CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049778
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 3, 1961

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3 May 1961
Copy No. C
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1.
Laos. (Page i)
CONTENTS
2. Congo: Katangan regime, minus Tshombe, in-
dicates greater willingness to cooperate with UN.
(Page it)
3. Germany: Lifting of tolls on barge traffic to Berlin
fulfills East German promise of last December. to
Bonn. (Page ii)
4. Iran: Former intelligence and security chief still
has plans to oust Shah. (Page tt)
5. Morocco: Cabinet changes expected on 7 May; con-
servative Istiqlal party strengthened. (page tit)
6. Dominican Republic: Group of army officers and
civilians determined to overthrow Trujillo. (page tit)
\I
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1
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N AM iTH A �
' duong Sai
.!. Nam Bars
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...- i SarinNeual
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LUANGI PRA ANG
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� Luang Prabang ....,,' (
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KHAMM UANE-,,,
Nhomma1 t ' I
T44
NORTHERN LAOS
lir GOVERNMENT
Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
- � -TRAIL P
0 ROUTE NUMBER
6105
510
STATUTE MILES
73�.72FE ILtZ.E0a,.
100
-
Vi entiorse
Thakhek Ma axay
9
� Stvannokher
SAVANNAKHET
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I.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos: Ile Pathet Lao high command broadcast an
�
order on 3 ay calling on all its combat units to cease all 0 g
military activities as of 0800 local time (2100 EDT 2 May). fou,tcf-u
According to the order, the cease-fire was to take effect
in spite of the postponement of negotiations among the
parties concerned. The Pathet Lao had previously insisted 7
\
that agreement on the conditions for a cease-fire be reached \
before a truce could be brought abouD
arhile a localized truce had been in effect in the Nam 7
N
Lik River area, the Kong Le and Pathet Lao forces had
continued moves to acquire more territory elsewhere. N
Tchepone, near the Vietnam border east of Savannakhet,
was reported to have been captured on the evening of 1 May.
.C\
Fifty miles west-northwest of Luang Prabang, the govern- P .
ment garrison at Muong Houn was reported encircled by
s\
Pathet Lao forces, while to the north, enemy elements .
continued to advance on Nam Th_a, s.-
liaotian officials deny that lang Savang has changed his
attitude on the need for an international conference on Laos, �.
and it now appears that Sihanouk's remarks to this effect
may have resulted from a misunderstandin0
LBloc airlift operations continue at a relatively low level.
There was only one flight into Laos on 1 Mal9
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Pointe
Brazzaville
No
Bananag
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
610503
Luanda
LIBERIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
MOBUTU
7,200
Bangassou
ttionga
.ta. Bondo
1/4
� Gemena C.
Butar�
e Aketi ,_ OR
�
, \
Scattered Forcer - , Bumba'
MOBUTU
3 ,400
EQUATEUR
�Coquilhatville
1
ETHIOPIA
200
1
Scattered Forces
EOPOLDVILLEIspo
Leopoldv j
ysville
MOBUTU
800
�Boende
Ikela
� �
�Basoko
GIZENGA
7,000
Francqui
4uabourg
Bak
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
(2:3 Kalonji
� Tshombe
Faro United Nations Forces
� Selected road
Selected railroad
=Selected airfield
STATUTE MILES
(Service Forces
not included)
4040
MALAYA
470
KALONJI
Luputa
Kamin
ETHIOPIA
_
Stanleyville
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
300
INDIA
3200
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
1 NIGERIA I
_ .900.
�Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
Flisabethville.
NIGERIA
500
Usurnbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Congo: The 2 May announcement by the Katanga govern-
ment that it is willing to discuss with the UN a disarming of
the Katanga army and the withdrawal of its foreign advisers
reflects the anti-Belgian disposition of certain of Tshombe's
lieutenants. The withdrawal of foreign advisers would move
Katanga closer to both the UN and the Leopoldville govern-
ment, and improve prospects for Congo unity. It is not clear
whether Tshombe''s release is a precondition for such discus=
sions.
, An American embassy officer who has returned from
Stanleyville has characterized the Gizenga regime as more
stable than in the past. He added, however, that the economy
continues to decline despite increased trade through Uganda.
