CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/08
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02008408
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
May 24, 2019
Document Release Date:
May 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 8, 1952
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15638384].pdf | 232.78 KB |
Body:
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SECUfl INFORMATION
8 January 1952
Copy No. 4 (
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
2/
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
DECIASSIF!ED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVEV1 DATE:
AUT.
MIIEViDijER.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
SEC INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. London Embassy reports basic British position toward USSR (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Plan to remove Burmese Premier reported (page 3).
EASTERN EUROPE
3. French Ambassador discounts mass arrests in Czechoslovakia (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. German ,church leaders disturbed over Niemoeller trip to Moscow
(page 5).
5. Ireland rejects Mutual Security Act terms (page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
6. American supply .of Chilean copper threatened (page 6).
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GENERAL
1. London Embassy reports basic British position toward USSR:
The US Embassy in London reports that, 3.3(h)(2)
although it is impossible to predict what Prime
Minister Churchill may say in the Washington
talks about USSR-Western relations, he and
Foreign Secretary Eden have with them a paper, approved by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, outlining a position which British officials feel is close to that of the
United States.
The Embassy reports that this paper views
relations with Russia in three stages: (1) the current phase, in which
agreement is impossible and during which the West should build up its
strength while keeping channels of negotiation open; (2) the period after
"parity of strength" is reached, in which limited agreements may be � s-
sible; and (3) a period in which the Soviet empire will start crumbling be-
cause of its own internal weaknesses.
FAR EAST
2. Plan to remove Burmese Premier reported:
The Burmese Commander in Chief, Ne Win, and 3.3(h)(2)
leaders of the Burma Socialist Party are
reliably reported to be planning a bloodless
coup to remove Premier Thakin Nu from office.
The action is to be announced on 9 January.
�
Justification for the coup is said to be docu-
mentary evidence that the Premier is plotting with the hill tribes against
Ne
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Comment: This report, if correct, means
that Ne Win has forsaken his neutral political position which, heretofore, has
served to restrain the Socialists from taking precipitate action against
Thakin Nu.
The Socialist Party is the majority party in
Parliament and has been reported by numerous sourpes to be maneuvering
for several months to replace the non-party Premier. Socialist leaders are
strongly inclined to the left and are critical of Thakin Nu's increasingly pro-
Western and anti-Commimist attitude.
The plotters may hope to reduce the risk of an
adverse public reaction to removal of the widely respected Premier by
linking him with the hill peoples, for whom the Burmans hold a-historical
antipathy.
EASTERN EUROPE -
3. French Ambassador discounts mass arrests in Czechoslovakia:
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The French Ambassador in Prague reports that
although there has been a number of arrests in
connection with the SlanSky affair, the numbers
cited in the Western press are exaggerated. He
points out that the government appears to be
proceeding with a purge of individuals rather than with mass arrests. The
Ambassador discounts recurrent rumors that the common Iewish origin of
many of the arrested persons was responsible for their removal.
Comment: The French Ambassador's opinion
agrees with that of the US Embassy in Prague, which estimated that no more
than 150 persons had been arrested following Slansky's fall.
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WESTERN EUROPE
4. German. chura leaders disturbed over Niemoeller trip to Moscow:
Protestant Church leaders in West Germany,
mixed in their reaction to Pastor Niemoeller's
current visit to Moscow, point out that the trip
will be a substantial Soviet propaganda victory
even 1. e I goes no urther than to talk about concessions such as the
release of German prisoners of war.
Church officials, wholly surprised by the
suddenness of Niemoeller's trip, are not hopeful of great results, but feel
that the average churchman with relatives still held in the USSR will be
enthusiastic. Niemoeller critics are more than ever convinced that, un-
wittingly or not, he is playing the Soviet game. Bishop Dibelius, the head
of the Protestant Church, although agreeing partially with criticism of
the visit, wishes to refrain from public censure in order not to publicize
church differences.
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Comment: Niemoeller's trip coincides with
current Soviet pressure to prevent West German integration with the West.
His public statements since the end of the war, particularly his neutralist
views, have aroused considerable criticism. In April 1951, after a rebuke
from Bishop Dibelius, he stated that he would refrain from political utterances.
He has nevertheless continued to speak, with the support of a minority of
Evangelical Church leaders.
5. Ireland rejects Mutual Security Act terms:
Ireland is not prepared to accept the terms of
the Mutual Security Act because of the implied
involvement in collective Western defense.
Although Irish officials hope that projects
already approved under ECA will be carried out without a new agreement,
they are prepared to sacrifice the financial benefits involved, amounting to
about one million dollars, rather than sign the MSA agreement.
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The Embassy believes that pressure on the Irish
Government would be undesirable in view of possible "internal political
repercussions.
Comment: The Irish Government replied to the
original submission of the MSA agreement with a statement on Partition --
the perennial excuse for not joining Western defense plans -- and a renewed
request to buy US arms. The amount of money involved is evidently not
enough to make the Irish Government run the risk of domestic political
attack for appearing to violate its neutrality policy.
LATIN AMERICA
6. American supply of Chilean copper threatened:
According to a reliable source the Chilean 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador in Washington has been instructed
by President Gonzalez Videla to inform the
United States that any effort to disturb the
favorable sale by Chile of its quota of copper pro-.
duced from American-controlled mines could lead
Chile to dispose of its total production. Legis-
lation already passed by the Chamber of Deputies
and pending before the Senate would authorize
the President to take such action.
The Chilean Ambassador, as a result of the
recent statement on copper by the US Defense Production Administrator, had
previously informed his government that the moment was opportune for noti-
fying the United States that any attempt to fix a copper price disadvantageous
to Chile could lead the latter to withdraw from the International Materials
Conference,
Comment: The US-Chilean copper agreement
provides that eighty percent of the large production of US-controlled mines
may be purchased by the 'United States at 27. 5 cents per pound, and that
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Chile may freely dispose of the remaining production. The minimum price
for "free disposal" copper is 54 cents per pound. Chile accepted the
International Materials Conference recommendations on copper allocation
only with respect to eighty percent of the large mine production.
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