CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/03/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026921
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: March 29, 1953

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29 March 1953
Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO. _
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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DATEI 41 11REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1, British Foreign Office officials comment on recent Soviet tactics
(page 3).
'Molotov offers to intervene on behalf of French internees in Korea
(page 3).
SOVIET UNION
j/Comment on Soviet amnesty .decree (page 4).
FAR EAST
Comment on the Communist offer to exchange prisoners in Korea
(page 5).
5. Communists in Korea strengthen defenses at Wonsan (page 5).
6. Joint Communist air force conference being held in Manchuria
(page 6).
7. Milk of Communist equipment in Korea is of Soviet manufacture
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Mossadeq proposes West German organization handle Iranian oil
(oaae 7).
9. 3.3(h)(2)
Israeli publicity dims prospects for peace with Arab states (page 8).
jorr. Comment on Mau Mau terrorism in East Africa (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
12.
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GENERAL
1. British Foren Office officials comment on recent Soviet tactics:
British Foreign Office officials privately
agree that until there is concrete evidence
of Soviet willingness to make genuine
concessions, no four power meeting should
be he . eir opinion such evidence is lacking.
They believe that current Soviet propaganda
should be regarded with the greatest skepticism, but that there
seems no reason to interpret it as a cover for more aggressive
actions. The officials further agree that the West should adopt a
"wait and see" policy while avoiding provocative actions.
Comment: Recent Soviet propaganda
tactics such as the renewal of the coexistence line, while appearing
conciliatory, have been accompanied by sharp attacks against the
United States. Other propaganda and diplomatic moves also suggest
that the Soviet aim is more divisive than conciliatory.
2. Molotov offers to intervene on behalf of French internees in Korea:
In a 26 March interview with French
Ambassador Joxe, Molotov offered to
intervene with the North Koreans to
secure the release of French internees.
The offer came in response to the Ambassador's question on the
relationship of Malenkov's statements of peaceful intentions to
a Korean settlement.
Joxe regards his interview as one of
several Soviet conciliatory gestures which have cost the Soviet
Government nothing and have the advantage of relaxing Western
vigilance. He does not think that the USSR will forfeit its
bargaining power through any substantial concessions.
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The American Embassy recommends that
the United States make a similar approach regarding American
Internees in North Korea.
Comment: Molotov has already offered
to intervene for the release OTr-3ritish internees.
Soviet reaction to any American proposal
of this nature would help to show whether recent Soviet conciliatory
tactics have been primarily aimed at dividing the West or represent
a modification in policy by the new regime.
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on Soviet ..amnesty decree:
The amnesty decree of the new Soviet
regime, although its scope is limited, appears to be a gesture in
support of the leaders' often repeated claims of humanitarian
interest in the people.
It is unlikely that this concession was
motivated by a feeling of weakness on the part of the new regime.
Previous Soviet amnesties have been declared on such historic
occasions as the "victorious conclusion of the civil war," the
"tenth anniversary of Soviet power," and "the victory over Hitlerite
Germany."
This development will provide Soviet
propagandists with a new point of emphasis for internal con-
sumption and will be beamed to foreign audiences in support
of the regime's "liberal character and prestige."
P S E T
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FAR EAST
4. Comment on the Communist offer to exchange prisoners in Korea:
The Communists' apparent agreement to
exchange sick and wounded prisoners in Korea probably represents
an attempt to regain the propaganda initiative, not only on an issue
of wide humanitarian appeal, but on the whole East-West controversy
of which Korea is the focus. The move is consonant with the recently
intensified effort to portray the Soviet side as the "camp of peace."
The Communists' statement emphasizes
their desire for an agreement in accordance with Article 109 of the
Geneva Convention, which specifically provides that no sick or
injured prisoner of war "may be repatriated against his will during
hostilities." Thus, while the Communists could negate the offer by
attaching unacceptable stipulations, they could, in the interest of
their broad propaganda objectives, agree on a partial exchange of
sick and wounded prisoners without compromising their stand on
"total repatriation." They could continue to interpret Article 118
as calling for matriation of all prisoners following the cessation
of hostilities.
