CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026613
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 23, 1961

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%IV JE%1IVE I
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
23 February 1961
Copy No. C c;7_71
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-TOVSECRET-
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23 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Note: Items I, 2, 7, 8, and 20 appeared in the Daily
Brief for 22 February. Backup material has been added
in this issue.
USSR: New 2,000-nautical-mile IRBM has undergone
extensive flight testing since last June.
(Page i)
USSR - West Germany: Moscow's 17 February memo-
randum to Bonn repeats call for free city in West Ber-
lin and a German peace treaty. (Ave i)
3. Congo: Leopoldville army officers reported preparing
anti-Ileo coup. (Page t)
4. Laos: Souvanna Phouma's speech on arrival in Xieng
Khouang blames US for preventing national harmony
in Laos. (Page it)
5. Burma: Leftist-led riots may lead to further demon-
strations. (142ge iii)
6. North Vietnam: Premier Pham Van Dong relinquishes
Foreign Ministry portfolio. (Page iii)
Portugal: Defense minister demands Salazar effect
reforms in Lisbon's African colonies. Oklge
)3. Saudi Arabia: Rivalries within royal family weaken
position of King Saud. (Page iv)
9. Ghana: President Nkrumah endorses Western aid for
Volta River hydroelectric project. (Page iv)
. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page v..)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR: The Soviet series-"65" 2,000-n. m. intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM) has been undergoing intensive
flight testing since last June. There have been 21 test opera-
tions to date--six of them in a recent three-week period--with
only one known failure. The high priority apparently accorded
to development of this new missile suggests that Soviet author-
ities have placed a premium on the development of a missile
system which can be deployed in more secure areas within the
USSR and can reach all the wartime targets on the Eurasian
periphery. (Map) (Backup, Page 1)
USSR-Germany: Ehe Soviet memorandum of 17 February
to Bonn probably is a reminder to the West that the Berlin and
German questions remain unsolved. It may have been timed to
Influence Chancellor Adenauer's talks with Prime Minister
Macmillan on 22 February. Although the memorandum asserted
that negotiations cannot be further deferred, it avoided estab-
lishing an explicit deadline. Moscow makes no new proposals
and reaffirms its long-standing positions on establishing a free
city in West Berlin and concluding a German peace treaty. The
memorandum does not exclude the possibility of an interim so-
lution of the Berlin question under a definite time limit, and
repeats the general threat to conclude a separate peace treaty')
) (Backup, Page 2r
co /'
*Congo: :'reparations for a possible military coup against h)ta_, .9-,-}`-'4-
the Ileo government in Leopoldville by s � '-:77-
I Lt. Col. Boboso c A)54 4 di
The officers are_,4et
concerned over the loss of their privileged positions if they]
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&oops are disarmed by the UN under the recent Security
Council resolution. They do not believe that Ileo will resist
the UN Command, although Ileo yesterday publicly denounced
any UN disarmament of Congolese forces. The army, which
retains its tribal loyalties, reportedly is also angered at the
recent execution by the South Kasai government of seven
Congolese, who came from, several tribal groups which are
also represented in the arml.)
Tshombe appears to have modified his initial reaction to
the UN Security Council resolution; on 22 February he announced
his agreement with UN representatives to stop all troop move-
ments in Katanga Province,
In Orientale Province, the Stanleyville government told
local authorities on 21 February that it alone can impose the
death sentence. Officials henceforth are only to arrest for-
eigners and transfer them to Stanleyville under a "good mil-
itary escort." If any locality fails to comply it will be subject
to "very severe judgment." The order was inspired by reports
reaching Stanleyville of "massacres of Europeans and Asiatics."
In Accra the foreign ministers of Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Morocco, and the UAR have reaffirmed their support for
Gizenga and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign
diplomats from the Congo. (Backup, Page 5)
*Laos: Former premier Souvanna Phouma arrived by air 62
In the Plaine des Jarres on 22 February, according to a TASS
broadcast from Moscow, and was greeted by Pathet Lao chief Seig-&--
Prince Souphannouvong and Captain Kong Le. (is afternoon 26,2a,
arrival, following departure from Phnom Penh the previous
evening by Soviet aircraft, apparently confirms an earlier re-
port that he would travel by way of Han.2,i2 According to Hanoi
radio, Souvanna, "premier of the legal aotian government,"
made a speech on his arrival in Laos blaming the United States
for "hindering the realization of the policy of peace, neutrality,
and national harmony in Laos" and congratulating "the government,
23 Feb 61
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army, and Pathet Lao fighting units for having liberated Xieng
Khouang and the Plaine des Jarres."
