Add to that,
because of the validity of the Marxist method if it is ef-
fectively adapted to realities .in the socialist countries,
that the conclusions from the Polish events cannot be lim-
ited strictly to the problem of the particular personalities
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or the errors committed on this particular occasion. The
result is that it is not enough to denounce and condemn,
even. with the greatest good will, the "errors and distor-
tions" of the Stalinist period; neither is it enough to af-
fect certain changes, if those changes deal only with the
surface and neither attack the root of the problems nor cre-
ate conditions for a continual adaptive process. The
politicians who were forced to leave the government helm in
December 1970 part-icipated actively in the communist-resist,
ance to the Nazi occupation of Poland; three of them --
GomuLlza,'Kliszko, and especially Spychalski -- had been per-
secuted during the Stalinist period. The fact that the
triumphal return of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the political scene
in October 1956 took place with the rallying cry, "Never again
a ',Poznan," takes on symbolic, almost tragic, dimensions if it
is borne irlmind that his inglorious disappearance from the
political scene after governing for 15 years took place once
again u_n.deripressure from the workers, this time even strong-
er pressure, and unfortunately at the cost of an even great-
er number of victims. The inquiry is closed, although there
would.be.nOreason to doubt that Gomulkaa-really wished to
avoid repeating the Poznan experience and was deeply con-
vinced he was doing everything to that end.
,The conclusion is so obvious that it seems quite un-
necessary to formulate it: in the functioning mechanism
of the existing system in Poland -- and it seems that this
system does not differ essentially from that existing in
:other Eastern European socialist counties -- there must have
been factors which did not favor the overcoming of social
and economic tonflicts, but on the contrary concealed them;
,(:) that after a certain period of time those conflicts emerged
with greater force, and exploded. As a Marxist, I think that
this is the only basis for explaining to ourselves and to
others the causes of the tragic events and the paradox of fate
which befell several eminent personalities in the Polish
workers' movement.
An Attempt To Define the Causes.of the 'Crisis
_Ari exhaustive answer to the question of what the causes
were for .the growth of the conflicts-which blossomed in the
explosion will of course. require a many-faceted analysis.
The more the climate of research is a free climate of true
research, the more effective the analysis will be.. It is
no longer 'useful to cling to defeated schemes. The attempt
which follows is'therefore in the spirit of logical dis-
cussion..
The direct cause of the Polish workers' demonstrations
in Decembe:::1970 was economic difficulties, and the attempt
to.overcome!them .at the ,expense of the working passes. 3ut'
what was the cause of the economic difficulties, and of the
choice of that particular method of dealing with them rather
than .som,e. other method?
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The writer holds the principal causes of the trouble
to be in the political mechanism. This statement should
not be surprising, inasmuch as in a socialist country --
where the. principal means of production have been national-
ized and the state has shaped the economy as a whole by means
of a central economic plan �.political power and the meznoe
of government become an inseparable element, and perhaps the
central element, of the system of productive relationships.
Without taking into account the characteristic of the state
and of the measure of real participation of the popular
masses in the exercise of power, it is impossible to define
the essence of the ownership of the means of production which
is the basis of every system of productive relationships. It
could therefore be expected that under these conditions the
classical Marxist theory of development through the manifest-
ing and surmounting of conflicts between the needs of the de-
velopment of productive forces and the character of the pro-
ductive relationships would find its expression in the con-
flicts between the political mechanism and the needs of the
economy. It does not seem too difficult to prove this
thesis: we shall limit ourselves to events in recent Polish
history.
The modern theory of decision-making, as is well
.known, attaches great importance to the creation of premises
for a rapid, free, and -- extremely important -- potentially
genuine flow of information. This factor increases in im-
portance as the importance of the decision to be made and
the level Of its consequences increase. From this point of
view, the narrowness and the degree of distortion of the
information at the disposal of the former leadership of
the Polish Unified Workers' Party (PZPR) in making the de-
cision to raise food prices in December 1970 (right before
Christmas, to make matters :worse) is truly surprising. To
judge from statements made after the December events, the
party leadership was not only in the dark about the real:
economic situation, but also about the political climate
prevailing both among broad strata of the population and in
high party and government circles. It has been learned that
the centers of decision were not receiving adequate input
regarding.the:situation. From materials published after the
December events, it appears .that many members of the central
committee, of the government, of the trade union leadership,
and even members of the political office and the, secretariat
of the PZPR criticized, and perhaps even strongly objected
to, the proposed decisions. .Yet there is no proof of any
attempt whatsoever on anyone's part to get these decisions
reversed; there is no proof that any energetic action was
taken. against them. The issue here is not to evaluate or
pass judgment on the politicians for not having done so in
time; the problem lies in a political 'mechanism in which
It becomes the rule not to furnish to higher offices an
4ta,,, of -tentially true information, but to furnish instead
information adhering to the point of view (previously 'ex-
pressed, or anticipated) of the superior.
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The total paralysis of the flow of information which
manifestad itself last December in Poland -- completely in-
comprehensible for anyone who was not present -- was the
result of an experience of several years' duration. This
experience inescapably taught that, from a personal point
of view, political conformism paid off, independently of
actual social results -- while one suffered personally
for criticism. As far as the economic sector is concerned,
one of the most characteristic examples of this phenomenon
was the unsuccessful attempt to hold discussions on the
projected economic 5-year plan for 1966-1970, whose imple-
mentation led to, among other things, the tragic finale of
last December. The projected plan, in particular as it af-
fected agricultural policies and foreign trade of agricul-
tural products, contained concepts which arDused great
uneasiness and opposition from some economists concerned
with the negative consequences for meat prodUction and thus
for the people's standard of living. This took place in
1964, in the period o-f public discussion officially opened
prior to the Fourth PZPR Congress. There were attempts to
express these reservations publicly, especially since the
reservations did not have to do with the principles of
socialism but rather with some concrete economic policy
solutions. One of Poland's most noted and international-
ly famous economists expressed his point of view in writing,
not limiting himself merely to criticism, but at the same
time formulating concrete alternative solutions. The
party summit promptly reacted in a negative and exceptional-
ly violent manner. Every attempt at concrete discussion
was immediately cut off, and no party group -- including the
congress-- even considered the possibility of studying
the indicated alternativee. After this experience, it is
therefore logical that it would not have been possible to
expect :a ground of Independent economic appraisal to exist.
In a 'certain sense, the whole history of the unsuccess-
ful attempts undertaken during% the past 15-years to effect
economic reform in Poland can serve as an example of the
negative inl.luence of the existing political mechanism on
the econom.-17c processes. -1t.goes without saying that economic
.reform-cannot be considered a panacea for all economic dif-
ficulties'but-even within these limitations the results of
economic-reform would certainly have a positive importance.
'This is 'particularly true for a country like Poland, which
must count first of all upon mobilizing the so-called sources
-of-intenaive development: increased labor productivity; im-
-proved txpleitation.of.rawHmaterials and resources; improved
adaptation Of production structure to demand structure; more
� efficient investment processes; and so on. Poland was among'
the first socialist countries to develop advanced projects
for economic reform, since efforts to implement them 'com-
menced immediately after October 1956. These projects were
.now and again in their program speeches declared their re-
peated willingness to put them.into.effect. But nothing was
done in practice, primarily because of concern, that reforms
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could eventually have c limiting effect on the autocratic
and arbitrary nature of the political mechanism. Particularly
unfavorable was the attitude toward the attempt to link
changes in the functioning of the economic system with the
development of self-administration among the workers. The
role of the workers' councils which spontaneously, arose in
the factorie:: during the "Polish October" became in practice
reduced to a purely formal aspect, and the councils com-
pletely lost the characteristics of genuine representation
of the workers in the economic administrative system. In
1970 the former Fan leadership sought to exploit the ideas
of reform in order to conceal a rigid deflationary policy,
aiming in practice at freezing salaries and stipends for
a minimum period of 2 years. The so-called new system of
economic incentives which was sUpposed to have begun func-
tioning at the beginning of 1971 --.cancelled as of 20
December 1970 -- could thus only have jeopardized the idea
of economic reform in the eyes of public opinion.
The cited examples relate to problems connected di-
rectly or indirectly with the economic causes of the events
of the past few months. Their significance, however, is of
a more general character, in that they clearly demonstrate
the role of restraint exercised by a defective political
mechanism in the process of development of the productive
forces and their social-implications. It, is worthwhile to
understand, particularly in this age of the so-called in-
formative revolution, that the formation of an adequate
information system, in the broad sense of that concept,
requires not only adequate solutions of a technical nature,
but also the right political conditions.
The Workers Demonstrations and the Intellectual Situt:tion
� The conflict between the needs of economic develop-
ment and the inadequate mechanism is of a dynamic rather .
than a static nature: if it does not result in an adequate
adaptation of the political mechanism (and its progressive
democratization), it becomes exacerbated. From this point
of view, it is necessary in the light of the events of
December 1970 to return once more to the events of March
1968 in Poland..
I consider it proper to give the reader a suggestion
before approaching this problem: Do not look for or make
analogies between demonstrations in intellectual circles
(primarily students) in the West and in Poland. The attempt
at analogy cannot hold up, since the causes of the demon-
strations were due to concrete and thus different reasons
in the West and in Poland. In Poland in 1968 the protest of
a good part of the students and intellectuals was an expres-
sion of unrest owing to the growing awareness of an involuted
process in the political mechanism, inconsistent both with
socialist ideas about individual freedom and with the purely
practical needs of social and economic development discussed
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above. The demand to restore the fundamental liberties of
the citizen, and particularly to abandon the practice of
Partial and even false information, was at the center of
those demonstrations, which at the same time already showed
that it was not a question of undermining the foundations of
the socialist regime, but on the contrary of safeguarding '
it from the dangerous upheavals which inevitably result from
political involution. "There is no bread without freedom,"
the students' rallying crying in March 19�8, expressed in a
very concise way the idea of the connections between the
economy and the political system in a socialist country.
1December 1970 gave very quick confirmation to this idea,
unfortunately in a very painful way.
. The response of the Polish political leadership
orces at that time proved extremely inauspicious in its
consequences. It was decided to exploit the students' and
"intellectuals' demonstrations to definitively cut off all of
the actual and potential sources of independent criticism.
As often happens in such cases, it was evidently held that
the trouble itself-did not lie in the conflicts of real
life, but rather in the attempts, minimal as they might be,
to call a spade a: spade.
' A vast range of instruments was used to realize this
plan, commencing with an exceptionally brutal and repressive
action, utilizing the monopoly of mass information media to.
-completely distort the true character and intentions of .
the students' and intellectuals' demonstrations. This is
not the place to analyze in depth the methods adopted; it
must be said, however, that this ideological campaign was
fought in ways never yet touched upon on such a broad and
open scale, not even during the darker period of the Stalin-
ist purges. (Here one thinks especially of the so-called
anti-Zionist campaign which in Poland was generally :inter-
preted as a direct blow aimed conscientiously against the
few -- but politically relatively active Poles of Jewish
origin.) A6 a result, they succeeded not only in eliminat-
ing from the public scene those who were directly involved in
the criticism of existing reality, but they also succeeded in
intimidating the Whole intellectual Community. To a certain
degree, and'thanka to the above-mentioned ideological campaign,
they even succeeded. in separating the working class from the
protesting students and intellectuals.
In the light of the ,events which followed, it can be
said that they succeeded in obtaining results in conformity
with these :wishes, in the sense that in December 1970 the
intellectual community, and particularly its official re-
presentatives, did .not raise any protest ,even during the
most dramatic moments. This fact does not seem destined.
to become part of the heritage of positive experiences of
socialism. :Very great importance is attached instead to
another fact --namely that from March 1968 onward there was
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heard in Poland no further critical voice against the policy
(econotic policy in particular) of the leadership of the country
at that time, although -- as it is today generally and of-
ficially admitted -- various decisions were often bad and
arbitrary. On the other hand, the connection between lack of
criticism and the degree of bad and arbitrary decision is
evident. The success obtained in March 1968 gave its authors
and beneficiaries a sense of absolute freedom to act in an
autocratic way, which led in the end to December 1970. Here
is the true connection between March 1968 and December 1970,
a connection which can serve as a classic, though negative,
example of the dialectic functioning of the socialist proces-
ses: The stifling of the external aspects of conflicts with-
out an effective solution of them becomes in itself the
*source of aggravation of the conflicts and multiplication of
the force, the level, and the dangerous significance of the
retarded explosion. In fact, from the point of view of the
social and political dangers, what did the demonstrations of
young students and of a certain number of writers and.sdholars
in March 1968 amount to, compared with the demonstrations of
the proletariat of the great Industries in a series of
important Polish economic centers in December 1970? It is
truly difficult to overvalue the significance of this con-
crete lesson in dialectical and historical materialism.-
, Often people try to deny the interdependence of the
political and economic factors in the development of the
latter events, limiting themselves to indicating the ap-
parently purely economic character of the workers' demands.
This reasoning does not seem well founded. First: 'Even ad-
mitting ..that the nature of the demands was purely economic,
the thesis regarding the Interdependence of economic and
political factors in creating the situation which was at
the root of the demonstrations remains absolutely valid.
Second: The workers demands were directly and indirectly
related to important political problema, even though perhaps
they were not sufficiently generalized (in form and not in
subatance) to do so clearly. (This, I think, is owing to the
lack of collaboration with the students and intellectuals; on
the other hand, however, one must ask oneself whether in the
given concrete situation this fact itself did not have pos-
itive consequences.) The demands were related especially to
democratization of relationships at the factory level; chang-
ing the character of elections in the various organizations,
Including party. Organizations;. a true autonomy and a new
style of work for the trade unions; diffusion of information
to all of public opinion without distortions; an effective
struggle against bureaucracy; abolition of ceremonial pri-
vileges, especially when -not public; and so forth.. In the
economic sector, there were numerous demands to increase
autonomy of businesses as a condition for a greater and more
efficient exploitation of productive possibilities, and as a
basis for a. real rather than fictional workers' self-admin7.
istration. Therefore, examining the demands more closely,
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their broader political significance cannot be escaped al-
together. Prom this point of view, the Polish working class
has given proof of its maturity by correctly understanding
the connections between economics and politics in a socialist
country, and also by demonstrating a high sense of realism
as regards the level and method of putting forth its demands.
Taward-F of the Experience -
The fact that the workers' demonstrations brought ,
about a change in Poland's political leadership is in it-
self positive; on the condition, however, that it is inter-
preted correctly. The problem is that the change in-polit-
ical leaders is considered the beginning and not the end of
a process; as a potential opening for the conflicts which
have come to maturity, and not as their effective solution.
