CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003075
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 21, 1951

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21 Iune 1951
Copy No. ej,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. .
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
. DECLASSIFIED
TO: 17; S
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DATE/1.A
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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3.3(h)(2)
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40 Differences foreseen between US and UK over possinie next move in
Iran (page 5). -
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Tito Government seeks to expand its role in Albanian resistance (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
60 Soviet officials indicate desire to reach settlement of Berlin trade
situation (page 7).
7. Portuguese Prime Minister agrees to Army's electoral wishes (page 7).
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FAR EAST
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. 3.3(h)(2)
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NEAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
41, Differences foreseen between US and UK oves_possible next move in Iran:
3.3(h)(2)
US Embassy London emphasizes that the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company still has no defi-
nite plans to close the refinery at Abadan and
impose a boycott on Iranian oil followingAhe
breakdown of negotiations. Nevertheless, the Embassy agrees with the
Department of State that the UK Government should immediately be Wormed
that the US would question the wisdom of such moves. The Embassy is
disturbed by:the Department's suggestion that the US tell the British that,
if it is forced to chose between Iranian expropriation of AIOC installations
and an internal revolution in Iran with the possible loss of that country to
the West, the US would favor the former and hopes that the UK would also.
The Embassy, in reply to the Department's
message, offers the following observations:
a) No British Government could afford to risk
the public criticism that would be leveled at it jilt yielded to Iranian
prf�ssure;
b) The US and the UK would not be able to
agree on a course of action in Iran...in-I:articular, there would be a dif-
ference of opinion on the use of force in the case of a Communist coup,
with the UK favoring military action to protect its interests;
c) Should the British yield to US pressure on
the oil issue, US-UK relations would suffer from a British conviction that
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they could have obtained more favorable results by following their owe
inclinations.
The Embassy suggests the initiation of talks
with the UK to work out an interim arrangement whereby an international
board of trustees would impartially administer the industry until such time
as a final settlement could be arranged between the UK and Iran.
EASTERN EUROPE.
5. Tito Government seeks to expand its role in Albanian resistance,:
3.3(h)(2)
Further information from refugees in Yugoslavia m ica es a ere are
now approximately 7,000 Albanians there who have been organized into a
National Committee, with a 25-man council representing the various regions
and religions of Albania. These refugees have prepared a pamphlet, which
is being distributed in Albania, proclaiming "a new era of partisan collabora-
tion between Albanian nationalist liberators and their Yugoslav brothers."
The pamphlet simultaneously attacks the Soviet Union and the Western-
oriented exiles.
Comment: Current efforts to organize the
Aluanian refugees in Yugoslavia into an effective force are handicapped
primarily by the lack of Albanian leaders. The Yugoslav regime is appar-
wally attempting to overcome this obstacle by seeking the cooperation of
- Albanian resistance leaders inside Albania and by overtures to Albanian
exiles in the West. By utilizing the five to seven thousand Albanian refugees
in Yugoslavia and an Albanian minority of appro�imately-I50,000, the
Yugoslays have a large reservoir of manpower for operations against
Albania.
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6. Soviet officials indicate desire to reach settlement of Berlin trade situation:
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Allied officials believe, after talks with the
chief Soviet representative in Berlin, that the
recent Soviet interference with the West Berlin
export trade represented a pressure tactic
to obtain a new interzonal trade agreement between East and West Germany,
even at the risk of serious retaliatory measures. In his talks with the
Deputy French Commandant, the Soviet representative tried to ignore or
play down the Soviet restrictions, and agreed to negotiations on the restric-
tions between Allied and Soviet experts. The Allied commandants now desire,
in view of the strong Allied position, to avoid any sign of over-eagerness
in the.se negotiations or in permitting the resumption of trade talks. They
also want to be ready to implement countermeasures as originally planned,
if the situation fails to develop favorably.
Comment The Soviet restrictions on trade had
resulted in the stoppage of an estimated 75 percent of West Berlin's vital
exports to the Federal Republic, and might, if continued, have necessitated
a limited Allied air lift. Soviet anxiety to conclude a trade agreement on
favorable terms reveals the weakness of the East German economy and the
continued need for strategic imports from the West. The USSR's harassing
measures in Berlin should be viewed as a recurring attempt to exert maximum
pressure on the Allies without provoking serious retaliation.
7. Portuguese Prime Minister agrees to Army's electoral wishes,:
3.3(h)(2)
Defense Minister Santos Costa has informed
the US Embassy in Lisbon that General Craveiro
Lopes has been selected to run as the government-
sponsored candidate in the forthcoming presi-
dential elections. The Embassy comments that Craveiro Lopes, a deputy of
the National Assembly, is generally regarded as the Defense Minister's choice.
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Comment: A public announcement of this
decision will probably bq made shortly, since the government coalition
party caucus held on 18 June agreed on both the election date and the party
presidential candidate. The selection of an Army general overrides the
group of Assembly deputies who have been advocating government by,
civilians alone. The Army, however, remained adamant in presenting a
military candidate as the only acceptable alternative to Prime Minister
Salazar, who refused to run and apparently thinks it expedient in the in-
terests of stability not to press the issue of civilian control.
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