CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/02/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02046543
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 10, 1952

Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Top NET
SECUR INFORMATION
10 February 1952
Copy No. 49
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
OCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
D
I I DECLASSIFIED
Wedi
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTHimFtRa
DATE.Kpli REVIEWER: .
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
RET
SECU INFORMATION
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Approved for Release: 2019765/08 CO2046543
ET
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Chinese postpone Sino-Soviet Friendship Week indefinitely (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
2. Soviet Government demands recall of Pakistani Embassy official
in Moscow (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Turkish company interested in buying Iranian oil (page 4).
4. Syria's difficulties blamed on French influence (page 4).
5. Syrian Government may fall by end of March (page 5).
6, Britain takes initiative to open negotiations with Egypt (page 6).
7. Wafd accused of supporting recent riots in Egypt (page 6),
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Comment on reaction to Austrian Foreign Minister's speech
(page 7).
* * * *
2
TOP RET
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
FAR EAST
1. Chinese postpone Sino-Soviet Friendship Week indefinitely:
The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association's
headquarters in Peiping announced on 7 Febru-
ary that "Sino-Soviet Friendship Week" had
been postponed until further notice. The post-
ponement was attributed to the demands of the
present nation-wide campaign against corruption, waste, andbureaucracy.
The announcement stated that "appropriate celebrations" should be held
on 14 February, the anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty
of 1950; and that propaganda designed to promote Understanding of the
treaty should be carried out.
Comment: The motive for this postponement
is obscure, but this action alone is not sufficient evidence of a cooling of
Sino-Soviet relations. Peiping may be telling the truth in stating that
it is too occupied with its current anti-corruption campaign to do justice
at this time to a special drive for Sino-Soviet friendship.
SOUTH ASIA
2. Soviet Government demands recall of Pakistani Embassy official in Moscow:
3.3(h)(2)
The Soviet Government has demanded the recall 3.3(h)(2)
of a Third Secretary from the Pakistani Embassy
in Moscow. According to the Pakistani Foreign
Office, the demand was made on trumped up
charges, and the Karachi government is consider-
ing retaliatory expulsion of a member of the Soviet Embassy. Soviet
police reportedly held the Pakistani official for questioning and tried to
extract confidential information from him in return for his release.
�
Comment: This is the first known instance of
serious diplomatic friction between the USSR and Pakistan although Soviet
propaganda has occasionally been unfriendly.
The reason for the Soviet action is unclear. The
USSR is presumably aware of the fact that this incident will increase the
suspicion already felt by Pakistani government leaders.
- 3 -
TOP ET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
'r� SECRET
3.5(c)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Turkish company interested in buying Iranian oil:
A Turkish company wants to buy 25,000 tons
of Iranian gasoline to be paid for in Turkish
pounds. The Iranian Ambassador in Ankara
who forwarded the inquiry to the Iranian
National Oil Company asked that he be sent
further information such as the octane rating of the gasoline available
� and the price f. o. b. Turkey. The Ambassador also requested that the
offer be kept confidential.
Comment: Turkey's oil needs are currently
supplied by western oil companies, and Turkey is aware that any purchase
of Iranian oil would bring restrictive action by the West. Consequently,
the government, which controls the distribution of oil products within
the country, would be unlikely to purchase oil from Iran. It is possible
that the present bid represents a Turkish maneuver to secure more oil
from Western sources.
The Turks, although sympathetic toward
Iranian nationalist aspirations, have supported the Western view in
the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and have not responded favorably to
previous Iranian efforts to interest them in buying oil. Iran currently
does not have the facilities to deliver any quantity of oil to Turkey.
4. Syria's difficulties blamed on French influence:
3.3(h)(2)
Former Syrian Foreign Minister Arslan, 3.3(h)(2)
recently Minister to Ankara, attributed Syria's
current difficulties to France's policy of seeking
to exploit the country. He charged that this
had been made possible by American and British acknowledgement that
Syria and Lebanon belonged to the French sphere of influence.
