CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/27
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02026930
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 27, 1953
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15677502].pdf | 254.43 KB |
Body:
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SECU INFORMATION
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27 August 1953
Copy No. 07
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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DATE EAN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Soviet press comment may foreshadow new disarmament
proposal in UN (page 3).
2. Soviet Union seen committed to support of East Germany
at cost of unity (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. Continued absence of Zhukov and Vasilevsky from official
Soviet functions noted (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Strategic corner of Tonkin delta heavily infiltrated by Viet
Minh (page 4).
5. Politicians blamed for terminating Philippine military action
against Huks (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
6. Nehru unlikely to withdraw Indian candidacy for political
conference on Korea (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7 Important Iranian tribe neutral toward Prime Minister Zahedi
1(page 6).
\efe Latest Anglo-Egyptian meeting reveals sharp conflict (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
1. Soviet press comment may foreshadow new disarmament proposal
in UN:
Ambassador Bohlen reports that the
Soviet press on 25 August carried a
long article quoting foreign reaction
to the Soviet hydrogen bomb explosion.
Most of the quotations were chosen to show that Soviet possession
of the H-bomb will give "new impetus to the struggle for outlawing
atomic weapons." One mentioned "repeated Soviet demands in the
United Nations for limitation of armaments and outlawing of atomic
weapons."
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The new emphasis given to the
disarmament question in the Soviet press at this time may foreshadow
Increased propaganda emphasis on disarmament as a prelude to the
Introduction of a new Soviet proposal in the forthcoming UN eighth
General Assembly. The proposal would probably be similar to that
of November 1951, following Stalin's October announcement that the
USSR had carried out an atom bomb test. It called for a "world
conference" of all states.
2. Soviet Union seen committed to support of East Germany at cost of
unity:
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the SoviE.3_3(h)(2)
East German talks and Malenkov's speech
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the USSR
has decided to throw its full support ehind
the East German regime for the immediate future, regardless of the
effect on other aspects of its foreign policy. He believes the decision
resulted from the 17 June riots and later unrest, which would have
weakened the Soviet position in serious negotiations on German unity.
Bohlen believes that Malenkov's speech
marks a return to a policy of general threat and intimidation on the
German problem. He notes that it contained no appeal to the West
German Socialists and seemed to anticipate an Adenauer victory,
which could be used as justification for later Soviet actions in East
Germany and Berlin.
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SOVIET UNION
3. Continued absence of Zhukov and Vasilevsky from official Soviet
functions noted:
The American embassy in Moscow comments 3.3(h)(2)
that press reports have failed to mention
either Marshal Zhukov or Vasilevsky in con-
nection with several recent functions attended
by the other members of the Soviet hierarchy. Both apparently were
absent from the Supreme Soviet session, the air show, and recent Mos-
cow receptions in honor of the East German delegation.
Comment: The continued absence of these
two first deputy ministers of defense may possibly reflect further
political maneuvering among the top leadership. While Vasilevsky
was listed above Zhukov in the March announcement of their appoint-
ments, the order was reversed when their names appeared among
the signers of an obituary of a lesser military figure on 22 July.
This was the last date either was publicly mentioned. Vasilevsky
also failed to attend the 16 July meeting of important party members
in the Ministry of Defense which approved Beria's arrest.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Strategic corner of Tonkin delta heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh:
The military and political situation is
"very bad" in the strategic area forming
the western apex of the Tonkin delta,
Viet Minh infiltration is
so heavy that the bulk of this nominally French-controlled area is
In enemy hands.
Most of the population supports the Viet
Minh and little is being done by the French or the Vietnamese govern-
ment to counter Viet Minh propaganda.
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Comment: The Viet Minh's most determined
frontal assault against the Tonkin delta took place at this point in Janu-
ary 1951. Several recent reports state that the enemy will drive for
Hanoi through this region in the fall.
5. Politicians blamed for terminating Philippine military action against
Huks:
The American embassy in Manila reports
that the Philippine army has confirmed the 3.3(h)(2)
termination of anti- Huk operations northwest
of Manila, placing responsibility for their
cessation on the politicians." The army is convinced that Huk leader
Luis Taruc could have been captured had the operations been permitted
to continue.
The American embassy believes that the
deliberate failure to capture Taruc strengthens the probability that
a Liberal Party deal with the Huks is being concluded.
Comment: This development is the strong-
est indication so far received that Liberal Party leaders, in anticipa-
tion of the forthcoming elections, are offering liberalized terms of
surrender to the Huks. It supports the embassy's recent warning that
such terms constitute a serious threat to Philippine security.
SOUTH ASIA
6. Nehru unlikely to withdraw Indian candidacy for political conference
on Korea:
the major par les co
On 25 August Indian prime minister Nehr
delivered a violent diatribe to American u3
delivered
ambassador Allen, stating with extreme
emotion that South Korea was not one of
ned with the political conference on Korea.
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He said that Rhee was a "wicked, corrupt, and unprincipled old man"
who had no right to dictate to the world, that it would be ruinous to
permit him to do so, and that Rhee's setting a 90-day time limit on
the Korean conference was "insupportable arrogance."
Comment: This outburst suggests that
if India is elected to a seat at the political conference, it will not
voluntarily withdraw therefrom. India is likely to regard the judg-
ment of a majority of UN members as outweighing that of South
Korea on the advisability of India's attendance.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Important Iranian tribe neutral toward Prime Minister Zahedi:
The Qashqai are willing to accept Prime
Minister Zahedi's offer of friendship, which was made through the
local provincial governor general. They fear, however, that the
shah may influence the army against them.
Comment: The neutrality of the Qashqai
will simplify Zahedi's task of maintaining public order throughout
Iran and may influence the Bakhtiari tribes to adopt a similar
neutral policy. The Qashqai tribes have traditionally resented
control from Tehran and have always resisted attempts by the
army to interfere with their semiautonomy.
8. Latest Anglo-Egyptian meeting reveals sharp conflict:
A sharp conflict between the British and 3.3(h)(2)
Egyptians over the question of the duration
of any Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the
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3(h)(2)
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Suez base emerged at the informal meeting of representatives of
the two countries on 24 August, according to the American embassy
In Cairo.
The British are proposing a ten-year agree-
ment, with 4,000 technicians remaining at the base for five years and
the number tapering off thereafter. Britain insists that all duration
periods must start after withdrawal of British troops has been com-
pleted. Eighteen months to two years is considered the minimum for
evacuation.
The Egyptian counterproposal was a five-
year agreement, with technicians to remain three years only. The
Egyptian negotiators maintain that the duration period must start
from the date of the signing of the agreement.
Comment: Anglo-Egyptian negotiations
on the Suez base were suspended on 6 May. Informal meetings be-
tween the delegates have been taking place in Cairo since 28 July in
an effort to establish sufficient agreement for the resumption of
formal talks.
WESTERN EUROPE
TOP SECRET
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