(Backup, Page 3) (Map)
East - West Germany: With the lifting on 1 May, after
strong West German prodding, of certain tolls on barge traffic
to Berlin, East Germany now has fulfilled most of the commit-
ments on access to Berlin which it made last December in re-
turn for the West German agreement to reactivate the 1961 o
interzonal trade pact. East Germany has not, however, re-
scinded its claim to the right of control over West German .c."--261-1-
traffic to Berlin and continues to enforce, albeit laxly, the re-R3
quirement that West Germans secure passes to visit East Ber-
lin. Although traffic between Berlin and West Germany now is
moving with a minimum of interference, the regime could renew
its harassing tactics on signal from Moscow. Backup,
Page 4)
Iran: Xt. General Timur Bakhtiar, recently removed as
chief of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organiza- LI'Vo-
t ion (SAVAK), is continuing his "contingency" planning for2.7
3 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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move to oust the Shah. He is vacillating on the timing but
has implied that an opportunity will arise when the Shah goes
to Europe in mid-May. Bakhtiar professes to believe it is
hopeless to expect the Shah to adopt and implement a more
progressive program; he claims the Shah has no genuine
feeling of responsibility toward the country. Bakhtiar feels
that recent changes in military officials have improved his
position and his capability for planning. The main sources of
his support, however, are not clear. Last week the Shah re-
quested Bakhtiar to resign from the army. This suggests the
Shah may be aware of Balchtiar's plans. As of 2 May, how-
ever, Bakhtiar had not resigne.e (Back-
up, Page 6)
Morocco: King Hassan II is expected to announce on 7 May
a reorganization of the Moroccan cabinet which will substan-
tially strengthen the position of the conservative Istiqlal party.
Istiqlal came out firmly in support of the monarchy on the death
of Mohamed V on 26 February, but recently has agitated for a
transitional government with clearly defined powers to serve
until a constitution can be promulgated. Istiqlal has been at
odds with the other royal political bulwark, the Popular Move-
ment, which has used public office primarily to strengthen its
party organization and apparently will lose substantially in the
reshuffle. The opposition left-wing National Union of Popular
Forces will remain without representation, and, encouraged by
its successful demonstration on May Day, will probably continue
to demand a radical reform of Moroccan institutions and the
election of a constituent assembly. (Backup, Page 7)
Dominican Republic:(group of high-ranking Dominican
I army officers and civilians planning to depose Generalissimo an
Rafael Trujillo within the next several days is showing un-
precedented degree of determination. US Consul General Dear-
born reported on 1 May that pro-US dissidents are selectiLig)
3 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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a, provisional government to be led by a seven-man civil-
military junta, five of whom are to be civilians. If it gains
control, the junta is expected to ask for cooperation from
the OAS and the US. Cooperation is particularly desired in
preventing the return of undesirable exiles, m
are proCastro and Communist sympathizers.
(Backup, age 8)
3 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Situation in Laos
Nehru told the press on 2 May that he expected a cease-
fire within a few days and suggested that it might help if the
ICC went to Laos. The commission is awaiting instructions in
Delhi from the UK and the USSR, as Geneva Conference co-
chairmen, after filing its initial report on 1 May.
New� Delhi's policy at the forthcoming Geneva Conference
would be aimed chiefly at keeping Laos unified and non-Commu-
nist, objectives which he noted were shared by India and the
Western powers. Sen conceded, however, that a major differ-
ence lay in the interpretation of "Communist" as applied to the
Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces. Indian officials are concerned
that a cease-fire line will be used as a basis for determining
the relative strengths of the two sides in a provisional govern-
ment, thus giving the "northern side"--controlling two thirds
of the country--disproportionate weight in domestic politics
during the extended period of propaganda debate at Genev2.j
While the Polish member of the ICC has been agreeable
in preliminary discussions, according to the Indian chairman,
he has made it clear in statements to the press that the ICC
should not go to Laos to arrange and bring about a cease-fire.
The ICC report of 28 April to the Geneva co-chairmen stipu-
lated that the ICC should await the proclamation of an agreed
date for announcing the cease-fire in Laos before proceeding
to the country. The ICC also stated in its report that it would
establish cooperative relations with any such "joint committees
as may be set up for effective implementation of the cease-fire."
ale fall of Tchepone would be regarded as a particularly
serious development by South Vietnamese leaders who have
watched the southward advance of Communist forces in Laos
with anxiety. President Diem has long been concerned over
the Communist guerrillas in southern Laos, but he has not
' felt South Vietnam's security directly threatened as long as
these elements remained dispersed and poorly armed. Ac-
cording to an unconfirmed report, however, Diem was plannilg
-S-EGR-EX
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to call a special cabinet meeting on 2 May to ask for emergency
powers and to decide on the degree of military assistance to
southern Laoq
.4eneral Phoumi continues to make contingency plans for
the evacuation of Vientiane. He has notified Thai officials
that it may become necessary to move the government and
some of the civilian population across the Mekong to Thailand.