-4
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
The Minister stated that France maintains
its control over Syria primarily through the "Banque de Syrie et Liban"
and through influence over the Syrian army. He further charged that
the French had deliberately killed the potentially important Syrian-
Iraqi trade agreement and had also opposed Syrian acceptance of US
economic assistance.
According to the Minister, Army Chief of
Staff Shishakli is becoming increasingly unpopular, can get no responsi-
ble people to join his government, and keeps control only by force.
Comment:
France considers its position in Lebanon and Syria
as privileged and wishes to strengthen it even at the expense of the
US and Great Britain. French support of Shishakli has been generally
assumed. At present rumors in the Near East suggest, however, that
Shishaklivs "puppet" Chief of State, Fawzi Selo, might receive French
assistance in attempting to end Shishakli' s power.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
5. Syrian Government may fall by end of March:
The present Syrian Government which is under 3.3(h)(2)
the control of Chief of Staff Shishakli cannot
last beyond March. 3.3(h)(2)
Ithe breach
between army leaders and politicians is widening and there are signs
of dissension between Shishakli and Colonel Fawzi Selo the Chief of
State whom he recently installed.
Comment: Shishakli has been in virtual
control for over two year despith several efforts to remove him.
Recent reports indicate increased dissatisfaction and new plots to
�
dispose of Shishakli. There is no indication, however, that his re-
moval by force would necessarily resrlt in anything but the establish-
ment of a new military dictator.
-5
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543�
Dol" ET
3.5(c)
6. Britain takes initiative to open negotiations with Egypt
Foreign Secretary Eden instructed the British 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador in Cairo on 8 February to take the
initiative in opening negotiations with Egyptian
Prime Minister Ali Maher. Ambassador Gifford
reports that "Eden seemed more willing to try to work something out on
the Sudan than at any previous time I have talked with him."
Comment: Previously Britain, though it
wanted talks with the new Egyptian Government to begin quickly, had
been awaiting word from Prime Minister Maher.
On the Sudan question, London has so far not
substantially altered its position that real concessions to the Egyptian
demands are impossible because of their probable effects on the Sudanese.
7. Wafd accused of supporting recent riots in Egypt:
The 26 January riots in Cairo were financed
to the extent of 1,0,000 Egyptian pounds,or
$29,000, by secret funds taken from the Ministry
of Interior by the Wafd Secretary General
Serageddin, who was at that time Secretary of the Interior.
these funds were given to Socia is leader
Ahrnad Husayn, currently under arrest for his part in the riots. It is
also reported that auxiliary and regular police helped incite students
to anti-British action on the day of the riots.
Comment: While the Wafd, according to the
American Ambassador in Cairo,is now spreading the story that palace
intrigue and British bribery of police caused the riots, the Wafd is at
� least guilty of indirect involvement. It deliberately fomented anti-British
sentiment during past months and openly permitted the extremists to
organize into freedom battalions, the
police, who are directly responsible to the government, did not oppose
the mobs on 26 January and at times joined with them.
- 6 -
C,,,,SECAET
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
Tt)P
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543
ET
3.5(c)
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Comment on reaction to Austrian Foreign Minister's speech:
The Austrian Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor
are annoyed over Foreign Minister Gruber's recent policy address,
which has been under violent Communist attack for some days.
Fearing a strong Soviet protest to the Allied
Council, the government has officially denied the implications drawn
from Gruber's speech. These were that Austria (a) has made proposals
to the West to meet any Russian move to partition the country, (b) has
decided to refer the Austrian question to the UN, (c) expects to place at
the disposal of the Americans a number of Austrian divisions, and
(d) intends to interfere with supplies for Soviet enterprises.
The Foreign Minister's speech has revitalized
Communist allegations that Austria is being remilitarized and has
probably worsened the unfavorable atmosphere for the introduction of
new proposals by the West for an Austrian settlement. While the govern-
ment may be reluctant to drop Gruber while he is under fire, his none-too-
strong, position in the cabinet appears to have been further jeopardized.
The Western High Commissioners in Vienna
have cautioned the Foreign Minister that it is inadvisable to refer to
possible utilization of Austrians in Western defense plans.
7
TOP ET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2046543