CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02014434
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 1, 1951

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1 August 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 3
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, ik
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUT :
DATE I REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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J. CAL-' orsttlkitgiAlu,{
GENERAL
Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy considered likely (page 3).
USSR
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
6. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees
in Indochina. (page 6).
NEAR EAST
EASTERN EUROPE
Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
10. Austrian Foreign Minister /Oaks with favor'upon reopening of treaty
talks (page 9).
11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions (page 9). '
12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy collaboration (page 10).
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GENERAL,
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poviet 'peaceful oexistence" policy considered likely:
3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in London suggests the possi-
bility that the USSR will now seek a period of
"peaceful coexistence" in which to increase its
Own strength while the West is weakened by
unpreparedness, complacency) or economic crises. Recalling the prece-
dent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 1930's, the embassy characterizes
the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat"
and an imminent showdown with the West
The USSR may even, for the time being, re-
frain from further local aggressions through Satellites, since the risk of
thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR cares
to incur.
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The embassy considers that a renewed at-
tempt to achieve an Austrian Treaty should be used to test the new Soviet
protestations of a desire to cooperate.
Comment: The only evidence of a possible
change in Soviet foreign policies aside from a professed willingness to
settle the Korean War, lies in the trade and cultural fields, but activities
in these fields have .not so far involved any real concessions on the part of
the Soviet Government They have coincided with a rather sharp shift in
Soviet propaganda, apparently designed to persuade susceptible non-
Communist ..governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet
Union is no longer necessary.
USSR
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French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina:
The French Foreign Office appears to be re-
ceding from its opposition to the repatriation
to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops in-
terned in Indochina, 3.3(h)(2)
Nationalist Minister in Paris.
Although emphasizing that General de Lattre
and the next French Cabinet must approve any decision regarding the intern-
ees, a Foreign Office official hinted to a US Embassy official that it might
be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await the Chinese Communist
reaction.
Comment: The Chinese Nationalist Govern-
ment has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain
permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French,
however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action
might provide the Chinese Communists with a pretext for intervening in
Indochina.
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The above message is the second report
during the past week that the French position in this matter has been
relaxed.
NEA. .AST
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EASTERN EUROPE
Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral:
3.3(h)(2)
The immense power of the Polish Catholic
Church was demonstrated on 27 July when
nearly a million persons attended the funeral
rites for Cardinal Sapieha despite Commu-
nist warnings against absenteeism and suppression of information concern-
ing the rites. The fervor of the public's Mass demonstration derived from
the fact that Sapieha symbolized, for the Polish people, national and spirit-
ual independence. Polish Primate Wyszynski's funeral oration indicated
that the Church, while not seeking open conflict with the government, was
determined to resist, with the firm backing of the mass of the Polish
people, any further CoMraunist incursions into the spiritual life of the
country.
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The US Embassy in Warsaw comments that,
in death, the Cardinal made his most crucial contribution to the unity and
strength of the Polish Catholic Church's struggle against Communism
Comment Cardinal Sapieha was nationally
revered as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church in Poland. Because
of his greatage (he was 86 when he died), he stepped aside several years
ago so that Archbishop Wyszynski, who was younger and stronger, could
become Poland's Primate,
WESTERN EUROPE
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10, Austrian Foreign Minister looks with favor upon reopening of treaty talks:
3.3(h)(2)
Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has wel-
comed the US suggestion that negotiations be
resumed on the.Austrian treaty, oil the
grounds that the continuity of four-power
treaty efforts should not be interrupted altogether. He believes that there
Is not at present any urgency for a meeting of the deputies, but that it might
be important to hold a session in September, depending on developments of
the next few weeks.
Comment In Iune of this year Gruber hoped
for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore
regarded the deputies' sessions as unnecessary. Now, with no prospect of
a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitude.
11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions: 3.3(h)(2)
US officials in Berlin feel that the success of
Soviet restrictions on Berlin trade, which
were originally related to immediate problems,
may have influenced the USSR to continue the
restrictions as a means to wider economic and political objectives. These
officials foresee a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain and develop the pre-
sent harassing restrictions, and estimate that the USSR could resist the
effect of present and proposed Allied ec nomic countermeasures for another
two months. If, however/ broader objectives appear feasible, the USSR
would be willing to persist much longer.
_Ciananagnt; The use of a limited air lift to re-
lieve the large backlog of stalled goods is in prospect, and some commercial
air freight shipments on a small scale have .already been made. Neverthe-
less, a firm Allied stand on the issue continues to be delayed by French re-
luctance to extend present countermeasures for fear that the "bluff would be
called" by the USSR. Present countermeasures now include the refusal to
approve the new interzonal trade pact and the institution of partial embargo
of shipments to East Germany. French officials fear that Allied counter-
measures will so discourage the USSR over the possibility of a restoration
of normal trade that it will be willing to incur the economic loss involved
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in the imposition of a blockade.
The East German economy would be serious-
ly harmed by a considerable extension of the present partial embargo of
key goods from West Germany, because, under normal trade conditions,
the legally authorized trade has always provided an excellent cover for
illegal shipments that have benefited the East
12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy. collaboration:.
3.3(h)(2)
The joint Norway-Netherlands experimental
uranium pile at Kjeller, Norway, was
operated for the first time on 30 Suly.
Comment Operation of this experimental
uranium pile represents the first major technical achievement by the
Norway-Netherlands Ioint Commission. The contract for the project was
officially signed on 12 April 1951.
- Because this is strictly an experimental
pile and its plutonium output will be negligible, it can provide only for
the production of radioactive isotopes for tracer and medical use, and
will have no military implications.
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