Recent propaganda has given no indication
that the Communists would be willing to accept a truce on anything
but their own terms.
5. Communists in Korea strengthen defenses at Wonsan:
The plans, which involved both Unmese
ofawNrthKorean forces included the construction of
camouflaged positions, reconnaissance of terrain, firing for ad-
justment, and artillery and infantry coordination.
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6. . Joint Communist air force conference being held in Manchuria:
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A "joint conference," attended by high-ranking 3.3(h)(2)
officers of four Chinese Communist Air Divi-
sions, and possibly by North Korean and
Soviet officials, is being held at Antung on
the Sino-Korean borderj 3.3(h)(2)
The conference is apparently sponsored by Joint Air
Force Headquarters at Mukden.
Comment: Although such a conference may
be evidence of a decision to employ air units in offensive operations
In Korea, there are few indications that an air offensive is being
planned in the immediate future.
the enemy will continue in a Clefensive role�
7. Bulk of Communist equipment in Korea is of Soviet manufacture:
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Communist China's production of munitions, 3.3(h)(2)
as estimated from a survey of markings on
equipment captured in Korea, is "extremely
Inadequate" for current requirements, 3.3(h)(2)
Less than three percent of all capture
ordnance examined was made in Communist China. Most of the
rest, including nearly all small arms and small arms ammunition,
was of Soviet manufacture.
Comment: It was previously believed that
Chinese arsenals were supplying a greater proportion of small arms
and ammunition in Korea: Evidently China's
principal contribution to the Korean war as een its manpower, with
the Soviet Union supplying virtually all the necessary materiel.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Mossadeq proposes West German organization handle Iranian oil:
9.
Prime Minister Mossadeq has proposed to
officials of the West German Berliner
Handelsgesellschaft Bank that a pool of
German banks organize the purchasing,
selling and distribution of Iranian oil on a world-wide basis. The
German organization would also provide technical assistance for
rehabilitating the Abadan refinery.
Chancellor Adenauer approves the plan
in principle, with the proviso that the United States Government
does not object.
Comment: Mossadeq, aware of the
relatively small potential of the companies he is currently dealing
with, apparently still hopes to find a large organization to market
Iranian oil. Strong British disapproval of such an operation can
be expected.
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10. , Israeli publicity dims prospects for peace with Arab states:
The Israeli press during the past few days
has given front page attention to a possible
Israeli-Arab peace. It has emphasized that
the United States would use its good offices
to bring this about as part of a new approach
to Middle East problems.
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According to some news reports, the American
plan includes splitting the Arab bloc, using Nagib's "pro-American
regime" as the lever. Wide reporting was also given the conversation
Nagib held with Ralph Bunche last month in which Nagib indicated an
interest in achieving peace with Israel.
Comment This extensive Israeli publicity
will create unfavorable reactions among the Arab states toward any
peace proposals. Premature Israeli publicity wrecked Israeli-
Jordanian negotiations in early 1951.
General Nagib has indicated his interest
In peace with Israel but also has shown sensitivity to Egyptian public
opinion which continues unyielding on this issue.
11. Comment on Mau Mau terrorism in East Africa:
Officials in Kenya fear a general uprising
resulting from an expansion of Mau Mau terrorism which has
threatened the security of Britain's Kenya Colony for the past six
months. Despite the arrest of alleged leaders, wholesale arming
of the European population, aggressive patrols by African and
British troops, and mass roundups of suspect natives 9 Mau Mau
gangs have grown in number. On 26 March they massacred at
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least 150 pro-British tribesmen near the colony's capital, in-
creasing by more than one third the total of known victims.
According to earlier plans, two battalions
of British troops are to be flown to Kenya beginning 30 March to
assist the single British battalion and local forces already there,
but British inability to protect loyal Africans and informers will
seriously handicap future operations. The most dangerous period
is believed likely to coincide with the anticipated conviction of
Somo Kenyatta, a leading African accused of instigating and directing
the terrorist movement.
Although the Mau Mau movement is at
present confined to a single tribe comprising about a fifth of Kenya's
5,000,000 Africans, there have been indications that its influence
may spread to other tribes and neighboring territories in east
and central Africa.
LATIN AMERICA
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