CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049784
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 10, 1961

r Z C %.� C I 3.3(h)(2)
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3.5(c)
10 May 1961
Copy No. C Si
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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10 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (rage t)
2. Iran: New prime minister announces cabinet.
(Page it)
3. Congo: Tshombe to be detained without trial for
Indefinite period. (Page 'tt)
4. Jordan: Baath (socialist) leader initiates planning
for coup against King Husayn, (Page itt)
5. UAR: Previously reported mobilization exercise
to begin today. (Page 'Mt)
Morocco: Labor difficulties at American air bases.
(Page ttt)
7. Brazil: Economic agreement with Rumania marks
beginning of trade expansion with bloc, (Page ft)
8. Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga to resign;
successor reported antagonistic to US Cuban policy.
(Page ft,)
9. USSR-Berlin: Change of Soviet Berlin commandants
suggests effort to play down quadripartite functions
in Berlin. (Page v)
10. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. (page u)
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.-- "'"
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VIENTIANE � Borikhone�
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Vientiane
I ti A
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
--ROAD
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0 ROUTE NUMBER
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STATUTE MILES
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1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Pathet Lao statements continue to stress that the
ICC can fulfill its function only after the three Laotian parties OK
have agreed on all questions concerning a cease-fire. On 9
May, ICC officials accompanying the government delegation to 7?
another unproductive meeting at the Nam Lik site were snubbed
by the enemy delegation, which said it had no instructions to
deal with the ICC. Meanwhile, delegations representing the
Souvanna Phouma "government" and the Pathet Lao arrived inp,,,)
Moscow on 9 May en route to the Geneva Conference in com-
pany with the Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese dele= 3 ',I- 6
gations. The Boun Oum governmpt delegation is expected to
leave Vientiane on 10 or 11 May. Un the military situation,
the pattern of scattered skirmishing continues, and Meo guer-
rilla positions south of the Plaine des Jarres are still under
enemy attackp
Airlift operations were scheduled through 10 May.
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Pointe Brazzavillem
Noiv
Banana
Kitona
616504 2
Matadi
Luanda
LIBERIA
INDIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
� Gemena
Bangassou
Lis
�
Monga
Bondo
Scattered Force Bumba
MOBUTU Basoko
3,400 800 �
= -
MOBUTU
+ Coquilhatville
I
ETHIOPIA
. 200
MOBUTU
7,200
Leopoldv
ysville
Scattered Forces
� Boende GIZENGA
7,000
Francqui
uluabour
Bak anga
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally contro led by:
11 Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Ti Tshombe.
E-1 United Nations Forces (Service Forces
� Selected road not included)
--tro: Selected railroad
Imr Selected airfield
STATUTE MILES
400
Luputa
MALAYA
470
KALONJI
1,500
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
300
INDIA
Bukav
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
NIGERIA
900
�Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
Flisabethville.
� td
V.* 4var
NIGERIA
500
Usumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Iran: S The nine new members of Prime Minister Ali
Amiiirg�cabinet appear generally less experienced and capable
than their immediate predecessors. All have had some gov-
ernment experience, mostly at a rather low level. Two of
them have past histories of as,�_ociation with the Communists,
although not in recent years. ("our ministers were held over
from the previous cabinet, two of them, the ministers of war
and interior, at the insistence of the Shah. Two posts remain
unfilled) The new appointees, however, probably owe their
primary allegiance to the prime minister rather than to the
Shah.
*On 9 May the Shah dissolved both houses of parliament
and Palled fnr nPw elections under revised electoral laws.
(Backup, Page 3)
*Congo: The 9 May announcement by the Leopoldville
government that Tshombe will be detained without trial for
an indefinite period probably stemmed from misgivings re-
garding anticipated international reactions to any trial of the
Katanga leader. The Leopoldville government may also have
feared that appeals on Tshombets behalf by the former French
Congo and others might force UN intervention to protect
Tshombe.
