CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049782
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 8, 1961

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uijt juu 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
8 May 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
IN'TELLIOENCE
BULLETIN
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8 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page i)
2. Congo: Leopoldville government's plan to try Tshombe
for treason will heighten tension in Katanga. (Page 1t)
3. USSR: Khrushchev discusses international situation.
(Page 'It)
4. USSR: Absence of Kozlov from recent public functions
noted. (Page tit)
5. Japan seeks tripartite council to deal with Ryukyuan
questions. (Page tit)
6. South Africa: Strikes and demonstrations expected
during May. (Page 111)
7. Iran. Oktge
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8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: 'A 150-man South Vietnamese special forces group,
which e r y moved into Laos disguised in civilian clothes,
reportedly moved up to Tchepone and on 5 May assisted the A
Laotian army commander and 300 men to exfiltrate east along .43,t_zi
Route 9 to the border. A South Vietnamese infantry regiment has moved up to the Laotian border to the point where Route 9J*, 4
crosses into South Vietnarq
itease-fire negotiators reportedly held another inconclu-,1
sive session on 7 May at a point just north of the Nam Lik
Rivek7
'ENo major fighting has taken place since the cease-fire
negotiations began, although press reports from Vientiane /Rs 4, ird
�
claim that the enemy has occupied a village 14 miles north of
Luang Prabang. Laotian army forces during the past several
days, have reported an enemy buildup in the area ranging in size
from two companies to two battalions. Elsewhere, enemy
guerrilla action and small unit probes continue. A Meo strong-
hold in Xieng Khouang Province was under heavy molar fire
on 6 May2
oviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through
7 Mayaj (Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko's statement on 7 May
that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshomb6 for
treason will heighten tension among his followers in Katanga,
who are already concerned regarding possible UN moves to
disarm Tshombes armed forces. An official of the Katanga
government has alleged to the American consul that the UN
is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that
the Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining in-
stallations rather than permit them to be turned over to the
central government.
according to reports from New Delhi, Prime Minister
Nehru may now consider Dayal to have been a failure as UN
representative in the Congo, and may be resigned to his re-
moval. Hammarskjold has previously indicated that he hoped
to appoint a committee to assume DayaPs functions, possibly
after his return to Leopoldville for a token period-)
USSR: Khrushchey's remarks on the international situa-
tion during a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently in-
tended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba
have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement
of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson,
the Soviet premier laid strong emphasis on the need for dis-
cussion of substantive matters in bilateral disarmament ne-
gotiations with the US. Khrushchev referred to talks which
were to take place "soon" on the disarmament question and
asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with
"complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba,
Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good
neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situa-
tion commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistical-
ly" on the future course of Cuban-American relations. Khru-
shchev reiterated that Moscow desires a genuinely independ-
ent and neutral Laos. He made clear his view that an improve-
ment in relations with the US depended not only on the outcome
of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Ber-
lin and German problems as well. He repeated standard de-
mands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called
8 May 61
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for nations to settle outstanding differencps both bilaterally
and through the UN.
USSR: Party Secretary Frol Kozlov, by many indications
the second-ranking man in the Soviet leadership, has been out
of public view since mid-April. There has been no official
explanation for his absence. The most important event he
missed was the May Day celebration, which traditionally brings
the top leaders out in full force. Mikhail Suslov, the other
leading party secretary under Khrushchev, was the ranking
party official at several Moscow functions during the latter part
of Khrushchev's April vacation.
Japan: [Foreign Minister Kvosaka has renewed Tokyo's re
quest that a tripartite council be established to handle matter
concerning Japan, the United States, and the Ryukyu Islands.
Kosaka claims that such a council would undercut leftist agita
tion in Okinawa and forestall attempts by the political opposi-
tion in Japan to make the Okinawan issue a public controversy
prior to Prime Minister. Ikeda's visit to Washington in June.
The US high commissioner for the Ryukyus comments, how-
ever, that establishing the council is likely to stimulate agita-
tion for further concessions to reversionist forces in Okinawa
and Japan. It seems likely that Japan's role in Ryukyuan af-
s discussions during his visit herf)
(Backup, Page 4)
tc
South Africa: LQnrest is likely to increase in South Africa k
in the next few weeks. Non-white organizations, aided by Com-
munists, are planning a series of strikes and demonstrations
late in the month to protest the proclamation of a South African
republic on 31 May. In an effort to head off the demonstrations, AI
the police are carrying out a series of raids and have arrested
or rest ' he antigovernment cam-
pai n.
"serious
disturbances in the public order" during May.
"the armed forces have been alerted and, if necessary, wi
take harsh action. The white civilians are also preparing them-
selves, and there has been a race to the city's gunsmiths."