T3l_oc airlift operations were continuing on 20 February,
when at least two Soviet IL 14s flew into Laos from Hanoi.
e Soviet AN12 heavy transport which recently left Irkutsk
arrived in Hanoi on 22 February. It reportedly was carrying
annrnximatply ninel elY10 flf ti vcrn rerrthrthler A nevi. 4vt esA T
� znimilici; mile riming in nangoon on zi Ivebruary was the -
most violent anti-American demonstration ever held in Burma;
well planned and directed, it probably has set the stage for fur-
ther disturbances. The leaders were leftist students and rep-
resentatives of groups in the pro-Communist National United
Front who had received police permission to demonstrate
against the murder of Patrice Lumumba and against the supply
of American materiel to the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in
northeastern Burma. They were forbidden, however, to approach
the American Embassy. Although a number of police and demon-
strators were injured and two deaths have been reported, thus
far 130 Americans have been hurt and property damage has been
limited to smashed windows in the embassy building and at the
Pan American Airways office.
6)/_�
*North Vietnam: Premier Pham Van Dong will no longer
hold the Foreign Ministry portfolio, although he retains the pre-
miership. According to a 22 February announcement, Hanoi's
new foreign minister is Ung Van Khiem, a fast-rising former
guerrilla leader who has been linked with the current intensified
drive to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Khiem is
a close associate of party First Secretary Le Duano Over the past
year, several of Le Duan's guerrilla colleagues have moved up in
the party and government structure, suggesting that Le Duan is
reinforcing is position as Ho Chi Minh's most likely successor
23 Feb 61
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Portugal: Defense Minister Botelho Moniz claims he
has given Premier Salazar a virtual ultimatum that imme-
diate economic and social reforms must be undertaken to
alleviate the deteriorating situation in Angola and the other
African provinces. Moniz told Salazar .a few days ago that
action had to be taken before the UN General Assembly re-
convenes on 7 March and that his ministry would "take the
matter into its own hands" if Salazar did not comply.
In northern Angola the leading non-Communist Angolan
nationalist organization, which is based in Leopoldville, re-
portedly plans to launch a terror campaign about 15 March
in an effort to focus world attention on Portuguese Africa
while the UN General Assembly is in session]
(Backup, Page 8)
Saudi Arabia: Flivalries within the Saudi royal family
continue, and several princely factions, including backers
of Crown Prince Faysal, have combined against King Saud.
The King has already been forced to order two of his liberal
advisers out of the country as ambassadors. A showdown
over the King's "progressive" cabinet and its "liberal reform"
policies is likely. However, dissension will continue and will
weaken the family's hold on the country. This development
would give further encouragement to anti-monarchical ele-
ments, which include some army offic,ers as well as dis-
gruntled younger� Saudi "intellectual@.!1
(Backup, Pagi,
*Ghana: President Nkrumah, in his address to the Ghanaian
parliament on 21 February, endorsed the Volta River hydroelec-
tric project being developed under Western auspices. He men-
tioned, but did not emphasize, the recently concluded agreement 710
with the USSR for the construction of a smaller dam. There had
been a report that Nkrumah, in an emotional reaction to devel-
opments in the Congo, might denounce American aid because of
his disagreement with the United States' policies, which he feels
are frustrating his Ilan- Afriran
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WATCH COMMITT7 CONCLUSIONS
Z_D the basis of findings by its Witch Co ittee,ilthe
United States Intelligence Board concludes th:1;17
A. E_To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate futur_e3
B. ao Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US al-
lies or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate fu-
tur.2
C. Ennmunist forces in Laos continue the active defense of
their base area in the Plaine des Jarres. The bloc shows
no inclination toward a political settlement except on its
own terms. The Communist forces in Laos retain the
capability to increase somewhat their military efforts in
support of their political objectives
D. Efiective implementation of the strengthened UN mandate
In the Congo will probably tend to arrest the disintegration
of the Gizenga regime, to inhibit the military activity of
Mobutu's forces, and to raise a serious possibility of armed
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MISSILE RANGE FACILITIES EMPLOYED
IN FLIGHT TESTING OF SOVIET SERIES2'65" IRBM
Kapustin Yer Missile test range
1050 n.m. Impact area
Sary Shogon
300 n.m. Impact area
Primorskiy
Itray
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Soviet IRBM Devolopment Program
The first two firings of the Soviet series-"65" missile
were made to the 1,050-n. m. impact area of the Kapustin
Yar Missile Test Range in June 1960, probably as part of
the early propulsion tests. There have been four other "half-
range" firings. There have been 14 successful test firings
to an impact area in Central Siberia, first used on 3 August
1960, about 2,000 n. m. from the launch point at ICapustin
Yar, with the latest firing on 15 February.