At the NATO ministerial: meeting in Oslo, Belgian For-
eign Minister Spook indicated concern over the possibility of
action by the UN and Kasavubuts forces against Katanga and
the chaos which might result. Spook said these questions
should be discussed in NATO, and that such consultation
should not be confined to fact-finding. Spaak warned that Bel-
gium, which could not solve these problems alone, would other-
wise have to seek a firmer basis of consultation in some other
international organization, presumably a reference to the pos-
sibility of political consultation on this issue among the six
Common Market-countries',-
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Sort:Ian: A leader of the Baath (socialist) party of Jordan
has said he p ans to begin at once to organize a coup d'etat in
Jordan, which might involve the assassination of King Husayn.
Dr. Munif Razzaz, be-
lieves that the virtually unanimous disapproval in Jordan of
Husayn's engagement to an English girl has made this a pro-
pitious time for the Baath, in cooperation with certain other
proscribed political parties, to attempt some action. While
Razzaz' thoughts are still preliminary, his ultimate objective
is to integrate Jordan with the UAR, whose support he intends
to seek. Razzaz professes to be unconcerned about the pos-
sibility that Israel might move into Palestinian West Jordan
in reaction to a pro-UAR coup, because he feels that if the
West would not deter the Israelis, the USSR would.)
(Backup, Page 5)
(.0
UAR: The UAR's previously reported mobilization ex-
ercise involving both the Syrian and Egyptian armies is sched-
uled to begin today,
Orders from Cairo to various military units�in-
cluding supply and transportation groups--on 6 May suggest
some troop movements will occur. If large-scale troop
movements take place, Israel may take similar measures,
which would increase tension.
No
Morocco: Moroccan workers at the American air bases,
who have struck three times within a month for higher wages
and other benefits, are reported to be considering new pres-
sures to gain their objectives. The base union, which is
subordinate to the leftist Moroccan Labor Union, is consider- 0,L
ing "embargoing"--through strikes of transportation workers
--the passage of US military materiel through Casablanca
port and harassing US military personnel and dependents. 4-etc/LA...to
Such action on the part of the workers would provide the press
and all Moroccan political parties with new opportunities to
10 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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reiterate their demands for an accelerated withdrawal of
American forces in Morocco. now scheduled for completion
by the end of 1963. (Backup, Page 7)
Soviet Bloc - Brazil: The Rumanian-Brazilian economic
agreement signed in Bucharest on 5 May marks the beginning
of a significant expansion in bloc economic relations with
Brazil. The five-year trade pact calls for total trade of at least
$64,000,000 annually�an amount exceeding Brazil's current
trade with any bloc country. In addition, under the agreement
Rumanian trade agencies may grant credits up to a total of
$50,000,000 to finance deliveries of oil and chemical industry
equipment. The Brazilian mission which negotiated this agree-
ment has also concluded trade pacts with Albania and Bulgaria
and is scheduled to conduct economic talks with the rest of the
East European satellites. Separate Soviet-Brazilian trade
talks are under way in Moscow, and the Chinese Communist
trade delegation has arrived in Brazil.
(Backup, Page 8)
Ecuador: aoreign Minister Chiriboga advised the US am-
bassador on 6 May that he plans to resign--probably on 10
May--in consequence of his failure to convince President A; 0
Velasco to alter his pro-Cuban policy. Chiriboga stated that
his replacement would be Ecuadorean Ambassador to Chile
Wilson Vela, whom he described as antagonistic toward the
US and US policy on Cuba. Velasco, who has long harbored
resentment toward the US and is a close friend of Ecuador's
principal pro-Castro leader, made a number of pro-Castro
statements both before and after the 17-19 April insurgent
landings in Cuba. Cuba, which has been the only Latin Amer-
ican country to support Ecuador publicly in its boundary dis-
pute with Peru, has recognized the value of Velasco's posi-
tion by frequently publicizing his statements on the Castro re-
gime and lauding his policies-.D
"Ecuador will never lend itselt
to punitive action" in the event the OAS Council or the American'