A series of measures taken immediately by the present lead-
ership, especially in the economic area, seems to be lead-
ing in the right direction. However, it is obvious that the
problem consists not in immediate but rather in long-range
activity. It is necessary to attack not the symptoms, but
the cause at its source. This is not the place for a de-
tailed analysis of the elements of a vast and courageous
program of activities which should transform possibilities
into reality. However, such a program results on the con-
trary from a critical analysis of the causes of the crisis.
The'elaboration of an adequate program certainly must
in conclusion take into account the personal characteristics
of party and government leaders, and the extent to which they
understand the causes of the trouble, as well as the extent
to which they are prepared (and have the desire) to effect
the necessary changes. But let us not delude ourselves.
Conservative forces will be opposed to their implementation.
These forces are accustomed to acting with repressive methods
rather than with methods normal to the reality of political
activity, such as broader participation of the workers in
the solution of important problems of. the present and the
future. This is why it seems so important .to eliminate
everything Which, in the recent past, made it impossible to
assume'and to freely express a critical position toward the
:problems relating to the whole society, and which, in a
socialist regime, should be the concern of everyone; other-
wise,, the people will continue to have a feeling of im-
potence and to feel that it is impossible to influence. the
decisions made in their name.
A particularly important conclusion to be drawn from
the' experience of December 1970 and the period following is
that of understanding that even in a socialist regime the
adaptation of the productive relationships to the needs of
development of productive torces does.not come about in a
mechanical way, but rather in the course, of a vital. social
process. . And its result depends net only on the good will
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of individuals (although, as we have emphasized, this is an
element which is anything but negligible) but also on the
interaction of social forces. From this point of view, it
is necessary to evaluate the significance of the .social pres-
sure we are witnessing in Poland, a pressure exercised es-
pecially by the working class. We are accustomed to eval-
uating such phenomena in a socialist country as deplorable
facts, to be eliminated at. whatever post and with whatever
method; and if it is not possible to eliminate the causes�
we at least eliminate the effects, burying them as deep as.
possible. I think that by now we ought to be able to do
without such unilateral attitudes,..which basically mean�
nothing more than loss of faith In the force and the wisdom
of the working class; these are nothing more than expressions
of an attitude which denies to the working clas in practice
what is ascribed to it in the textbooks -- the. political
-role of vanguard. With the demonstrations of December 1970
the Polish working class affirmed in a concrete way, through
strong enough and continuous enough pressure on those who
govern, the role which holds true and Which should hold true
not only in exceptional situations but on a day-to-day basis.
Only in this way will the forces within the party which
truly zeflect these transformations have a social base,
Indispensable for the formulation, of and.achievement of a
program of activities corresponding.to.the needs and po-
tential of socialism. It is unnecessary to emphasize that
the role of the vanguard of the.. working class not only does
not exclude active collaboration with other social groups -4-
in particular intellectuals.-- but on the contrary pre-
supposes it.
In conclusion, permit me to offer some reflectionS
on the conclusions the Polish events imply for the inter-
national communist movement. Whether we wish it or not, the
reality is this: Communist. and workers' parties in non-
socialist countries, and in particular in the developed.
countries of the West, are held responsible for what happens
In the socialist countries. This implies, indeed imposes
upon Communist and workers' parties operating outside
socialist countries, a duty of autonomous analysis of the
processes taking place in the socialist countries; it
imposes the political necessity that they assume an active
position in 'confronting them. This seems all the more in-
dispensable in view of the fact that the many conclusions
drawn from concrete experiences in socialist countries
contribute to the elaboration of their own program, their own
strategy, their ewn vision of socialism. It is neither right
not proper for the opponents of socialism to have a monopoly'
on critical analysis of the socialist world, since by the
nature of the case they interpret reality in the socialist
countries in a unilateral way. It therefore seems that a
critical, but communist, analysis of socialist experiences;
along with a renunciation of the "sweetness and light" type
of analysis, is indispensable for the international com-
munist movement and for individual Communist parties, as well
as for the future of socialism on a world scale. .
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SURVEY, London (Vol. 17, No. 3)
Summer 1971
Hope and Hopelessness
Leszek Kolakowski*
T ET us summarize briefly " the arguments which are most often
advanced in support of the thesis that the communist social system
in its present form is thireformable. These arguments hold that the
main function of this system is to uphold the monopolistic and un-
controlled power of the ruling apparatus; all institutional or actual
changes which have occurred, or which one could imagine occurring,
will not undermine this basic principle, to which are subordinated all
political and economic actions of the rulers. For the monopoly of
despotic power cannot be partially abolished (this is almost. .a tautology,
since by definition a monopoly cannot be partial '). ,Thus all past
and foreseeable changes within the framework of the system are un-
important and can easily be reversed, for they cannot be institutionalized
without destroying the whole mechanism. The satisfaction of the basic
exocctations both of the working class and of the intelligentsia is thus
an impossibility within the limits imposed by the main function OF
the system. We are dealing here with a totally inflexible mechanism,
lacking self-regulating devices and capable of change only in the face
of violent catastrophes, which do occur from time to time, but which do
not, apart from a number of superficial concessions and reorganizations
within the ruling cliques, leave any scars on the physiology of the
whole. Stalinism in the strict sense, i.e. the bloody and unrestrained
tyranny of an individual, was the most perfect embodiment of the
practical premises of the system; later changes, in particular the con-
siderable attenuation of terroristic forms of governing, however important
from the point of view of the security of individuals, have in no way
altered the despotic nature of the system or limited the characteristically
socialist forms of oppression and exploitation. Since the basic functions
of this social system are directed against society, which in turn is
deprived of any constitutional means of self-defence, the only conceivable
change must thus take the form of violent revolution. Such a revolution,
moreover, is possible only on the scale of the whole socialist world
system, since, as experience has shown, Soviet military predominance
will always be employed to crush local attempts at revolution. " The
result of this revolution is to be�according to the hopes of some�a
socialist society in the sense defined by Marxist tradition (i.e. the
social organization of the processes of production and distribution and
the establishment of a representative system) or�according to others�
the introduction of the Western European model of capitalism, which
in the face of the economic and ideological bankruptcy of sociaiism
would seem the only trustworthy path of development.-
These are the basic peculiarities of the Soviet model of socialism
which determine�according to this line of argument�that all hopes
for its partial, gradual 'humanization' by the introduction of successive
reforms must be vain (we refer here to 'structural' peculiarities which
can be detected in all countries building socialism on the Soviet pattern).
_ -
(1) What is often called the d 'aocratization ' of the system of
c__-overaing is inconceivable in terms of For political desootism
* Leszek Kolakowski is a:pragnent Polish Marxist philosopher who became a Communist during the German
occupation of Poland and loyally lived through the ,difficulties of the post-war Communist regime. Having
been deprived of his post as Professor of Philosophy in 1968 for expressing ideas too'liberal for the regime,
he now teaches at Oxford University. The article reproduced above appeared previously in the Polish emigre
magazine 'ultura, published in Paris, and in the French dissident Columnist magazine Politique Aujourd'hui
of July-August 1971.
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and the monopoly of the ruling apparatus in controlling the means of
production, investment, employment and the division of the national
income are mutually interdependent. The political monopoly of the
ruling oligarchy rests on its position as the sole employer and -sole
controller of the means of production. Thus every movement in the
direction of political democracy, if genuine, no matter how partial, just
involve the partial- expropriation of the ruling class, which, though not
the legal owner of the means of production, has all the rights and privi-
leges of a collective owner. In this fundamental sphere, all departures
from this principle are illusory: one can, without danger, allow workers'
discussions about their place of work and one can allow commissions
of the Seim, a 'parliament' by the grace of the Party apparatus, to
discuss the details of economic policy. All decisions will still in one
way or another be made by the same bodies, which are in no way
controlled by society. Any dissent from the desires of these bodies,
revealed in discussion, will have no significance since as a result of the
detailed control of information it will not be able to take the form of
social pressure. All plans for reform proposed by, economists aim at
significantly weakening the monopoly over economic decisions possessed
by the ruling apparatus and threaten its partial expropriation; they have
thus no chance of success. .
(2) A natural tendency of the system is the continual reduction of
the role of experts, in particular in the sphere of economic, social and
cultural policy. Groups of experts are tolerated, insofar as they do not
claim for themselves any rights to take decisions, but even in this purely
advisory capacity, as experience has shown, they are unwillingly tolerated
and arc done away with or replaced as far as possible by mock bodies
chosen in advance according to the criterion of political servility. To
allow experts any truly significant role in taking decisions would involve
a reduction in the scope of the ruling elite's power. Thus inefficiency,
the waste of social energies and of material, the rule of incompetents,
are, as it were, built into the mechanism of government and cannot be
seen as temporary defects corrigible in the future. The mechanism does
not allow purely ' technical ' criteria, not subordinated to the function
of maintaining and strengthening the existing authority, to have any
influence on its functioning.
(3) Freedom of information�the indispensable condition for the
col opc1;,!ion ho Ii of ih;: ceononly and of education culture�
s naturally untilitiknble without the ruin or the he it of rovern-
m'cat. which, in conditions of the free exchaT.c ot inlorni;oion, vtijht
in2vitahlv collapse in a short period. In addition, the idea of limited
;nfotmaton. made available to the rulers in dose corresponding to their
pinces in the hierarchy is impossible to introduce. In other words, the
tcic-i-s, though they might delude themselves in this regard. and even
actively seek unfalsified information for their own use, will in;2vitably be
Misinformed and will, from time to time, fall victim to their own lies.'
The time is indeed past when Stalin dealt with insufficiently optimistic
statistics by murdering statisticians, and obtained information about
ko/kHoees from propaganda films about them. Nevertheless. the doing-
away with the most blatantly caricatural misinformation has not changed
the fact. that the misinformation of the rulers is built into the system.
This is the result or at least two sets of circumstances. In the first place,
the providers of hermetic information tire most often the same people
who, on the lower levels of the ruling apparatus, arc responsible for
the matters on which they provide information. It is thus a normal
phenomenon, and not at all exceptional, that unfavourable information
can prove self-denunciatory, which can hardly be expected to be
practised by people on a large scale, and also that the bringing of
desired news is rewarded while that of unfavourable information is
punished. This system, as one would expect, spreads inevitably and
affects all categories of information-providers. Examples of ptinish-
ment for bringing bad news are countless and everybody knows them.
Secondly, the gathering of information about social life, not affected by
anything apart from the desire to establish the actual state of affairs,
would require the creation of a considerable apparatus, free from any
special political obligations and allowed to work in conditions of com-
plete freedom at least to assemble, if not to pass on, information. Such
an apparatus would not only be an unnatural freak within the system,
but would also constitute a source of political insecurity, for it would,
by its very nature, be an organism not subject to ideological' restric-
tions, and free from the necessity to pay ideological tributes and thus
to-be servile. In addition, a large-amount of the information collected
in this way would inevitably increase internal tension and conflict at
the higher levels of the apparatus. For there is practically no informa-
tion which is entirely neutral, and unfalsificd information about social
life is immediately exploited by all competing groups or cliques aspiring
to higher positions against those who are the present holders of these
positions. Thus, although the Universal rule of self-delusion and self-
deceit may seem at first glance to be- senseless, it is, in. fact, one of the
means employed by the system in self-defence. The ruling groups do,
it is true, sometimes pay for the lies which they themselves produce, but
on balance it pays them to bear these costs (the more so since a greater
part of the cost is borne by society) which seem to increase stability and
the security of the government.
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(4) A further characteristic of socialism in its present Soviet version
is the inevitable mental and moral degradation of the apparatus taking
the most vital decisions affecting the life of .society. This is also
inherent in the functioning of the political mechanism and does not
result from the bad or good will of the rulers. This mechanism demands
a strict subordination ,within the hierarchy, which is closely related �
to the principle of the monopoly of power. In this way, as in all despotic
systems, the positively effective characteristics in the career pattern of
an individual (i.e. the characteristics which facilitate his advance up the
ladder of the hierarchy) are servility, cowardice, the lack of initiative,
eeadiness.to obey superiors, readiness to inform_ on people. indifference
el social opinion and public interest. By contrast, capacity to take
initiative, concern about public good and attachment to truth. efficiency
and social interest, with no regard to the interests of the apparatus,
oecome negative characteristics for the individual's promotion. The
mechanism of power produces thus 'a negative � natural selection
of the leading cadres in all parts of the ruling apparatus, but, above
all, in the Party apparatus. The fourteen years of Gomulka's rule in
Poland are the most striking confirmation of this truth. Their most
outstanding characteristic was the systematic weeding out of individuals
with competence and initiative and their replacement by cowardly and
submissive mediocrities. The process which took place from March
1968 on�the massive promotion of ignoramuses, informers or simple
louts (the invasion of the lice' as it was called in Warsaw) was
merely the acceleration and intensification of phenomena which had
7:Nen occurring for many years. .As in all matters in this world, one
can cite exceptions, but they afe few. The reverse process can some-
times be seen at critical. moments, but these do not change the basic
tendency of the system, which, inevitably, must treat competence and
the capacity to take initiative as phenomena hostile to itself. Different
parts of the ruling machinery undergo this process of negative selection
in different degrees, so that in the economic and industrial administration
one can always find a significant number of competent and courageous
people beating their heads stubbornly against the wall of helifference.
fear and incompetence which encompasses the Party apparatus and
its political and propaganda branches, where the principle of the
selection of the worst elements achieves its greatest triumph.
(5) Despotic forms of government inevitably produce the need for
permanent, or at least periodically repeated, aggression. That war is
a grave for democracy has been known for centuries. For this reason it
is also the ally of tyranny. In the absence of foreign wars, a similar
function is performed by various forms of internal aggression, whose
aim is the maintenance of a continuous state of threat and the pre-
servation of the siege psychosis, using the most artificial methods and
the most imaginary enemies. The renewal of acts of brutal aggression
against successive groups of the population, selected by the. most varied
criteria, are not at all the consequences of folly, but an inherent function
of the meclianiinn of power, which cannot do viithout mortal enemies..
in wait to take advantage of its least w, , . for only in thi,
can it enstue the necessary readiness for filolOtation. It thus
invents its own enemies, creating real ones in the process, for the acts
of renewed aggression inevitably promote 'hostility and resistance in
the persecuted and lead to a situation where repression can be justified
� as necessary. The system of repression is thus self-propelled, and acts
of internal aggression create of themselves the need for further
repression.
