CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/07/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02051067
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: July 10, 1952

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10 July 1952
Copy No. 53
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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NEAT REYiEW DATE: -- _
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Office of Current Intelligen rifiA10118EvIoNEf':
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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� SECURIT FORMATION
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1.
2. Indian diplomat criticizes US policies in Far East (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
3. Mossadeq likely to obtain parliament's approval for his program
(page 4).
4. Turkey prepared to approach Arabs on Middle East defense
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Polish radar net identified along Baltic coast (page 5).
6. Yugoslav leaders worried over change in Soviet tactics (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Allied Commander plans to surrender civil authority to Italian
official in Trieste (page 7).
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FAR EAST
1.
2. Indian diplomat criticizes US policies in Far East:
Indian Ambassador R. K. Chettur in Tokyo,
recently
blamed the present world situation on "in-
creasing American intransigence."
Expressing approval of the May Day Commu-
nist riots, Chettur stated that American policy in Japan was likely to
lead to serious internal and international consequences. He also
charged that American indecision and vacillation in the Korean truce
talks "has changed the fundamental terms of the negotiations," result-
ing in a loss of prestige for the United States.
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Western diplomats in Tokyo believe that
Chettur is seeking support in Japan for Indian groups which favor
a compromise with the Soviet Union,
Comment: Chettur is one of several leftist
Indian diplomats who exert anti-American influence on Prime Minister
Nehru. He reportedly has aroused the resentment of the Japanese
Government for his open support of the left-wing Socialists, a minor-
ity party which favors strict neutrality for Japan and bitterly opposes
the Japanese Peace Treaty terms and the US-Japan Security Treaty.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Mossadeq likely to obtain parliament's approval for his program:
ment to continue.
The Acting Governor of the Iranian National
Bank now believes that Mossadeq will be
able to persuade parliament to pass the fi-
nancial legislation necessary for the govern-
The economic counselor of the American Embassy
predicts that Mossadeq could carry on for a year or more if he could
also persuade Parliament to authorize him to use 45,000,000 to
50,000,000 dollars of the gold currency reserve.
Comment: Mossadeq has insisted that he
could not continue as Prime Minister unless he were first assured of
parliamentary support for the reforms which he considers necessary
If Iran is to be deprived indefinitely of its oil revenues. He program
Is expected to include electoral changes, expansion of the note issue,
reduction of the number of government employees and increasedtaxes.
The recent Majlis and Senate recommendation
that Mossadeq remain as Prime Minister suggests that he stands a
good chance of persuading parliament to adopt his program.
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4. Turkey prepared to approach Arabs on Middle East defense:
Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu believes
that Turkey is the best qualified of the Allied
powers to approach the Arab countries with
respect to the proposed Middle East Defense
Organization. As an alternative, he suggests that the power with the
most influence in each Arab country make the initial contact.
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Koprulu states that a major problem is the
possibility that the Arab governments might insist on first discussing
the proposed organization in the Arab League. Under such circum-
stances, he believes the Western defense proposals would "get nowhere."
Comment: The Turks have previously ex-
pressed concern that attempts by Britain and France to strengthen
their influence in the Arab area might jeopardize acceptance of the
Middle East defense plan. Turkey has also indicated that it will co-
operate in promoting a stronger defense of the area, but that it be-
lieves the Anglo-Egyptian impasse is a serious block to the establish-
ment of a defense organization.
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Polish radar net identified along Baltic coast:
Five radar stations located along the Baltic
coast of Poland recently have been identified
as part of a Polish air warning net first noted
in April. These stations are capable of main-
taining overlapping radar coverage from
Swinemuende to Kaliningrad and as far inland as Poznan, west of
Warsaw. Use of Moscow time and communications procedures com-
mon to the air warning systems of European Satellites suggests a
close integration of this net with Soviet and Satellite air defense organi-
zations.
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Comment: Addition of this net sharply in-
creases the capability of the Polish Air Force to intercept aircraft
approaching over the Baltic. In view of the probable integration of
this network with the Soviet air defense system, early warning infor-
mation obtained thereby will serve to strengthen defense of the USSR
against air attack.
6. Yugoslav leaders worried over change in Soviet tactics:
Yugoslav leaders reluctantly admit that
during the past six months a significant
change in the tactics of the Orbit toward
Yugoslavia has become evident. This
change is characterized by a reduction of pressure from the East, a
softening in the attitude of Cominform diplomats abroad, and a "tend-
ency of the Cominform countries at the Moscow Economic Conference
to show a pretended desire for cooperation with Yugoslavia."
Yugoslav leaders explain these developments
as an effort to remove a rallying point for Yugoslav unity and to isolate
Yugoslaviafrom the West by fostering the myth that the Yugoslav-
Cominform break is not irreparable.
Comment: Yugoslav fears of the effects of
Moscow's new policy were illustrated in a recent speech by Marshal
Tito in which he accused Moscow of attempting "to create a gap in
Yugoslav-Western relations" by spreading false rumors of collusion
between the Kremlin and Belgrade.
The relatively mild though essentially nega-
tive attitude of Orbit delegates toward Yugoslav demands during the
recently adjourned sixth meeting of the Danubian Commission lends
substance to the Yugoslav thesis.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. Allied Commander plans to surrender civil authority to Italian official
in Trieste:
General Winterton, Allied Commander of
Zone A of Trieste, states that he now intends 3.3(h)(2)
to surrender his authority over those civil
affairs assigned to the Italian director of
a mims ra ion un e London agreement. He has reversed his
earlier position because he feels it would be "politically impossible"
to resist for any length of time Italian encroachment on the Zone
Commander's power.
The American Political Adviser in Trieste
notes that Winterton's behavior since his return from London on 28 June
suggests that he may have orders from the Foreign Office to allow the
Italians de facto control of the zone.
Comment: The United States and Britain
have assured Yugoslavia that the Zone A Commander will retain final
authority under the London agreement. An abdication of Winterton's
powers now would reinforce Yugoslav fears that there has been a
secret agreement giving Italy political control of Zone A and would
probably provoke renewed protests from Belgrade. It would also make
the negotiation of any Yugoslav-Italian settlement of the Trieste issue
more unlikely.
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