CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/10/16

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02018003
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
June 6, 2019
Document Release Date: 
June 27, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 16, 1952
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15652968].pdf217.28 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 *.ae TOP S SECURIT.YINFORMATION 16 October 1952 Copy No. 5., CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN toe DOCUMENT NO a NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2A DATENDA4 77 REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) SEC INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 SUMMARY FAR EAST 1, North Korean aircraft vacate combat airfields in Yalu River complex (page 3). SOUTHEAST ASIA 2. French clearing operations may have upset Viet Minh plans (page 3). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Ibn Saud opposes withdrawing troops from Buraimi (page 4). 4. Change in Egyptian Re gency Council emphasizes army's strength (page 4), 5. Communist-front party will run candidates in Greek elections (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 6. French report West Berliners shifting in favor of four-power talks (page 5). 7. Prospects for Belgian ratification of EDC treaty worsen (page 6). 8, Italian leaders to block opposition to EDC at Socialist Conference (page 7). * * * * - 2 - 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) �...-Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 3.5(c, FAR EAST 1. North Korean aircraft vacate combat airfields in Yalu River complex: 3.3(h)(2) Comment: These transfers will practically empty the airfields in Yalu River complex of North Korean air units, still largely in a training phase. The move may be designed to provide facilities for additional trained Soviet or Chinese combat units. SOUTHEAST ASIA 2. French clearing operations may have upset Viet Minh plans: French headquarters in Indochina believes 3.3(h)(2) that current clearing operations and the partial interdiction of Viet Minh attempts to infiltrate the Tonkin delta have upset the over-ail v...3z. Minh campaign plan. The delivery of Chinese Communist aid, currently estimated by the French at 500 tons a month, has been rendered increasingly difficult by the bombing of supply routes and a shortage of coolie labor. Comment: Viet Minh offensive operations would be initiated during the latter part of October. It is not yet possible to determine whether the French action may have forced a postponement, - 3 - 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 ET The estimated Chinese aid contrasts with 1,000 tons a month believed to have been delivered last winter. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3. Ibn Saud opposes withdrawing troops from Buraimi: 3.3(h)(2) Comment: Although the American Consul at Dhahran believes that the situation is improved for the moment, the King's adamant attitude on withdrawing troops from Buraimi may encourage the outbreak of further incidents in the area. 4. Change in Egyptian Regency Council emphasizes army's strength: General Nagib's removal of Colonel 3.3(h)(2) Mohanna from the Egyptian Regency Council is considered by Ambassador Caffery to be a sign of the strength of the army's inner circle. 3.5(c) The Embassy points out that Mohanna did not belong to the military group which planned the 23 July coup, and that he was selected for the Regency Council only because of his high reputation as an army officer. Caffery adds that some sources in Egypt believe that Mohanna represented the Moslem Brotherhood and that his dismissal may be connected with army efforts to curb the Brotherhood's influence. 4 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Comment: Nagib's summary dismissal of Colonel Mohanna and the resignation of Mohammad Barakat remove the two strongest men from the three-man Regency Council, further evidence that the army is steadily consolidating its position. Prince Moneim, the provisional regent, can be expected to be completely docile. 5. Communist-front party will run candidates in Greek elections: 3.5(c) The Communist-dominated EDA Party 3.3(h)(2) announced on 12 October that its efforts to cooperate with other parties had failed, and that consequently it will run its own candidates throughout Greece in the approaching elections. The announcement added that the door was still open for cooperation. Comment: The strength of Marshal Papagosi rightist Greek Rally ancrthe left-center EPEK-Liberal coalition is nearly equal, and it is difficult to predict the outcome of the elections. Although EDA leaders recently stated that Prime Minister Plastiras' EPEK could not blackmail them into joining an electoral coalition, they are presumably aware of the ad- vantages which the reiteration of their independent status gives them in extracting concessions from E:PEK. 3.3(h)(2) WESTERN EUROPE 6. French report West Berliners shifting in favor of four-power talks: 3.3(h)(2) a result of the initiative of the German Democratic Republic in mid-September, public opinion in Berlin has "clearly" shifted in favor o negotiations with the USSR. 3.5(c) /Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 West Berliners, led by Mayor Reuter, have regarded past Soviet and East German unity offers as propa- ganda, but are taking the latest overtures seriously. They feel that the Germans may have a chance for unity if they sacrifice the Polish-administered territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. They believe that the USSR has abandoned the idea of a neutral Germany, and now simply requires "guarantees" concerning the German army and relinquishment by Germany of the Polish-administered territory. Comment: Sentiment for four-power talks is widespread in West Germany, although there are no other reports of its extent in West Berlin. Although there is no evidence that the USSR would permit the unification of Germany on the terms described, certain West German circles believe that a Soviet policy shift in that direction is imminent. 7. Prospects for Belgian ratification of EDC treaty, worsen: The American Embassy in Brussels believes 3.3(h)(2) that the Belgian Government may be expected to grow even more timid about ratification of the EDC treaty as a consequence of its unexpectedly heavy defeat in thel2October communal elections. The Embassy notes that the opposition Socialist Party may prefer to let the weak Social Christian (Catholic) government remain in power for the next few months to bear the onus of sponsoring taxes for support of the new budget. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Comment: Just before the elections, Foreign Minister Van Zeeland indicated that because of the govern- ment's slim parliamentary majority and widespread doubts on EDC, the arrangements for voting on the EDC treaty would have to be made carefully. ----Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 TtSECR ET 3.5(c) 8. Italian leaders to block opposition to EDC at Socialist Conferencez Italian Democratic Socialist leaders Saragat 3.3(h)(2) and Lombardo have promised to make every effort to prevent use of the forthcoming International Socialist Conference at Milan to retard EDC ratification. Saragat doubts that a call for four-power talks on Germany would carry at the conference. The Amefican Embassy in Rome has emphasized to both men that any resolution bearing on German unity should be premised on free elections, Comment: At the recent Democratic Socialist congress, Saragat was elected secretary general and his right-wing groups won 12 of the 21 seats on the directorate. Lombardo reiliesented Italy at the EDC treaty negotiations, The West German Social Democrats are expected to propose at Milan a resolution in favor of four-power talks. Such talks would inevitably delay ratification of the EDC treaty. TOSEC1 �Approved for Release: 2019/05/28 CO2018003 3.5(c)