Phoumi would prefer to relocate in Savannakhet, but he is not
certain of being able to hold that tows
a his present mood, Phoumi may call for SEATO inter-
vention at any time, possibly without prior consultation with
the US. He has made a unilateral appeal to Thailand to fur-
nish a regimental combat team for the defense of Vientiane,
and he may also be considering asking South Vietnam to help
ripfpnri thP southern Drovinces-7
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vier,
The Situation in the Congo
Gizenga's reference to his "collaboration" with General
Lundula suggests that he has reached some form of accommo-
dation with his army chief. Lundula has been associated with
a conciliatory outlook toward the Leopoldville government and
with willingness to make compromises in the interest of Congo
unity. Some of his subordinates are believed to have acknowl-
edged Mobutu as head of the entire Congo Army, while urging
that certain of Gizenga's demands--such as a recall of parlia-
ment--be met by Kasavubu.
Lundula told a visiting officer of the American Embassy
in Leopoldville that any true rapprochement between Stanley-
vale and Leopoldville depends on the achieving of Congo unity
through a reconvening of parliament. Lundula's remarks, to-
gether with the Congo Army's detention of Tshombe at Coquil-
hatville, suggest that opposition to a loose Congo confederation
is a unitvina factor between the two main army factions.
ville government continues concerne regar
from the north.i
the Stanley-
ssible attack
Reports that UN representative Dayal may not return to
the Congo may stem from vigorous protests registered
bu concernin his anticipated return.
no agree-
ment between the Le� ille governmen an e --includ-
ing that regarding Matadi--would be honored if Dayal returned.
Kasavubu in late April reportedly planned to decline A 11 respon-
sibility for the "consequences" of Dayal's return]
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NW'
East Germany Completes Most of Steps to Facilitate
Interzonal Trade
On 24 April 1958 the East Germans imposed an additional
tax of about 70 cents a ton, based on carrying capacity, on West
German and West Berlin barges using East German waterways.
They explained that West Germany's construction of a dam on
the Elbe River near Hamburg would necessitate extensive work
on adjacent East German waterways to regulate the water level.
The East German decision to abolish these additional tolls on
1 May was announced on 20 April, thus, in effect, meeting a
West German deadline; Bonn had threatened to take retaliatory
measures unless East Germany moved to reduce the tolls by
21 April. The smaller original tax for barges using East Ger-
man rivers and canals and locks on these waterways will be
continued.
In announcing the abolition of this tax, Neues Deutschland
alleged on 21 April that the West German Government had
pledged that further work on the Elbe River dam would not re-
sult in changes in East German waterways. The West Berlin
press notes, however, that revenue from the increased barge
tolls has amounted to approximately $17,500,000--considerably
in excess of the $12,500,000 originally asked by the East Germans
in 1958 as damages and costs to offset the rise in the Elbe water
level after construction of the dam.
One other technical concession remains to be negotiated:
that is to determine how much Bonn must pay for badly needed
repair work on a bridge on the southern Autobahn near Hof. So
far, East Germany's compliance with the terms of its December
commitments has been secured only by Bonn's delay in deliver-
ing certain products badly needed by the East Germans.
Meanwhile, Neues Deutschland on 24 April attacked West
Germany for interfering with interzonal trade, notably because
it has issued revocable licenses for certain products exchanged
under the trade pact. Such licenses, it alleged, cause "unbear-
able insecurity" in the execution of East German commercial
contracts with West German firms. The editorial also declared
-SECRET--
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that West Germany was delaying the implementation of import
agreements made when the pact was renewed.
The Neues Deutschland editorial may be an attempt to
camouflage East Germany's current difficulties in securing
West German goods without paying hard currency. Kurt Leo-
pold, the West German interzonal trade negotiator, noted
that East Germany could not export enough products to pay
for West German goods purchased under the trade pact, had
practically exhausted available "swing" credits, had canceled
some contracts, and was importing only priority goods from
West Germany.
