CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/03/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02050128
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: March 3, 1953

Approved foF6eleasse,,: 2019/06/276, CO2050128,
s INXRE
FORMATION //r/
3 March 1953
3.5(c)
opy No.
"
(0/
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
OOC/4 ric3) ocurimEsEs CLAS&
c E
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW Dikle. ---
AUTH: TO-2
REVIEWE
DATE:
P7`
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
TOP S}iVRET
SECU INFORMATION
/
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
1.
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
Tt998ECRET
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
2. Li Mi reluctant to withdraw his troops from Burma (page 3).
3. American Ambassador comments on Burmese statement concerning
Chinese Nationalists (page 4).
4. Quirino plans to charge Magsaysay with misuse of Philippine Army
funds (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on Tudeh position in current Iranian situation (page 5).
WESTERN 'EUROPE
6. Adenauer government likely to receive setback by West German
Court (page 6).
2
3.5(c)
TOP CRET
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
3.5(c)
1.
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
rr'fr" SECRET
FAR EAST
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Li Mi reluctant to withdraw his troops from Burma:
3.3(h)(2)
General Li Mi, commander of Chinese National-
ist forces in Burma, has told Chiang Kai-shek's
chief of staff that the evacuation of his troops
from Burma would be a mistake, since the Chi-
nese Communists would occupy northern Burma as soon as he withdraws.
He indicated, however, that he would remove his forces to Formosa if so
ordered.
- 3 -
2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
TeP SECRET
In addition, Li Mi stated that his policy of
cultivating the Karen insurgents was designed to keep them in the
anti-Communist camp.
Comment: In view of their past ineffective-
ness against the Chinese Communists in Yunnan, it is doubtful whether
Li's forces, believed to number less than 10,000, are a deterrent to
Chinese Communist operations in northern Burma.
Li's remarks concerning the Karens directly
confirms numerous reports since last summer of cooperation between
the Nationalists and the Karens, Such cooperation may well have caused
the Karens to terminate negotiations for an alliance with the Burmese
Communists.
3. American Ambassador comments on Burmese statement concerning
Chinese Nationalists:
Ambassador Sebald, in commenting on the text3.3(h)(2)
of Premier Nu's statement charging aggression
by the Chinese Nationalists, notes the absence
of any recrimination against the United States.
He believe thLs ind cates that the Burmese Government will continue
friendly relations with the West. He points out, however, that the speech
also reflects a fear of the attitude Peiping might take as a result of pos-
sible UN discussions and foreshadows closer Burmese cooperation with
the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador also emphasizes the bitter-
ness in the speech toward the Nationalist Government and the Burmese
sense of hopelessness at facing the issue alone.
4. Quirino plans to charge Magsaysay with misuse of Philippine Army
funds:
President Quirino plans to accuse former
Defense Secretary Magsaysay of malfeasance
in office, according to reliable Embassy
- 4 -
3.3(h)(2)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
Tizi.93 SECRET
3.5(c)
sources. The "startling discovery" that Magsaysay used defense funds
to further his political campaign will be announced soon by the army
chief of staff and by the Secretary of Justice, who will assume the De-
fense portfolio.
Comment: Sensational charges by Quirino
against Magsaysay, who resigned as Defense Minister on 28 February,
can be expected as long as the latter remains a possible rival for the
presidency in the November elections.
Nacionalista Party leaders have signed an
agreement to make Magsaysay their presidential candidate, but several
sources have expressed the opinion that he will be dropped if his politi-
cal value deteriorates.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on Tudeh position in current Iranian situation:
Current Tudeh attempts to exploit the confused
situation in Iran suggest that the Communists are not ready for an all-
out assault on the government, but believe that Mossadeq's continuation
In power will best serve their interest in what they regard as a maturing
"revolutionary situation."
On 28 February the Tudeh press came out for
a united front of pro-Mossadeq elements. This was followed by repeated
attempts to obtain the Prime Minister's consent to Tudeh collaboration.
Concurrently the Tudeh, in line with its desire
to overthrow the dynasty and to remove American influence from Iran,
unsuccessfully tried to turn the demonstrations in Tehran against the
United States and the Shah.
The diverse nature and conflicting interest of
the forces opposing Mossadeq would undermine any government brought
to power by his defeat and would presumably present the Tudeh with a
new chance to further its aim of obtaining control of the government.
- 5-
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128
1ICRET
3.5(c)
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Adenauer government likely to receive setback by West German Court:
the second panel of
the West German Constitutional Court will
reject the government s petition for an immediate court ruling on the
legality of the Bonn and Paris treaties. Adenauer will now attempt to
obtain ratification in both houses of parliament prior to his departure
for the United States, tentatively scheduled for 2 April.
Comment Even if the Bundesrat, or upper
house, reverses itself and agrees to act on the treaties without a prior
court ruling, it is not likely to do so until late April. In any case, the
Bundesr t will not act before the treaties have been finally approved
in the Bundestag.
Although the second panel of the court is
believed to regard the treaties as constitutionally acceptable, it will
probably reject the government's petition for procedural reasons. The
question of the treaties' constitutionality may not be settled until early
summer.
-6
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2050128