(6) The same principle of the monopoly of power creates the neces-
sity to encourage the disintegration of . society and, to destroy all forms_
of social life not decreed by the ruling apparatus. Since social conflicts
arc not done away with, but stifled by repression and camouflaged by
ideological phraseology, they seek the most varied forms of expression,
which consequently means that even the most innocent forms of social
organization, if not subject to proper police control, can indeed transform
themselves into centres of opposition. This fosters the need to
nationalize' all forms of social life and leads to continuous pressure
aimed at destroying all spontaneous social ties in favour of compulsory
pseudo-associations, whose only functions are negative and destructive
and which do not represent anyone's interests, but those of the ruling
class. Although the system needs enemies, it mortally fears any form
of organized opposition; it wants to have only those enemies which it
selectsitself and which it can tight in conditions of its own. choice. The
natural need of despotism is to frighten individuals by depriviee them
of the means of organized resistance. One method which serves this
function is the creation of a criminal code which is consciously vague
and ambiguous, so that the largest possible number of citizens can feel
and be treated as criminals, and so that the scale of actual repression
is not linked to rigorously laid down legal norms, but is subject to
arbitrary manipulation and arbitrary decisions of the police and the
Party.
(7) The ruling apparatus has, moreover, no freedom in the question
of citizens' rights: It cannot, under the threat of its own ruin, widen
those rights even if this were the intention of the rulers. Experience
has shown that concessions in the face of demands for democracy,
'rather than causing satisfaction with partial gains, become, on the
contrary, the reason for increased pressure from below which begins
,to grow like an avalanche, threatening the whole political order. The
enslavement of society is so great and the feeling of oppression and
exploitation so strong that the smallest crack in the system of institu-
tionalized violence or the smallest reform which promises its relaxation
immediately sets in motion huge reserves of hidden hostility and sup-
pressed demands which threaten to explode and which it then becomes
impossible to control. It is not surprising that, after so many experien-
ces, the .philanthropy of the rulers, even should it exist, could not relieve
the political and economic slavery of the population.
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fHEsp, are the most important arguments advanced in support of
the thesis�which is moreover consistent with the spirit of Marxist
tradition�that the characteristically socialist form of slavery cannot be
partially done away with or reduced by partial reforms, but requires
total and simultaneous destruction.
In my view this thesis is incorrect, and its propagation constitutes
an ideology of defeatism rather than a revolutionary appeal. I base
this conviction on four general principles. First, we are never in a
position to decide in advance on the degree of flexibility of any social
organization; events so far have not proved at all that the despotic
model of socialism is in fact completely rigid. Secondly, the rigidity
of the system depends partly on the degree to which ,the people living
under it are convinced of its rigidity. Thirdly, the thesis of unreform-
ability is based on the ideology of ' all-or nothing', which is charac-
teristic of people who have been educated in the Marxist tradition,
but which is not at all confirmed by general historical experience.
Fourthly, bureaucratic despotic socialism is entangled in contradictory
internal tendencies, which it is incapable of resolving into any kind of
synthesis, and which inevitably weaken its cohesion�a development
which is becoming more acute rather than diminishing in intensity.
All the mechanisms which have been �mentioncd so far and seem
to justify the argument that socialist despotism is incapable of reform
do in fact operate within the system, have been noted on many oCcasions
and can be personally confirmed by all who live in the socialist countries.
They all reveal the logic inherent in this system whose basic forms sat
action are directed against society. , What follows from these observa-
tions is that if the mechanism of the bureaucratic rule functions without
any resistance on the part of society, it will be inevitably producing, in
ever more intensive forms, all the phenomena which we have described,
leading ultimately to a society organized on strictly Orwellian lines. It
does not, however, follow from these observations that these tendencies
cannot be countervailed by a movement of resistance capable of limiting
and weakening their operation, which will not lead to any perfect society,
but which will create viable forms of socialist organization capable of
offering its members a reasonable life. The reformist position would be
absurd if it was dependent on the goodwill of the exploiting class, on
the philanthropic attitude of the apparatus of coercion or on the auto-
matic mechanisms of the organization. The reformist position is not
absurd, however, if it is understood as an idea . of active resistance
exploiting inherent contradictions of the system. All the characteristics
of bureaucratic socialism described so far emphatically indicate that it
has built-in tendencies leading to the continuous growth of police
methods of government, to social disinteeration and demoralization, to
the persistence of economic ineffeciencies and to the perpetuation of all
those negative social characteristics which are universally known and
which make life a torment for working people. ' .:owever, in this general
respect, it has one feature in common with the capitalist system as ana-
lyzed by Marx. All the productive and social tendencies inherent in
this economic system which were discussed by Marx, did not come
arbitrarily out of his imagination, but were based on a detailed observa-
tion of society. There were reasons to believe that a growing class
polarization was inherent in capitalism, along with the P,I3solute impover-
ishment. of the proletariat, a progressive fall in the rate .of profit, anarchy
and periodic crises of overproduction, massive uneme4oyment and the
disappearance of the middle classes; that all reforms which could be
conceived within the framework of this system could not be lasting,
since the fundamental laws caused by the wolf-like hunger for surplus
value' which determined the totality of productive processes could not
be abolished within this framework; thus the real importance of reforms
is in their political significance, as means for training in the struggle
and for the � consolidation of class solidarity before the final conflict.
Marx, of course, was quite aware of all the counter-trends weakening
the operation of capitalist laws of accumulation, the most important of
which, though not the only one, was the resistance of the working class.
It was not possible, however, to assess quantitatively the tendencies and
counter-tendencies in the future evolution of the system. Thus, although
Marx's analyses were well grounded, his belief that ' ultimately ' the laws
of capitalism will always prove themselves stronger within the system
than the resistance of the oppressed has proved to be only an expression
of his ideological position. In fact, the failure of the expected progres-
sive impoverishment of the proletariat and of the growing anarchy of
production to materialize in the end was the result, not of the philan-
thropic attitude of the bourgeoisie or of its moral transformation. It
was the result of long years of struggle and confrontations which forced
bourgeois society to recognize certain principles of social organization
as its permanent features. Exploitation was not done away with but
was limited in an important way in industrially developed countries;
the possessing classes agreed to the limitation of their privileges in order
to preserve what could .be preseved of them without bringing society to
ruin.
NATURALLY analogies of this type are not completely satisfactory.
It is true that socialist bureaucracy has learnt from the defeats of
the bourgeoisie, i.e. how dangerous an be the freedom of information
and assembly. Thus resistance to exploitation and oPprcssion in the
Soviet system of despotism takes place in worse social conditions than
ever before; no oppressing class in history has had power of such scope
at its disposal. But this concentration of power is not only a source
of strength, but also of weakness, as has been revealed by the whole
post-Stalin history of communism.
The very nature of this system demands complete concentration
of power at the centre of command. That is why it is true that Stalin's
power (and that of his local miniatures) was the most perfect embodi-
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merit of the principles of despotic socialism. However the impossibility
of re-establishing it stems from the impossibility of reconciiing two
values, both important for the ruling apparatus; unity and security.
The conflicts for powci- within the system cannot be institutionalized
without threatening the ruin of The whole system, for institutionalization
would mean the legalization of fractional activity within the PartY,
which would only differ in an insignificant way from the establishment
of a multi-party system. . Yet groups, cliques and cabals which organize
themselves in accordance with various criteria of choice and with
different bonds of interest are an inevitable product of social life. There-
fore for a' system facing a-constant threat of political escalation, the
ideal is the absolute tyranny of one autocrat with so limited an intel-
ligence and morality that he will not be held back by any 'abstract'
principles, yet so shrewd that he is able to prevent all crystallization
of groups within the apparatus by periodic massacres and purges, and
in this way maintain the instrument of government in a proper state
of constant fluidity and fear. However this is drastically at odds with
the need for security of the apparatus, which not surprisingly does not
want to live in a situation where every one of its functionaries, including
the members of the Party Secretariat and of the Politburo, can at any
moment be transferred from his oflice to the dungeons of the police at
a nod from his chief. Therefore the move away from one-man to
oligarchic rule, the so-called collective leadership', was in the' highest
interest of the ruling machine. This is certainly not without significance,
though it might not seem that it makes much difference to the oppressed
whether the documents of their oppression are signed by one or ten
individuals. Oligarchy does not, of course, involve any 'democratiza-
tion' although it does involve a significant limitation of terroristic
method's of government. Moreover it also involves a serious under-
mining of the stability of the government and its inevitable decentraliza-
tion (still�no democratization), e.g. the consolidation of the positions
and extension of the rights of the local apparatchiks. This apparatus
is not able to prevent concealed fractionalism and to avoid creating
competing bodies which continuously undermine its efficiency. More-
over, from another point of view, resistance is most likely and most
effective not when oppression is at its worst and terror strongest, but,
on the contrary, at moments of relative loosening caused by the dis-
aggregation of the ruling apparatus: we have to thank Lenin for this
perceptive observation. The present-clay apparatus is not subject, it is
true, to ideological shocks, as was Stalin's apparatus, which lost its
balance for that very reason after the moral disereditation of the leader,
but it is demoralized and suffers chronically from the internal conflicts
of rival groups. It is true that it is in the interests of these groups to
keep their existence a secret from society, but in this sphere concealment
cannot be wholly successful and is wholly unsuccessful within the
political machinery. The partial paralysis of the apparatus is thus
liccoming incurable and follows a natural coin-se of successive remissions
and decrioriations; its stability depends on several independent factors,
v.rilose interaction is difficult to predict. In this sense, one can say that
the partial ' destalinization ' which has been forced on the system has
intrcduccd a degradation of power into the mechanism and this makes
effective resistance possible. In other words: as long as the apparatus is
stable and immunized against political shocks it can, in general, dis-
regard popular dissatisfaction. But once it has lost this stability and
no longer fears its leader or its police so much, it pays for this by
continual fear. of....society,..of.its...competitors..for power,. of .domestic and.
foreign bosses, of the working class, of the intelligentsia, and even of
small groups of intellectuals.
THE next ineradicable internal contradiction of bureaucratic socialism
is the conflict between the need for a radical change in �ideology
and the impossibility of getting rid of the Stalinist-Leninist ideology.
As distinct from democratic political organizations, which can refer
'back to social consensus as the basis of their legality, despotism lacks
any representative organs and must inevitably possess some sort of
ideological system even if of the most paltry kind, in order to estab-
lish the apparent legality of its existence. No state and no system can
exist without legitimacy�whether it be the inheritance of royal charisma
or free elections, In the absence of such possibilities, legitimization takes
on an ideological character�the principle that the Party is the embodi-
ment of the interests of the working class or of the whole nation, that �
the state is part of the great international working-class movement.
consolidating its power in one part of the world in expectation of its
further extension. Obviously ideology plays an entirely different role
in this system of government than it does in the democratic states, no
matter how pathetic may seem the clash of principles with reality. At
the moment ideology in the socialist world is a burdensome hump which
cannot be dispensed wi in any way. Internationalist phraseology is
indispensable to the So v authorities, since it offers the only legitimation
of their rule abroad; it is indispensable to the local rulers who are
dependent on the Soviets, as the justification of their dependence and
of their own power.. It Might seem that the Soviet rulers can completely
disregard the non-ruling communist parties, whom they hardly wish to
incite to a real struggle for power,' and that _their splits and deviations
are of no political. significance. In reality, this is not the case, for an.
open and complete abandonment of the communist movement in
countries which are not under Soviet control could only occur if they
were to abandon the principles which justify this control where it exists.
The rulers are thus the victims of their own ideology with all its
nonsensical baggage. . It is a paradox that this ideology, in which
practically everybody has ceased to believe�those who propagateit,-
those who profit from it, and those who must listen to it�is still a
matter of the most vital importance for the continuing existence of this
of.
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political system. The dead and by now also grotesque creature called
Marism-Leninisyn stiil haii:s at the necks of the rulers like a hopeless
tumour, limiting their freedom of movement. This ideology has no force
of persuasion in the countries of the Soviet bloc as the rulers well know:
thus propaganda intended to make an effective appeal to the population,
or even to the Party itself, uses ideology less and less, confining its6lf
almost entirely to miuments based on the notions of raison d'etat and
of national interest. But this development brines forth another contra-
diction within the system. As we know, apart from articulated pro-
paganda, there also exists in these countries an esoteric propaganda,
which is sometimes more important, and which cannot be formulated in
speeches and articles, but must somehow be conveyed to the people. In
the Soviet Union it is the idea of being a great power, the glory emanat-
ing from an empire which rules over large-parts of the globe more or less
directly. In contrast to the official Marxism-Leninism, the imperial
ideology can produce a certain real response. But in the countries of
the People's Democracies this unspoken ideology is an ideology of the
-
tear of Soviet tanks,, imparted by the use of the most varied forms of
allusion. Here also the unarticulated ideology, unlike the articulated
one, can count on a certain success among the population: one does not
need particularly subtle arguments to convince the people that the.
Russian leaders are capable of producing massacres in any insufficiently
obedient protectorate. To some extent the two unarticulated-ideologies
�that of the centre and that of the periphery�converge in their effects,
but it would be shortsighted to count on this convergence as a lasting
basis for ruling: not only because in both cases the unarticulated ideology
is not complementary but clearly contrary to the official ideology, but
also because it can achieve its goal�temporary pacification�only at the
cost of the perpetuation and intensification of national hostilities, which
though advantageous in times of peace, are extremely dangerous in
times of crisis. For the time being, there is no other solution, if the
ruling apparatus is to retain even a minimal contact with society.
Among the historic quips of Stalin there was the famous question:
How many divisions has the Pope?' The poverty of this question
illustrates most clearly the poverty of a political system which has lost
everything except divisions (no mean thing to be sure), which does not .
know how to believe in anything apart from divisions, and boasts of
this as an example of healthy realism, forgetting that it emerged as a
result of the Russian revolutions of February and October 1917, which
were successful, not by virture of possessing 'many divisions, but as a
result of the moral collapse of the Tsar's empire and army.
