CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003083
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 15, 1951

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15 july 1951
Copy No. C. 2--
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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AUTH
REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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TOT' SEULIAT
S
,IMMARY
GENERAL
I. Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected
by US (page 3).
2. Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philippines (page 3),
30 Loerman support of Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis Tieen weaken-
ing (page 4).
4. Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers (page 5)�
FAR EAST
5. South Korean Prime Minister suggests that President Truman reassure
Korean people (page 5).
6. Chinese Communists reportedly rush completion of railroad into Indo-
china (page 6)0
7. Burmese Commandeptin-Chief and kiatlislistivRiconfliot (page 6),
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
8, Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising
opposition (page 7).
la. Comniunists linked to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government
(page 8).
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
1. Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected
by US. 3.3(h)(2)
Mr. John Foster Dulles has informed Ambas-
sador Cowen in Manila that the US has gone
as far as is possible to meet the Philippine
demands for revision of the Japanese p� ace
treaty. Pointing out that five years of occupa-
tion experience had firmly convinced the US
that Japan could not pay reparations, Dulles
states it was with great reluctance that the
US altered its position on reparations to ease the position of the Philippine
Government. He believes that that government is gravely at fault in not
having informed its public of the very considerable efforts made by the
US to accommodate Philippial/ demands.
Cowen subsequently informed Dulles that
after an unsatisfactory meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo and Pre-
sident Quirino's advisory committee on reparations at which Dulles'\
views were presented� Romulo stated that Quirino was obdurate in his
refusal to sign the treaty in its present form.
2. Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philthpines
3.3(h)(2)
An emissary of President Quirino has informed
the US State Department that the Philippine
Government is seriously considering again
prOposing a Pacific Pact. The intermediary
said that President Sukarno of Indonesia had reacted favorably to the idea
during his recent visit to Manila and believes that Nehru could be persuaded
to participate in the proposed pact. The emissary revealed that Quirino
had dispatched unofficial emissaries to Indonesia, Burma and Thailand
to discuss the matter and had received favorable responses.
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.Comment At President Quirino's invitation,
representatives from most South and Southeast .Asian countries met at�
Baguio in the Philippines a year ago to discuss the possibility of a Pacific
Pact The only tangible results were agreements to consult with each
other on matters of mutual interest and to develop closer economic and
cultural relations.
India is interested in developing regional
pacts in Asia, but its whole-hearted participation will be obtained only
if it is assured a preeminent position. Pakistan, while concerned over
regional security, recently has been promoting a itar Eastern Moslem
alliance. Indonesia, Burma and Thailand would be receptive to a pact
proposal, while Japan, when eligible, would be anxious to sign one.
3.5(c)
3. German support of Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis seen weakening: 3.3(h)(2)
US officials in Berlin cite evidence of weaken-
ing local German support of the Allied position
in the current Soviet restrictions which have
resulted in a choking off of much of West Ber-
ltn's export trade. Certain large firms and many smaller firms in West
Berlin, hard hit by the restrictions, have been ignoring West German and
Allied directives and complying with Soviet demands.
The French Commandant in Berlin feels that
the West Berliners will not support�the Allied position and that no one has
been able to indicate what the Allies. will do if West Berlin trade is stopped
and Allied countermeasures, including the proposed move to hold up im-
plementation of the new interzonal trade pact between East and West Ger-
many, fail to cause the USSR to back down. He adds that the USSR could
afford one or two years delay in the East German Five Year Plan if its
objective to force the Allies out of Berlin1F achieved.
Comment: The dragging out of the current
Soviet restrictions appears to have succeeded in further dividing the Allies
and West Berliners on this issue. Shortly after initiating the restrictions,
the Soviet authorities encouraged West Berlin firms to by-pass Allied
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offices and deal directly with Soviet authorities. This is the first con-
crete evidence that large numbers of firms have felt the squeeze sufficient-
follow this course.
4. Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers:
3.3(h)(2)
The requisitioning by the UK of two Polish
overnment-owned tankers nearing completion in British shipyards,
under defense regulations, "was an action taken most reluctantly, and
nl)t after vigorous US protests that the vessels might be used to ship
etroleum to Communist China. The UK feared Polish retaliation, and
insisted at first that there was no satisfactory legal basis for the seizure.
