CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/03/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026922
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: March 31, 1953

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- /. Y AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE. 114141, REVIEWER
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
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Ty INFORMATION
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SECkUTY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Chou En-lai's proposal to resume Korean truce talks
V(page 3).
. Polish UN delegate will welcome discussion of Burma's complaint
(page 4).
SOVIET UNION
SOUTHEAST ASIA
iireViet Minh attack on northern Laos expected about 10 April (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Saudi Arabia refuses to arbitrate Buraimi dispute with Britain
(page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
6. Comment on the 29 March "uprising" in Guatemala (page 7).
7, Panamanian President wants to discuss Canal Zone treaty in
Washington (page 8).
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GENERAL
I. Comment on Chou En-lai's proposal to resume Korean truce talks:
Chou En-lai's statement calling for the re-
sumption of the Korean armistice negotiations is not only conciliatory
in tone but departs from the previous Communist demand for total
repatriation. His statement admits for the first time that there are
two categories of POW's -- those who insist on immediate repatriation
and those "remaining prisoners." The latter would be handed over to
a "neutral" state which would ensure "the just solution of their repatri-
ation."
It is not clear from Chou's statement whether
the repatriation agreement is to precede the cease-fire. In this
connection, the UN has held that any repatriation agreement must be
effected before hostilities are ended. It is also not clear how the
screening and classification will take place.
Chou's return from Moscow only five days
ago underlines the probability that the move is closely tied to the
current Soviet "peace offensive." It could also indicate that the
Malenkov regime believes that its Cold War strategy would be better
served by obtaining a post-hostilities political conference on divisive
Far Eastern issues. In any event, the Communists realized that an
apparent concession on "total repatriation" was essential in order to
resume the Panmunjom discussions.
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URITY INFORMATION
2. Polish UN delegate will welcome discussion of Burma's complaint:
3.
The Polish representative at the United
Nations has told a member of the American
delegation that Poland "would have a good
deal to say" when Burma's complaint against
Chinese Nationalist "aggression" is discussed.
He said that "everyone knows that the United States is in a weak
position" because of its support of the Nationalist units in Burma and
claimed to have specific knowledge of the involvement of two American
officers.
The Pole's remarks, together with charges
in lzvestia of American involvement, clearly suggest that the Orbit
will press for full UN discussion.
SOVIET UNION
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4, Viet Minh attack on northern Laos expected about 10 April:
The decisive phase of the coming Viet Minh 3.3(h)(2)
offensive will be a two-division attack about
10 April against Sam Neua in northern Laos,
A
third division will cover this movement. Elements of a fourth division
are moving westward from their positions south of the Tonkin delta
in what may be a pincer movement against northern Laos. (see map, p.6).
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cident with the drive on Sam Neua, a fifth Viet Minh division will
engage in diversionary action against the southern part of the Tonkin
delta, although this is not expected to be serious.
Comment: The imminence of a Viet Minh
offensive against northern Laos has been indicated by numerous
reports over the past two weeks, although no firm date has been
established. Despite French reinforcement of several posts in the
threatened area, its defenses are still believed inadequate to meet
a concerted Viet Minh attack.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Saudi Arabia refuses to arbitrate Buraimi dispute with Britain:
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Saudi Arabia will definitely not submit
its dispute with Britain over the Buraimi
oasis to arbitration. He added that unless there is a change in
British policy on the dispute, his government will have no alter-
native but to meet force with force or to resort to some other
measure, such as presenting the problem to the UN Security
Council.
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told Hare that he agreed with Yassin's observation that the situation
had deteriorated so badly that matters .could not be allowed to
continue in their present state.
Comment: The State Department has
explained to Prince Faisal in Washington that the American Govern-
ment, like Britain, still favors arbitration as the best method of
settling the dispute.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Comment on the 29 March "uprising" in Guatemala:
The apparent ease with which the Guatemalan
armed forces suppressed the 29 March "revolt" at Salama is evi-
dence that the major portion of the army remains loyal to the Arbenz
administration. The "uprising" may be another indication of
dissatisfaction among some of the junior officers, and possibly
among some troops, in the garrisons distant from the capital.
It is entirely possible, however, that the
"revolt" was staged by the government for the purpose of alerting
troops to control the crowds in the streets of the various communities
during Holy Week. On 30 1Vlarch the army declared a natioriwide
military alert, according to press reports.
Salama is about 100 miles north of
Guatemala City
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7. Panamanian President wants to discuss Canal Zone treaty in
Washington:
Panamanian Foreign Minister Guizado told
Ambassador Wiley on 28 March that he was
proceeding to Washington to request an official
invitation for President Remon to visit the
United States, and to clarify Panama's position
that a total revision of the 1936 Canal Zone treaty is essential.
The Panamanian Ambassador to Washington,
who is now in Panama, believes that Remon feels obliged to have some
agreement to submit to the National Assembly next fall, because of
the Canal Zone resolution approved by the Assembly last November.
Comment: Remon has sought to dissociate
himself from the enthusiastic response with which extreme nationalist
and anti-US elements greeted his recent decision to seek a revision
of the 1936 treaty. It is clear, however, that he does not intend to
alter his stand on treaty revision or his determination to discuss the
matter with President Eisenhower. Failure to carry through his
much-publicized plans would expose him to criticism and possibly
weaken his political position.
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