CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/03/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026919
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: March 10, 1953

APIR
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
./111/4
TOPS ET /
SECUR NFORMATION
10 March 1953
Copy No. 59
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 5�4
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. )je
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. toe/
AUTH: k4R 70-
DATE:
REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Tc(!j_lit: SE T
E FORMATION
E
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
t3 SECRET
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Moscow Embassy comments on Soviet governmental reorganization
(page 3).
2 USSR reinforces air strength in Eastern Europe (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. 1Vlossadeq asks removal of Point IV personnel from Caspian area
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia would rebuff any Soviet overtures (page 4).
5. Yugoslavia to abandon collective farms (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on effect of Italian decision to postpone EDC ratification
(page 5).
* * * *
- 2 -
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
----Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019706/26 CO2026919
1*..)P�FsECRET
3.5(c)
SOVIET UNION
1. Moscow Embassy comments on Soviet governmental reorganization:
The American Embassy in Moscow believes
that the centralization of the new government
in the hands of Malenkov and four other ex-
perienced leaders has created what may be
the best balance among the top Soviet leaders. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that possible differences are permanently settled. The
primary task has been one of filling the power vacuum and presenting an
immediate appearance of unity.
The organizational changes in strategic indus-
tries are viewed as an attempt to intensify control over the Soviet war
potential. No change in Soviet foreign policy is expected.
The Embassy points to the possibility that
Mao Tse-tung may be less amenable to direction by a group which has
yet to prove its ability to survive. Mao's importance has been clearly
recognized in the special attention accorded the Chinese over all other
Communist associates during the Stalin obsequies.
2. USSR reinforces air strength in Eastern Europe:
a tighter di-
vision was recently transferred from the
western USSR, possibly Minsk, to the 59th
and is now based near Budapest. Between 16 and
22 January advance elements apparently moved to a new base about 30
miles west of Budapest; group flights from the USSR noted in late Febru-
ary and early March probably represent the ferrying of division aircraft.
Comment: This forward displacement
follows recent Soviet measures effecting close coordination among
Soviet and Satellite Air Forces in Eastern and Western Europe.
- 3 -
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
TOP RET
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
1:41'>SECItET
3.5(c)
Soviet air strength in Hungary had previously
included one Set-equipped fighter division, with an authorized strength
of 111 tactical aircraft.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Mossadeg asks removal of Point IV personnel from Caspian area:
3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Mossadeq has asked Ambas-
sador Henderson to withdraw American Point
IV personnel from the Caspian area within
four or five weeks. The Soviet personnel
reportedly have not yet been withdrawn from the fisheries, and Mossadeq
argued that they will refuse to leave as long as Americans are there.
Henderson believes that under the circum-
stances, the Americans should be transferred to other parts of Iran,
possibly to return to the Caspian area later.
Comment: As recently as 4 March, Mossadeq
told Henderson that the Soviet UnilTii had again complained about Point IV
activities in northern Iran.
The Prime Minister has been under increas-
ing pressure to implement his internal reform program and recently
suggested that Point IV be taken over by the Iranian Government. The
request to remove American personnel may be a step in that direction.
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia would rebuff any Soviet overtures:
Edvard Kardelj, second ranking Yugoslav
Communist, told Ambassador Allen on 6
March that Yugoslavia would rebuff any
- 4 -
3.3(h)(2)
TOP ET
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
Tt9I-CRE:11
3.5(c)
overture the Soviet Union might now make. He said that the Yugoslav
quarrel was not with Stalin personally, but with the "bureaucratic,
dictatorial system" and as long as that system continued, there was
no possibility of a change in the Yugoslav attitude.
Comment: Yugoslavia's break with the
Soviet Union came about through 27-distinct clash in national interests.
Icardelj's statement supports previous estimates that the Yugoslav
Communists would not seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
5. Yugoslavia to abandon collective farms:
Milovan Djilas, a top-level Yugoslav Corn-
munist� has informed Ambassador Allen
that his government is now drafting a decree,
to be effective before the spying planting,
perm. peasants to withdraw their land and all personal
property from collectives. He admitted that most peasants would leave
the collectives.
Comment: The dissolution of a vast majority
of the existing collectives, which 'Eve been admittedly inefficient and
account for only 20 percent of the country's agricultural production, would
probably be a prelude to the introduction of a new agricultural system
designed to conform with the regime's program of decentralization and
industrial self-management.
Last year at this time, the regime was waging
a concerted campaign to keep the peasants from exercising a legal right
to withdraw from the collectives after a three-year period.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on effect of Italian decision to postpone EDC ratification:
The decision of the Italian Government to
postpone parliamentary, consideration of the EDC treaty until the second
- 5 -
RET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
�..-Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
'rt9? SECRET
3.5(c)
half of 1953 adds another complication to those already obstructing
creation of a European ArtilY�
The French, West German, and Benelux
governments are holding back from final ratification primarily be-
cause of other problems, including the French protocols. There
will now be an increasing disinclination to press for early action
because of this delay on the part of one of the most zealous pro-
ponents of European integration.
Indications had been increasing that Premier
de Gasperi would not introduce the controversial EDC measure into
parliament before this spring's national elections, despite promises
to the contrary. He had also told American representatives several
times that it would be difficult to secure EDC ratification unless the
Trieste problem was solved.
TOP RET
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2026919
3.5(c)