10 May 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Goreign ministers convene to consider the Cuban issue.
USSR -Berlin: Major General Zakharov's replacement by
Colonel Solovyev as the USSR's Berlin commandant will--un-
less Solovyev is promoted--reduce the Berlin command to the
level of other Soviet city garrisons in East Germany, which
are customarily headed by colonels. Solovyev's rank and the
circumstances surrounding this shift suggest the USSR is con-
tinuing to dissociate itself from the four-power control mech-
anism in Berlin and may have decided to strip its Berlin
Kommanclatura of its special quadripartite functions and re-
soonsibilities deriving from the occupation status of the city.
(Backup, Page 10)
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USLB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 11 April 1961 through 8 May 1961:
1. There are suggestions in Soviet and bloc official
statements that the USSR is preparing the ground for a for-
mal diplomatic initiative on the Berlin problem and that the
Berlin situation will become increasingly spotlighted in the
coming months. The Soviet call for a resumption of negotia-
tions could come at any time. Khrushchev himself, however,
used a 24 April conversation with West German Ambassador
Kroll to offset any impression that he felt committed to a
showdown on Berlin before the Soviet party congress in Octo-
ber, thereby extending his previously vague but implicit
"deadline" of not waiting for the West German elections in
September.
2. There have been no significant developments adversely
affecting access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period
covered by this report.
10 May 61
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Situation in Laos
CGovernment reports indicate continuing maneuvering by
enemy elements on the immediate northern and eastern ap-
proaches to Luang Prabang. The situation is obscure, and
the anxiety of the Laotian Army commanders in the area is
compounded by the poor quality of the city's defending forces,
which comprise mostly volunteer-type troops and new re-
cruits. Meanwhile, Muong Houn, about 50 miles west of
Luang Prabang, has fallen into enemy hands as a result of
abandonment of the position by the government garrisoni)
The Souvanna delegation going to Geneva is headed by
Quinim Pholsena, information minister and acting finance,
defense, and foreign affairs minister in the "Royal Laotian
Government"; the Pathet Lao group is led by Phoumi Yong-
vichit, secretary general of the central committee the Neo
Lao Hak Sat�the political arm of the Pathet Lao. The pro-
posed Boun Own government delegation consists ofTPhoumi
and fellow cabinet members, Nhouy Abhay, Ngon Sananikone,
and Sopsaisana, plus several adviserS
jn Saigon, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vu Van
Mau has told Ambassador Nolting that the Diem government
considers it vital that the Boun Oum government delegation
be seated as the official Laotian representation at Geneva.
Mau said that any compromise which would not permit the
government delegation to be seated would be degrading, but
he indicated that an observer role for the Pathet Lao would
be acceptable. He said that he would prefer to see Laos not
represented at all rather than by observers from the opposing
factions, as this would equate the government and the rebels.
Mau indicated that the Diem government had not yet decided
on its own participation, but Ambassador Nolting expects
South Vietnam to atten
Chou En-lai has written Prince Sihanouk urging him to
join in the Geneva Conference on Laos. There has been some
indication that Sihanouk would like some face-saving pleas
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from other participants that would permit him to join the con-
ference gracefully. Chou's appeal to Sihanouk that the confer-
ence "cannot be held without participation of your royal high-
ness," was coupled with an attack on the US-."continually try-
ing to sabotage convening of such a conference."
The day Chou's letter to Sihanouk was published in Phnom
Penh, 8 May, the Chinese Communist premier also implied
concern lest Peiping be denied its first major diplomatic con-
frontation with the US since 1954. Speaking at a Peiping ban-
quet for the Geneva delegations of North Vietnam, the Pathet
Lao, and Souvanna Phouma's "lawful government," Chou em-
phasized Peiping's support for the conference and complained,
"but no one really knows whether the US will in fact partici-
pate."
