CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026614
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 2, 1961

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2 March 1961
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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2 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Congo:- Luluabourg under UN control; Gizenaa repeats
demands for aid from UAR and bloc,
(Page t)
India-Congo: Nehru warns Khrushchev solution to Congo
problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's
status and the Congo are separated. (P2ge t)
3. Laos: Chiang Kai-shek orders rapid withdrawal of irregu-
lars from Burma-Laos border area. (Page it)
4. France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed
US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. (Page ttt)
5. Communist China: Peiping revives "100 flowers" con-
cept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of
expression. (Page ttt)
Brazil: Yugoslav gvoernment accepts invitation for Tito
i it Brazil; suggests August as date.
(Page iv)
7. Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga threatens to resign;
opposes President Velasco's increasingly favorable policy
toward Cuba. (Page tv)
8. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page tv)
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A
a
Brazzaville
SUDAN
390
Luanda
31594 A
TUNISIA
2 600
MALAYA
610
Leo poldv
ysvilFe
MOROCCO
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INDONESIA
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattered Fore
MOBUTU
2,700
Coquilhatville
'411.
Approximate area controlled by:
KasaiouburkiloPutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tsinambe
1:MD United Nations Farces
Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
0 STATUTE MILES
MOBUTU
1,500
Francqui
uluabou g
Bak n
40,0
Ba so ko
�
Luputa
MOROCCO
1,000
IRELAND
655
LIBERIA
,13
ETHIOPIA:
Elisa
Usumbura
ETHIOPIA
GIZENGA
7,000
KongoIo�
Albertville
NIGERIA
1,300
SWEDER
680 1
TsHomg
4,0Qp
villef
2 Mar 61 CENTRAL INtELLiGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Cony: E_UN representatives in New York say that by the
end of 28 ebruary Luluabourg was a "UN city," with all
Congolese troops cleared from the town and the airport.
Earlier, most of the Gizengist
force which entered Luluabourg last week was disarmed by
Congolese forces there loyal to Leopoldville.
the Gizengist force arrived "hungry and in rags,"
consisted largely of new recruits, and "gave up without a
fight" after failing to swing a majority of the Luluabourg
troops over to their cause. Hammerskjold commented to
Ambassador Stevenson in New York on 28 February that
he felt troop movements such as have recently taken
place in the Congo are not bringing about a significant mil-
itary or political shift in the balance of power among the
various factionE
Gizenga is continuing his demands for outside aid. On
28 February,
Gizenga said, "I hasten to insist that your republic come to
our aid immediately," and reiterated that Stanleyvilles re-
quest to buy long-range aircraft--in exchange for Congolese
goods--is "very important." On 1 March Gizenga's representa-
tive in Cairo asked for permission to go to Moscow in order
to "settle the Question about the airplanes." Gizenga has
itself if provided with long-range aircraft.
that his regime would supply
claimed
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
India-Congo:ENehru's reply to Khrushchev's letter of 22
February on the UN and the Congo reaffirms the strong Sup-
port of the UN which he has previously expressed.
the reply, which Nehru read to the Indi5ji
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Ebinet's subcommittee on foreign affairs on the 27th, warns
that if the issues of Hammarskjold's status and the Congo are
not kept separate, "we shall never find a solution to the Congo
problem." Subsequent discussion by the subcommittee indicated
that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in
terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of In-
dian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits
assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in
fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is
awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in
which the Indian leader sought to persuade Nasir of the desir-
ability of reinforcing the UN forces in the Congo. Furthermore,
Nehru is reported especially concerned about avoiding clashes
between Indian troops and any. African troops which might be
sent imilntprally to sunnort the Gizencra ree1me-7
*Laos: (Chiang Kai-shek on 28 February ordered the rapid
withdrawal irregulars from the Burma-Laos border area, C, k
Taipei will request
the cooperation of Thailand and Laos. Chiang Ching-kuo, who
has been given responsibility for the operation, said he plans p
to tell the
to send a high-level military team early
Irregular commanders they must withdraw from Burma and \\\.
this month
return to Taiwan. He believes that most of the 3,000 men in
Laos will consent to return but that many of the troops still in
Burma will refuse. General Ouane, chief of the Laotian general
staff, has reportedly ordered irregulars recruited for special
battalions, but except for a battalion of local tribal peoples that
had been serving with the Nationalists, no Chinese Nationalist
tr7ODS have joined the Laotian armed forces)
Rangoon
had rejected membership in a neutral nations commission be-
cause the plan was unacceptable to Souvanna Phouma. The For-
eign Office also expressed doubt that Premier Sihanouk's proposed
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14-nation conference could achieve worthwhile results.
