CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008378
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 29, 1951

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29 August 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
.41.1
5311
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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AUTH: HA 0 70-2 111411(EVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
2. Embassy London forecasts British position at coming tri-partite
meeting (page 4).
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5. Possibility of anti-British violence in Iranian oil installations reduced
(page 6).
6. Iranian army prepares for civil disorders (page 7).
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2. Embassy London forecasts British position at coming tri-partite meeting:3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in London makes the following
forecast of the line Britain will take at the tri-
partite Foreign Ministers' talks planned to follow
the San Francisco Conference:.
I. Britain is anxious to pave the way for a
general Far Eastern settlement, and regards a Korean armistice as the first
indispensable step in that direction. Morrison may suggest that an armistice
be followed by general talks outside the UN in order to facilitate participation
by the Peiping government. The scope of these talks would depend upon
reaching an agreement with regard to Korea. The chief British concern is
that, if the armistice talks fail, the US might be tempted to renew a "full-
scale military effort." Morrison will probably express the hope that the fight-
ing may develop into a stalemate at approximately the current line, and may
ask for assurances that the US will not attempt a full-scale effort unless the
Communists launch a major air intervention. The embassy states that in the
event of such intervention, Britain would probably be prepared to accept a
full-scale war with China, perhaps one "leading to general war."
2. The British believe that the general Western
policy toward Communist China should be one of "containment without inter-
ference in internal affairs. " In this connection, Morrison will probably ex-
press the hope that the US might ultimately reaffirm its earlier pledge not to
veto UN membership for the Peiping regime, especially if progress can be
made in settling the political aspects of the Korean affair.
3. The British will oppose any French moves
at this time to demand a Chinese Communist non-aggression pledge on behalf
of Indochina, or to obtain a US-UK guarantee of Indochina's borders. In the
UK view, the former would be worthless, and the latter contrary to the
British "allergy" to unnecessary extension of their defensive responsibilities.
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4. The British are not "overly concerned"
regarding Formosa. However, Morrison will probably ask US assurances
that the aid given to Chiang is intended and actually used for defensive pur-
poses, and not for preparations for what the British believe would be ill-
advised attempts to invade the mainland.
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5. Possibility of anti-British violence in Iranian oil installations reduced.:
All non-Iranian AIOC employees have now been
evacuated from Iran, with the exception of 350
British subjects and 210 Indian and Pakistani
employees who are stationed in Abadan. The
smaller number of non-Iranians materially reduces the likelihood of violence
and the consequent possibility of British armed intervention.
Comment The transfer of British personnel
from outlying installations to Abadan likewise makes it easier to provide
them with full police protection, lessens the chance of isolated incidents,
and makes their evacuation a simpler problem.
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