THE ideological paralysis of bureaucratic socialism is ever more
extensive and irreversible; successive campaigns and conferences of
Party officials on the theme of 'ideological struggle may work out new
methods of repression and intimidation, but they are not able to offer
society anything apart from the usual insipid phrases. All attempts to
reverse this catastrophic trend follow two courses�nationalistic phra-
seeT.-Igy or phraseology of order and efficiency, and around these catch-
words loose factions form themselves. The first is of little value, since
the central and basic question�real national sovereignty�constitutes
by its very nature an impassable barrier. The second would be more
effective, if it could demonstrate that it possessed a programme capable
of being implemented on technocratic ' principles. But the techno-
cratic ' programme implies the primacy of criteria of productive efficiency
and of technological progress over political values, and as such could only
be implemented as a result of the ruling apparatus progressively abandon-
ing its power, or again, at the price of the partial expropriation of the
ruling class. We touch here upon successive internal contradictions of
the system of government: contradictions, often : analysed, between
technological and industrial progress and the system of political power
which continually hampers that progress. This contradiction falls within
the scope of Marx's classic definition of capitalist production, but has
never manifested itself so strikingly as in the regime which, according
to its principles emerged to end such contradictions. All the charac-
teristics of despotic socialism which we have thus far mentioned arc,
for obvious reasons, powerful brakes on technical and productive
progress and perpetuate the stagnation of the system. But technological
progress (not limited only to military technique) and even the increase
of consumption (in spite of certain political advantages which poverty
and an inadequate supply of elementary needs give to the rulers) are in
the interests of the ruling class for various reasons; the higher the general
� level of development, the more difficult it is to achieve outstanding
results in one area of production, such as military production, treated as
an isolated branch; the expectations of the population depend to a con-
siderable degree on their comparison of their situation with that of
highly developed countries, a phenomenon impossible to avoid because a
complete blOckage of information is, for many reasons, already impos-
sible to achieve. Thus in a situation of stagnation or even one in which
- the level of consumption is increasing slowly, the level of subjective dis-
satisfaction and discontent can grow. One can indeed never foresee
when it will reach the point of explosion in conjunction with other
circumstances; in general it is impossible to avoid a situation of inter-
national competition even when this imposes an unfavourable situation,
and the conditions of this competition are ever more difficult. Thus the
rulers, when they stress their desire for technological progress and the
improvement of the material situation of the population, are, in general,
stating their true intentions. These intentions are, however, in conflict
with a second group of intentions, related to the perpetuation � of their
own monopoly of uncontrolled power in all fields of social life.,
But if this contradiction is unavoidable, this does not mean as Isaac
Deutscher seemed to hope that the socialist system will 'democratize'
itself as a result of the automatic pressure of technical progress. The
contradiction between technological development and the system of
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political government and economic organization can only foster
development where it emerees as social conflict: a conflict between all
strata interested in maintaining the existing mechanism of exploitation,
and the working class and intelligentsia, above all though not exclusively
�the technical and managerial intelligentsia,
The conflicts which we have mentioned are strengthened by an
additional contradietion resulting from the national situation of the
countries making up the Soviet Empire. The ruling apparatus, aims at
maintaining the dependence on the Soviet Union as a guarantee of its
own position. but at the same time it wants to weaken it to increase
its own freedom of decision-making. This situation inevitably creates
tensions in the political machine and also Creates a point where social
pressure can be effective. National sovereignty is not sufficient in itself
for the social emancipation of working people, but it is obviously an
indispensable precondition of that emancipation. Fear of the fraternal
guns from the East is, of course, not unjustified but it is consciously
exaggerated as a 'patriotic device' for stifling the smallest demands and
as a means of convincing the nation of the absolute hopelessness of all
its efforts. In reality, the goal of Poland, as of the other nations of the
Soviet zone, is not to provoke an armed conflict, but a ceaseless pressure
aimed at diminishing Polish dependence. on the USSR, a dependence
which can only be weakened through pressure. In this sphere, too,
thinking along the lines of 'all or nothing' is futile and the 'adoption
of such a principle means in practice to accept ' nothing '. No one can
be so blind as to argue that there is no difference between the national
situation of Poland and Lithuania, or that the degree of dependence of
Poland did not change at all between 1952 and 1957. Dependence and
non-sovereignty can exist in different degrees and the difference in the
degree of dependence is of enormous significance for the existence of the
nation. The function of the humanistic intelligentsia and, in general,
of the teaching intelligentsia is of key importance in this respect.
If the Polish nation was able to resist Germanization and Russifica-
tion in the partition period, this was primarily the achievement of this
social stratum. If it had not possessed this group, it would have
remained in the same position as the Lusation nation, which did indeed
preserve its language but because it has failed to produce its own original
culture and its own intelligentsia has little chance of survival. Poland
was preserved as a cultural entity thanks to those who created the
Commission for National Education and those who continued its work,
thanks to the teachers, writers, historians, philologists and philosophers
of the nineteenth century, who, in very difficult conditions, worked to
increase the nation's cultural heritage. The Czech nation, which was on
the brink of being Germanized culturally, was saved thanks to the
similarly conscious efforts of its nineteenth-century intelligentsia. Those
who today stifle the free development of the national culture are the
enemies of Poland.
I 17 I declare myself in favour of the reformist ' principle, it is not in
the sense that I believe one can define reformism as a legal ' means
of struggle, as distinct from illegal ' means. This distinction is simply
without meaning in a situation in which the decision as to what is or is
not legal is decided, not by the law, but by the arbitrary interpretation of
ambiguous laws by the police and the Party apparatus. In conditions
where the rulers can, if they wish, arrest and condemn citizens for
possegsing unorthodox books, for conversations between individuals on
political subjects, for telling jokes and for the expression of improper.
ideas in private letters, the application of the concept of legality has no
meaning whatsoever. On the contrary, the best way to counteract
prosecutions of this type .of �-`. crime.'� is their massive committal. I am
thinking of a reformist orientation in the sense of a belief in the possi-
bility of effective gradual and partial pressures, exercized in a long-term
perspective, a perspective of social and national liberation. Despotic
socialism cannot be seen as a totally inflexible system, for there arc no
such systems. Its capacity for a.certain 'flexibility has been revealed in
recent years even in fields as decisive as the scope of decision-making
which is to be subject to official ideological control. The scope of this
ideological control has diminished to a not insignificant degree: Party
officials no longer have to know more about medicine than professors of
medicine and more about philology than philologists. They do still, it
is true, know more about literature than writers. But in Poland, even
in this field, certain irreversible changes have taken place. The area
subject to interference by the ideological authorities is still unbearable,
but it is significantly smaller than it was, when compared with those
times not long past, when state doctrine decided the width of trousers,
tpe colour of shoes and the truths of genetics. One can perhaps say
that this censtitutes progress from slavery to feudalism. However, we
are not confronted with a choice between complete decay and perfection,
but only with the choice of agreeing to decay or making an unceasing
effort to preserve in our national life such values and standards which,
once preserved, will not easily be destroyed. The cultural pogrom of
1968 left a great heritage of discouragement because, though unavoid-
able, it was a confrontation which took place in conditions chosen and
imposed by the coercive apparatus. But we are now witnessing in the
world the breaking down of rigid orthodoxies, the abandoning of rules,
taboos, saints and beliefs, which, not long before, seemed the absolute
condition of their existence. It might seem that analogies with church
history are beside the point since churches do not have police and prisons
at their disposal. Nevertheless, churches have also lost their means of
compulsion because of the pressure of cultural change, while the police
have since time immemorial deluded itself as to its own omni-
potence, and have attempted to delude others, because it retains its
power only so long as others continue to believe in its omnipotence.
If it has to face strong social pressures. the police reveals itself as Lila
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iltely powerless, and the fear of those �vno live by spreading fear
nes tinnier than the fear of the persecuted.
Bureaucratic socialism has lost its ideological base. in spite of all
t:le monstrous features of Stalinism, the Stalinist apparatus, at least in
the People's Democracies, was incomparably more dependent in its.
activity on its ideological links with the system than the pre?ent
apparatus. It might seem that a cynical apparatus, whose members
measure, the achievements of socialism by their own privileges and
careers is more efficient, since it lacks encumbrances and restraints, is
not threatened by ideological shocks, is capable of arbitrary and light-
ning transformations and is more subject to manipulation. But this is
less than half the truth. Such an apparatus is not only weak in moments
of crisis and unable to survive real tests, not only highly vulnerable to
self-destruction through its tendency to-form cliques, but itself appears
as a symptom of historical decay of the system which it serves. A
system which nobody serves disinterestedly is dootmed�I quote this
sentence from Victor Serge's book on the Okhrana�Ha sentence which no
policeman will ever believe, until he loses his job. Despotic socialism is
dying the slow death described by Hegel; it seems untouched but it is
sinking down into an inert boredom and numbness, relieved only by
everyone's fear of everyone else, a fear discharged in aggression. The
loss of its ideas means a loss of its raison d'�e for the system. Let
us note some small changes in phraseology: the word freedom '. was
always on Stalin's lips when torture and massacres were the order of
the day in his empire; today when the massacres have stopped, the faint
cry of freedom puts the entire police force on the alert. All the old-
fashioned words�' freedom ', independence ', law ', justice ', truth '
�can turn against the bureaucratic tyranny. All that is valuable and
lasting in the present-day culture of the nations under the rule of this
system rises against it. The international communist movement has
ceased to exist; the idea of communism in its Soviet version has also
ceased to exist.
Probably in conditious of ficedorn of choice the majority of the
Polish working class and intelligentsia would opt for socialism as would
the writer of this article. Socialism, as understood here, can only be
implemented in a sovereign national organism, and it presupposes the
control of society over the means of production and distribution of the
national income and over the administrative and political apparatu,
working as an organ of society, and not as a master for whom society
is a hand-maiden. They would opt for an organism which would
establish freedom of information arid communication, political pluralism
and a multiplicity of forms of social ownership, respect for the criteria
of truth, of effectiveness and of public interest, freedom to form trade
unions and freedom from the arbitrariness of political police, a criminal
code under which prison will exist to protect society against anti-social
behaviour and not in order to transform all citizens into criminals, so
as to be able to blackmail everyone.
To what extent a movement for the establishment of such a society
is po.,e.,0..le depends to a considerable degree, though of course not
completely, on the extent to which society believes that it is possible. As
the nature of a given society is dependent in part on its own self-image,
there cannot be in social change a pure potential concealed in material
circumstances alone and independent of the degree of awareness of
potentialities by the people. Thus in the countries of socialist despotism.
those. who inspire hope are also the inspirers of a movement which
could make this hope real�just as in society's attempts to understand
itself, object and subject often coincide.
THE, belief that socialism in its present form is totally inflexible and
I can only be destroyed at one fell swoop, and therefore that no partial
changes are in essence changes in its social nature, easily lends itself to
justifying opportunism and pure knavery. For if it was true, there would
be no significance in any individual or collective initiative to counteract
the monstrous behaviour of the neo-Stalinist bureaucracy, nor in ,any
struggle to preserve in society respect for the truth, for competence,
for honesty, for justice and for intelligence; in short, on this premise
each individual act of knavery can be justified, since it can be interpreted
simply as an element of the universial knavery, which for the moment'
is unavoidable and is not the work of individuals but the result of the
system. The principle of unreforrnability can thus serve as an absolution
granted in advance for every act of cowardice, passivity, and co-
operation with evil. The fact that a large part of the Polish intelligentsia
has been persuaded to believe in the complete inflexibility of the shameful
system under which they live is almost certainly responsible for the
regrettable passivity which they displayed during the dramatic action of
the Polish workers in 1970.
The worst service one could possibly do to the cause of Polish
independence and democracy is to perpetuate nationalist anti-Russian
stereotypes. The Russian nation, which has been through a most
terrible gehenna of recent times, is used by its rnlers as a tool in their
imperialist policies. But it is itself a victim of these policies to a greater
extent than anyone else. Given the atrophy ef internationalist ideology,
the fostering of nationalism within the Soy sphere of influence' is,
despite certain inherent risks, an intlispense le tool of the most tradi-
tional kind for maintaining power. The friendship of nations' in the
official doctrine consists of the drinking of toasts of friendship by official
delegations, and of visits by folk dance groups under strict police
supervision. True friendship and understanding between nations, whose
mutual distrust and hostility may have deep historical roots, can only
be anchored in uncontrolled contacts and exchanges�but this the ruling
strata fear above all. Polish anti-Russian nationalism, in provoking a
natural reaction, only strengthens Great Russian nationalism and con-
tributes to the prolongation of both nations' enslavement. It is a pity
that it should be necessary to repeat this truth which already during the
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'Peoples' Spring' of 1848 was quite banal for the revolutionary demo-
cracy of that period, but, as long as it still applies, it will have to be
repeated. Those peoPle who, instead of seeking to know and understand
the true national culture of Russia. perpetuate anti-Russian stereotypes
in Poland are the uncOnscious spokesmen of the power which holds both
nations in slavery. '
In spite of the Soviet empire's military power and of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, decentralizing tendencies within the bloc have not
ceased and nationalism will continue to erode the organism evermore,
lacking. as it does,- any ideological -cement. It is not in-any nation's
interest that national hatreds should provide the fuel for this disintegra-
tion, since such hatreds could end in apocalyptic massacres. One can
only offset this fearful perspective by putting new life into the traditional,
old-fashioned idea of the brotherhood of nations united against their
oppressors.
TO conclude: all the internal contradictions of despotic socialism
1 which we have described can be resolved in one of two ways. If left
to its own inertia, in silence and fear, the system will always and inevit-
ably tend to such a solution of its own contradictions which will increase,
and not decrease oppression; tighten, not loosen the bondage. . The
growth of police methods of rule is the result not of increased resistance,
but, oft the contrary, of its absence. The flexibility of this social forma-
tion�a flexibility whose limits cannot be estaMshod in advance�will
manifest itself in its re-Stalinization, if no etTecti,, e forces to oppose this
trend emerge. It can manifest itself in a form more in accordance with
the needs of society only under pressure from this society; this is a
lesson which follows irrefutably from our experience. Those who think
that they can buy their personal tranquillity with small concessions will
discover that the price of their tranquillity will rise continually. Those
who today pay only with innocent toadying, will be compelled tomorrow
to pay with denunciation of their colleagues for the same commodity;
those who buy miserable privileges only by being silent in the face of
knavery which they could oppose, will soon be forced to pay by actively
participating in knavery. The natural law of despotism is moral
inflation, whereby the distributor of goods compels people to pay ever-
higher prices, if social pressure does not enforce cuts.
