CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/10/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02020568
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: October 31, 1952

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SECUR NFORMATION
31 October 1952
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
DOCUMENT
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H 70-2
DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECUR NFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Moscow suspected of planting rumors of Franco-Soviet negotia-
tions (page 3).
2. USSR obtaining strategic electronic equipment through London (page 3).
3. Indian Ambassador believes Peiping "feeling way" toward com-
promise on POW issue (page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Unusual stand-down by Communist combat air units in Manchuria
reported (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Council of Economic Mutual Assistance meets in Bucharest (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. New French-German Saar negotiations appear distant (page 6). 3.3(h)(2)
7.
8.
Comment on growing pressure in France for four-power talks (page 7).
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T'PSECRET
GENERAL
1. Moscow suspected of planting rumors of Franco-Soviet negotiations:
Simon Alsot, an employee of the independent
leftist daily Franc-Tireur, attempted in
early October to sell a leading American
newspaper a story regarding secret Franco-
Soviet conversations.
The story alleged that a high French official
engaged in the talks, which were instigated and financed by "powerful
French industrial interests in North Africa" in an effort to impair
American policy in Western Europe and so relieve United States
"pressure" on France concerning North Africa.
American officials investigating Alsot's
alleged documentation concluded that the whole story was fabricated.
Embassy files in Paris describe Alsot as a Communist and a suspected
Moscow agent.
Comment: This information tends to confirm
the theory that Moscow has inspired the oft-repeated rumors of secret
Franco-Soviet negotiations. Recent efforts to investigate such rumors
have shown that they originated with obscure journalists who person-
ally admitted giving them no credence.
2. USSR obtaining strategic electronic equipment through London:
The Soviet foreign trade agency in London
notified the industrial Machinery Import
Agency in Moscow during July and August
of two shipments to Leningrad comprising
technical electronic testing and measur-
ing equipment valued at about $130,000.
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Comment: This specialized equipment, some
of which is embargoed, canThiiitarzed in development of search and
fire control radar, radio communications, proximity fuses, and control
units for guided missiles.
The USSR has given high priority to expansion
of its electronics industry and has surrounded it with strict security
measures.
3. Indian Ambassador believes Peiping "feeling way" toward compromise
on POW issue:
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai
recently summoned the Indian Ambassador
at midnight for a two-hour talk. Chou
denounced the United States for refusing
to discuss the latest Chinese proposals on
ner o ar issue and insisted that all Chinese prisoners
must be repatriated.
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The Ambassador believes that the Chinese
Communists are "feeling the way" toward a compromise based primarily
on a distinction between Chinese Communist and North Korean prisoners.
Comment: Communist negotiators already
have compromised to the extent orieducing their repatriation demands
from 134,000 to 116,000 prisoners. Chou En-lai has further suggested
a willingness to settle for repatriation of 100,000 provided they include
all 20,000 Chinese of whom some 16,000 are unwilling to be repatriated.
Soviet officials have recently hinted in
private conversations in New York that the Communists are approaching
the UN position on the POW issue. Although Peiping may be preparing
to compromise on its demand for the 20,000 Chinese, neither the latest
Chinese proposals nor Chou's remarks to the Indian Anibassador pro-
vide specific evidence of such an intention.
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FAR EAST 3.3(h)(2)
4. Unusual stand-down by Communist combat air units in Manchuria reported:
An unusual three-day stand-down by Chinese
and Soviet combat air units
in Korea on 30 October.
since z.r uctooer only two comoat ttignts
have crossed the Yalu River into North Korea,
flights within Manchuria have continued.
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Training and routine 3.3(h)(2)
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no enemy
aircraft have been sighted by UN pilots during this period.
Comment: This is the first lengthy stand-
down in over a year, and the reason for it is not apparent. While
previous stand-downs of a shorter duration have produced no change in
the enemy operations, a long period of inactivity would enable the enemy
to prepare for maximum effort.
EASTiERN EUROPE
5. Council of Economic Mutual Assistance meets in Bucharest:
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Comment: The last known meeting of the
CEMA congress was in mid-1950. The purpose of a meeting of this
congress immediately after conclusion of the 19th Party Conference
is presumably to receive economic directives on implementation of
the Kremlin trade policy, which is designed to disrupt Western' political
unity by breaking down Western export controls.
WESTERN EUROPE
6, New French-German Saar negotiations appear distant:
The West German Government appears 3.3(h)(2)
unperturbed by the recent breakdown of the
Saar negotiations, and there is little indication
that it will ask for a resumption of French-
German talks soon.
In Paris, Foreign Minister Schuman is re-
ported to have said that little possibility
exists for a compromise of the disputed economic issues until a new
West German Government is elected in 1953.
Minister President Hoffman of the Saar
territory has declared that the Saar elections will be held on 30 Novem-
ber, and that no further postponement is possible unless France and
West Germany reach an agreement before 8 November, when the
electoral campaign will begin.
Comment: Chancellor Adenauer seems
convinced that West German ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties
is assured, and apparently feels that an immediate settlement of the
Saar dispute is now less urgent. West German diplomats also have
suggested that the French Government may be more amenable to
compromise when its domestic political position improves.
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7.
8. Comment on growing pressure in France for four-power talks:
Growing pressure within Premier Pinar s
coalition for four-power talks is suggested by the recent proposal
of National Assembly deputy Andre Denis that opponents of the Bonn
and Paris treaties unite in proposing immediate discussions with the
Soviet Union. Denis made his proposal coincident with an announce-
ment that he had had "most useful talks" in Berlin with East German
Foreign Minister Dertinger and Deputy Premier Nusclike. The results
of his visit, he said, had been made known to "those responsible for
our policy."
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This pressure for four-power talks appears
to be contributing to the government's consideration of Vyshinsky's recent
�approach to Ambassador Ioxe for bilateral efforts toward an East-West
detente. Denis is prominent among the approximately 30 left-wing
deputies of Foreign Minister Schuman's own Popular Republican Party
whom Pinay now needs to conciliate in order to avoid defeat in critical
Assembly voting on foreign policy issues.
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