6-...)n 7 May airlift operations consisted of a total of six
sorties, one of which involved a Soviet LI-2 in a round-trip
flight from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. On 8 May, airlift oper-
ations involved a total of 20 sorties, five of which involved
Soviet IL-14s in round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng
Khouang. An additional five sorties by Soviet transports may
have been flown into Laos on 8 May via Dien Bien Phu. On 9
May, five Soviet IL-14s and one North Vietnamese LI-2 made
flights to Xieng Khouang. Nine Soviet IL-14s and two Soviet
LI-2s were scheduled for flights into Laos from Hanoi on 10
May-;)
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New Iranian Cabinet
rime Minister Amini gave in to the Shah's insistence
tha eneral Naqdi be retained as minister of war and General
Amir-Azizi as minister of the interior. Both Naqdi and Amir-
Azizi are capable officers with whom Amini feels he can work.
Amini had, however, earlier demanded that he be free to choose
his cabinet without interference; his apparent willingness to
compromise on this point may indicate the extent to which he
is willing to go to remain prime minister, as well as a reali-
zation that the Shah is not likely to tolerate any interference
with the army. In 1953, the attempt by Mossadeq, then prime
minister, to take over control of the army was a turning point
In his relations with the Shah and one of the major factors
which led to his downfalf3
[The new minister of justice, Nur ed-Din Alamuti, was
once a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist
Tudeh party, but he claims he broke with that party in 1946.
Minister of Industry Gholam Ali Farivar, although apparently
not a Tudeh member, has supported and been supported by the
Tudeh in the past. Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsenjani
has been described by various sources as a leftist, but there
is no evidence that he was ever a Tudeh member, and he has
in the past publicly opposed the Tudeh. Arsenjani has, how-
ever, frequently been associated with groups opposed to the
monarchyJ The over=all composition of the cabinet suggests
an attempt by Amini to establish a balance between right and
left and thus prevent the pressure on him from either side
from becoming too strong.
The Iranian constitution requires that elections for a new
parliament must begin within a month after dissolution of the
previous parliament. New elections would give Amini an op-
portunity to establish a parliamentary, base of power. He had
earlier been reported reluctant, however, to hold new elections
until he had an opportunity to make some progress in other
areas. The Shah, in his decree, said that a new electoral law
must be drafted before new elections are held, and it is probable
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that the one-month time limit for starting new elections may
be ignored. It is also not clear whether parliament was dis-
solved on the initiative of the Shah or the prime minister. If
the move was made without Aminits consent--which seems
unlikely--a strong reaction from Amini, possibly even his
resignation, can be expected.
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Ba\efiist Leader Plans Coup in Jordan
CThe coup plans of Dr. Munif Razzaz are in effect an up-
dating of longer range plans that Baath party leaders have
discussed with other dissident parties for eventually over-
throwing King Husayn's regime. Razzaz reportedly feels
that the major problem will be to overcome deep-seated fear
and general inertia among Jordanian subversives caused by
the failure of various previous coup attempts. He believes
the government is capable of forcibly suppressing anti-regime
demonstrations and therefore does not favor them. He con-
siders that some dramatic action--such as an "accident" for
the King--is "the most effective way to set things in motion,"
after which it will be "easy" to mobilize nationalist and popu-
lar support for necessary further action against pro-regime
elements
011ie National Socialist and the Qawmiyin al-Arab (Arab
Nationalist) parties are the other groups with which Razzaz
expects to cooperate. The National Socialists include sev-
eral prominent former Jordanian leaders�e. g., former
Prime Minister Fawzi Mulqi�and they probably have the
greatest potential popular base of support. The Baathists,
on the other hand, have developed an apparently effective
� clandestine apparatus which receives arms infiltrated from
the UAR and the pan-Arab Baathist leadership-T.3
Ciordanian Baathist activities have been hampered by in-
ternal factionalism during, at least the past year and a half.
These differences resulted in 1959 in the expulsion of party
leader Abdullah Rimawi, a former Jordanian cabinet minis-
ter. The UAR's Nash', who has suppressed Baathist activi-
ties in Syria, subsequently backed Rimawi as leader of a
splinter Baathist group in an apparent attempt to usurp con-
trol of the party and its assets and activities throughout the
Arab world.
