CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049789
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 20, 1961

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TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
CENTRAL
20 May 1961
Copy No. C
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
7
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20 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. South Korea. (Page it)
3. USSR: Illness of Frol K.ozlov, leading contender as
Khrushchev's successor, may intensify maneuver-
ing for the succession. (Page itt)
4. USSR: Press comment on extension of death penalty
apparently intended to forestall public fear of revival
of police terror. (Page itt)
5. USSR: M. V. Keldysh replaces A. N. Nesmeyanov as
president a Academy of Sciences. (Page iti)
6. Ghana-Angola: Nkrumah apparently hopes to become
exclusive sponsor of Angolan rebel organization.
(Page tit)
7. France-Algeria: Reported plot to assassinate De
Gaulle. (Page tv)
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20 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos: The deadlock in the 19 May session of the tri-
jetz-Z4...ree�,
partite talks at Namone reflects General Phoumi's in-
structions to the government delegation to stall talks on /3
formation of a coalition government. The Pathet Lao and
the Souvanna Phouma group repeatedly have attempted to
get political discussions started, but the government dele-if /, -2 .3, 6,
gation is insisting that the meeting address itself first to 7 g q /0.
cease-fire matters because of recently received reports
of continued fighting in Pa Dong and in other scattered /
areas. The next session is scheduled for 22 May.
No action was reported on the major military fronts.
Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through
20 May. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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ii
*� South Korea: President Yun announced at a press con-
ference this morning that he has reconsidered his resignation
and plans to remain as chief of state. Military Revolutionary
Committee (MRC) Chairman Chang was reported very upset
by Yun's surprise resignation and has evidently succeeded in
persuading him to remain to provide the new regime with some
semblance of constitutional authority.
Gen. Chang meanwhile has named a 15-man cabinet--
all military officers--,with himself as Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense. Crhere are growing indications, how-
ever, that dissensions are developing within the MR :C parti-
cularly over the question of transferring power to a new
civilian government. There are also unconfirmed reports
of a dispute developing between the marines, who seek an
early restoration of civilian administration, and the army,
which claims there is need for indefinite military rule. Army
officers constitute the bulk of the MRC, but the marines have
a large troop concentration in Seoul and are opposing attempts
to replace them with army units:)
General Chang's first bid for public support was an an-
nouncement on 19 May that rice rations for military units
would be reduced and increased quantities made available
for civilian consumption, both to counter runaway grain
prices and to offset food shortages in some areas.
The National Police have been instructed
to give "positive impetus" to grain shipments for the cities.
Some segments of the South Korean populace are be
apprehensive about the dictatorial powers assumed
by the military group but on the, whole the public remains
apathetic.
20 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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USSR: Frol Kozlov, probably the leading contender as
Khrushchev's eventual successor, has been "convalescing
from heart trouble" since 22 April, according to a Soviet
Foreign Ministry official. Kozlov's chances of succeeding
Khrushchev may now be reduced and below-the-surface ma-
neuvering for the succession may be intensified. Any seri-
ous impairment of Kozlov's activities would also necessitate
� the redistribution of his key administrative responsibilities
in party,organizational and personnel work.
o K
USSR: Initial Soviet press comment on the decree which
sets the death penalty for large-scale embezzlement, counter
felting, and forgery is apparently intended to forestall public
fears that Stalinist police terror may be revived. While
calling for strict enforcement of the new decree, Moscow at
the same time insists that "liberalization trends" have not
been reversed. The Kremlin is apparently also concerned
that this move will furnish propaganda fuel for the West.
(Backup, Page 5)
K
USSR: For comment on election of M. V. Keldysh, who
Is believed to have played an important role in research on � K
the Soviet guided missile program, as president of the Acad-
emy of Sciences, USSR, see Page 6. emmeutwiwirhia '
Ghana-Angola:CPresident Nkrumah on 16 May reportedly
claimed he cotild supply "any quantity" of arms to the Angola
People's Union (UPA)--the organization believed chiefly re-
sponsible for the rebellion in Angola. In a talk with UPA
leader Holden Roberto in Accra, the Ghanaian President said
that such materiel would come from the bloc, which had re-
sponded "immediately" to a request from him for arms "for
Gizenga, Angola, and South Africa"--presumably a reference
to the arms delivered to Ghana by the USSR last month.
Nkrumah admitted, however, that a secure means of delivery
still had to be worked out. Nkrumah also offered to provide
"plenty of money" if the UPA would establish its headquarter
20 May 61
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(in Accra or at least assign a permanent representative there
to receive funds and advice. At the same time, Nkrumah dis-
couraged Roberto from seeking aid elsewhere, apparently in
the hone of hpeomincr the exeluctive snopsor of the UPA)
(Backup, Page
*France-Algeria:
cer-
tam army units in France plan to storm the Elysee Palace,
De Gaulle's official residence, and "remove him" shortly
after the 20 May opening of negotiations with the Algerian
rebels. Premier Debrd is said to have been alerted to this
report, which is one of a number in circulation concerning
an early rightist civilian or military attempt to assassinate
De Gaulle.
