CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02046534
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: January 27, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
27 January 1952
Copy No.
40
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
! DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: Tsli",
NEXT REVIEW DATE'
AUTH: TO-
DATE.
Office of Current Intelligence
REVIEWER;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SEC NFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Comment on Soviet boycott of Austrian treaty talks (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Karen-Communist accord reported Imminent (page 3).
3. Tanker shipments to Communist China at new high (page 4).
4. Comment on Chinese Communist efforts to procure rubber from
Ceylon (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. France prescribes conditions for resumption of talks with Tunis
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Hungarian Government assails US note (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on record Italian defense budget (page 6).
8. Chancellor Adenauer rejects contractual security controls (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet boycott of Austrian treaty talks:
The refusal of the Soviet representative to
attend the 259th meeting of the Austrian deputies in London has probably
terminated the first phase of renewed Western efforts to secure an
Austrian settlement. By making further treaty talks contingent upon
the discussion of Austrian demilitarization and denazification and the
Trieste issue, the USSR has made apparent its unwillingness to give
up its position in Austria on any terms the West is willing to offer.
Since the possibility of achieving an agreement
through further Western concessions appears for the time being to have
been eliminated, future negotiations with the British and French for the
introduction of an abbreviated treaty draft are likely now to be less
difficult. The Austrian Government and the general public are deeply
pessimistic over current developments, and Austrian officials have
already intimated their desire that their country's case be submitted
to the United Nations,
FAR EAST
2. Karen-Communist accord reported imminent:
Karen
leaders will sign an accord early in February
with the Burmese Communists at Mawchi, a
town in eastern Burma near the Thai border.
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Comment: Full-scale Karen-Communist
cooperation would present a grave threat to the Burmese Government.
There have been some signs that sweeping Communist promises have
become increasingly attractive to the hard-pressed Karens, but the latest
report from Burma indicated that the Karens preferred to withdraw some
of their most important demands upon the Government rather than enter
an alliance with the Communists. Mawchi and the surrounding area have
been controlled by the insurgent Karens for nearly three years but have
been relatively free of Communist activity.
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3. Tanker shipments to Communist China at new high:
Four of the estimated thirteen tankers in
the Soviet Far East Tanker fleet were en
route from the Vladivostok area to Chinese
ports in early January. The combined
carrying capacity of these tankers is over 40, 000 tons.
Comment: Only -one tanker carrying pe-
troleum unloaded in a Chinese port in January 1951; for the entire
year the total of tanker arrivals was ten � all from the Soviet Far
East or the Black Sea. The apparent step-up in these sea-borne
shipments follows a sizable increase in the second half of 1951 in
Soviet deliveries to China.
Comment on Chinese Communist efforts to procure rubber from Ceylon:
The arrival of one Polish and one Russian
ship at Colombo during the past week makes possible the resumption
of shipments of rubber to China. With the ban on exports of rubber
to China from Malaya and other producing areas, the Chinese Commu-
nists have been looking to Ceylon as their only source for legitimate
shipments. Ceylon, not a member of the UN and not subject to the UN
embargo resolution, permits exports of rubber to China.
Lack of shipping space has thus far prevented
the Chinese Communists from getting more than one shipment from
Ceylon � a 5, 500 ton cargo transported by a Polish vessel last October.
3.3(h)(2)
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/several thousand tons of Ceylon rubber are now earmarked for
China � more than the two vessels which arrived in the past week are
expected to carry.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. France prescribes conditions for resumption of talks with Tunis:
The French Cabinet has authorized the
resumption of talks with the Tunisians,
but not until the Bey recalls his two minis-
ters who are now in Paris attempting to
obtain UN support for Tunisian autonomy.
France no longer insists upon dismissal of
the Bey's Cabinet. Negotiations would be
held in Tunis, the French delegation to be
eneral, and the Tunisian by Prime Minister
Chenik.
The Bey, however, has so far refused to
recall the Ministers from Paris or to make a public appeal for the
restoration of order. He insists that the nationalist leader, Habib
Bourghiba, must be released as the prerequisite for these concessions.
The Resident General, however, is convinced that because of firm
French efforts to restore order and the failure of the Tunisians to
obtain UN action, the Bey and his Cabinet will capitulate to French
demands.
Comment: Disorders, which began 16
January, have ceased in most parts of the country, but the lessening
of political tension depends upon a more conciliatory French policy
toward Tunisian desires for self-determination.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Hungarian Government assails US note:
The Hungarian Government in a note of 25 3.3(h)(2)
January stated that the tenor of the American
note of 29 December 1951 "is not susceptible
for the maintenance of normal relations between
sovereign states."
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When the American Minister refused to
accept the note because of its offensive
language, an official of the Hungarian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed him
that the language accurately represented the views of his Government
and could not be changed.
In commenting upon the return of the
Hungarian note, the US Minister states that his action may result
in his being declared persona non grata.
Comment: The American note of 29 December
1951 had replied to Hungarian charges against the Mutual Security Act.
The stress in the current Hungarian note is upon the unsatisfactory
terms of the American reply. This is in contrast to a similar Soviet
note of 9 January 1952 which emphasized the hostile nature of the
Mutual Security Act,
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
7. Comment on record Italian defense budget:
The Italian Government has approved a
record defense budget for 1953 of 980 million dollars, a 200 million
dollar increase over the previous year's expenditures. This budget,
however, does not meet fully the recommendations made by the Temporary
Council Committee of NATO for the 1953 Italian defense effort. Further-
more, Italy is making the implementation of its defense effort for 1953
conditional on further US aid. Full compliance with the recommendations
has been prevented by the unexpected expenditures due to the recent
floods, the government's awareness of its deteriorating political position,
and pressure from the democratic Socialists and left-wing Christian
Democrats, as well as Communists, for greater social expenditures.
The Italians now say that implementation of the
1953 defense budget depends upon a level of economic aid adequate to meet
the balance of payments deficit, an increased flow of items for military
end use, assurances of the supply of necessary raw materials, and assis-
tance in the solution of manpower problems through emigration.
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8. Chancellor Adenauer rejects contractual security controls:
Chancellor Adenauer told the Allied High 3.3(h)(2)
Commissioners on 22 January that Germany
is willing to accept security controls in the
form of restrictions on arms production, but
did not want this written into an annexed convention to the General
Agreement.- Adenauer stated this in response to the French High
Commission's query as to when the Federal' Republic would submit its
promised proposal on security controls. In reply, the French High
Commissioner accused Adenauer of trying to renounce the proposed
convention on security controls and of thus endangering the whole system
of contractual arrangements.
Comment: During the past few weeks the
French and West German representatives had been conducting bilateral
negotiations without success in an attempt to resolve the question of
security controls. Allied diplomats in general regard the current
German stalling as an effort to secure further concessions.
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