CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/03/21
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02046565
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
May 24, 2019
Document Release Date:
May 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 21, 1952
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15638463].pdf | 174.29 KB |
Body:
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'*al TOP
S ITY INFORMATION
21 March 1952
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Copy No. 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGSD TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE�
AUTE-Eig0
DAT
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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TpP, -IS EC a T
S CURITY INFORMATION
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1.
SUMMARY
USSR
FAR EAST
2. Japan - Nationalist China treaty considered not applicable to
mainland (page 3).
3. Swiss hesitate to protect French interests in Shanghai (page 4).
4, American Minister analyzes rumors of French negotiations with
Viet Minh (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iranian Army concerned over possibility of British subversive
activities (page 5).
6,, American Ambassador pessimistic about British-proposed joint
statement on Egypt (page 5).
2
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T&P
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USSR
1.
FAR EAST
2. Japan - Nationalist China treaty considered not applicable to mainland:
Acting Japanese Foreign
Minister Okazaki stated that the proposed
Japan-China peace treaty would not apply to
the Chinese mainland. In Okazaki's opinion,
the phrase in Yoshida's 24 December letter to Ambassador Dulles
regarding territories which might pass ultimately to Nationalist control
referred only to the islands still being contested by the Nationalists
and Communists.
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h)(2)
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Comment: Yoshida's letter stated that the
treaty shall "be applicable to all territories which are now, or which
may hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the
Republic of China."
Okazaki's remarks are consistent with Japan's
attempt, during the current negotiations, to avoid any phraseology or
commitment which would imply current or future Nationalist sovereignty
over the mainland.
3. Swiss hesitate to protect French interests in Shanghai:
The Swiss Minister to China is reluctant to
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grant France's request that his Consul General
in Shanghai protect French interests there,
The Swiss Minister indicated that any action
on behalf of French interests by Swiss representatives in Shanghai might
arouse the animosity of the local Chinese authorities toward French
nationals, but agreed to instruct the Consul General to use his good
offices "personally and discreetly" to assist French interests.
Comment: France does not recognize the
Peiping regime and is withdrawing its consular officials froth Shanghai.
The Swiss, in keeping with their traditions of diplomacy, may agree to
look after French interests in China, provided the French request covers
all of China and not just Shanghai.
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4. American Minister analyzes rumors of French negotiations with Viet Minh:�
Minister Heath in Saigon credits assurances 3.3(h)(2)
given last month by Minister for Associated
States Letourneau, and more recently by other
high officials, that the French Government is
not now engaged in, or considering the opening of,negotiations with the
Viet Minh. Heath expresses the view, however, that some statements
of French leaders on this subject are equivocal and do not preclude
consideration of an offer for negotiations by the Viet Minh or a neutral
like India.
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Minister Heath is convinced that the French
would not initiate negotiations "at this precise time," and believes that
the Viet Minh would refuse to deal with the French.
Comment: For some time rumors have
persisted in Saigon and Hanoi that French officials have been, or have
been on the point of, negotiating, or planning truce negotiations, with
the Viet Minh. There is no evidence to substantiate these rumors.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5, Iranian Army concerned over possibility of British subversive activities:
The Iranian General Staff in Tehran on 29 Febru-
ary warned subordinate units along the Iraqi
border to be on guard against Iraqis, posing as
religious leaders, whom the British are sending
o s tr up iscontent among the Iranian people with subversive
propaganda."
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Comment: Since the beginning of the oil dispute,
Iranian military traffic has frequently mentioned suspicions of British
subversive activity. no evidence that the British are trying
to arouse discontent, do indicate that Iran is worried over
the possibility of Bri WictT�iEiiimed at overthrowing the government
in order to obtain a favorable settlement of the oil dispute.
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. American Ambassador pessimistic about British-proposed joint statement
on Egypt:
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The American Ambassador in Cairo believes
that the statement the British Cabinet proposed
as a joint Anglo-Egyptian communique for the
treaty negotiations represents a "degree of
progress, but is "not nearly enough" to arouse Egyptian action. He is
particularly disturbed by the British assumption that Egypt would accept
a verdict on the Sudan from a Sudanese cabinet and parliament selected
entirely by the British.
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TO ET
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TtarECRET
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According to the Ambassador, his British
colleague has discussed the proposed communique with Prime Minister
Hilali and with an adviser of the King only in general terms,because he
feels that the proposed statement concedes so little that it might disrupt
the negotiations.
Comment: A Foreign Office official in London,
while admitting that the British statement offers little on the Sudan
question, has explained that the draft nevertheless represents the
maximum concessions which the British Cabinet can make at this time.
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