This perspective is perhaps not an encouraging one, but at least it is
not a fantasy, in contrast to perspectives which would have us wait for
a miracle, for help from outside, or for the automatic self-correction
of the system's jarring machinery left to its own inertia. What is
important is that instruments of pressure are available and arc at nearly
everybody's disposal. They consist in drawing obvious conclusions from
the most simple precept. --those which forbid silence in the face of
knavery, servile subservience to those in authority, accepting alms with
humility or other similar attitudes. Cur own dignity gives us the right
to proclaim out loud the old words 'freedom', 'justice', and Poland
�
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.WITHOUT MARX OR JESUS
lean-Francois Revel
Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Garden City, New York
Chapter 3
V./POSSIBLE REVOLUTION:
Thu Communist Nations
No ONE TODAY, even within the communist parties
of the western world, seriously contends that the Soviet
Union is a revolutionary model for other countries. Hopes
for a form of "socialism with a human face," and ex-
pectations of a spontaneous liberalization of the Soviet
regime, have been periodically, and invariably, disappointed.
At- the same time, the Soviet Union's lack of success
in the economic field has made its totalitarian regime
less and less acceptable. It is no longer possible to justify
the suppression of liberty by the imperatives of industrial
discipline�especially since it has become obvious that
Soviet industry is characterized by waste and inefficiency.
The China of Mao Tse-tung offers no more promise
than does the U.S.S.R. China has repudiated "economism";
but, for all of that, her people have not regained their
freedom. The so-called cultural revolution�which seems
to have been essentially a purge, reinforced, in some in-
stances, by an ominous explosion of collective sadism�
has left intact, or even strengthened, China's dictatorial
political regime and her all-powerful political propaganda
machine. It is hard to see the 'sense in declaring economic
productivity to be of secondary importance in an under-
developed country; and that is particularly true if, as in
the ease of China, the ideal of austerity which is offered
to the people is not odkt by: the right to individual
development, and if it is accompanied instead by an ever
more oppressive climate of moral,. intellectual, and physical
terrorism.
This refers particularly to austerity in the communist
countries, which is not. the kind of austerity that one
can interpret as an investment in the future; it is not
planned, coherent, or due (as we are expected to believe)
to "primitive socialist accumulation." Rather, it is a
state of anarchic poverty, resulting from the underpro-
duetivity of a badly managed industrial machine. Thus,
we are treated today to the spectacle of the Soviets
borrowing capital from Japanese (that i5, American) banks,
and asking Ford to build, at: its exper
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fact-61-y in Russia. In other words; they are soliciting_the
honor of beim-, included arnong_the victims of ne_geolonial-
____
These indications of failure arc more or less accepted
as such, depending upon the bias of the individual. Even
on the European Left, which is traditionally well disposed
toward China and the 'U.S.S.R., it is- difficult to, find any-
one still willing to declare that every instance of Soviet
expansion represents a step forward for world socialism
or that the Chinese system is a freely -exportable mode.
of "socialism with liberty." (It is true that some student:
regard themselves as "Maoists" because they reject al
authority and demand complete individual freedom; but
these individuals are simply badly informed on the state
of present-day Chinese society.) On the whole, most
militant socialists-communists and their sympathizers, or
at least those who arc open-mindcd and have access even
to a minimum of information, have gradually been forced
to recognize, either openly or in their own minds, that
the Marxist-Leninist states represent a revolutionary fail-
ure. It is no longer Possible to maintain that there can be
progress in socialism without equal progress in Unman
freedom, and particularly in freedom of expression. We
have already seen where that road leads, in rile case
of National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy.
Yet, once we abandon this thesis, we must also abandon
all hope in "democratic centralism"�that is, in the Soviet
system and the Chinese system. Wc must even question
whether the system of economic management practiced
in Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and Cuba dess-.:rvcs the name
of socialism�that is, whether it is possible to have a
socialist economy without a political democracy. Can
we say that the total or partial collectivization of the
means of production is "socialist" if, at the same time,
the people are not allowed to exercise individual initiative
and control,' or to share in decision-making and in the
exercise of power? Can we say that a system is "socialist"
if the great options (often a synonym for great errors)
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that determine the destiny of a people for rgenerations arc
determincd by an authoritarian minority? Can a repressive
totalitarianism which generates underdevelopment be
called socialism, even at a purely - material level? It is
high time to preach what we have learned at high cost:
economic socialism cannot exist in an atmosphere of
political dictatorship. Any attempt to establish one along-
side the other must lead either to caricature, or to tragedy.Ynslavia, in which non-Stalinist Marxists have placed
such great hope, has confirmed this principle by remaining
both ineffectual and repressive. And Cuba, ten years after
Castro's triumph, is still bogged down in the morass of
authoritarian nonproductivity.* In the most conservative
terms, this situation may be expressed by a formula:
"Socialism has not yet been realized anywhere in the
world." As a corollary, we might add: "The. U.S.S.R. is,
in any ease, the last place where it may be realized; and '
it is likely that, henceforth, the same prognosis applies
to China." To put it brutally: the events of October
1917 in Russia were not the beginning, and cannot be-
come the model, of world-wide socialist revolution.
If socialism, with or without its "human face," has not
been realized anywhere, then it is foolish to continue
referring automatically to the "socialist camp" and the
"imperialist camp," as though revolutionary action were
merely a problem of mechanics or of transportation, by
virtue of which a maximum number of territories or
political regimes would enter into one camp to the
detriment of the other. Moreover, this attitude presup-
poses that only capitalistic expansion is "imperialistic,"
and that socialistic expansion is not; that is, that only
capitalistic nations are capable of seeking to increase
their influence in international affairs so as to strengthen
themSelves as geographic realities. The truth, if we are
impartial in our judgment, is that the communist nations
and the capitalist nations have been endoi.ved with the.
spirit of imperialism in approximately equal portions. It
is hardly worth ',mentioning such obvious examples as
the invasion of Tibet by China, or of Czechoslovakia by
the U.S.S.R.; for those Were old-fashioned,, almost Hitlerian:
enterprises, unworthy of the more _subtle methods of mod-
ern imperialism which seek to avoid outright military -
conquest. More representative of imperialism at a re-
fined level is the Soviet presence in the Arab nations of ,
the Middle East, which utilizes the very real problems of
these states to aid thern in 'their war�or rather, to push
them toward war�while satisfying Russia's own ancient
expansionist ambitions in this region. Similarly, the ha- -
tred which exists between the Chinese and the Soviets
sscc especially Cuba esl-irsocialiste? by Rene Dumont (Paris, 1970),
and Guerillas in Action by K. S. Karol (New York, 1970).
is of the kind that Ca 11 flourish only when two imperialis
tic powers have conflicting designs on the same sphen
of influence�on black Africa, for example. It means noth
ing to say that these penetrations into other states ar(
not manifestations c.) - imperialism simply because they
are accompanied by an ideological message. Let us recall
that it was in the name of an ideology�Christianity�
that Latin America was conquered in the sixteenth cen-
tury, and that Christian principles were as little applied
in those countries then as socialist principles arc applied
in Africa now. It was also in the 'name of an ideology,
which was to remain wholly academic�that of "repub-
licanism" and "progress"�that France built her colonial
empire between 188o and 1914. Ironically, France's ideo-
logical pretexts were not far removed from those of com-
munism. Marx deplored the cruel 'methods of the Euro-
pean powers (particularly those of Great Britain in India)
in their seizure of territory and commercial rights in
Asia; but he considered that, in the final analysis, this
eruption of colonialism represented a progress in civili-
zation, for it would rouse the Asiatic peoples from their
torp'or and plunge them "into the mainstream of historical
development."*
It is clearly a mistake to believe that only capitalism
is imperialistic, or that the U.S.S.R. and China arc con-
genitally incapable of using their systeMs, of alliances to
further their own economic, political, and military in-
terests at the expense of weaker nations. We may con-
clude, then, that there has been no more a revolution in
the foreign policies of the communist countries than there
has been internal revolution in those same countries.
For the past fifty years, every road seems to have led to
increased socialism. Every road, that is, except the socialist
road. And the reason is obvious. The purpose of the
second world revolution is to create real equality among
men, and to give to men the political means to decide
for themselves on the great matters affecting their destiny.
Therefore, the concentration of all power�political, eco-
nomic, military, technological, judicial, constitutional,
cultural, and informational�in the hands of an oligarchy,
or even, in certain, cases (Stalin, Tito, Castro), of an
autocracy must be the method least likely to lead to such
a revolution. And, in fact, what happens under these
oligarchies and autocracies is that the oligarchs and auto-
crats become more and more entrenched in their positions
of power, and the solutions that society expects from
them arc more and more rarely forthcoming. For, unfon
tnnately, 'the qualities necessary to acquire power (eV=
heroically) and to exercise power. (even ineffectually) arc
* Wolfe, 13. D., Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a DOC'
trine. New York', 1965, p. 36.
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not the same as the qualities necessary to resolve the
problems of modern. society. The result is that, as authority
increases, competence decreases. And since no amount of
criticism seems able to halt either the increase of the
former or the decrease of the latter, society is becoming
WASHINGTON POST
BOOK WORLD
19 September 1971
THE BOOK, reviewed by Theodore Roszak
The subtitle of this book in the original French was..
"ln nouvelle 'revolution rnondiale est commencer: aux
Etots-Unis." ``The new world revolution has begun
in the United .States"!
Imagine how that brazen-, announcement comes across
to French intellectuals who Were born believing they �
hold the patent rights on revolutionary politics�and for
whom the last word on America has long been Jean-
Paul Sartre's � The Respectful Prostitute. There must
have been many who at once identified the book as
satire. It isn't.- Revel means it. The man knows how to .
be outrageous.
The main audience this book addresses is the French
left wing. Its real subject matter is the stagnation and
self-congratulations (if French radicalism. Revel spends -
about a third of his space ispecifically on France, lam-
basting radical nonperformance under the de Gaulle .
ann Pompidou governments. Even- when he is talking
about America, he is really using us like a whip on
his left-wing compatriots. A witty, wickedly incisive
polemic, this�and thoroughly French in substance and
style. But Americans will find it fascinating to eaves-
drop on the argument. For Revel is a first-class political
journalist (he is a leading , columnist for the liberal �
weekly L'Express) and his, comments on the American
scene hold many home truths.
Moreover, what Revel lets us overhear about our-
selves is flattering�in the !extreme. Think of it: Here
is an obviously sane, highl-y knowledgeable writer who
has nice things to say aboUt us! That is very nearly a
newsworthy event. Lots of book-reading Americans, by
now lacerated to the bone, with our copious literature
of national self-recrimination, will surely love Revel (as
they did Charles Reich) for breathing a precious little
zephyr of euphoria through the miasmic social climate. �
Of course, Revel has his Own good reasons for lavish-
ing compliments on America. Idiot anti-Americanism is
the hard .core orthodoxy of the European left; the
demonology of every radical true-believer. So' Revel
takes it deftly - to :pieces, in; the process giving even the
most cynical American food for thought.
more and more dominated, and less and less governed. In ,
Such a predicament, the question of whether one social
system is better or worse than another becomes a matter
of purely academic interest.
For example, he reminds us that, by European stand-
ards, many of America's poor look almost like a corn-
�fortithle middle class. Further,, by comparison with �
the current ane.mio condition of Frcnel>civil liberties,
'Americans are living in the democratic promised land.
. Again by comparison with France (where official, ins-
. official, 'and Self censorship now works to prune con-
America)) political forum
Froversy at the roots) the
�-,Ities Ns ith i�lth debate and action.
And Revel goes on to marvel at how runny more
Americans go to college and how many more books ,
they read; how dissent commands prime time on U.S.
television; how Black Panthers are (occasionally)
ex-
onerated by the courts; how issues as yet esoteric in
some major European countries�like Gay ,and Women's
Liberation, like environmental defense�fill our popular
awareness. If we experience little and reludtant reform,
Revel sees at least much vitality and originality of ap-
proach. He even concludes that America is "one of the
least racist countries in the world today"�that is, inso- �
frit. as racism here is under pressure by a lively mil-
itancy. Whereas in France, the growing number of
exploited nonwhite aliens (now totaling some. four mil-
lion is still an invi.sible, powerless population.
Or. be .r!l's balance sheet, we do indeed pick up lots
of points against weak competition. Because the sitha-
tion in France ( always his main point 0r reference) :iris
been dismal since de Gaulle, and especially since Vay
'The left bank of Paris is all but under martial law
each night; it swarms with surly cops checking identity
papers. The crude harassment of students by, special
polic.e squads (like the super tough CRS) is an open
disgrace�but French courts have yet to decide a case
against she gendarmerie. Moreover, when Revel poses
America against the even gloomier backdrop of many
communist and third world countries, our merits shine
with brighter magnitude still. Myself. I cannol. cheer
very loudly for teams that win by default. But then :li,-
crirninating comparisons have their place (I suppo,e)
in any intelligent politics�though I think only a foreign
observer like Revel could make the judgments in this
1,:k sound like more than special pleading.
In Revel's view,- .he FIlm total of America's relative .
vi:tfleS ilddS up to the world's only hope of true revolt:-
ace the great liberal breakthrough made in France
1-7t39.----"the fiust revolution." as he calls it. As a rev-
vanguard, the communist and third world
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countries are dismissed as non-starters. Much of Europe
...ernains "mesmerized and immobilized by the past .. .
pervaded by the idea that nothing can happen here."
- But
today in America a new revolution is rising. It is the
revolution of our time. It is the only revolution that
involves .radical. moral, and practical opposition to the
spirit of nationalism...It is the only revolution that, to
that opposition, joins cultuie, economic and techno-
logical power, and a total affirmation of liberty for all.
. . It tlirefore offers the only possible escape for
mankind today: the acceptance of -teChnological civ-
ilization as a means and not an end, and ... the ability
to reshape-that civilization withoUt annihilating it.
All the things Revel identifies as signs of the revolu
tionary dawn have by now been much discussed in
America: student radicalism, hippies, the militant mi-
norities, the new feminism, ecological activism, the con-
sumer crusaders, above all the massive war resistance.
Revel even finds a small residue of radical, promise in
Marshall MeLuhan and Playboy magazine.
The revolution toward which these forces build, Revel
ttrgues, is something "wholly new and . .. has nothing
to do with the revolutions of the nineteenth century."
By this-he means it must be constructively nonviolent
in its tactics this critique of revolutionary. yiolinc. e�
the more violence, the less revolution�is. especially
wise) ; it must use the system against itself, exploiting
its many legal resources; it must rely on "prepared ex-
temporization," avoiding the doctrinaire paralysis of
the European left wing where "everything that is work-
able is considered to be tionrevolutionary, and every-
thing that is revolutionary is nonworkable"; above all,
it must have world government as its highest goal�
something I, cannot recall hearing much discussed
among young radicals.
