CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/21
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02008384
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 21, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603095].pdf | 266.35 KB |
Body:
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21 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCarTENT tact
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
; DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS r. C
N.E.xT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HTIO-au.
GAT4 lei in REvinivE
47
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. French oppose invitation to Arab states to join in Middle East Command
(page 3).
FAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
SOUTH ASIA
3. India faces dilemma on the Suez Canal issue (page 4).
4. Pakistani Government identifies Prime Minister's assassin as an Afghan
national (page 4).
5. Comment on constituent Assembly elections in Kashmir (page 5).
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EASTERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. US officals indicate US claims to Soviet-seized zone in Berlin are
tenuous (page 6).
9. Austrian contribution to Western defense discussed (page 7).
10. Madrid government charges UK with sabotaging US aid program in
Spain (page 8).
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GENERAL
1 French oppose invitation to Arab states to join in Middle East Command:
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The French Foreign Office opposes the US
suggestion for an early quadripartite approach to
the Arab states inviting their participation in the
Middle East Command. The French consider that
�in the "present state of public emotion" the Arab governments would not
"dare" show a lack of solidarity with Egypt and that even a dernarche
stressing NATO determination to proceed with Middle East Command plans
and activities would be unwise.
France is "in full agreement," however, that the
closest possible cooperation among the four powers organizing Middle East
defense is necessary and believes that the US suggestion can be reconsidered
if the Egyptian situation "quiets down."
Comment: For the immediate future, the Arab
governments will be inclined to give the Egyptians strong support. The
Arab states would tend to be impressed, however, with a show of determi-
nation by the NATO powers. Such a policy could be expected later to
tempt individual Arab governments to participate in the Middle East Com-
mand should the present conflict of interests in the Middle East result in
a stalemate.
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SOUTH ASIA
3. India faces dilemma on the Suez Canal issue:
3.3(h)(2)
India understands and is sympathetic to the
Egyptian desire for complete independence and
freedom, according to the Secretary-General of
India's Ministry of External Affairs. However,
this same official gave the US Charge in New Delhi the impression that India's
practical interests might cause it to sympathize with the British. He said
that his country's position on the Suez question was, as in the Iranian case,
extremely difficult because of its desire nQt to strain its relations with either
the Moslem world or the Commonwealth.
Comment: On Far Eastern problems India, with
few economic interests, is pronouncedly anti-Western and pro-Asian. In Near
and Middle Eastern Affairs where Indian economic and security considerations
are at stake, it apparently is willing to let idealism give way to expediency.
4. Pakistani Government identifies Prime Minister's assassin as an Afghan
national
3.3(h)(2)
An Afghan national assassinated the Pakistani
Prime Minister, according to an official
release by the Government of Pakistan. \
3.(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Karachi reports that if this
orma ion is accepted as true, the public will demand war.
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Comment: There is sufficient doubt about the
matter to indicate that the identification of the killer may be merely an at-
tempt to divert the attention of the Pakistani public. The Afghan Government
has officially denied any connection with the killing. The situation in Pakis-
tan seems to be well in hand, and there is nothing to indicate that extreme
nationalists could promote a war against Afghanistan
3.3(h)(2)
5. Comment on constituent Assembly elections in Kashmir:
The Kashmir National Conference, the govern-
ment in Indian-held Kashmir, has concluded its "elections" for a constituent
Assembly. Only two of the 75 seats were contested by anti-Indian elements,
and even these were won by the National Conference. These Indian-sponsored
elections, whose results were a foregone conclusion, have already created
antagonism and bitterness in Pakistan.
Although, in any UN discussions on Kashmir,
India will place great emphasis on the outcome of these elections as ex-
pressions of the popular will of the people, any argument based on these
elections is worthless.
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EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
8. US officials indicate US claims to Soviet-seized zone in Berlin are tenuous:
Soviet Zone police on 18 October occupied 3.3(h)(2)
small Berlin district of Steinstuecken and
announced that henceforth the area will be admin-
istratively incorporated into the city of Potsdam.
spo esmen assert that the area belongs to the Berlin District of
Zehlendorf and is therefore a part of the US sector.
Commenting on the seizure, US officials ob-
serve that, although the area was part of the Berlin district assigned to the
US in 1944, the US has never exercised effective control over it. The West
Ts011
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Berlin government has continued to administer the district in matters of
elections and social security payments, but West Berlin police have not
patrolled the area since 1948.
US authorities are considering what reprisals
can be undertaken.
Comment: A somewhat similar "nibbling"
operation was undertaken by Soviet and East Berlin authorities against the
British sector earlier this year. Inasmuch as the division of Berlin between
the East and West left the demarcation line vague in many places, there is
ample opportunity for such incidents. The West Berlin population is aroused
over the unilateral Soviet action, and Western authorities have demanded
that the Russians withdraw from the area.
9. Austrian contribution to Western defense discussed:
3.3(h)(2)
US officials in Vienna have suggested that "at
some suitable time" US political and military
officials should once more discuss with the
government what military contribution Austria is
willing to make in the event of a Soviet attack. The US Legation points out
that any estimate of Austria's military manpower potential would necessitate
a definite statement from the government of its willingness to commit the
gendarmerie and to call for volunteers to fight with Western forces.
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Conversations regarding such a commitment
would require the West to state an intention to hold as much of Austria as
possible. Previous reactions of Austrian government officials when approached
on this subject are described as "mixed."
Comment: While there is no question that the
sympathies of the government and people are wholly with the West, both
Austrian and US officials in Vienna have been reluctant to formalize any con-
nection between Austria and Western defense plans prior to an Austrian
treaty. Soviet authorities have recently charged that Austria is being incor-
porated into the NATO organization and have warned of the dire consequences
of such action.
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10. Madrid government charges UK with sabotaging US aid program in SP)
(2)
For the second time in three months the Spanish
Ambassador in London has lodged with the
Foreign Office an official protest against the
British Government's "very unfriendly attitude"
oward Spain. The Foreign Office confidentially informed the US Ambassador
that the new Spanish note, dated 12 October, is couched in stronger language,
and complains, among other things, that Britain is sabotaging Spain's
chances for US dollar aid.
It is feared in British diplomatic circles that
the Madrid government may be preparing to press Spanish claims on Gibraltar,
possibly accompanied by a threat to expropriate the British-financed Rio
Tinto copper mines. The Foreign Office, however, is inclined to believe that
the Spanish action was calculated to hasten the adoption of a favorable British
policy toward Spain in the event that the 25 October elections bring the Conser-
vatives to power.
Comment' The earlier Spanish note on 21 July
followed the British-French demarche against the US-Spanish mutual defense
talks. It protested'bitterly against British "interference with Spain's sover-
eign rights. " The 12 October note appears to reflect a Spanish fear that the
UK may have attempted at Ottawa and Washington to minimize Spain's strate-
gic capabilities, thereby placing in jeopardy the only claim Spain might have
for US financial assistance.
It is not unlikely that the Franco regime is
trying to capitalize on current British diplomatic reverses in the Middle East
in order to remind the Foreign Office of Spain's latent capabilities for harass-
ing the British in the Mediterranean.
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