Collapse of the late April military revolt in Algeria has
left military and civilian extremists still bitterly opposed to
De Gaulle's Algerian policy. In view of the failure of past
plots to seize control of the government or otherwise persuade
De Gaulle to modify his policy, fanatic rightists probably feel
assassination is the only remaining way to block Algerian in-
dependence)
20 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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*NO
Situation in Laos (
(General Phoumi,
stated that he neither expected nor in-
tended to come to an early agreement with Souvanna and Prince
Souphannouvong on a coalition government. Phoumi cited vari-
ous legal and technical impediments to early formation of such
a regime but added that in any event, it was impossible to settle
the question until the neutrality of Laos had been assured by
some form of agreement at Geneva. With regard to a much
mooted "summit meeting" with Souvanna and Souphannouvong,
Phoumi stated that he would be willing to meet with them, pro-
vided a mutually satisfactory site could be agreed upon
(According to a report that is probably true, Phoumi was
to stop off in Nong Khai, Thailand, on 19 May, during a flight
to Savannakhet, to see Premier Sarit. Phoumi was character-
izedl as feeling isolated and puzzled
by the American position on Laos; it is probable that he hoped
to obtain new insights into American intentions from Sarit on
the basis of the latter's recent talks with Vice President John-
son. The report quotes Phoumi to the effect that if the United
States is not prepared to act militarily in his behalf in the event
the Pathet Lao should suddenly attack Vientiane or Luang Pra-
bang, he should know about it, in which case he would prepare
to move his government to Pakse in southern Lao
(-Should Phoumi become persuaded that the United States
would not come to his assistance in the event of the resump-
tion of the Pathet Lao offensive, there is a possibility that he
might suddenly come to terms with Souvanna and the Pathet
Lao, his contrary protestations to Ambassador Brown notwith-
standing)
Xieng Khouang town
the airstrip there is lightly defended
by two companies. The radio station appeared powerful and
had a trans-horizontal aerial. Three pairs of permanent tele-
phone lines were observed along the Plaine des Jarres Xieng
Khouang road with one pair terminating about four miles from
the Plaine des Jarres. The ICC villas in Xieng Khouang are)
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(guarded by Pathet Lao troops under the supervision of Kong
Le paratroops, who seem to be in control of the area. The
paratroops were equipped with US arms, whereas the Pathet
Lao were armed with Soviet carbines
he South Vietnamese special forces engaged in patrol
duty just inside the Laotian border in the Tchepone area were
reportedly withdrawn on 19 May. Their return to South Viet-
nam was allegedly occasioned by a letter written by the local
Laotian commander in which he asked them to withdraw, as
"the war was over," and refused to accept any further respon-
sibility for their acts or security. No mention was made in
the report of elements of the Third Battalion of the South Viet-
namese Army, which is also reported to be in Laos in the
same general area)
CSeveral prominent South Vietnamese opposition leaders
now residing in Paris are reported assembling in Geneva,
where they hope to make informal contact with various dele-
gations to the conference on Laos and to advance their politi=
cal aims in South Vietnam. Among them are leaders, alleged
by South Vietnamese officials to have some covert French and
North Vietnamese backing, who are working for the ouster of
President Diem and are advocating a policy of neutrality for
South Vietnam. Although they have no official access to the
conference, they may also hope to present their views if the
question of Vietnam is raised at the meetings.
Indications that the uommunist
guerrillas in South Vietnam were planning a "program for re-
sponding" to the conference
CA key Chinese Communist objective at the Geneva Con-
ference is to damage SEATO as much as possible, according
to recent statements of Communist newspapermen to Western
journalists. Since arriving in Geneva, the Chinese have main-
tained a steady barrage of attacks on the US alliance structure
in Southeast Asia. These attacks are designed to create inter-
national apprehension�particularly among Asian neutrals--
over US defense commitments in the area, and the Chinese lose)
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Eno opportunity to charge that, so long as these commitments
exist, the peace of Southeast Asia is threatened. Moscow
also has shown, both in Gromyko's speech and in propaganda,
that one of Moscow's central objectives is to reduce SEATO's
effectiveness)
(Peiping also is promoting closer ties with the pro - Sou-
vanna Phouma commander in Phong Saly Province, which
borders on Communist China's Yunnan Province. On 17 May
Peiping announced that Lieutenant Colonel Khamouan Boupha
had arrived for a "friendly visit" in Kunming. Khamouan
was greeted by the ranking Chinese Communist military of-
ficer for the Kunming garrison and by Yunnan provincial gov-
ernment officials)
(Airlift operations on 18 May involved an estimated total
of 19 sorties--16 by Soviet transports and three by North Viet-
namese aircraft. Of this number at least four Soviet IL-14s,
but possibly nine, were involved in flights into Laos. In ad=
dition, two Soviet LI-2s probably flew to Nam Bac)
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-GONFIDENT-f-At-
Soviet Comment on New Em
oezzlement Law
On 14 May, the officiallgovernment organ Izvestia pointed-
ly denied that promulgation TQf the new death decree had come
as a shock and asserted that the measure enjoys the approval
of the entire Soviet people. Ostensibly written in answer to
Western press criticism, the commentary has strong over-
tones of Kremlin concern thatthe law will revive old memories
of indiscriminate police terror. Izvestia reassured the "cap-
italist world" that there has been no abandonment of the post-
Stalin trend of liberalization of the Soviet penal code and de-
nied that crime is on the increase or that the punitive arm of
the state has been strengthened.