That is not toO specific a program�but then only
dilettantes and dimwits draw up detailed blueprints for
revolution these days. I would take mOre issue with
other aspects of Revel's analysis. I think he'grossly un-
derestimates.the American corporate economy's sheer,
greedy, foolish inertia and the sad loyalty that a cor-,
ruptcd establishment commands in mindless "middle
America." Then too, he has the odd belief that economic
growth�is the sine qua non of radical social change. But
our bloated GNP is largely a proliferation of swanky
garbage. Clearly, Zero :growth is the only sane econom-
ics for the industrial Societies�and the only economics
that does not play into technocratic hands.
Revel also plays down the importance of religious
vision to the new radicalism (he is very secular-minded;
hence- the "without Jesus" in the title) and gives little
.attention to the liandicraft-communitarianism that is
pioneering the counter culture. He is perhaps a little too
hooked on obsolescent superindustrial values.
'.Serious shortcomings, these. And yet Revel's shrewd
.study stems from a sojouin of only a few- Months in
America-; his overall perceptiveness durinrso 'brief a
visit is really too dazzling to be much :faulted, But who
can tell? If he had stayed longer, would ,his optimism
have survived?
4
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
DALES WORTH NOTING
November 17
International International Students
Day promoted annually by
the (Communist) Inter-
national Union of Students.
IUS, which is observing its
25th anniversary this year,
chose this date after WW II
to commemorate the death
of a Czech medical student,
Jan Opletal, killed
November 1939 during mass
student demonstrations
against Nazi occupation of
Czechoslovakia. For the
Prague-based IUS, the
history of this date is
embarrassingly parallel to
the mass student demon-
strations in 1968 against
the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia and the
death of another Czech
student, Jan Palach, who
set himself afire in down-
town Prague to protest the
Soviet occupation.
November 21-23 East Berlin
November 26-27
Conference on ABC Weapons
(atomic, biological,
chemical) sponsored by the
(Communist) World Federation
of Scientific Workers. The
conference is expected to
stress European security
as part of the Soviet
drive to promote a people-
to-people approach to it,
thereby creating a climate
of opinion in Europe that
would exert pressure for
the convening of a govern-
mental European security
conference "without prior
conditions."
Czechoslovakia Confirmed dates for parlia-
mentary elections. There
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have been no parlia-
mentary elections since
1964; the elections
scheduled for 1968 were
not held because of the
Soviet invasion. The
elections this year will
be held under provisions
of a new repressive law
passed in July that
insures the Connaunist
Party control of the
selection of candidates.
November 28 Uruguay General elections. A
leftist Frente Amplio
(Broad Front), under
strong Communist influence,
is striving to duplicate
the Allende victory in Chile.
November 28 Mexico City 5th World Congress of the
World Psychiatric Association.
Western correspondents in -
Moscow reported 18 September
that according to Soviet
dissidents the unofficial
Soviet Human Rights Committee
(led by Sakharov and others)
has appealed to the World
Psychiatric Association to
help establish international
guarantees for the rights
of the mentally ill.
Previously, Soviet dissidents
have complained about the
KGB's use of Soviet mental
hospitals for the imprison-
ment and torture of political
dissidents who are sane.
December 2 Florence International Youth Meeting
on European Security sponsored
by the (Communist) World
Federation of Democratic
Youth. Although WFDY is
currently promoting a campaign
of militancy in Latin
America under the slogan
"Youth Accuses Imperialism,"
2
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WFDY is avoiding a militant
posture in Europe to gain
backing for the Soviet
drive for a governmental
European security conference.
December 5 USSR Constitution Day and 35th
anniversary of the present
Soviet Constitution, adopted
under Stalin in 1936. For
several years dissidents
have held a brief public
vigil in Nbscow on this day,
which the police break up.
The government's failure to
observe the Constitution
is a major theme in Soviet
dissidence.
December 6 Poland The Polish Party Congress
is to meet (see article,
"Whither Poland," in this
issue).
December 10 Worldwide Human Rights Day, commemor-
USSR ating the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by the UN General
Assembly in 1948. In 1970
the unofficial Soviet Human
Rights Committee was formed
by Sakharov and other Soviets
who said their independent
organization would be
guided by the principles
of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
December 14 Poland 1st anniversary of the
December Workers Riots
(see article, "Whither
Poland," in this issue).
December 19 Indochina 25th anniversary of the
beginning of the French
Indochina War.
December 21 USSR
3
Anniversary of Stalin's
birth, 1879. The way the
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Brezhnev regime handles this
day will be watched for signs
of renewed Stalinization
in the USSR.
December 26 China Who Tse-tung's 78th birth-
day.
December 31 New York Expiration of U Thant's
term as UN Secretary General.
U Thant has announced he
is retiring.
4
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY November 1971
SHORT SUBJECTS
Malaysia's Scarlet Pimpernel. The legendary Chin Peng, long-
time lea er of Malaysia's ghostly Communist Terrorist Organization,
is once again leading his 1,500-man guerrilla force into Malaysia.
Not long ago Malaysian Government security officials intercepted
a Malayan Communist Party directive ordering Chin's guerrillas to
move out of their Thai-Malaysian border sanctuaries and to
reestablish their old bases and supply networks on Malaysian
soil, A few weeks ago Malaysian Government troops discovered a
Communist guerrilla training camp a few miles outside Ipoh,
capital of tin-rich Perak State and one of Malaysia's major towns.
The potential danger of a new outbreak of carefully planned
militant Communism in Malaysia (attested to by foreign military
attaches in Kuala Lumpur and neighboring Singapore) has revived
all the old stories about Chin, widely known in Western circles
as Asia's Scarlet Pimpernel. Chin, who has survived nearly three
decades of hit-and-run existence dating back to the Japanese
invasion of Malaya in World War II, began his career by supplanting
his Communist camanding officer after finding the man with his
hand in the Party till. An instant hero to his guerrilla followers,
Chin carried out military action against the invading Japanese with
such elan that the British awarded him the Order of the British
Empire. By 1948 his love affair with the British had cooled as
his guerrilla forces began their 12-year harassment of Camonwealth
forces in Malaysia. The mini-war ended with the British driving
the CTO to the Thai-Malaysia border, declaring themselves the
victors and smartly departing the country. Since the departure
of the Commonwealth forces, the CTO has harassed the Malaysian
Government with major logistical support being furnished by the
Chinese Communists. It is possible, in fact, that the present
CTO forays, which are the deepest penetrations of Malaysian soil
in many years, were ordered by the Chinese. A number of recent
reports have placed Chin, in fact, temporarily in Peking. Happily
for his Chinese benefactors he speaks fluent Chinese,
The interest in Chin's flamboyant history, of which the preceding
is only a part, plus the concern being expressed by foreign
observers, has caused some observers to ponder about Peking's
support for militant Communist forces in the less-developed nations.
Peking recently initiated contacts with Kuala Lumpur which culminated
in the exchange of trade missions. Peking also recently initiated
contacts with Rangoon which culminated in the August visit of
Burmese Premier Ne Win to Peking shortly after Burma's Kachin
guerrillas agreed to accept Chinese aid for their insurgency
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against the Ne Win: government In the midst of all this action
on the government-to-government front, Peking has obviously
remained as active as ever in offering secret tactical and logistical
support for militant Communist forces in Malaysia and Burma and,
implicitly, in a number of other nations as well.
* * * * *
The Smrkovsky Incident. Josef Smrkovsky, Chairman of the
Czechoslovak parliament during the Prague Spring of 1968 and a
key figure in the Dubcek regime, now expelled from the Party and
living in Prague as a private citizen, gave an interview to the
Italian weekly Giorni Vie Nuove (appearing in the 22 September
1971 issue). The interview was a forthright condemnation of the
fraudulent accounts of the events surrounding the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia and an exposure of current conditions. Especially
poignant is his account of the fate of former Dubcek supporters
and the article has caused a sensation in Western Europe. In the
first place, Smrkovsky could speak as revealingly and authoritatively
as almost anyone participating in the great Czechoslovak experiment,
Second, his was an extremely courageous act since he obviously
placed his personal safety in jeopardy at the hands of the
current Czech regime. Finally, Giorni Vie Nuove was formerly an
Italian Communist Party (PCI) organ and still is close to the
Cannunist Party with its publisher a PCI Central Committee member.
The interview was published in various European newspapers.
A shortened version appeared in the London Times:
The leading Czech Communist newspaper Rude Pravo attacked
both Smrkovsky and the Italian magazine for the interview. At
the same time the newspaper claimed the regime did not intend
to make a "Smrkovsky case," and implied that he would not be pro-
secuted, though calling him a "traitor" and "renegade."
The PCI in its official organ, l'Unita, took due note of the
Rude Pravo attack and indicated its concern about the possible
consequences to Smrkovsky. There have been unconfirmed reports
about Smrkovsky's disappearance in Prague. No doubt the Soviet-
backed ,Husak regime would like to punish him, but it may be that
current international publicity may be enough to prevent Smrkovsky's
persecution.
2
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 September 1971
Does Ciii
Hong Kong
He's as elusive as the fictitious Scarlet
impernel.
No one outside the jungles and Mountains
hich mark Malaysia's border with Thai.
nd knows for certain where Chin Perig is.
Indeed, none but his close folloveers (with
e possible exception of top Peking el-
als) can be sure that this home.bred Com-
unist revolutionary is still alive. If so, he
Lnks as a master of survival, too.
But wherever the elusive Chin is today
nd his mantle and even his name may
ive been taken by a successor), he and
s men have Malaysia worried.
Best estimates are that his Communist
nrorist Organization (CTO) numbers
>out 1,000 h.ard-core fighters. In recent
-nes, they have penetrated farther south
to Malaysia from their border hideouts
an for many years past
[formation scarce
"The situation is serious, very, serious,"
id Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul
azak recently.
Factual information about Chin Peng is
most as hard to locate as his jungle head-
Larters. Twelve years ago one of his body-
lards surrendered: he confirmed that the
gendary Chin was then alive and still hi
ntrol of the CTO. Since then, silence.
But not quite total silence. A ranking Thai
r marshal told a newsman two years ago'
� always receives , a Chinese new year
eeting from Chin.
Recent reports have placed the man in
)mmunist China, which is not unlikely
-ice he is of Chinese descent and speaks
iinese as well as English.
What makes this senior guerrilla leader
,Asia a man to reckon with is the fact that.,
has �a very powerful ally on his side �
e People's Republic of China.
Despite the recent exchange of trade mis-
ms between Kuala Lumpur and Peking,
&inland China still supports the militant
ammunist forces in such states as Malay-
a and Burma � even while supposedly
eking closer political or economic ties.
guiw e guerrillas?
By Henry S. Hayward
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Propaganda continues No-surrender pled,ge
Peking permits, and doubtless operates,' Once he agreed-to talk with the man who
the continuous propaganda campaign was to become Malaysia's long-time Prime
against Malaysian leaders. aired over the Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had
"Voice of Malayan Revolution" in radio Made an amnesty offer to the COmmunists.
broadcasts from southern China. It does the The meeting of the cultured Tunku and the
same against Burmese leaders in the "Voice jungle guerrilla leader took place in Baling
of the People of Burma." in North Malaya in December, 1955.
Moreover, the chief of staff of China's, The two could not agree, and Chin Peng
People's Liberation Army recently went out stalked back into the jungle after declaring
of his way to repeat the pledge that Chinai the Malayan Communist Party would never
will do its utmost to back "the revolutionary,surrender.,
struggle" of the peoples,of the' world.
Statements like these keep the Chin Pengs Nor did it. For the past 11 years since the
of Asia and their followers going. "emergency" ended, the terrorists have
kept alive their cause with sporadic forays
But actions such as . Chinese backing f�1' from their strongholds. They led a will-o'.
Communist insurgents make Kuala Lumpur the-wisp existence, often chased by govern.
and Rangoon long to say to Peking: You rhent units, usually avoiding frontal com�
can't have it both ways�either turn off the bat, but occasionally ambushing a small dc.
guerrillas or stop pretending we can warm tachment or bombing a bridge or railway
, up relations at the same time. . line. -
Chin Peng's history meanwhile giveg This June one of their camps was found at
fascinating glimpses of a dedicated, deter., Chemor in the jungles of Perak 70 miles
mined Communist who appears to have sur. south of their normal operating area. The
vived nearly three decades of hit-and-run Sultan of Perak warned that the Commu.
existence dating back to World War. II days, nists were planning a "major comback"
Decorated by British i next year.
He was awarded the Order of the British Assurance sought
_
. Empire for his anti-Japanese efforts, But Tun Abdul Rezak, Prime Minister.
by 1948, he was struck off the honors list-e. erehkeis successor, is anxious to move
for his efforts against Britain during the ahead with Malaysia's ambitious develop.e
Malayan "emergency," ment plans. He has asked the great powers,
Chin was born above a bicycle shop on especially China, to guarantee the neutral-
'the island of Penang about 48 years ago, ity of southeast Asia�to ensure that devete
the second son of a Chinese bicycle dealer. opment can continue. Peking has not re- ,
He studied.at a Methodist missionary school isponded.
in Perak and proved a smart pupil. He left Asia's real-life Red Pimpernel, having !
school at 15 and three years later joined' survived the Japanese and the British, is:
the Malaya Communist Party (MCP), always a potential threat to Malaysian i
During the Japanese occupation of Ma- peace, even though "Peng" can be trans. k
laya, the MCP formed the Malayan People's lated as level or peaceful.
anti-Japanese Army, led by Lai Tek. Chin
was one of his wartime lieutenants. In 1947,
Chin replaced Lai after the former leader
absconded with the party funds. '
' Although only 25, Chin' already was an
experienced revolutionary when he took i
charge of the ghostly guerrilla force, Ever
since', British and Malaysians have 'been
looking for a legend named Chin Peng. .
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THE WASHINGTON POST
7, October 19 71
Q-uerr
By Anthony Polsky
Iltresla News Service
KUALA LUMPUR, Malay-
sia�The erratic guerrilla
warfare along Malaysia's
jungled and mountainous
border with Thailand is ex-
pected to reach a serious
new stage next year, accord-
ing to documents reportedly
captured by government se-
curity forces.
Compared with guerrilla
wars elsewhere in Southeast
Asia, the Thai-Malaysia fron-
tier troubles have so far
been little more than a se-
ries of skirmishes with occa-
sional casualties.