Backup, Page 6)
8 May 61
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*Iran: Ali Amini, appointed Prime Minister of Iran on
6 May, has asked the Iranian public for time and an end to
demonstrations to permit him to put his plans for social and
economic reforms into effect, but he made no specific promises
in his first public statement. The American Embassy in
Tehran reports that Amini demanded from the Shah the right
to name nearly all cabinet ministers and insisted on the for-
mation of a special court to try cases of corruption. Amini
announced that the Majlis would not be dissolved, although
this was reported also to have been a condition for his ac-
ceptance of the prime ministership.
Amini may have a period of calm to try his programs,
but the success of public protests in toppling the last two
prime ministers makes it likely that he will face the same
challenge unless he can move rapidly enoughto satisfy at
nimum of popular expectations.
Backup Page 8)
8 May 61
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Situation in Laos
following the Pathet Lao
occupation of Tchepone, he had no choice but to establish con-
trol over a perimeter six miles inside Laos along Route 9.
I any Vietnamese Communist column attacking east
from this point would neutralize Vietnamese Army defenses
along the 17th parallel. Vietnamese special forces operating
in Civilian clothes within the perimeter will control and defend
the 'area and give early warning of a large-scale Vietnamese
Communist attack. As of 7 May the situation was quie_g
rBoun Qum declared, at a press conference on 7 May, his
readiness to meet today with Souphannouvong and Souvanna
to "find a path of reconciliation and to decide on a delegation"
to represent Laos at Geneva. He insisted, however, that the
meeting would have to take place on neutral ground, not at
Ban Namone. He added that the delegation should represent
all factions and should be confirmed by the National Assembly?
Ethe cease-fire talks on 6 May bogged down in the dis-
pute over a site for formal negotiations, but the enemy was
represented for the first time by qualified officers. Liaison
tents have been set up at Ban Hin Heup, and since there ap-
pears to be no immediate disposition to break off contacts,
both sides may be awaiting the arrival of the International
Control Commission to art a, an intermediarB
Pathet Lao - Kong Le stalling
may stem in part from confusion.
: the negotiators are in place
and requests that the commanding general return immediately
"as he is the only person to make any decision on the problem. "
gouvanna Phouma.
, expounded on the desirability of
forming a government of national union before the Geneva
Conference and reiterated his position that any government
he might head would have to include Pathet Lao representa-
tion. Souvanna would keep fig
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a)efense and Interior portfolios out of "leftist" hands. Sou-
vanna was definite that General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum
would be excluded from a possible Souvanna government, but
he adopted an equivocal position when asked if Phoumi could
be given responsibility for military affairs at a sub-cabinet
lev2.1j
be Laotian Government considers that the primary ob-
jective of the conference is to work out an internationally
guaranteed neutrality status for Laos, but it considers the
formation of a government of national union an internal af-
fair. Ina 6 May press conference in Phnom Penh, Souvanna
Phouma adopted the same position, saying it would be incor-
rect for the conference to deal with internal Laotian affairs.
Souvanna, proposed that the conference study the creation of
a neutral zone which would include both Laos and Cambodi2)
The Hanoi Foreign Ministry has charged that on 6 May
US aircraft violated North Vietnamese air space four times.
The alleged overflights are reported to have occurred in the
southernmost provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Hanoi
warned that the US must "bear full responsibility for the con-
sequences of its actions."
Communist propaganda continues to place the blame on
the US for the failure thus far to achieve productive cease-
fire negotiations. A People's Daily commentary on 7 May
terms Vientiane's refusal to meet at Ban Namone a "move
to create new obstacles" to forming a coalition government
and sending a Laotian delegation to Geneva. People's Daily
also charges that the US desires only a "breathing spell"
and that the "emphasis of US policy is still on intervention."
goviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through
7 May. On 5 May a total of 21 Soviet and North Vietnamese
transports were involved in airlift operations; of this number,
five Soviet LI-2s were noted in round-trip flights from Hanoi
to Xieng Khouang. On 6 May 20 Soviet and North Vietnamese
transports were involved in airlift operations; of these, eigh9
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1 .oviet IL 14s and one Soviet LI-2 are believed to have made
round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouaug
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Japan Seeks Broader Role in Ryukyuan Affairs
ale US-Japanese peace treaty acknowledges Japan's re-
sidual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands but authorizes the
United States to exercise exclusive authority there for an in-
definite period. Since 1952, Tokyo has maintained a small,
quasi-consular agency in Naha, Okinawa's capital cit_571
anscontent among the Okinawans was first manifest in
1956 when a Communist was elected mayor of Naha during a
period when there was considerable resentment against US
procedures in acquiring land for military purposes. Although
land acquisition is not now a problem, it awakened reversion-
ist sentiment in both Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Japanese
have not diverted their attention from the Ryukyuan questio19
dhe Kishi government initiated moves for a greater Jap-
anese role in Ryukyuan affairs in 1958. Tokyo has been per-
mitted to provide technical and economic assistance on a
project-by-project basis and to engage in teacher-training
programs. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands, an indig-
enous structure operating with limited powers granted by the
US high commissioner, has been promoting Tokyo's causfy
fihe high commissioner indicates that Okinawan support
for reversionist activities has been somewhat greater recent-
ly, possibly due to Ryukyuan hopes in connection with Ikeda's
visit to Washington. He believes it desirable to expand con-
sultation with the Japanese on purely technical matters but
doubts that this would satisfy reversionist elemenlq
&Japan, the moderate Democratic Socialist party (DSP)
is introducing a bill in the Diet which would authorize seats
for nonvoting representatives from the Hyukyus. The DSP,
which heretofore has taken an equivocal position on the Oki-
nawan question, is supporting Ryukyuan demands for increased
autonomy for popular election of the Ryukyuan chief executive
--he is at present appointed by the high commissioner--and
for transfer of administrative jurisdiction from the Department
of Defense to the Department of State. Symptomatic of
CONFIDENTIAL
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gpparently closer liaison between Japanese and Ryukyuan po-
litical elements is an exchange of parliamentary delegations
which is being undertaken3
ffhe Ikeda government prefers, for domestic political
reasons, not to adopt a firm stand against reversionist agi-
tation and may consider that an easier solution, consistent
with the ultimate Japanese objective of regaining administra-
tive control over the Ryukyus, is to seek concessions from
US authorities-3
CONFIDENTIAL
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Nissi CONFIDENTIAL
Tension Rising in South Africa
[Planning for the demonstrations against the proclamation
of the South African Republic on 31 May got under way late in
March, following an antigovernment conference sponsored by
leaders of the banned African National Congress (ANC) and
dominated by the Communists. The conference called for dem-
onstrations throughout May, to culminate in a general strike
of all non-white communities on 29 and 30 May. The anti-Com-
munist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the white Liberal
party dissociated themselves from the proceedings, thus giving
the initiative to the Communist-influenced element. A Liberal
official stated recently that his party and the PAC plan to "play
the month of May by ear." They will find it difficult, however,
to keep aloof from the protest movement should it gain mo-
mentus9
The usually apathetic colored (mixed-blood) community,
an important economic force in the Cape Town area, has
shown considerable sympathy for the strike call. While the
coloreds did not participate in the disturbances of March and
April 1960, they now reportedly hope to impress the ruling
Nationalist party with their strength and solidarity, in an ef-
fort to deepen the split within the party over concessions to
the coloreds)
hough there is considerable sympathy for the demon-
strations, police operations have further reduced the already
tenuous organizational capabilities of the opposition groups.
A few African Communists apparently still remain at large
and are spending considerable sums to encourage support for
the strike; otherwise, most of the potential leaders are either
In jail or have had government orders served on them forbid-
ding their participation in any meetings. The chief of the spe-
cial branch of the South African police said in early May that
there were no signs of rising tension in the native population.
Nevertheless, the Union's Defense Ministry is increasing its
CONFIDENTIAL
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gyms purchases, and private white citizens reportedly are
buying firearms at a record rate]
ffimidation by both the police and African nationalists
probably will be widespread as the strike date approaches.
Moreover, white civilians, who fear and distrust African
mobs, are likely to become increasingly nervous. Outbreaks
of violence may occur]
ONFIDENTIAL
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Amini Appointed Prime Minister of Iran
All Amini was recalled from his post as Ambassador to
the United States in 1958 under suspicion of complicity in a
plot against the Shah. Since that time he has come to be
identified as an opponent of the Shah's regime, and the de-
cision to appoint him as prime minister is a measure of the
effect that the three days of rioting had on the Shah. Amini
has had wide experience since he entered government service
in 1932, particularly in economic and financial affairs. He
is certainly more able than either of his two immediate pre-
decessors, Eqbal and Sharif-Emami. He has made no secret
in the last two years of his ambition to be prime minister and
to give that office genuine authority independent of the Shah.
Amini has stated, however, that there is no alternative to the
Institution of the monarchy. He believes that the Shah could be
a strong force in any responsible government, but that in order
to preserve his position, the Shah must work in the background.
FA-mini will probably have considerable support, at least
initially. The anti-Shah National Front reportedly will give
Amini a chance to prove himself, but it believes he will not
succeed because he will not be able to resist the Shah and will
not have military support. Amini reportedly will appoint Gen-
eral Timur Bakhtiar to a high post in the army, however, and
he has implied that Bakhtiar will run the army for him:g
In his first statement on foreign affairs, Amini said that
he proposes to improve relations "especially with neighboring
countries," and intends to respect the provisions of CENTO.
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kJ, V A' .L.1-0.1-41 V AL-11..La
Nose
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTLILL
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