In Burma's view, the prerequisites for
the restoration of stability in Laos were an agreement by all
� countries not to intervene in any way in Laotian internal af-
fairs and an agreement among all major Laotian factions to
hold free elections under the supervision of a neutral commis-
sion. Burma would be willing to serve
on such a commission.
France: Flie fourth French nuclear weapons test in the
Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April.
The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which
are to be resumed in Geneva beginning 21 March, De Gaulle,
determined to obtain "full membership in the atomic club,"
continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban
unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of
nuclear, weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face
the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African
and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the
United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will
be underground is unlikely to calm this hpstile reaction?
thina: Peiping appears to feel the need for a
limited liberalization of scientific thought and an increase in
freedom of expression among the country's intellectuals. An
editorial published in the 28 February issue of the party journal,
Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states
that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they
lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists
have recently released and allowed to appear in public several
prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of
the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign
against those who had expressed themselves too freely, before,
the intellectuals will be extremely wary about the new invitation
to "bloom and contend." (Backup, Page 2)
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VA
VA
Brazil-Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav Government,
has accepted an nv a ion
for Ti ifBIaziUanFSuggested next August as the most
favorable time. Although Yugoslav interests in Latin America
are limited, Tito has long wished to tour the western hemisphere.
He should have little trouble in arranging visits to some other
Latin American enuntries and can be expected to seek an invi-
tation to the US. (Backup, Page 3)
Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga has told an American
officia=the intends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3
March, unless President Velasco agrees to change his in-
creasingly favorable policy toward Cuba. Chiriboga's resigna-
tion could provoke a cabinet crisis. The foreign minister's
stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-
Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel
Araujo, a key lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced
Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant."
Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have
gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies
toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
(Backup, Page 5)
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos dur-
ing the last week. There are no indications that the Com-
munist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to launch
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-Nave
5 counter-offensive in the immediate future, although
they have the capability to do so. There is an uncon-
firmed report that the Communists have a plan to
Initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south
of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such ac-
tion on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao -
Kong Le resources. Large-scale action would require
outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to
be unlikely at this time. Meanwhile, the Communist bloc
continues its build-up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal"
prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate
except on its term
D. 5Toneofthe contending factions in the Congo seems able
at present to impose a military solution, although the
situation appears to favor whichever faction is willing
to take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and dis-
trust of the UN, the factions will go as far as they think
they can get away with in resisting any UN move to neu-
tralize their forces. Under the impetus of the Kasavubu-
Kalonji-Tshombe agreement, the start of political com-
promise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is
willing to pntpr intn nnlitieal nerrntiatinns with the nther
factions ,7
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Situation in the Congo
(fhe threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared
to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of
ICasavubuis government to the point of being willing,for the first�
time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be
urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1,500 men,
to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open
fire." It is questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces
would fight even if such an order were given, especially since
the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced)
fkammarskjold said that the Luluabourg episode was not a
military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegra-
tion of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation
is now shaping up in Equateur Province, where Stanleyville troops
easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward
Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the
Leopoldville government because Mobutu has taken most of its
garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say
that Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to GizengaZi
.1ammarskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation
to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal
to Kasavubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken'personally with
Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had
started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and
slowest--military offensive in history" and then last week told
UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only
for defense against infiltrators from Stanleyville. Hammarskjold
felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu
and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might be nlanninfr A m -.
tary arouninff directed again t all politicians
an indication that Gizenga is planning to leave Stanley-
ville appeared on 28 February when Gizenga asked his rep-
resentative in Cairo to send him "two suits of heavy weight
English worsted clot'
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Peiping Announces New "100 Flowers" Campaign
Where previously the slogan was "let politics take com-
mand;' the 28 February issue of Red Flag says that science
and politics "are not the same thing" and that however help-
ful a correct world outlook may be, "Marxism-Leninism
cannot replace actual study in the various branches of science."