C_Nasir's plan does not appear to have been very success-
ful. Dr. Razzaz, in discussing Baathist factionalism, now
claims that Rimawi is "finished" and that the rival factions
in Jordan have drawn closer together again. He expects th
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--SEekEIL�
(forthcoming effort to unseat Husayn's regime will sublimate
if not eradicate any remaining differences')
(The success of Razzaz' plans also depends on the achieve-
ment of some accord between the UAR and the pan-Arab Baath-
ist leadership. He said he realizes the UAR will drive a hard
bargain with the Baath, but expressed willingness to subordi-
nate party doctrines, for the time being, in the interest of uni-
fied action. It is not presently known whether Razzaz has dis-
cussed his plans with the leaders of the pan-Arab Baath party
in Beirut-)
[Razzaz--to whom all the problems involved in such a coup
seem surmountable�believes the United States probably would
continue to provide economic assistance through the UAR to the
new regime he envisages for Jordan. If not, he assumes the
Soviet bloc would provide such assistance
(organized political parties were banned in Jordan in 1957
� after a free election almost resulted in a pro-UAR coup. The
party organizations have persisted despite arrests and other
harassment, and Husayn has even approached them about in-
stalling certain of their members in the government as a means
of increasing support for his regime. Razzaz was among those
approached, and last December he reportedly requested the
Baath party's pan-Arab leadership to approve the participation
of Jordanian Baathists in the government under certain con-
ditions. The central headquarters is said to have rejected the
request, directing the party in Jordan to join instead with
other Jordanian nationalists in forming a "national front" in
opposition to Husayn
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Moroccan Workers at American Bases Consider New
Pressure Tactics
Leaders of the United States Baseworkers' Association,
established in 1956 and affiliated with the left-wing Moroccan
Labor Union (UMT), have been agitating for several months
for wage increases and other benefits. Their control over
Moroccan workers at the bases has been demonstrated in a
series of increasingly effective strikes within the past month.
A one-hour sit-down strike was held on 7 April when strike
leaders also threatened a demonstration in front of the US
Embassy. Subsequently, on 17 April and 3 and 4 May, 24-
hour and 48-hour strikes were called, absenteeism being
nearly 100 percent on 3 and 4 May.
The US Embassy anticipated in late April that the left-
wing National Union of Popular Forces and the UMT, which
have been seeking ways to attack the Moroccan Government,
might use the presence of the American bases and alleged
disregard of workers' rights for a convenient and popular
pretext for a "protest and display of muscle." Full UMT
support of the base workers could lead to placing a cordon
around the bases to interfere with the water supply and oth-
er contractual services, halting the movement of military
material, or refusing to handle US military shipments
through the port of Casablanca.
The Istiqlal party press, particularly since the announce-
ment early in March that France had speeded up the sched-
ule for evacuation of its troops, has been pressing the gov-
ernment to obtain an accelerated schedule for American
withdrawal. Conversely, however, representatives of the
Istiqlal-dominated union on 24 April maintained that wages
and labor relations on the bases were satisfactory and that
baseworkers' demands were only a "reflection of irrespon-
sible leadership!'
though Moroccan officials suggested a year ago that
the schedule for American evacuation might be stepped up;)
King Hassan II implied to an American correspondent in�
mid-March that the 1959 agreement would stand.
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Bloc Economic Overtures to Brazil
As in all bloc aid programs, details of the Rumanian
credit must be worked out later. The agreement, however,
is the largest credit arrangement ever offered by Bucharest
and is the first in which Brazil has accepted substantial eco-
nomic aid from the bloc. The only previous bloc aid to
Brazil has been in the form of medium-term commercial
credits, amounting to less than $4,000,000 to finance Czech
and Polish exports.
