CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02018031
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01728
• Publication Date: August 4, 1973

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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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4 August 1973
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f_LN PAL IN IF I. t 1(;1- FAll IF TIN niodneed by the Director of Central
his tespori,Thoi !TIPS for orovinina current intelligence hearing on issues
4.11 riry to me President, the National Security Council, and other senior
Oroariceo iii consul ration with the itenartments of State and
- -iecatise of the time factor. arieduate consultation with the department of
inter r IS not reasinie items or portions thereof are produced by the Central
c�isqiiiv and enr ioseo with brackets
14.ftS ,f4 inteihnence information in this publication represent immediate and
views whicn are subiect to modification in the light of turther information
0 items in tn Is Mall 'cation may pe designated specifically for no further
()trier inteliinence items may he oussemmated further, hut only on a
basis
tiN= i-(AL INTELLIGENCE BLit LE TIN is published in both a Top Secret Code-
Ann ser-ti-u eon ion keutpien7s of Me more rightly held Codeword version should
its r orieworti contenis with rei rit the Secret edition.
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Comments Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the CIB Panel Secretary.
Sc No. 00186/73
4 August 1973
CehTeral Intelligence Bulletin
\ CONTENTS
GREECE: A P esident and His roblems (Page 6)
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TOPS
Greece: A President and His Policies
George Papadopoulos' position has been strength-
ened, at least for a time, by the vote on 29 July
that confirmed the new republic and made him presi-
dent until June 1981. Key figures in the former
military regime are now preoccupied with jockeying
for position in the new government. Criticism of
Papadopoulos' personal role will continue, however,
and could still develop into a move by one or an-
other of his colleagues to unseat him.
Papadopoulos worries about three broad catego-
ries of opposition forces:
--The least worrisome are the pre-revolutionary
political leaders. The most vocal are in exile;
they are a nuisance, not a threat. Many of them
represent the extreme right or the extreme left
of pre-revolutionary politics and have little
or no following at home. More moderate poli-
ticians in this group, like former premier
Karamanlis, are beginning to stir, and many
cooperated prior to the plebiscite in urging
a "no" vote. They have no leverage at all on
the present government, and it will be a long
time before they can hope to rally enough pop-
ular support--they would need an especially
burning domestic issue--to make their presence
felt.
--The second category is of more serious con-
cern, but is one which Papadopoulos and his
colleagues have so far been able to handle.
This is an amorphous band of "super-revolution-
aries" made up of younger officers of the Greek
armed forces. They want to purify the revolu-
tion and carry it even further than their su-
periors.
--It is the third category, his comrades of the
1.967 coup, that Papadopoulos must persuade or,
more typically, outmaneuver if he is to stay
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in power. The big four--Pattakos, Makarezos,
Angelis, and Ioannides--control, either directly
or through their subordinates, most of the units
in the armed forces. Ioannides alone could make
or break a putsch through his control of the
military's internal security apparatus and his
personal following among second-rank officers.
Papadopoulos has been able to play his coup
colleagues off against each other, and most
of them would rather have him out in front any-
way. They know, however, that he would prefer
to rule without them, and they rankle at the
inroads he is making into their individual and
collective authority.
Most of the trouble Papadopoulos encountered
during the pre-plebiscite period came from his col-
leagues within the junta. Although most of the mil-
itary leaders favored the abolition of the monarchy
and the creation of a republic, there was consterna-
tion among them when Papadopoulos moved so swiftly,
leaving them no time to object to details of his
plans. They dislike the idea that Papadopoulos gains
even more power under the new republic, while theirs
may be diminished substantially. Some senior mili-
tary people--like Ioannides--fear that parliamentary
elections will open the door to the influences their
1967 coup was intended to suppress.
They chafe most of all, however, over Papadop-
oulos' secrecy, which has separated them from the
making of policy. Most of Papadopoulos' senior mil-
itary colleagues agree that they must watch him
closely and find a way to make their own influence
felt more heavily on his decisions.
During the next month or so, Papadopoulos and
his senior colleagues will be testing each other's
strengths. They will also be reorganizing the gov-
ernment apparatus for the new republic. The Supreme
Court will validate the 78.4-percent affirmative vote
in the next two weeks. The formal complaints of op-
position politicians over voting irregularities will
undoubtedly be ignored. There will be minor insti-
tutional changes; for example, a constitutional court
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may soon be set up to oversee the eventual formation
of political parties. Extensive discussion over how
many and what kind of parties should be allowed is
probable. Some cabinet members may be installed in
office, but the important posts will not be filled
until fall. That should give Papadopoulos ample
time to decide which of his military associates he
can safely fire and which he must keep on.
Later in the fall, Papadopoulos will face re-
newed criticism from outside the regime. The stu-
dents have promised to resume their agitation for
educational reform. Their demonstrations last spring
turned into an attack on the regime, and Papadopoulos'
heavy-handed tactics were an embarrassment to many
government leaders, including some key military of-
ficers. Inflation is another growing problem. Pro-
test strikes could hit the big cities in consequence.
These and other problems may significantly
weaken Papadopoulos' position. Military critics
will almost certainly move to exploit all opportuni-
ties to preserve or enhance their positions at
Papadopoulos' expense. In addition, having committed
himself to elections in 1974, Papadopoulos will be
under international pressure to meet that deadline.
During the same period, resistance among the military
to elections is likely to rise, and sometime before
national elections actually take place Papadopoulos
could face a concerted effort by his associates to
bring him down.
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