At present it is not known whether a similar intensity
of activity marks other aspects of the development of this
weapons system--production of missiles and supporting
equipment, site construction, and troop training--which also
influence the achievement of operational readiness.
the series-"65"
missile probably uses non-storable liquid propellants. The
operational version will probably have a guidance system
combining radio command and inertial components giving
it a circle of probable error of 1-2 n. m. It is estimated
that this missile will become operational in late 1961 or ear-
ly 1962.
The USSR already has available, in the 1,100 n. m. sur-
face-to-surface missile which is estimated to have become
operational in late 1958 or 1959, medium-range ballistic
missiles capable of reaching most of the probable wartime
targets on the Eurasian periphery either from positions in
satellite states or border areas of the USSR. An IRBM system
provides an advantage illustrated in the case of operations
against targets on Okinawa. Because of its range, the launch
positions of the 2,000-n. m. missile could be as far inland
as Chita, whereas a 1,100-n. m. missile would have to be
deployed in southern Primorskiv_KravwhereJtwouId be
more vulnerable to attack.
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Moscow's Memorandum to Bonn Restates Position
On Germany and Berlin
Elie Soviet memorandum-of 17 February probably rep-
resents the first of a series of diplomatic moves to reactivate
the Berlin question and test the Western attitude toward a re-
sumption of high-level negotiations on Germany and Berlin.
The move was apparently in response to Adenauer's private ef-
forts, acting through the Austrian and Norwegian foreign min-
isters last fall, to gain some clarification of the Soviet position.
Furthermore, in reply to Adenauer's statement to Smirnov in
early January that the disarmament question should be given
priority over, the Berlin and German problems in East-West
talks, the memorandum calls for negotiations on Berlin with-
out further delay and describes the "working in" period for the
new US administration and the need to await the West German
elections as a "train of delaying arguments!
Etk� the first formal and complete recapitulation of the Soviet
position since the Paris summit, the memorandum reaffirms
standard proposals but does not insist on immediate implemen-
tation of the free city and refers to a possible interim solution
with a fixed time limit. This approach is similar to the last
Soviet proposal--made on 9 May, before the abortive summit
meeting--when Moscow offered a two-year interim solution, at
the end of which the four powers would be committed to estab-
lish a free city and sign a peace treaty with both German states.
The memorandum also repeats the Soviet claim that a separate
treaty, which would be signed either at the end of the interim
period or in the event that West Germany refused to participate
in the peace settlement, would liquidate the occupation of Berlin
and force the Western powers to negotiate access to Berlin with
East German0
5 dealing with the interim solution, Moscow asserts for the
first time that Bonn has no authority to participate in negotiations
on such an agreement. This position ignores the fact that both
East and West Germans participated as observers at the Geneva
foreign ministers' conference discussions in 1959, which cov-
ered an interim agreement. It also contradicts the Soviet note
of 2 March 1959, proposing that both German states participate
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Mt negotiations on the questions of West Berlin and a peace
treaty with Germany. The new gambit is probably designed
to elicit a West German claim to take part in any discussions,
which the USSR could use as an argument for including the
East Germans, or to draw a West German refusal, which the
USSR would then represent as an acceptance of its position
that West Germany has no legal relationship to West Berlilg
Ehe remainder of the Soviet memo reaffirms that unifi-
cation and a peace treaty are separate issues and charges that
West German "revisionism" over border questions necessitates
the conclusion of a peace treaty. The memo also indicates the
USSR will consider West German counter-proposals if they are
taped on the "present situation," meaning the existence of "two
Germanie�...J
� Eollowing an easing of Moscow's propaganda attacks on West
Germany last fall, Adenauer has sought to exploit the "improved
atmosphere" in hopes of forestalling any sharp tension over Ber-
lin at least until after the West German national elections in
September. Adenauer also continues to favor reducing tensions
through an agreement on disarmament before tackling the Berlin
and Germany problems. However, if talks on Berlin are unavoid-
able, he will press for Bonn's participati2E7
K.hrushchev's letter to Adenauer dealt only with the question
of repatriation of German nationals in the USSR. Khrushchev re-
turned to the official Soviet position of early 1960 that formal
repatriation ended on 31 December 1959 and henceforth would
proceed only in the framework of Soviet law. In a private talk on
17 October Khrushchev told the German ambassador that any Soviet
citizen was free to leave and that the matter could be reopened in
official talk.0
he repatriation of Germans from, the USSR has had consid-
erable domestic significance in West Germany. Nearly 10,000
German war prisoners were released in 1955-56 in connection
with the 1955 agreement to establish diplomatic relations betwefg
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lEi2nn and Moscow, and their return enhanced Adenauer's pres-
tige. On the basis of a 1958 agreement, approximately 13,000
Germans went from the USSR to West Germany, but Bonn claims
that there are still 10,000 eligible Germans in the USSR seeking
to emigra_tf3
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The Situation in the Congo
Tshombe had initially reacted vigorously to the UN
Security Council's 21 February resolution, charging that
the resolution was a "declaration of war by the UN against
Katanga and the whole former Belgian Congo!' He announced
the mobilization of the province's population to "defend lives
and property menaced by the United Nations, which would be
responsible for any bloodshed as a result of the resolution.
