CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008382
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 18, 1951

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18 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO GIIANGE IN CLASS.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
. British accepting further amendments to draft resolution age 3
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3.3(h)(2)
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FAR EAST
33(h)(2)
6. Recent Viet Minh operations allegedly part ot Peiping plan to mvaae
Indochina (page 6). 3.3(h)(2)
SOUTH ASIA
8. Comment on new appointments in the Pakistani Government (page 7).
NEAR EAST
g. British fly reinforcements to Suez Canal Zone (page 8).
EASTERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
11. USSR again violates agreement by rejecting Berlin trade permiis (page 9).
12. Serious strike threat is posed in Belgium (page 9).
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OENERAL
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2. British accepting further amendments to draft resolution:
The British Foreign Office has authorized the
acceptance of the Yugoslav and Indian amendments
to the British draft resolution on the Iranian
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crisis. The Foreign Office is discouraged at the prospect of thus further
weakening the resolution but could see no other way to obtain seven affirmative
votes.
Comment: The amendments would omit any
reference to the 5 July decision of the International Court of Justice which the
Iranians had previously refused to recognize.
The British, in order to obtain Security
Council action of some sort on Iran, have retreated from their position of a
week ago, when they decided to introduce the resolution whether or not seven
votes were forthcoming. Although the resolution may receive seven affirma-
tive votes, Iran and the USSR continue to assert that this question is not within
the jurisdiction of the Security Council.
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6., Recent Viet Minh operations allegedly part of Peiping plan to invade Indochina:
It is rumored that
the recent operations were a result of pressure
from Peiping to clear up western Tonkin and thus
permit the movement of Chinese Communist
orces m o near y Laos. this is intended to pave the
way for an invasion of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: An attack on Southeast Asia by way of
Laos would provide the Chinese Communists with an opportunity for maximum
disruption with a relatively small force. American and British observers, as
well as General de Lattre, have shown concern over the possibility of such a
flanking movement, which would enable the Chinese Communists to avoid
jurisdictional friction with the Viet Mirth army and would obviate the problem
which a direct assault on French positions in the delta would pose� 3.3(h)(2)
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SOUTH ASIA
8. Comment on new appointments in the Pakistani Government:
The appointment of Finance Minister Qhulam
Mohammad as Governor-General of Pakistan to succeed Khwaja Nazimuddin,
who resigned on 16 October to become acting Prime Minister, indicates that
the reorganization of the Pakistani Government is proceeding along conserva-
tive lines in as satisfactory a manner as can be expected. It does not,
however, assure eventual political stability in Pakistan.
Ghulam Mohammad has been generally acknowl-
edged to be the most competent cabinet minister after Liaquat Ali Khan, and
he might have become Prime Minister had he not been hampered by serious,
chronic illness. His appointment as Governor-General, a post which requires
less exertion than that of the Prime Minister, should increase public confidence
in the government.
Khwaja Nazimuddin, a prominent and capable
member of the ruling Moslem League party, presumably took over the Prime
Ministership on a temporary basis, pending deliberation by the Moslem League
Council and the crystallization of public opinion as to the best permanent
appointee.
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3.3(h
WESTERN EUROPE
USSR again violates agreement by rejecting Berlin trade el....rafts:
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Soviet authorities in Berlin on 15 October once
again rejected a block of over 2.00 trade permits
submitted to them by West Berlin firms. The
head of the West German interzonal trade office
views this action as a violation of the conditions agreed to by the East Ger-
mans at the time of the signing of the interzonal trade pact on 20 September.
He has informed his superiors in the Federal Ministry of Economics that
his office can no longer cope with the situation, and has requested further
instructions from them.
Comment: Since the signing of the trade pact,
the USSR had created a huge backlog of uncleared permits by failing to act on
them. It had not, however, gone so far as to reject any permits outright, as
it had been doing before the pact was signed. Although this new rejection of
a large block of permits appears to be the most obvious violation of the oral
agreement to cease harassing measures in Berlin, West German authorities
are unlikely to take any strong counteraction unless prodded by Allied
authorities. French and British officials have recently indicated a reluctance
to adopt strong countermeasures at the present time.
12. Serious strike threat is posed in Belgium: 3.3(h)(2)
The Belgian Socialist Trade Union Federation
has set 22 October as the date on which a strike
will be called among mine, metallurgical and
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chemical workers, and possibly dockers, unless the Federation's demands for
a 40-million-dollar bonus to labor and a low cost housing fund are met. The
Christian Trade Union has been "embarrassed" into taking similar action.
High industrial profits for this year, and the in-
crease in the price of bread touched off the Federation's dissatisfaction.
Meetings between employers, the government and trade union officials are
now taking place to stave off a crisis. The government may be forced into a
compromise favorable to the Federation's demands.
Comment: Any curtailment at this time of
Belgium's economic effort, especially of its coal production, could have a
serious effect on defense production. Coal is in short supply, and the stock-
piles, usually large at this time of the year because of summer production,
are negligible.
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This strike threat, supported by most of organized
labor, may serve as a new tactic in the Socialist Party's campaign to force
the fall of the present one-party Belgian Government and the calling of par-
liamentary elections.
SCANDINAVIA
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