CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026928
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 11, 1953

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11 August 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CUIUTY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Comment on Chinese Communist attention to "collective
leadership" (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. That leaders threaten drastic steps if excluded from postarmistice
political conference (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Comment on announcement of opening of Iranian-Soviet negotiations
(page 4).
5. New British proposal on Suez base unacceptable to Egypt (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Czechoslovakia seeks to increase exports to non-Communist world
(page 6).
7. Hungary permits increase in private trade (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1. Comment on Chinese Communist attention to "collective leadership":
A review of Peiping broadcasts since Beria's
downfall in early July reveals a greatly increased Chinese Communist
awareness of the Soviet emphasis on "collective leadership." This has
been reflected in a noticeable decline in Peiping's praise of Mao Tse-
tung's personal leadership.
Following Stalin's death, Soviet propaganda
gradually developed a trend away from "worship of the individual."
Although this line was clear before June, Peiping's eulogies of Mao
reached an all-time high in June and early July. It was publicly
asserted that China was entering a period of glory identified with
Mao's personal rule, the "era of Mao Tse-tung."
As leader of the Chinese Communist Party,
Mao has been unchallenged since at least 1938, and his position is
believed to be secure. There are grounds for questioning the status,
however, of several other members of the party's central committee.
Some of these persons may be publicly purged in the alleged interests
of party "unity."
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Thai leaders threaten drastic steps if excluded from postarmistice
political conference:
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The Thai deputy foreign minister on 8 Augu:3.3(h)(2)
suggested to the American charge in Bangkok
that Thailand could not continue to support the
United Nations effort in Korea unless it par-
e pos rmistice political conference.
Meanwhile, Deputy Defense Minister Sarit,
a powerful member of the ruling military clique, told an embassy
officer that Thailand had earned membership in the conference. He
stated that the Soviet embassy had already approached the government
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regarding the sale of tin to the Communist bloc, and indicated that
Thailand's support of the UN embargo against Communist China might
be withdrawn if its hopes for representation were frustrated.
The embassy comments that while it is un-
likely that the Thai would carry out any of their veiled threats at this
time, the importance they attach to this issue cannot be overestimated.
3.
4. Comment on
SOUTH ASIA
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
announcement of opening of Iranian-Soviet negotiations:
ana Moscow
The 10 August announcement from Tehran
that a Soviet-Iranian commission will try to settle all
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outstanding differences appears to be aimed at extracting the maximum
propaganda benefit from the forthcoming talks. While Soviet approaches
to Iran reportedly have been friendly, there is no indication
that appreciable progress has been made toward settling
major outstanding problems.
the commission 3.3(h)(2)
will concern itself with frontier disputes and the settlement of financial
claims and counterclaims. The border disputes may be settled rela-
tively easily, but the financial claims and counterclaims may bring long
and possibly indecisive wrangling.
as far as is
known, the proposed agenda does not include Iranian oil. There is
likewise no reference to oil in the published data on the economic
pact negotiated between the two countries two months ago.
5. New British proposal on Suez base unacceptable to Eqpt:
Vice Premier Nasr told an American embass.3(h)(2)
official on August that the British formula
on "future availability" of the Suez base is
unacceptable to Egypt.
Nasr described the British proposal, offered
during the 6 August informal discussions, as even less satisfactory
than the formula which the Wald party turned down in 1950. He also
Indicated disagreement on the duration of any arrangement covering
the Suez base.
Comment: An acceptable formula for future
availability of the base has been the chief point of discussion during
the three recent informal Anglo-Egyptian contacts.
There is no indication that Egypt is willing
to alter its present stand on the question of availability of the base,
and the desultory contacts between the two parties during the past
ten days offer little hope for a quick settlement.
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EASTERN EUROPE
6. Czechoslovakia seeks to increase exports to non-Communist world:
Comment: The intensified Czech efforts
to increase exports are in line with the continuing Soviet drive to
gain political as well as economic advantage from a limited expan-
sion of trade with the West.
7. Hungary permits increase in private trade:
In the latest of a series of measures to
give substance to Premier Nagy's promises
of a liberalized domestic policy, the Hun-
garian government on 8 August decreed
approved individuals will be permitted to set up small private
consumer crafts and service businesses. Local authorities will
grant licenses for such concerns in areas where state enterprises
and craftsmen's co-operatives are not able to fulfill consumer de-
mands.
Comment: Hungary has gone farther than
any other Orbit country except East Germany in liberalizing its
internal program. The measures go beyond the current Soviet
liberalization policy and are reminiscent of the USSR's New Eco-
nomic Policy of the 1920's.
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The Hungarian regime has promised to cut
back its industrialization program in favor of increased emphasis on
agriculture and consumer goods, to permit the peasants to leave the
co-operatives and to aid them in re-establishing private farms. It
has also pledged to eliminate forced labor camps.
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