Pressures on Tshombe from hard-line mining interests which
counseled an immediate attack against UN forces were sub-
sequently softened by his official Belgian advisers. Tshombe
is reported to believe he was "fighting for his job and life" in
the face of UN determination to punish him for the death of
Lumum1,2
ape Stanleyville administration is said to have consolidated
its au hority locally but not necessarily for Gizenga's benefit.
The native elements there are reported to be under the provin-
cial leader, Bernard Salumu, while Gizenga is said to be re-
garded as a "foreigner" from Leopoldville and his "central
government" officials are inactive. Frictions inherent in this
situation may well develop further as a result of Lumumba's
death and the reported execution of 15 political and military
opponents of Gizengaj
aleanwhile, Gizenga appears to have been drawing on the
cash reserves of the Stanleyville branch of the central bank
to pay his troops--whose loyalty, at least in the Stanleyville
area, apparently can be counted on only as lone as they are paid
unless replenished, cash available for troop payment prob-
ably will not last through March. Gizenga and his subordinates
probably could be persuaded to permit disarmament of these
forces, especially if Gizenga's cohorts are offered responsible
posts in the Ileo government. The best disciplined and least
undependable of Gizenga's forces are reported to have been sent
into Katanga and Kivu provinces and against Mobutu's reported
"invasion" up the Congo River
Supporters of the Gizenga regime continue to attempt to
send in aid and personnel through th ndnoviet authorities
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in Moscow have requested the Sudanese Embassy to grant
transit visas for eleven Russians traveling to the Congo,
The "Communist Congolese party" proclaimed by a local
Baluba official on 15 February has received considerable pub-
licity in the country. An anti-Communist Baluba leader in
Leopoldville denied on 20 February that such a "youth move-
ment" had been formed;
cautioning against "dissem-
inating your protests or declarations over any radio against
anyone except through the UN." However, the Communist label
apparently has considerable appeal to organizations of Lumum-
ba's supporters; a local group in western Kivu
Province tffiliating
itself with the new party.
The Accra conferees wound up a three-day conference with
a communique reaffirming recognition of Gizenga's regime as
the legitimate government of the Congo and making several pro-
posals aimed at "preventing civil war in the Congo." In addition
to re-endorsing Ghana President Nkrumah's plan for reconstitut-
ing the UN force into an African command, the conference pro-
posed that the UN should immediately halt all mobilization in any
part of the Congo and expel all Belgian and other foreign military
units not belonging to the UN force. It also recommended that
foreign intervention be checked by halting the flow of arms, per-
sonnel, and money into the Congo except through agreed UN
methods, and that all foreign companies, banks, and other com-
mercial organizations be controlled and inspected. Finally, the
communique recommended the establishment of a neutral com-
mission to investigate the events leading to the death of Lumumba,
the freeing of all political prisoners, and the reconvening of par-
liament.
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Rioting in Rangoon
The anti-American demonstrations in Rangoon were
professionally led and clearly intended to result in violence.
Supplies of bricks and stones�and,
Molotov cocktails intended for burning the embassy
uil ing--were stored in the park across the street before
the demonstrators arrived. Order was restored only when
the army reinforced the 200-man police guard at the embassy
and fired into the mob.
The leaders--left-wing students from the pro-Communist
Rangoon University Student Union .and he All-Burma Federa-
tion of Student Unions, as well as representatives from the
Communist-dominated Burma Trade Union Congreg and the
National United Front�flouted police orders to stay away
from the embassy. AE.s soon as the mob turned violent, a
number of the student demonstrators returned to the univer-
sity c.a,mpus to pass resolutions condemning the "police bru-
tality.Lj' Such a move has in the past preceded expanded student
strikes and demonstrations and, although Rangoon remained
quiet on 22 February, there were widespread reports that new
violence aimed primarily at the police would be undertaken.
