CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/25
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02008385
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 25, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603287].pdf | 189.02 KB |
Body:
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26 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 5/
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
REVIEW DATE:
NEXT 290
CLA.SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
AUT
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DA _ VIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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3. Comment on Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech (page 4).
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. Soviet attitude on seized Berlin district still unclear (page 6).
7. German defense contribution may be delayed by French stand (page 6).
8. Communists inspire strikes in German ports and plan Dutch dock strike
(page 7).
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GENERAL
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Comment on Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech:
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Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech before the
'Nati nal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
� an allegedly representative body which invariably endorses the Communist
program � was his first major policy statement since June 1950. In con-
trast to the 1950 speech, which Outlined Communist China's long-range pros-
pects, Mao's most recent address emphasized the "great success" of the
regime's three-point program for 1951: aiding Korea, advancing land reform
and suppressing "counter-revolutionaries."
Although reaffirming other recent Communist
declarations that the Chinese commitment in Korea "must continue" until the
UN agrees to a "peaceful settlement," Mao did not suggest any alteration in
Peiping's previous terms for such a settlement and did not indicate Peiping's
future course of action in Korea.
Characterizing the USSR as the "most trustworthy
and loyal ally" of China, Mao asserted that the Sino-Soviet alliance ensures
the "doom" of "imperialist domination" of the world, and that Soviet strength
has "greatly increased. " The first contention has been common in Communist
propaganda of the past year, while the second has been emphasized throughout
the Soviet world since Stalin's recent claim of Soviet atomic achievements.
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WESTERN EUROPE
. Soviet attitude on seized Berlin district still unclear:
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Soviet authorities in Berlin on 22 October ordered
the East German Peoples' Police to withdraw from
Steinstuecken, the small district in the US sector
of BerU ized,by1 .PeopJes'..Police unitS four
days earlier. Although the acting chief of the Soviet
Control Commission in Berlin explained to the US
Commandant that the community would revert to
its former status, he requested further documen-
tation of the US claim to the sector.
During the conversations, the Soviet representa-
tives gave the impression that they wished to extricate themselves from the
whole affair by shifting the blame to the East Germans. In a later press,state-
ment, however, they stressed that the future status of the area would be studied
by Soviet and US specialists.
Comment: At the_time the East Germans with-
drew from Steinstuecken, the Allies were considering retaliatory action in the
form of denying the Russians access to the important radio building which they
now occupy in the British sector. Despite indications that the USSR was
backing down completely, an unconfirmed press dispatch now reports that a
group of Soviet soldiers and Peoples' Police returned to the area on 24
October,
7. German defense contribution may be delayed by French stand:
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The US delegation to Allied discussions in London
n a German financial contribution to Western de-
ense warns that the French position on this subject
hreatens to "move back the entire timetable" for
nc usion o con rac ua relations with the Germans, the establishment of
the European Defense Forces, and the raising of German units.
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France &s insisting that a common defense budget
be applied by the European Defense organization from its inception and hence
seems to contemplate a "much fuller working out and implementation" of
financial arrangements than was envisaged by the US.
Comment: France had previously approved post-
ponement by the Defense ConfeTli'Cce- of consideration of a budget, pending
at least the initial results of the current NATO study of its members' poten-
tial defense contributions.
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Communists inspire strikes in German ports and plan Dutch dock strike:3.3(h)(2)
Communist-instigated wildcat strikes have broken
out in the key North German ports of Bremen and
Hamburg. In Bremen, city and union officials
agree that 80 percent of the dockworkers are out
only because they fear Communist strong-arm
tactics. Although the strikes are still confined
to these two ports, they are rumored to be part
of a long-range Communist program supported by
a large fund sent from East Germany.
Meanwhile, other reports indicate that the Dutch
Communist-controlled dockers' union is planning
to stage a 24-hour strike in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The walk-out is to be
based on demands for a ten percent wage increase and a Christmas bonus;
its success will allegedly determine the advisability of attempting a general
strike.
Comment: Daring the past several months there
have been unconfirmed reports of a possible wave of strikes throughout
Western Europe this fall.
Communist strength in the German dock areas
traditionally has been great. Communist influence in the Dutch dock areas
has declined since the failure of the 1950 appeal not to unload MDAP ship-
ments. A 24-hour strike now would serve to test present Communist
strength in the area. No date for the Dutch strike has been given.,
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