The guerrilla bands are
known as CTs�for Commu-
`errorists�but they are
no all members of the out-
lawed Malayan Communist
Party. They include bandits,
Thai Moslem separatists dis-
affected from Bangkok's
Buddhist government, and
members of the Communist
Party of Thailand, whose
objectives differ from those
of their Malaysian col-
leagues.
The Malaysian army,
which controls operational
areas of the border, is dis-
inclined to extend facilities
to foreign observers, partic-
ularly newsmen. But diplo-
mats and foreign military
attaches both here and in
neighboring Singapore say'
insurgency in Malaysia i s
reaching new dimensions.
Prime Minister Tun Abdul
Razak has commented on
the resurgence.
One of the most dramatic
recent developments was
the discovery of a Commu-
nist guerrilla training camp
just a few miles outside
Ipoh, capital of tin-rich
Perak State. Ipoh is one of
Malaysia's major towns and
�
GS 0171 litse in17
such a camp could not have
existed without clandestine
support from some of the
townspeople.
Until quite recently, the
guerrillas stayed in rela-
tively remote base areas on
both sides of the border.
They were regarded as a
nuisance, not as a serious
threat.
Popular Support
They had been driven to
the border at the end of the
Malayan Emergency in 1960
after a 12-year campaign
spearheaded by British
Commonwealth forces. Ma-
laysia had gained independ-
ence in 1957.
Malayan Communist
Party leader Chin Peng,
whose World War II anti-
Japanese exploits earned
him a British award which
was later rescinded, took the
remnants of his bands
across the border into Thai-
land. From there, they occa-
sionally crossed to harass
Mals m patrols.
Government security
forces set about dismantling
the Cominunist Party infra-
structure in Malaysia's cities
and towns, but they never
really succeeded. "The Brit-
ish did not completely de-
feat the guerrillas in the
field," said one senior politi-
cal observer, a long-time res-
ident of this country. "But
they played their trump po-
litical card. Once Malaysia
achieved merdeka (inde-
pendence, or freedom) popu-
lar support for the guerril-
las dropped sharply."
Today there is concern
but little hard evidence that
this urban infrastructure is
being revived to support the
Communists. The trairking
camp uncovered near Ipoh,
almost certainly derived its
trainees and logistic support
from the town. And in a can-
did interview the Sultan of'
Perak�a member of the
State Operations Council
which deals, among other
things, with insurgency
problems�said the 'Commu-
nisiS were planning a
"major cameback" next
year.
The number of guerrillas
is anybody's guess, but
1,200-1,500 hardcore fighters
on both sides of the frontier
is considered a reasonable
estimate by independent in-
telligence sources. A year
ago, Britain's crack Special
Air Services troops were on'
more or less continuous
"training missions" along
the central sector of the bor-
der. At that time, the guer-
rillas seemed to be orga-
nized into three regiments�
one in the Changloon trian-
gle along the border's west-
ern sector, around Kedah
and Perlis states; a second
\ in the mountainous central
'sector around the Betong sa-
lient in upper Perak, and
the third in the eastern sec-
tor, the Weng district,
around Kelantan state.
Small SAS units main-
tained contact with the abo-
rigines who live in Malay-
sia's mountains. The aborig-
ines, some of whom are in a
special police force, are a
prime source of intelligence
because they know the al-
most-invisible jungle trails
used by the Communist
guerrillas.
� But sometime during the
,past year, the Malaysian
-government requested that
the British 'end SAS "train-
ing" in the frontier region.
This was done despite evi-
dence that Malaysian secu-
rity forces�especially army
units� have been unable to
establish the same rapport
with the aborigines.
Politically, economically
and racially, Malaysia now is
going -.11 a delicate pe-
riod. The aation has largely'
surmounted the immediate
crisis caused by Malay-
Chinese riots in Kuala Lum-
pur in May, 1969, when more
than 200 persons were �
� killed.
Tun Razak, who took over'
the premiership from Tunku
Abdul Rahman in Septem-
ber, 1970, has launched an
economic development pro-
gram of crucial importance
to the country's future.
His government has deter-
:mined that a Major cause of
the 1969 riots was the eco-
nomic imbalance between
Chinese and Malays. (Ma-
lays comprise about half of
the country's 10 million pop-
ulation. The other half is
made up of Chinese and In-
dians and the tribal peoples
of Borneo. Basically, the Ma-
lays control the government
while the Chinese hold the
economic power.)
While Tun, Razak's gov-
ernment is trying to end the
disparities, the Chinese in
particular are bound to feel
they are being inequitably
treated because of Malay de-
velopment policies. Racial
antagonisms have become
somewhat hardened racial
attitudes. And if each of the
country's two major races is
unwilling to be conciliatory,
toward the other, Malaysia
Is in serious trouble.
The Communists, what-
'ever their actual numbers;
obviously hope to capitalize
on such problems.
2
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LONDON TIMES
17 September 1971
over
Joseph Smrkovsky was chairman of parliament and one of the most popular leading figures under Dubcek
in the Czechoslovak leadership in 1968. After the Russian . invasion, he was progressively demoted and
eNpeHed from the Communist Party in 11979. This is a shortened version of an interview given exclinsiNcly
to the Italian 11-cekly paper Vie Nuove, edited by Pavide Lajolo, a communist deputy and member of the
Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party. -
Q. How do you yourself live?
A. There are few reasons for
contentment, none for joy. For
two years now 1. have been
almost daily the target of attacks
in the press, on the radio and
television and party meetings.
My political as well as ray per-
sonal honour is being assailed.
If truthful facts were being used,
I could admit that this is criti-
cism, although one-sided. But
it is not truthful information
that they work with, and there
is no way of defending oneself
against slander and smear.
PrOM.,M7=777=...,..4k4Akw.t....4.4=7,07446o1=41�564
Q. What happened to your
former collaborators and to
people who held the same
'political views as you did?
A. My collaborators : they
were all communists. They
were erudite people, specialists,
political scientists, economists,
historians, party officials, trade
unionists. etc. None of them
holds a job today in which he
can use his specialized know-
ledge. They all work as un-
skilled workers, . mostly on
digging jobs in. the country. And
they are supposed Co be happy
to have got a job at all. One
Of them, father of a family with
two childreu, has been dn six
months to 34 different factories,
enterprises and institutions
which advertised vacancies, but
in, each -case�after a decision
- taken by the local party
organization--he was rejected.
�Professors work as stokers onaa
- warehouse attendants, former
- ambassadors work as porters, a
doctor is now a delivery-man, a
journalist works as a driver.
This has been the lot of the
intellectuals and the former
party and state offlicials who in
1968 supported the then policy
of the communist party and re-
fused to accept the occupation
.of Czechoslovakia by the War-
saw Pact armies. If you do not
endorse the occupation of your
,country by foreign, troops you
will lose your livelihood.
Q Your attitude to August,
1968, is well known and we do
not, have to deal with it.. But in
recent months Czechoslovak
communications media have
been claiming that the Warsaw
Pact troops were invited to the
country by a number of Czecho-
slovak party and state leaders.
Would you comment tni this?
A The third anniversary has hist
passed of the moment when we,
the praesidiu.m of the C011131111-
niq party central committer.
were informed at 11.30 p.m that
rthelaJe troops had crossed the
borders of � our .country and
would have it occupied by 6 am.
Up to this day no one has said,
no one has made public in the
press who those people. were
who issued � tlhot "invitation ".
There has been sonic talk of
the members of the National
Assembly� of which I was the
chairman at that time. Shortly
after August 21 1068 the
presidium of the National'
Assembly asked all members- of
the parliament, all deputies and
members of ,the government to
submit sworn statements in writ-
ing saying . whether anyone of
them had invited the troops in.
All 296 deputies (that is how
many there were in the parlia-
ment at that time) submitted to
the presidiuM their written state-
ments that they had not invited
anybody, any troops to Czecho-
slovakia.
Since when does a state or a
group of states send its troops to
another country at the request
of " many " or " a number of "
people, without the knowledge
of the government. the parlia-
ment and other relevant organs
of the country concerned? All
that argument about an " invita-
tion" is just naive talk.
sTha.t there were people in this
country who wished it, that is
another matter. And they would
have signed. There have been
such people. But at their " invi-
tation " troops do not come. In
spite of that this justification of
the military action in Czecho-
'slovakia is now to become- -;
after various other versions�the'
official version. And there are
efforts to find an appropriate
ideological justification. But
why, then, arc both communists
and non-communists in Czecho-
slovakia being compelled to de-
clare, one just like another, that
they agree with the military
occupation of the country and
that this was correct ? They want
to involve the whole nation in
tih e blame-14h o ugh triter she
event�so that in the future they
will again he able to say that
" we all made mistakes, we ail
are guility "--just as they tried to
do ;after the dark years of the
1950s.
awiszarmstor===missa=namma�
The present leadership of
the communist party has re-
ferred to you many limes as a
right-wing opportunist and a
renegade. How would You
yourself characterize your pre-
sent political standpoint ?
In-.4,4zaaipaaa.agasaalgra-aaaat
A : Right-wing opportunist,
renegade : I used to hear those
words as long as forty years ago.
At that time we, young people,
were scared by then). To(lay 1
see them as cliches, as abuses, as!
the junk of dogmatists who--in.
one case--substitute a babe for
the lack of arguments and know-
ledge, while others--that is the
second case--try to cover up
with these �clieltes aims- quite
different from those whioli they
talk about.
What. is nay poli�tieal stand-
point today ? Thc same as in
1968. But more reasoned and
clearer today than at that time,
The main pro position, the p rio.
on which the party policy
is based,- is that in our country
we have the dictatorship of the
working class, on whosc behalf
power is exercised by the party.
In practice this principle is
further reduced to the point
where the dictatorship i�ti eaer-
cis�ed on. bahalf of the party by
the salaried party appal a; UN. The
presidium and the secretto iat of
the central committee, the secre-
taries. The party as such, the
party membership and the elec-
ted bodies----except for the- prate-
sidium--at e in fact the execut
organs of the apparatus.
Even if we admit that this
concept of the dictatorship of
the working class, wihere it is
exercised on be-half of the work-
ing class by the party, wa
idied shortly after the aid-eat of
capitalism and the assuming of
power, still it cannot remain as
a permanent mode of existence
for an advanced socialist state.
In the quarter of a Century of a
socialist Czechoslovtukia our
people have become a socialist
people, supporting this system
such as it is, in their overwhelm-
ing. decisive majority.. The six
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or sesen nes cent of sezeolio-
ti;,-}`, ICUS Nth� were in
oi inset-phi gainst the.
1 ,k011(.`11'1 I;IIlh III'
151.111(/111 .111
\veil, and they ale itol es en
actively trying to change this
system.
The administration of all
affairs. of the country as well,
as of the lives of the citizens
is exercised by the party and
state apparatus, Whether this
concerns 100 per cent of all
affairs or " only" 95 per cent-
er them, that does not make
any difference. Where is the
participation of the people�in
eluding the working class itself
in he decision-making cone
cc-ming its affairs? In the out-
lining of Policy; in its execution
and control? How can the
working people, the intelligent'
sia, the economists. Ph(
scientists, show their initiative.
when " sta nda rds " for their
activity are being set up try a
bureaucratic apparatus which
lacks any expert knowledge?
And is this supposed to be the
result of the stru-g.gle of genera-
:ions of working people for
.heir liberation and that of all
mankind? Who then; has
:tetrayed the programme and the
linis of the revolution? Who
ls a renegade and an oppor-
unisi in relation, to the
listorie struggle of the working
sea* for a new, humane sys-
em. for the socialist system? It,
s not we, who in 1968 strove to
7.orrect deformations and
irbitrary methods, and who
vorked for a socialist demos:-
iacy. for a humane socialist.
slider, for the opening of doors
io that progress and science
sould penetrate all areas of our
-rational- life. Neither is it our
people who in 1968 spontan-
sously adopted the communists'
iew policy and identified with
Renegades and opportunists
ire to be looked for elsewhere.
'slot among usl
l. Where do you see the mein
lifference between your stand-
)oint and the views of the pro-
cot Czechoslovak party and
,tate leadership?
k. August 1968 the claim that
here was a threat of, or actual,
:ounter-revolution in our coun-
ry is a propaganda invention.
There was no force in this coun-
try which could have removed
he communist party from power
old overthrown the social sys-
cm. At any time about.90 per
'ent of the citizens spontane-
susly supported the then policy
sf the Czechoslovak communist
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journalists or outer writeis 1,1 of
110:11,10:il trials have taken
a rides in the press a nd of n,Liee in !ea ov;i ,oes
snealsei dimIiI find Atv 'is!lituri this really mean a Irwin lo the
iciponse and neither did they
in flucncc mass opinion, although
they stirred up a lot of noise. The
main and decisive reason for the
military intervention was that
early in September, 1968, a. party
congress was to be held, which
would have approved the then
policy of the party and which
would have excluded from deci-
sion-making the representatives
of the past, pre-January policy.
And this had to be prevented at
all costs, even by military means
when other means were not
ayailable. �
' How can I come to terms With
this or even endorse it when
the sovereignty Of the people
and the nation to which I belong
is trampled and 'violated, the
sovereignty of a socialist people
and nation at that. when all
standards of relations between
parties and states are brushed
away, when the declaration of
the international workers and
communist movement on the
rights of nations is turned into
a piece of crumpled paper?
Sovereignty: how many
different ways have been tried
to confuse people about
sovereignty. The citizen, " the
man in the street ". as he is
sometimes called, possesses a
normal brain and therefore he
knows that the Czech and
Slovak lands have belonged for
the last 1.500 �years to the Czechs
and the Slovaks and that in this
country Czech and Slovaks
should role over their affairs.
over the affairs of their country
and its people. and at the same
time to 'stand up properly to
commitments given to allies and
friends. What is, however, a
"limited sovereignty '', a "class
sovereignty ". a sovereignty
subordinated to internationalism
and similar bunkum, according
to which a nation is supposed to
leave to someb,ody else its
'inalienable right to determine its
own destiny and th.e destiny of
its country, even though that
somebody be the dearest ally?
If someone "cedes " this right.
the sovereignty of the state and
the people, to other officials or
Stales, he is giving away some-
thing that does not 'below': to
him. Neither � the party leader-
ship, nor the entire party mciii-
hershtp, � nor the governnient,
not even an entire living genera-
tion of the nation can surrender �
the sovereignty of the nation.
A 1 don't think so. Despite the
!fact that there have been some
!trials and people are being hold
;in jail, even without trial.