Scientific work, states Red Flag, must not merely repeat
"successes achieved by our predecessors," but should strike
out in new fields. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians last
summer probably brought home to the Chinese the extent of
their dependence on the USSR for scientific and technological
information and their pressing need to expand their scientific
capabilities. If a modicum of freedom of expression will help
achieve this end, Peiping finds the risk worth taking. Red
Flag rationalized the acknowledgment that non-Marxists can
make valuable contributions to research by stating that such
individuals "lean toward materialism" without knowing it.
Peiping admits that the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom"
may spill over from the academic into the political sphere but
somewhat defensively states that "Marxists-Leninists are not
afraid. . . because of that." In 1956-57 when Mao Tse-tung
originated "100 flowers," the criticisms voiced by the intel-
lectuals obviously shook the leaders. Mao was termed "hot-
tempered, imprudent, reckless, and desiring to be a benev-
olent god." The anti-rightist campaign which followed saw the
arrest and imprisonment of many intellectuals and the creation
of a stultifying atmosphere in academic circles. Presumably
neither the intellectuals nor the regime desires a repetition of
the 1957 excesses.
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%sour sur Noe
Tito to Visit Latin America
The Brazilian. ambassador in Belgrade was instructed on
23 February to tell the Yugoslav foreign minister "that the
new Brazilian administration is interested in increasing rela-
tions with Yugoslavia in all areas, political, economic, and
cultural. . . . Proceed at once to make discreet inquiries on
the reception which an official invitation for Marshal Tito would
receive." The Brazilian ambassador reported a favorable Yugo-
slav reply on 25 February and advised that the matter "continue
to be secret," but Foreign Minister Arinos has publicly suggested
a Tito visit to Brazil.
Quadros' invitation to Tito is intended to demonstrate the
"truly independent" foreign policy he promised in his inaugural
address on 31 January and during his campaign. Before the elec-
tion Quadros publicly expressed admiration for the independence
of Tito and Nasir and during a pre-inauguration visit to Europe
apparently hoped to arrange a meeting of neutralist leaders on
the Yugoslav island of Brioni.
Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic
and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959
when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven
Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high re-
gime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting
in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.
Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the
West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and
provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In
January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange
reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer ac-
cord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an
official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues
publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international af-
fairs.
Tito is currently in Ghana, the first stop on a two-month
African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia,
Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR
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liven" ,tic-rcr,
President Nasir. This is the third tour Tito has made to in-
crease Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdevel-
oped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were
made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close
identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense
against possible future political and economic pressure from
East or West and the best possible platform from which to
voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session
last fall, the UAR's Nasir�long Yugoslavia's closest collab-
orator- Ghanat Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's
Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease East-
West tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the
neutrals confer more often, collaborate more closely, and
act in concert more frequently.
In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party rela-
tions, Belgrade has generally satisfactory relations with the
Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and
Communist China. Tito and Khrushchev held conversations
in New York last falltOne result of which was an agreement
to exchange visits by their foreign ministers3 Moscow and Bel-
grade hold similar views on most international issues, such as
disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China
disapprove of close state _reaqtions_witlavia and maintain
them at a minimal level.
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Nier -3-ECTtr1� Soo,
Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue
Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaurn in early February
that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political
situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh
Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He
noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with
Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action
against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.
The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indi-
cated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both
Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against
Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government The
Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particu-
larly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing
boundary dispute with Peru.
Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 Febru-
ary that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such
an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-
ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army com-
mander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated
last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused
these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political
controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although
Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he
might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government
position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga
said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday
Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail
if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was
certain Velasco will not follow through on this.
Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he
has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy
in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he pos-
ciblv contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.
---SEefter
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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