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General Bakhtiar Continuts Planning tor possitme uoup in Iran
In the past two years, General Bakhtiar appears to have
moved from a theoretical consideration of the measures he
would have to take if the Shah were overthrown to an active
belief that the Shah must be removed or reduced to a figure-
hea_01
&akhtiar played an influential role in returning the Shah
to power in 1953. As military governor of Tehran and later
as chief of the National Intelligence and Security Organization
(SAVAK), he was a supporter of the Shah. Now, however, he
professes to believe that the Shah is prepared to abandon the
country whenever serious difficulties arise7
ELn any move against the Shah, military support would
be essential. Bakhtiar feels certain that he can rely on some
commanders in the Tehran area and in the provinces, regard-
less of his own military status. The appointment of weaker
personalities to replace some of the high-ranking officers
recently removed has, in t3 akhtiar's opinion, improved his
chances for success. He apparently also can count on
support of some nationalist elements as well as influential
bazaar merchants
ff_3_akhtiar's reluctance to move probably arises from sev-
eral factors, including a residual loyalty to the monarchy,
if not to the Shah personally, and a fear of risking a career and
a fortune built up to a great extent by support of the Shah.
However, some of those who are presently backing Bakhtiar
could try to force him to take action--perhaps while the Shah
is in Europe in the latter part of May--by fomenting anti-
government street demonstrations which would require
strong action to controil
-SECRET--
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Moroccan Government About to Be Reorganized
The long-awaited reshuffle of the King's cabinet,
apparently
would introduce no new personalities to the Moroccan scene,
but would continue Hassan's technique of relying heavily on
the prestige of his father. Istiqlal would gain primarily by
the promotion to deputy premier of Minister of Justice
Abdelkhalek Torres, a particularly able member of its ex=
ecutive committee and former ambassador to Cairo. More-
over, the projected nomination of Mohamed Boucetta, also a
member of Istiqlars executive committee, as minister of for-
eign affairs should consolidate the party's hold over that min-
istry. Boucetta has been Morocco's senior representative in
the Congo and has been influential in developing Morocco's
policy supporting the Stanleyville regime. He is reported to
have become the most anti-American member of the Moroccan
Government, Both Torres and Boucetta were close to Mohamed V.
The proposed cabinet reorganization might alleviate the
present stalemate in government operations caused in part by
a concentration of such diverse functions as agriculture and in-
terior under the prime ministry. It would not, however, ap-
pease widespread discontent caused by the lack of dynamism
which has characterized Moroccan governmental operations
since independence. Unless the King delegates responsibility,
this reorganization would not long satisfy the Istiqlal party,
whose national council on 23 April demanded both the forma-
tion of a modern responsible government with well-defined
powers and the drawing up of a constitution.
--sratty--
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Dominican Dissidents Plot to OverArow Trujilld Regime
ighe dissidents, should they succeed in overthrowing
Trujillo, plan to approach President Joaquin Balaguer and
demand that he sign a proclamation turning the government
over to the junta. If Bala er refuses, they intend to depose
him and to install the junta
[one dissident army general believes he has the loyalty of
35 percent of the armed forces, while two other generals ex-
pect to sway more than half of the army in the important north-
central part of the country. The revolutionaries also hope for
support in the same region from peasants who recently have
been demonstrating their loyalty to the local bishop in the face
of great intimidation by the secret police. The dissidents, how-
ever, are not known to have any collaborators in the air force,
but they believe at least half of the 80 pilots are anti-Trujillo.
The loyalty of the air force's mobile ground division--a force
roughly comparable in size and firepower to a US World War
II regimental combat team--is unknown. This force and two
army brigades commanded by members of Trujillo's family
are stationed at Ciudad Truji1193
fihould the initial attempt to seize or kill Trujillo fail,
these units probably would remain loyal to him, while officers
deeply implicated in the plot and who are in control of units
in outlying towns might decide to risk civil war rather than to
face prospects of torture and execution following their arrest.
If the dissidents are able to neutralize Trujillo, almost all
Dominicans, except for those military men and members of the
secret police prob-
ably would offer no significant resistance to the revolutionaries.
The dictator's sons and several other close relatives are re-
ported abroad or planning to leave the country so0n9
Le group which is to capture or kill Trujillo may not
have enough arms to ensure success. It believes quick action
is necessary before Trujillo learns of their plot--if in fact he
has not already done so5)
Ileanwhile, Trujillo is reported to believe that exiles in
Venezuela are about to invade the Dominican Republic. On 27-)
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[April he reportedly ordered four of his generals to tighten
security and assigned Felix Bernardino, head of a paramili-
tary peasant force in the eastern part of the country, to be
vigilant along the coasts. Artillery and tanks are said to
have been sent to strategic places and aircraft to have been
dispersed. A member of the opposition told the US Consulate
at Ciudad Trujillo that he had heard the invasion is being
postponed until Trujillo relaxes these security measures.
However, there is no information tending to confirm that an
exile force of any size is preparing to invade the Dominican
Republi
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EAL V 11 I.L1.1141N .1.ei..1-1
.rry
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department bf the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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