However, in 1971 it is not
:possible, I think, to arrest 'tens
of thousands of people and
throw them in jail. It is not pos-
sible to concoct charges against
thousands of people and then
to force them to :sign such in-
ventions and recite them in
"court ". It is probably impos-
sible to execute dozens of inno-
cent people 1. think it is no
longer possible. The power of
world public opinion `and the
weight which official state dcc-
Ia rations canry are I oda y d if -
fere nt from what they were 20_
years ago. The power, experi-
ence -and knowledge of the.
world communist movement
are different, too.
But is only. that horrible,
which happened 20 years ago ?
Arc not other things and other
methods horrtible as seer] 7. If.
in our case over half a million
party members have either
been expelled or have left the
party because they did not agree
with its policy and if they are
then deprived of -their liveli-
hood, if they are denied any.
chance to work in that I;elsi
which is their occupation �is,
not that horrible?
'MU
Q: How would you briefly
characterize the results of the
line taken by the. Husk leader-
ship from April 1969 up to the
present?
=ma
A : For tWQ years all the efforts
of the party leadership and of
the subordinated institutions
have concentrated on liquidat-
ing the views, resolution and re-
sults of the. policy introduced in
1968. The past two years have
been two years of negation.
Everything has been denoun red
as had and revisionist -and fit to
extinpated, Including peoole.
And the occupation of: the coun-
try by the troops of the Warsaw
Pact had to be accepted every-
where as a gift. from, heaven..
-These efforts, which de-
veloped into blind fanaticism,
and cynicism, have consumed
all the energy of the present
party and its leadership and have
brought about an isolation of
the party from the people. They
have deadened the people's init-
iative. have laid waste the soul
4
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of the nation, have thrown it.
iin:lethatess Does life .go on,
are industi se transport and
col! LII-C Willi. rig?t Of conrse they
IC, �I cy always %York under
any nIgitne because people de-
p-end on diem for their liveli-
hood. Bul how they work is
another matter. People do net
consider the present policy to
be their own, so they behave,
accordingly. Scarcely mote
than 10 per cent of the populat-
ion supports the present policy..
The 'future will show whether
it was or is otherwise. I do not
think it is.
Our people decided For social-
ism in our country out of their
-own free will and they see it as,
their cause.
In 1968 they adopted the pro-
gramme of the communist party,
the programme of d�emoenatte
socialism, so spontaneouslY and
such -an overwhelming majo-
rity, that the comma ii party
had never- before had such a
natural authority and power.
and Our people � have kept this
attitude to the programme of
1968. They. live in the conviction
that the present times will pass,
that , the attitude of allies to rho
policy of our :party in 1968 will
he revised, that the attitude to
'August 21 will. be revised, and
that this will, provide for the,
normalization of relations be
tween Czechoslovakia and the
other countries of the Warsaw
Pact, in the first place relations
with the Soviet Union, which
ate not normal.
The Czechoslovak people and
the Czechoslovak Republic are
not such an insignificant factor
on the map of Europe that they
need not be taken into considera-
tion. The allies and neighbouring
states cannot and should not
remain permanently indifferent
to the fact that this people and
this country have been driven by
force and arc still being pushed
further into opposition and into.
a longing for freedom. The
"calm " in this. country is an
active calm. OUT people is like
a doctor, watehing over a sick
patient, ready to intervene and
act immediately should it come
to a crisis. That is a situation
which -oobody has to organize.
That is how it is I
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NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1971
\Prague Liberal Says in Interview Barely 10%
Back New Regime
���
By PAUL ROI-MANN
Soeclat to The New Yolk TarCs
ROME, Sept. 17 -- Josef
Smrkovsky, one of the leaders
of the short-lived "Prague
spring" of liberalization in
1968, said in an interview pub-
lished by an Italian Communistl
magazine yesterday that barely
10 per cent of the Czechoslovakl
people supported the present
pro-Soviet regime.
Now ill and under police
surveillance in Czechoslovakia,
Mr. Smrkovsky, who is 60 years
old, declared that he considered
his country's continued occupa-
tion by Soviet-bloc troops one
� of the basic problems of the
international Communist move-
ment.
"Our people will never rec-
ognize the accomplished fact,
will never resign themselves to
it," Mr. Smrkovsky warned,
"even if they were forced to
raise arms every day to vote
for the sending of resolutions
and letters of thanks for that
'fraternal help.'" �
Mr. Smrkovsky said that
anyone who approached him
faced "persecution," that his
former aides were under "in.
supportable pressure," and that
some Czechoslovaks were being
held in jail without trial.
Mr. Smrkovsky's statements
appeared in an interv,.. e in
Giorni-Vie Nuove of Milan, a
magazine close to the Italian
Communist party, the strong-
est in the west, although osten-
sibly independent of it.
, _
I Authentic, an Editor Says I
In a telephone interview, thel
assistant editor of Giorni-Viei
Nuove, Clemente Azzini, said
the staff was convinced that
the interview was authentic,
and that a message recereed
from Mr. Smrkovksy was un-
mistakably in his handwriting,
The magazine's editor, Da-
vide Lajolo, is a Communistl
deputy in parliament and.a for-
mer editor of L'Unita, the or-
'ficiel party organ.
The cover of Giorni-Vie
Nuove carried a photograph of
Mr. Smrkovsky in a windbreak-
er and holding an ax. He looked
old but vigorous. An autograph
in Czech read: "Greetings to
Friends�J. J. Smrkovksy-
1971. -
The magazine did not
identify the interviewer. Mr.
Azzini said the reason was
"to spare him trouble." He
hinted that the interviewer was
not Italian.
Mr. Lajolo said in a commen-
tary printed with the interview
that Giorni-Vie Nuove would be
glad to print interviews with
the present Czechoslovak lead-
ers.
In the interview, Mr. Smrkov-
sky said he had "few reasons
to be satisfied," because he had
for the last two years bee; ::te
target of, "one may say, c-e
-te-ecles by Czechoslovak .
papers, broadcasts and Cornmu-
nisi e. J.
Mr. Seerkovsky said he had
learned from an article in the
Czechoslovak Communist party
newspaper, Rude Pravo, last
year that he had been expelled
from the party, but had never
been notified, Orally or in writ-
ing, which party organ had
made this decision.
Mr. Smrkovsky, chief of the
Communist-led anti-Nazi resist-
ance movement in Prague dur-
ing World War II, was president
of the National Assembly
during the liberalization drive
early in 1968. He was one of
the main lieutenants of Alex-
ander Dubcek, then first secre-
tary of the party.
Mr. Smrkovsky said in the
interview that his former col-
laborators, all of them Commu-
nists and many highly
educated, were in grave dif-
ficulties today.
"All, of them work today as
unskilled laborers, mostly in
building projects outside
Prague," Mr. Smrkovsky said,
"and they must be glad to have
found work. One of them, a
father of two children, applied
during six months at no fewer
than 34 plants, enterprises and
agencies that had job opening's,
but was always rejected by de-
cision of the local party organi-
zations."
"Former professors work as
stokers or storeroom attend-
ants, former ambassadors work
as janitors, former physicians
are porters, former newsmen
are drivers," he said.
Many of these, Mr. Smrkov-
ksy charged, are living in mis-
iery," multiplied by the insup-
portable pressure on the con-
sciences of these comrades to
force them to say that black is
no longer black but white and
vice versa."
, Referring to the contention
by the present leaders that the
Soviet-bloc forces invaded
Czechoslovakia on Aug. 21,
1968, following requests from
Prague, Mr. Smrkovksy re-
marked:
"Up to this day nobody has
told us, or printed in the news-
papers, who attended this fa-
mous 'invitation.'" �
In 1968, Mr. Smrkovksy de-
clared, he and like-minded.com-
munists fought "for socialist
democracy, for humanity in a
socialist order."
He said the main reason for
the Soviet-bloc invasion was
Moscow's determination to pre-
vent endorsement of this policy
- -
by the Czechoslovak party con-
gress that was to have met in
September.
Mr. Snarkovksy described the
present leaders in Prague as a
clique of cynical party bureau-
crats, but said he was confi-
dent that .his country would
not e ,ise into the Stalinist
ter,�oriLL.;. of the early nineteen-
fifties, "even though various
trials have been held and
though there are also persons,
in prison without trial."
This confidence was based,
he said, on his belief that world
public opinion today has a
greater weight than 20 years
ago.
Camera Pros-PIX
Josef' Smrkovsky
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 September 1971
-19 0
I n.1 ,
�raiser
14 Eric Bourne
Special correspondent cyj
The Christian Science Monitor
Vienna
One of Alexander Dubcek's� most popular
,aides during the .1968 "Prague spring" has
'revived Communist acrimony over the So-
viet invasion,
Josef Smrkovsky, humiliated, isolated,
ridiculed -at home, has broken his silence
:with the cooperation and evident approval.
of the largest and most powerful Commu-
nist party outside the Soviet Union�the
Italian. �
The event could have serious implications.
for international communism, which already
is fraught with ideological squabbling.
.Mr .Smrkoysky's criticisms came in the
:form of a lengthy'question-and-ans�Ver inter-
;view published, in Italy by Vie Nuovi Giorni,
la large circulation picture- weekly close to
:the Italian Communist Party.
As one of the most progressive radiniaers
of the party Presidium and chairman of the
National Assembly, Mr. Smrkovsky was
closely associated with the democratizing
reforms written into the action program,
since suppressed in the "normalization" (the
Soviet term for invasion) process.
Forceful challenge
His comments pose a forceful challenge,
,to regime arguments on all counts covering
the circumstanees of the InVasicin n�ly
thing that has happened under. the cloak of
"normalization" in Czechoslovakia since.
To that extent an official reaction, and
possibly some further sanctions against him,
might appear ineviiable.
In the interview, Mr. Smrkovsky ridiculed
rthe contentions that the Soviets decided to
intervene after an "invitation" from "re-
sponsible" Communists in Prague disturbed
by events under Mr. Dubcek and the
"threat" of "counterrevolution."
"To this day," he said, "nobody has told
us, or printed in the newspappy, who gave
this famous 'invitation.'"
Still more pertinently, he described ".the
occupation- by Soviet forces and their con-
tinued presence as a problem on the "road
to socialism" not only for Czechoslovakia '
but for all parties and the whole,.communist
movement.
zt.ec171 uaaer
0,7
vrs
ze
"Our people," said Mr. Smrkovsky, "will
never recognize the accomplished fact, will
never resign themselves to it, even if forced
every day to raise their hands for resolu-
tions and letters of thanks for that 'fraternal
aid.' "
Prepared indictment
This was no "off the cuff" outburst by an
embittered man. It was clearly a carefully
prepared "indictment" made with the full
approval of the powerful Italian Communist
Party with which the Kremlin's relations
have been gravely strained through the
three years since the events of 1968.
The protest was one of the most stoutly
argued from the "liberal" side and must be:
deemed the one most likely to command ,
popular sympathy and respect in Czech
minds because it was made not by an �gr�
living outside, but by a man still living in
the county, sharing its disappointments
with that great majority which supported
the reform movement.
But whatever official Prague's anger�
and 'angered, indeed, one may assume it is
�it is unlikely to act without the fullest
consultation with the Soviet Party.
It is not hard to see that any hasty, puni-
tive action would only sharpen differences
between the Soviet party and the Italian.
Rekindling held possinIe
It could also rekindle all the old criticisms
widespread in the international movement
over the Soviet action against Czechoslo-
vakia. Moreover, it could disturb public
bpinion'elses.,vhere at a time when the Soviet
,leaders are concerned-to .gain.".goodwill,n4,,
support for major policy initiatives on the
general international scene.
The Soviets do not normally pay much
heed to other parties, where major ques-
tions are concerned. But they might be
_reluctant just now to further aggravate their
-relations with the Italians.
The Italian party is unique. It is not only
the largest outside the 14 parties in power.
It also commands a big popular vote and
cpuld conceivably come out on top, in a
country where Moscow knows large areas
of opinion are lukewarm on NATO and
iiapcs it propaganda accordingly.
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�
In 19G8, Vie titiovi Giorni (which was
"Vie Nuovi" and' was tnen owned by the
party) created a stir in the Communist
world by, Printing One .of the most graphic
and forthright condemnations of the in-
vasion.
Party leaders approved
Subsequently it was taken over by a group
connected with export-import business with
the Soyiets. Editorially, it continued along
the Italian party line and its present editor,
David e Lajolo�a foxiner editor of Unita,
the party's official daily�is a Communist
member of Parliament and a member
the party's Central Committee.
Obviously, therefoiv, the decision to af-
ford Mr. Smrkovsky a platform to uphold
views which he is not at liberty to present'
in his own country was undertaken with
L'UNITA, Rome .
26 September 1971
the full knowledge of the Italian party lead-
ership.
The implication is that the latter regards
.the subject of the interview as one covering
issues which need still to be considered�
as Mr. Smrkovsky himself suggested�
within the Communist movement and not
just by parties directly concerned.
So far 'Mr, Smrkovsky's comments have
drawn no public reaction from the ruling re-
gime in Prague, But a few weeks ago, he-
was publicly derided by the present party
leader, Dr. Gustav Husak, becausd of a
picture published by a German news maga-
zine showing him, a pensioner, sitting silent
,and alone on a park bench.
The Italian and other Western Communist
partita and 'many Communists in Eastern
;Europe, too � Will be watching Prague's
attitudes nod' that he has broken his silence.
UNITA REPORTS'ON'SWOVSKY 'ATTACK
An article in RudeTravo, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party,
signed by Vlacav Dolezala, bitterly attacks Josef Smrkovsky, who was
President of the Czechoslovak Parliament and who today lives-inretirement
in Prague, because of an interview given to the weekly'GiOrtiVie'NUOve,
an interview that is described as slanderous.
The article attacks Smrkovsky claiming that in the past he had two-faced
contradictory positions, that he was treated with. Magnanimity-, And that today
he supposedly is abusing it.
The article says that there is no desire to open any Smrkovsky affair;
for us it has been definitively closed.
The article itself, however, asserts further on that, with this interview,
Smrkovsky has placed himself on the side of the renegades and traitors and
that he sold himself to the enemy against which he himself in the past more
than once found himself face to face.
[L'Unita Footnote]:
We know how bitter can be the polemic within our own movement even if
this is notthestyle we choose and if, moreover; we think that polemic should
concern the subject matter of the positions enunciated from time to time.
Moreover, We cannot but view with concern the appellations of 'renegades'
and 'traitor' and 'bribed' used by'RUde'PraVO's journalist over an interview
given to an Italian leftist weekly.
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