CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/10/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02020904
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 20, 1953

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20 October 1953
Copy No. 6 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 33 te/
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE-
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: /72_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
J. Yugoslavia and Italy reject tentative proposal for five-power
ViTrieste talks (page 3).
Tito states his position on Trieste (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. High priority established for transport of Soviet consumer
goods (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
I0( Iranian prime minister reportedly plans military action against
the Qashqai (page 4).
te Arab reaction to the Israeli-Jordanian dispute (page 5).
Britain to make concession on uniform issue in Suez dispute
(page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Yugoslavia and Italy reject tentative proposal for five-power
Trieste talks:
Both Yugoslavia and Italy have rejected
the terms of a tentative Anglo-American
proposal for the holding of five-power
discussions to ensure that the decision
of 8 October is so applied as to bring
about lasting peace on the Trieste issue.
Marshal Tito told the American charge
and the British and French ambassadors
in Belgrade on 18 October that a five-
power conference was acceptable in
principle, but that terms must first be
agreed upon which would not prejudge the outcome by tying it to the
8 October deciSion.
A spokesman for the Italian Foreign
Ministry replied on 18 October that Italy could not accept a five-
power conference on Trieste until the actual transfer of Zone A
to Italy had taken place. Meanwhile, however, Pella told the
British ambassador that he would not insist on taking over full
military administration of Zone A prior to a confefence if the
civil administration of the zone were turned over to Italy.
2. Tito states his position on Trieste:
Marshal Tito told the American, British,
and French representatives in Belgrade
on 18 October that if a partition of the
Free Territory were agreed to, he would
not insist that Italy renounce its claims to areas given to Yugoslavia.
He would, however, maintain his own claims to Zone A. Tito does
want a public declaration by the three Western powers that they will
not support Italian claims. He said this was necessary to refute sus-
picions in the minds of the Yugoslav public that the Western powers
consistently support Italy.
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Tito said that if the 8 October decision
were implemented, Yugoslavia would send troops into Zone A. If
Italian troops entered under cover of the British and American
occupying forces, Yugoslavia would not fight, "since we must not
fight each other." A much more serious threat to good relations
with the West would result from this action, however, since there
was no way to explain to the Yugoslav people the need for such re-
lations "with nations which impose such a diktat on us."
SOVIET UNION
3. High priority established for transport of Soviet consumer goods:
Comment: Such a basic change in
transportation priorities is further indication of the importance
attached to the government's program for rapidly increasing con-
sumer goods availability, since the lower shipment priorities for
other goods will have an adverse effect on industrial production.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Iranian prime minister reportedly plans military action against
the Qashqai:
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Comment: Such a plan, if carried out,
would place the Qashqai, and perhaps other tribes, in opposition
to the government and would probably result in armed conflict.
the Qashqai leaders had pledged to
refrain from hostile action against the government and had refused
Tudeh requests for cooperation.
5. Arab reaction to the Israeli-Jordanian dispute:
Public and private statements by Arab
spokesmen indicate that while ,spontaneous local wrath against
Israel continues high, the Arabs, hay ing restrained their initial
impulse to take military action, are now awaiting Western moves.
Failure on the part of the United States and its allies to act forth-
rightly on this issue by Arab standards will intensify suspicions
of the West and aggravate existing differences.
The Iraqi prime minister, in comment-
ing on the Israeli attack to the British and American ambassadors
In Baghdad, elaborated on the growing Arab hostility toward Britain
and the US and pointed out that repeated unpunished Israeli aggression
promoted this state of being.
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he Jordanian prime minister publicly stated on 18 October
that the future reputation of the United States in the Waddle East
hinged on its performance in the present crisis.
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6. Britain to make concession on uniform issue in Suez dispute:
oreign Secretary Eden told Secretary
ulles on 11 October that the cabinet was
willing to sign an agreement with Egypt
rohibiting the wearing of uniform or the
carrying o weapons by British personnel on the Suez base. However,
he stated that the technicians would never wear uniform outside the
base and normally not inside it.
The Brftish will consider Secretary Dulles'
suggestion that the base become available in the event of a UN decision
that there is "a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression" as well as in the event of an attack on any member of the
Arab League Collective Security Pact.
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The British anticipate little difficulty on
either air facilities or organization of the base. They are now pre-
pared to evacuate their troops in 15 months and have worked out a
time schedule for withdrawing the technicians over a seven-year period.
Comment: Except for the uniform issue,
Britain and Egypt appear claTTFT:greement. The next meeting in
Cairo, which the Egyptians have threatened may prove the last if no
agreement is reached, is now scheduled for 21 October.
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