CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008383
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 19, 1951

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19 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
r.ocumENT NO.
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NEX7 DATE' I
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DATE/244 r 7 REviEwER
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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3. Arab states not likely at present to accept membership in Middle East
Command (page 4). 3.3(h)(2)
4. French favor strong stand in Near East (page 4).
6. Early Libyan independence seen as possible new grounds for criticizing
West (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
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7. Austria proposes counter-propaganda move on World Peace Council
meeting (page 6).
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3. Arab states not likely at present to accept membership in Middle East
Command:
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The Saudi Arabian Minister in Baghdad believes
that because of Egypt's refusal to join the Middle
East Command no other Arab states will accept
the plan. He told the US Ambassador in Baghdad
1. w e y angerous for any Arab leader to attempt to force his coun-
try into such an organization without prior general agreement.
The Iraqi Prime Minister, although showing in-
terest in the Command proposal, expressed similar opinions to the US and
British Ambassadors in Baghdad.
Comment: As Arab reactions continue to be re-
ported, it is becoming clear that Arab participation in the Middle East Com-
mand cannot be anticipated while the Anglo-Egyptian dispute remains unre-
solved. British Foreign Office spokesmen also believe that the Iranians would
refuse an associate membership in the Command were it offered them at the
present time.
4. French favor strong stand in Near East:
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France strongly supports the British stand in
defense of the Suez Canal and favors continuance
of efforts to establish the Middle East Command,
regardless of the Egyptian rejection. A Foreign
iviinistry spokesman states that his government is informing the British of
this position in answer to Morrison's statement to the US and France that
Britain is determined to remain in the Canal Zone, The French want to keep
open the sea routes to Indochina, and they are anxious to check the Egyptians
before French North Africa is affected.
Comment: French insistence on a unified Western
policy in the Near East increases as the situation there becomes more
threatening for all Western interests in the area. While the French are con-
cerned over their investments in Iraq and the Suez Canal, their chief worry
seems to be the implications for North Africa of an increasingly aggressive
Arab nationalism.
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6. Early Libyan independence seen as possible new grounds for criticizing West:
The US Embassy in London considers that
Near Eastern developments may make unwise the
British proposal to grant independence to Libya
prior to the next meeting of the UN General
sse yo m assy thinks that the US, Great Britain and France may
be placed in a difficult situation in the General Assembly if they are forced to
explain the coincidence between early independence and the announcement of
military negotiations with Libya.
The UN Commissioner for Libya is opposed to
giving the Libyans independence by 1 November on the grounds that they are
not ready to assume such responsibility.
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Comment: The General Assembly resolution on
Libya states that independence is to be granted by 1 January 1952, Both
France and Britain, administering powers, admit that the level of political
development will cause difficulties whenever independence is granted. How-
ever, they have favored early independence in an effort to forestall an an-
ticipated Egyptian campaign in the General Assembly to have the period of
Libyan tutelage extended in the hope of being able to undermine Western
influence.
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The Libyans are pressing for independence, and
the West is anxious to capitalize on their pro-Western disposition to secure
military facilities. The current Egyptian attack against British treaty rights
at Suez and the French position in Morocco will make Britain and France
receptive to the suggested postponement of Libyan independence.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Austria proposes counter-propaganda move on World Peace Council meeting:
3.3(h)(2)
The Austrian Cabinet has decided to issue a
strong statement on the meeting of the World
Peace Council in Vienna, scheduled for 1 to 5
November. The statement will assert that the
r' Council is unwanted and uninvited, and that no Austrian should associate
himself with this Soviet-controlled movement.
Foreign Minister Gruber has requested US co-
operation in a propaganda campaign exposing Soviet militarism and Satellite
remilitarization, to be followed by a "silent treatment" of the Council
meeting itself. The Austrian Government feels that this will be a more use-
ful counter-move than public demonstrations.
Comment: The Austrian Government has ex-
pressed increasing concern over the tendency of the international Communist
movement to choose Vienna as a center for its activities, and apparently
hopes that an unfriendly reception may reverse this trend. The presence of
the Soviet occupation forces handicaps the government in a more effective
resistance.
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