Two weeks ago Foreign Secretary Morrison'promised to reconsider the
matter in light of the Iranian oil crisis.
5.
Korean movie:
FAR EAST
ister su
I
ests that Presi
ent rum
s r
3.3(h)(2)
In a conversation with Ambassador Mucci�
summarizing the attitude of the South Korean
people, the ROK Prime Minister stated that
it was not enough for the US to reiterate its
exemplary past record; Korean worries stemmed from its intentions in
the future. He said that the Korean people believe the US is "calling the
whole thing off with victory within its grasp," and that they are particu-
larly worried over the concessions which will have to be made in order
to obtain a cease-fire and political agreement.
The Prime Minister stated that his people,
regardless of the past record, simply do not believe that the US continues
to have Korean interests at heart, and furthermore believe that for reasons
of global strategy the US now plans to abandon the Republic of Korea. He
feels that the situation is deteriorating and suggests that a statement of
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reassurance from a high US official, preferably the President, meeting
else Korean suspicions head-on, would have a salutary effect. Ambas-
sador Muccio believes the suggestion merits consideration. ,
Comment Despite the plausibility of the
Prime Minister's analysis oritEaOuith Korean situation, there is evi-
dence that the government itself, through inspired demonstrations and
press agitations is largely responsible for the current feeling. There
is little indication that continued remonstrances by US officials have had
any appreciable effect upon President Rhee, whose actions continue to
irresponsible and unpredictable.
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7. Burmese rommaimdsr4n=Chief and Socialists in calpflict
3.3(h)(2)
Serious friction and general deterioration
wi din th Burmese Army are reported by the
US Embassy in Rangoon These developments
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are the result of mounting tension between the Burmese Commander-in-
Chief, Ne Win, and leaders of the Socialist Party, which controls the
government. The situation is rapidly reaching a point at which Ne Win
must retire (he is reported as contemplating a trip to London) or force
a showdown, for power with the Socialist a large private army. With
regard to future developments, the Embassy is concerned over, the fact
that Ne Win this week conferred with the Chinese Communist Ambassador
for over an hour.
Comment
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A clash between the Socialists' irregular forces and Army elements loyal
to Ne Win could have grave consequences, particularly at a time when
Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists is increasing.
Although Ne Win has been considered anti-
Commvist, he is completely opportunistic and might seek Communist
support to maintain his position.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
8. Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising op-
position:
3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Tehran has received in-
formation from several sources that the Iranian
Government may haveftenconsiderably weakentid
by developments in the past two weeks. Par-
liament is becoming restive aS a result of its realization that the situation
has worsened steadily. The cabinet is dissatisfied with the Prime Minis-
ter's habit of making decisions without consulting it. The press has also
developed a more critical attitude on the handling of the oil issue. The
Prime Minister, meanwhile, has announced that a group of physicians will
check his physical condition. This has resulted in a spate of rumors on his
resignation and a possible successor.
The US Ambassador, while recognizing all
these factors as indicative of a ceqkin weakness in the present government,
concludes that Prime Minister Mossadeq still has very strong popular
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support and that no group in Iran has shown a willingness to assume res-
ponsibility for any modification of the oil nationalization which is the basis
of the Prime Minister's power. The Ambassador believes that for the
present Mossadeq can continue in power.
3.3(h)(2)
10. Communists linked to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government
The USSR has been definitely linked to the
recently uncovered conspiracy which aimed 3.3(h)(2)
at overthrowing the Ethippian Government
and establishing a "republic." Total arrests
as ot 11 July are 43, including two interpreters at the local Russian
institute and several other Ethiopian Communist sympathizers. Ethiopian
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officials have linked the USSR to the mutiny in early Tuly of sixty members
of the Imperial Body Guard Cadet School. The local Communist-controlled
Youth league is also tinvolved. Ramifications of the plot are still under
investigation and more arrests are expected.
Comment
3.3(h)(2)
The Ethiopian Government, resolutely
anti-Communist, may be expected to take appropriate action against any
of its own subjects invgived in conspiracy. It will also express itself
strongly to the USSR, whose activities in Ethiopia may be sharply curtailed.
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