CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003065
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 2, 1951

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2 June 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 13ULLETtN
43
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _
AUT HR i0,131
DAT REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Indonesia reluctant to classify rubber as strategic (page 3
SOUTH ASIA
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2. India expresses concern over Sino-Tibetan: agreement (page 3)
NEAR
NEAR EAST
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EASTERN EUROPE
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5. Western diplomats consider imminent hostilities :against Yugoslav'La
unlikely (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Dispute over Saar's status subsides (page 7).
7. French election picture appears somewhat brighter (page 7).
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- FAR EAST
I. Indonesia reluctant to classify rubber as strategic:
The Indonesian Ambassador to the US, 3.3(h)(2)
presently in Djakarta has admitted to
US Ambassador -Cochran that Indonesian
officials are reluctant to include rubber
on the list of strategic materials now being drawn-up in conneiction with
the UN embargo on shipments to Communist China. He pointed out
that other countries might classify rubber as non-strategic, and
that he, in any case, was under the impression that the US would be
satisfied `if Indonesia adhered to its "historic pattern" in foreign
trade. The US Ambassador notes that Indonesia is unlikely to commit
itself publicly to a full embargo on rubber so long as there is reason
to doubt that the British will go that far.
comment: Indonesian officials have
pointed out that the Indonesian economy is highly dependent upon the
income derived from rubber, exports and that, in any event, Indonesia
has not shipped rubber directly to the Soviet Orbit in the past The
bulk of Indonesian rubber has gone to Malaya for re-export; figures
are not available on the amount of Indonesian rubber included in
Malayan exports to China and the USSR.
2. Indi
sSes one.,'n
SOUTH ASIA
LLn
eme
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The US Minister Counselor in New 3.3(h)(2)
Delhi, in discussing the recent Sino-
Tibetan agreement wt the Secretary-
General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs,
Affairs, received the impression that the Indtan'Government (a) was
disappointed over the Tibetan failure to secure better terms, but
(b) felt helpless in the face of developments and is likely to accept
the agreement without protest. When pressed, the Secretary-General
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admitted that the agreement had far-reaching implications for his
government. He added that a governmental committee, appointed
to survey the problem of defending India's northeastern and eastern
borders following the Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet last
autumn, had recommended strengtherang',theilorder.posts, 'improving
communications and raising the conditions and morale of the in-
habitants of the area who had always been neglected. He added that
India was not a military power and there were definite limits to
what it could do.
NEAR EAST
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EASTERN EUROPE
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5. Western diplomats consider imminent hostilities against Yugoslavia
unlikely:
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According to the US Legation in Bucharest,
Western diplomats in Rumania agree that
an attack on Yugoslavia this summer appears
unlikely, although the situation is always
explosive. The Legation acknowledges that more reports, largely
unconfirmed, of Rumanian and Soviet troop movements are now cir-
culating than at any time since last spring, but points out that move-
ments into critical areas such as Western Rumania are customary
during spring maneuvers. Thus, the departure of Rumania's only
armored division from Bucharest in early May is in itself not
considered alarming. The fact that there are no mounted anti-
aircraft guns and no air raid directives in Bucharest is cited in
support .of the Western diplomats' estimate.
unaLantj For over a year travel
restrictions have limited the personal observations of Western
diplemats to the immediate vicinity of Bucharest. In addition,
numerous arrests and trials of Rumanians on "espionage" charges
because of their contacts with Western missions have drastically
Curtailed sources of information available 14 Western diplomats. These
factors tend to weaken the factual basis of any Western diplomatic
estimate of military activity in the. country. The fact that rhilitary
maneuvers in the spring are traditional in the Balkan countries could
furnish convenient cover for any military activity, but there is no
firm indication of an imminent attack against Tito.
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. Dispute over Saar's status subsides:
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Schuman Plan author Monnet has told the
US Embassy in Paris that he believes (a)
a dangerous situation has been created in
the Saar by the banning of the Saar Democratic
Party, and (b) further actions of this sort
could cause difficulties for Adenauer, whose
political position is dependent on Franco-
German friendship. On the other hand,
French Foreign Office officials claim they would have been "placed on
the skids" if they had failed to act against the Saar Democratic Party.
They add that they anticipate no additional steps in the matter.
Meanwhile, in the six-hour debate on the
Saar in the West German Bundestag on 30 May, a temperate atmosphere
prevailed, due chiefly to the mild tone of the addresses by both
Chancellor Adenauer and Socialist opposition spokesman Carlo Schmid.
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Comment: The' Saar Democratic Party, a small
group favoring the return of the Saar to Germany, was banned on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional. The Bonn Government wants to
support a Saar party working for union with Germany, but feels it cannot
back the Saar's Socialists, many of whom favor such a union, because
in West Germany the Socialist Party constitutes the chief opposition
to the government. Unfortunately for Bonn, the Saar Democratic Party
is reportedly exhibiting neo-fascist tendencies and, furthermore,. ill March
of this year sent represent atives to the first meeting of the German Congress,
an organization attempting to coordinate the activities of groups opposing
German remilitarization.
French election picture appears somewhat brighter:
Proportional representation, which the
new French elettoral law was designed
to reduce in the 17 June national elections,
is expected to obtain in about two-thirds
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of the electoral contests of France. This is largely due to De Gaulle's
unwillingness to 'form electoral alliances with the other non-Communist
parties. Because of his intransigence, the newly organized Rightist
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oriented "Fourth Force" has been obliged to form numerous electoral
alliances with the middle-of-the-road "Third Force", which had
managed to maintain a government despite the opposition of both extremes
in the last Assembly. This development further reduces the chances for
a Gaullist landslide and makes it somewhat less likely that the Gaullists
and the Communists can obtain a majority between them. It is probable,
however, that the combined Communist and Gaullist representation will
be larger than the 210 seats held in the last Assembly.
Com ine= If all non-Communist parties
united for the elections, they would obtain majorities in most districts
and Communist representation in the National Assembly would be almost
wiped out. De Gaulle's strategy is calculated to reduce the strength of
the middle-of-the-road parties by scaring the electorate into voting
for his party as the only effective opposition to the Communists. This
strategy will, however, also encourage those leftist voters seeking to
counterbalance De Ga.ulle's strength to vote for Communist candidates.
While the number of electoral alliances among Third and Fourth Force
parties now indicates that a middle-of-the-road majority is still
possible, this does not guarantee that a workable goVernment will result.
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