Ithrushchey, in a conversation with the head of the
Brazilian trade delegation now in Moscow, stated that the res-
toration of diplomatic relations between the two countries would
provide a "strong stimulus" for a significant expansion of trade.
Since Quadros was inaugurated, Brazil has expanded its diplo-
matic ties with Eastern Europe to include all the satellites ex-
cept East Germany. These countries now are responding fa-
vorably to Brazil's requests for credits, technical assistance,
and expanded trade. The Brazilian mission touring Eastern
Europe is likely to conclude further aid agreements, and Mos-
cow probably will offer a sizable credit to Brazil if arrange-
ments are made for the eventual exchange of diplomatic repre-
sentatives.
The Chinese Communist trade delegation now in Brazil is
assessing the opportunities for Sib-Brazilian trade. Peiping's
contacts with Latin American countries, except Cuba, have
been extremely limited. Leftist Brazilian Vice President
Goulart reportedly has said he will visit China in June to "for-
malize" the trade contacts being made now. The Chinese prob-
ably envisage the conclusion of a trade agreement as a prelude
to political recognition.
The initiation of a Soviet bloc aid program in Brazil will
serve to promote bloc interests far better than normal trade
contacts, which in Brazil have not proved particularly success-
ful. Bloc-Brazilian trade rose moderately last year to nearly
$150,000,000--some 6 percent of Brazil's foreign trade. Poland
and Czechoslovakia accounted for more than half this amount,
while the USSR's share increased to nearly 20 percent. Despite
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the increase, however, the goals of the major trade agree-
ments with the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were not
met. Any significant expansion of trade depends on the bloc's
willingness to accept greater amounts of coffee, cacao, iron
ore, and other raw materials from Brazil. Bloc credits will
facilitate long-term trade while adjustments are made to ac-
commodate greater bloc purchases of these products.
Brazil's poor prospects for increasing its exports sub-
stantially�accentuated by the world's surplus of coffee--are
prompting the country to explore bloc relations in the hope
of stimulating new markets. Brazil is expected to produce
40,000,000 bags of coffee in the 1961-62 crop year, while
recent exports and internal consumption have come to only
25,000,000 annually.
The Quadros administration is also negotiating for for-
eign aid from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and
the International Monetary Fund on a far more extensive scale
than from the bloc. The Brazilian mission which is touring
Eastern Europe has also concluded a trade and aid agreement
with Yugoslavia.
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Noe Nitre
Soviet Commandant in Berlin Transferred
Maj. Gen. N. F. Zakharov, former Soviet commandant
in Berlin, left the city on 30 April for transfer to an undis-
closed post. He departed without making the usual formal
calls on his opposite numbers. US Commandant Osborne
first learned of Zakharov's departure on 1 May when an
officer at the Soviet Kommandatura in ICarlshorst called to
say that Zakharov would not be able to receive Osborne the
following day. Osborne had wanted to take formal leave prior
to his own departure for another assignment.
Zakharov, who took over the Berlin post in February
1958, had been absent in recent weeks on sick leave. His
political adviser, Lt. Col. Odintsov, also slipped out of
town, apparently in late March, without taking formal
leave of his Western opposite numbers.
Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin in East Berlin presum-
ably would take over certain functions now exercised by
the Soviet commandant--notably contacts with Western
occupation authorities--while other functions would be
transferred de facto to East German authorities in East
Berlin. Such a move was foreshadowed last December
when Pervukhin told US Ambassador Dowling that he,
Pervukhin, was solely competent in matters of Soviet-
American interest in Berlin. He further declared that
the Soviet commandant was in no sense a sector command-
er, on par with the US commandant, but was merely
head of the Soviet garrison in East Berlin.
From the USSR's viewpoint, downgrading the com-
mandant's post would tend to underline East Germany's
"sovereignty" over the Soviet sector andrwouldOefyetan-
other step toward the formal incorporation of East Ber-
lin in East Germany.
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14,...WITA"IllEJ1111111-1.14
NW/
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
- CONFIDENTIAL
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