CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/23
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02046530
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
May 24, 2019
Document Release Date:
May 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 23, 1952
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15638359].pdf | 243.1 KB |
Body:
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INFORMATION
2.3 January 1952
Copy No.
49
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPS
SEC NFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Italy maneuvers for admission to United Nations (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Reports of political unrest in Thailand continue (page 3).
3. Malayan Police rivalries hamper security operation (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
. Chinese Communists advocating "liberation" of Kashmir provinces
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Czechs ready to buy oil from Iran (page 5).
6. Iranians push for conclusion of Polish trade agreement (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Belgium's intransigence on the European Defense
Community (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
8. Attempt against Guatemalan Government possible (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Italy maneuvers for admission to United Nations:
Italy says it has lined up seven Security
Council votes, including France's, for the
Soviet omnibus resolution on UN member-
ship. In addition, it will try to persuade
Britain to support the resolution, or at least to abstain from voting. It
hopes that the United States will, abstain.
The American Embassy in Rome expresses
the hope that the United States will be able to abstain, and thus avoid
being placed in the position of having blocked Italy's membership in the
United Nations Organization.
Comment: Either a US abstention or a
vote against the resolution would provoke an unfavorable public reaction
in Italy.
FAR EAST
2. Reports of political unrest in Thailand continue:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
A number of independent sources have recent133.3(h)(2)
predicted a new outbreak of violence in Thai-
land in the near future.
such violence might erupt on 25
January, which is Thai Army Day. The primary cause of the tense situ-
ation is the continued friction between the supporters of General Sarit,
the Bangkok garrison commander who has been seeking the support of the
King, and those of Army Commander Phin and Police General Phao.
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3.5(c)
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Comment: Maneuvering for power within
the present ruling military, clique has been continuing without cessation
since the 29 November coup d'etat, and an open clash could occur at any
time. There is, however, no firm evidence that Sarit considers him-
self strong enough to challenge the Phin-Phao faction, or that the latter
group considers itself in such jeopardy as to warrant an attempt to
eliminate Sarit.
3. Malayan Police rivalries hamper security operation:
The abrupt resignation and departure from
Malaya of the Commissioner of Police and
his Director of Intelligence have left the
Malayan Police without effective leadership
at a critical time. The lack of a positive police program, a condition
which will continue until the staff of the newly-appointed High Commission-
er is selected.and organized, increases the opportunity for internal Commu-
nist aggression in Malaya during the next few months.
Comment: Inability of the British author-
ities in Malaya to eliminate top-echelon rivalries within the police
organization and between the police and the army has hampered oper-
ations against the Communist guerrillas.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Chinese Communists advocating "liberation" of Kashmir provinces:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
a propaganda 3.3(h)(2)
campaign is under way in Kashgar and other
cities of Sinkiang advocating the "liberation"
of the two Kashmir border provinces of Ladakh
and Gilgit on the ground that these areas are an "integral part of China."
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
the Pakistani Consulate-General in Kashgar, near the Soviet
and Kashmir borders of Sinkiang, is still open; this report may there-
fore be based upon personal observation by Pakistani officials. Although
no Chinese government is known ever to have claimed authority over, or
to have had direct relations with, any of the provinces of Kashmir, Chinese
Communist patrols have operated well within that state in the past year.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Czechs ready to buy oil from Iran:
3.3(h)(2)
the Czechs are ready to buy up to 500,000
tons of oil. They are now attempting to find
shipping space for it and have asked for Iran-
ian help in this matter. The Czechs wish to
er, in view of foreign exchange difficulties.
Comment: These proposals result from
talks conducted by the Iranian Legation at the behest of its Foreign Office.
Lack of transportation continues to be an obvious major obstacle to the
implementation of any Iranian oil transaction with Orbit countries. More-
over, oil is not an item of high priority on the Czech import list, and
there is no indication that these negotiations will be quickly concluded.
Iran's pressing need at this point is hard currency or sterling.
6. Iranians push for conclusion of Polish trade agreement: 3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
that the Iranians are pressing for speedy con-
clusion of the Iranian-Polish trade negotiations
currently being carried on there. Iran is also
anxious to sell oil to Poland despite the Polish
Minis r s lack of authorization to discuss anything except the trade agreement.
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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Prime Minister Mossadeq is planning to use the opening of trade negoti-
ations with Poland and prospective oil negotiations with Czechoslovakia
"to strengthen the position of the government and to refute the accusation
that the government is following an anti-national and pro-American
policy." "According to our friends, the Polish Minister reported,
"the situation should be exploited and the agreement signed."
Comment: Rumors of Polish negotiations
for Iranian oil have been circulating for several months.
considerable interest and coordination exists within
the Soviet Orbit on the. Iranian situation. There is no indication, how-
ever, that the Soviet bloc actually will purchase Iranian oil or that it in-
tends to help the Mossadeq government to survive. Mossadeq is interested
in securing an economic agreement to bolster his own position and to in-
dicate that his government is following a neutral policy.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Belgium's intransigence on the European Defense Community:
Belgium's participation in the European
Defense Community is still uncertain, and current discussions in Paris
and Brussels will probably be decisive. Foreign Minister van Zeeland
has adopted an extremely cautious attitude and has stated that the Belgian
Parliament is merely lukewarm to the plan. He says that if Belgium had
to "take it or leave it" now, a decision against participation would receive
popular and parliamentary approval.
Aside from constitutional objections, Van
Zeeland is opposed to the top.pheavy political structure borrowed from the
Schuman Plan, The US Ambassador in Brussels believes that he is also
concerned about the attitude of the Belgian King, who would probably ob-
ject strongly to a transfer of authority over the country's armed forces.
Except for the Foreign Minister's half-hearted
approaches to Parliament, there is no indication that the Belgian Govern-
ment has made a definite attempt to induce favorable parliamentary con-
sideration of the Defense Forces plan.
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
LATIN AMERICA
8. Attempt against Guatemalan Government possible:
3.3(h)(2)
the possibility of a 3.3(h)(2)
revolt there during the last week of Sanuary.
It is the general belief in Guatemala that Lieu-
tenant Colonel Castillo Armas is now in Mexico or El Salvador after a trip
to the United States, where he is said to have been successful in obtaining
help for the overthrow of the Arbenz administration.
Castillo Armas is reported to have the support
of one-third of the Guatemalan Army and to be receiving help from within
the country.
Comment: Castillo Armas led the abortive
attempt on the Guatemalan Government in November 1950. He has been
traveling in Central America since his escape from jail in Guatemala last
June.
Last month Castillo Armas was reported to
have spoken optimistically of his plans for overthrowing the Guatemalan
Government and occupying the presidency. He stated that his movement
had more than enough money, that people were organized within Guatemala,
and that the movement lacked only a few more arms and last-minute organ-
ization. Presumably, one of the movement's objectives would be to remove
Communists and Communist-sympathizers from positions of influence in
Guatemala.
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3.5(c)
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