Apparently anticipating Western propaganda exploitation
of the law, Moscow twice broadcast the Izvestia article to
Europe on the day it was published.
The Kremlin nevertheless seems bent on enforcing the
law, and the secret police (KGB) have evidently assumed re-
sponsibility for investigating the crimes which it covers. On
18 May, the KGB announced the arrest of a gang of "large-
scale speculators" in currency; declaring that "the hour of
revenge" had come, Izvestia hinted that the ringleader might
be sent to the firing squad in accordance with the law.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Ns,
M. V. Keldysh, New President of Academy of Sciences USSR
Moscow radio announced on 19 May the election of M. V.
Keldysh as president of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. He
was elected by the academy's General Assembly of Academicians
and Corresponding Members. The outgoing president, A. N.
Nesmeyanov, who had served since 1951 and is 62 years old,
was relieved at his own request and received a unanimous ex-
pression of gratitude by the General Assembly for his service.
Keldysh, who is 50 years old, is a leading Soviet scientist
in the field of mechanics and mathematics and has specialized
in aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and the theory of functions of
complex variables. He is believed to have played an important
role in the basic research essential to the development of Soviet
guided missiles. He graduated from Moscow State University
in 1931 and thereafter served in several leading scientific in=
stitutions. He became a corresponding member of the academy
in 1943 and a full member in 1946, at which time he was the
youngest of the new academicians. He became the head of the
academy's department of physical=mathematical sciences in
1953 and last year a vice president of the academy. Although
he has been a member of the Communist party since 1949, he
is said to have limited political interests and to devote all his
efforts to science and technology.
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',4�S
Nkrumah Bids for Influence Over Angolan Nationalist
Organization
(Nkrumah's apparently increasing interest in the Angola
situation and the Angola People's Union (UPA) stems from
his desire to align any future African regime there with his
own program for African unity. This desire has probably
been intensified by the frustration of the similar hopes
he held a year ago with respect to the Lumumba government
in the Congo. That development embittered Nkrumah toward
the West and made him more receptive to close collaboration
with Sino-Soviet bloc countries)
(Roberto's meeting with the Ghanaian President this week
followed an urgent invitation from Nkrumah.
Roberto received the in-
vitation last month while in New fork for the UN General As-
sembly session. Roberto
normally operates out of UPA headquarters in Leopoldville,
but has been a frequent visitor to Accra at least since late
1958, when he represented the Angolan nationalist movement
at the first All-African People's Conference. At that gather-
ing--promoted and dominated by Nkrumah�Roberto, like Lu-
mumba, emerged as a member of the organization's policy-
making steering committee. Nkrumah's regime apparently
began to provide some direct support to the UPA about the
same time. More recently, the UPA appears to have estab-
lished close ties with Tunisia)
(Roberto
indicated that Nkrumah had warned him against
yiel ing to overtures for a united front being made by the
rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
whose leaders have long been subsidized by the bloc. Nkrumah
denounced the MPLA as Communist controlled; Roberto be-
lieves he had tried but failed to lure the organization to Accra
from Conakry. At the same time, however, Nkrumah defended,
as he has in the past, the acceptance of Communist aid by Af-
rican nationalists. He insisted that strong leaders such as)
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(himself would have no difficulty severing ties with the Commu-
nists once their assistance was no longer needed)
(Urging Roberto to have faith in him ("I am leading Africa
down the path to freedom and socialism."), Nkrumah also
warned the Angolan against any contact with "the Americans,"
whom he accused of assassinating Lumumba and of refusing to
"help me in my cause." When Roberto expressed hope of re-
ceiving help from the 20 moderate Monrovia conference states,
Nkrumah condemned the Monrovia conferees as "tools of im=
perialism." Roberto had earlier asked the participants at
Monrovia for material and financial support to supplement and
offset the UPAts present dependence on Ghana.)
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CONFIDENTIAL
Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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