Student-led demonstrations have long been major political
weapons, and only the army-led administration of General
Ne Win was uninfluenced by them. Now provided with "mar-
tyrs"--two dead and 33 injured, according to the latest re-
ports--as well as the emotionally charged issue of American
materiel captured from the Chinese Nationalist irregulars,
student demonstrators may again become a significant influ-
ence on government policy.
The popularity of the demonstrators' cause is under-
scored by a statement issued by the ruling Union party on
22 February which sympathized with the demonstrators'
"strong spirit of nationalism" and appealed to the people to
"observe restraint" but failed to condemn the mob violence.
Although responsible government officials have not sought to
stir up anti-American sentiment, their own handling of the
irregulars issue has served to promote the violence.
CONFIDENTIAL
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� Portuguese Defense Minister Demanding Changes
In Lisbon's African Policy
aoefense Minister Moniz cum uLD mcial epui Leuty veileVe
that Lisbon must choose between two courses of action in
Africa: (1) either trying to hold on to Angola by military
force and having it eventually turn into another Congo, or
� (2) improving living and working conditions sufficiently that
the African provinces will be willing to remain with Portugal
in a voluntary political relationship. They are demanding that
Salazar cancel all industrial monopolies in Angola and issue
orders providing social benefits, minimum wages, and similar
� reforms, in return for which Moniz is said to have assured
Salazar the complete support of the Defense Ministry3
ahe defense minister expects further difficulties in Africa
soon, and reportedly is putting into effect a 13 February or-
der giving his ministry control over the security forces in
Angola. Portuguese military leaders are said to be more con-
cerned over, the "extremely serious" situation in the Angolan
district of Malange than they are over the recent Luanda dis-
turbances. The powerful industrial combines are exploiting
native labor in Malange under conditions of virtual slavery.
Military authorities report difficulties with their white troops,
who observe the w_a_.the colony is run and realize government
propaganda is false.
FITh.e chief non-Communist Angolan nationalist organization,
the Union of the Angolan People (UPA), which has its headquar-
ters at Leopoldville in the Congo, apparently is concerned that
a majority of Angolan youths are becoming pro-Communisto Its
leaders believe it must launch a terrorist campaign to spearhead
the struggle for independence, but it is hampered by a shortage of
funds and limited military equipment. The UPA allegedly has
some 100 rifles--purchased from Congolese soldiers--and a small
number of submachine guns, hand grenades, and land mines. Be-
cause of the recent disorders in Luanda and pressure from adher-
ents in Angola, the UPA reportedly now is reversing the policy
of restraint it has followed heretofore, and about 15 March will
start a campaign of attacks on white-owned plantations and other
civil disturbances in an area between Luanda and the Congo bor-
dfli
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�SeeRET--- low?
Showdown Between king Saud and Royal'Princes Near
[Aker more than two years of intermittent maneuvering,
King Saud succeeded in reasserting his authority over the
Saudi Government on 21 December by assuming the post of
prime minister and forming a "progressive" cabinet. To oust
his brother Faysal, Saud obtained the support of Saudi Arabian
"liberals" by naming four of them to cabinet posts and includ-
ing several among his personal adviserg
Ewing Saud's "liberal" cabinet as a threat to their in-
terests, several factions among the princes have combined
to return Faysal to power as prime minister. Motivations be-
hind the opposition are varied�support of Faysal, mistrust of
some cabinet ministers, resentment by some princes who had
been ousted from the cabinet, and dissatisfaction over the dis-
tribution of the King's largess. A strongly worded petition
signed by 45 princes is said to have been presented to Saud
on 13 February demanding the restoration Of Faysal to full
authority. Since that time Riyadh has been the scene of "fren-
zied" activity. Apparently, Saud has attempted to conciliate
as well as divide his opponents by dropping two controversial
advisers and appointing them to ambassadorships. Jealousy
between cabinet ministers and advisers, as well as cabinet
dissension, has further weakened the King's position. He is
likely to appoint one or two dissident but important princes as
advisers in a further effort to split the opposition:7
(Frown Prince Faysal, who following his ouster as prime
minister had been on a hunting trip in the Hijaz, where his
support is strongest, has returned to Jidda and is holding court.
Ambassador Heath, who talked with Faysal on 18 February,
found him in better health than usual. Faysal said emphatically
that he had not given up in any way his "interest in life.?
Gaud's "liberal" cabinet also appears to have alarmed re-
ligious leaders of the powerful Wahhabi sect--Islamic reaction-
aries who adhere to strict interpretation of the Koran and have
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an.g been a bulwark of the Saudi state. In early February one
Wahhabi emissary sounded out Jordan's King Husayn regarding
his attitude toward acceptance of the Saudi throne should thp
Saudi dynasty be overthrown]
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613