CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003051
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 20, 1951

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�20 April 1951 
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
DOCUMENT NO.   
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 
II DECLASSIFIED 
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 
NEXT REVIEW DATE: eZ4  
AUTH: HR 70-2 
DATE122/1.../i _ REVIEWER: 
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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'AiiR CHET 
SUMMARY 
GENERAL 
1. US Ambassador reports serious US French disagreement over mili-
tary program (page 3). 
FAR EAST 
NEAR EAST 
3. Shah reaffirms confidence in Iranian Prime Minister Ala (page 5). 
WESTERN EUROPE 
5. Abductions of Austrians in April now total six age 6). 
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*GENERAL, 
1. US Ambassador reports serious US-French disagreement over military 
program: 3.3(h)(2) 
US Ambassador Bruce in Paris reports the pos-
sibility of a "very damaging crisis" in US rela-
tions with France over the amount and method 
of US assistance to the French rearmament pro-
gram. Foreign Minister Schuman told the US Ambassador on 15 April 
that the French Cabinet is "puzzled and resentful" over the situation and, 
in order to deal with it, has scheduled discussions "with difficult and un-
fortunate implications!' Fo deal with itg All members of the US Embassy, 
the Military'Assistance Advisory Group and the ECA Mission who deal 
with this question are "acutely aware" of the "dangerously surcharged 
atmosphere-.'" The Ambassador believes an urgent necessity exists to 
terminate this state of affairs, in view of: (a) Gaullist criticisms that 
the present French Government is "totally subservient" to US instruc-
tions;� (b) the necessity of insuring mutual confidence at the Foreign Min-
isters Conference Which is "probably approaching"; (c) constant negoti-
ations with the French over military installations; and (d) "many other 
political objectives of major importance" requiring the kind of close under-
standing and French faith in US leadership which "simply does not exist 
at present." This "discouraging" situation, according to the Ambassador, 
stems primarily from conflicting interpretations of the military assis-
tance agreement reached last October in Washington and also from mis-
understandings of unilateral actions taken by both governments under 
that agreement He feels that it is "comparatively irrelevant" whether 
the fault for a failure of US diplomacy at this juncture would lie basical-
ly with the French. 
Comment: Periodic reports on the disagreement 
over this matter have been received in the past few months, but the tone 
of extreme urgency in the Ambassador's message is unexpected. Re-
cently, the French Government has also resented the fact that it was ex-
cluded from preliminary US-UK talks on Eastern Mediterranean and Yugo-
slav problems. Furthermore, there has been ample evidence that US 
influence in Indochina is already feared by French officials, including 
General do Lattre himself, and that the French Government will be in-
creasingly hard pressed in the pre-electoral period to defend its policy 
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of military colaboration with the US against Gaullist and Communist 
attacks. The reported developing "crisis" in relations with the US 
need not be expected, however, to weaken France's firm orientation 
toward the West or its growing support of Western rearmament. 
FAR EAST 
3.3(h)(2) 
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NEAR EAST 
3. Shah reaffirms confidence in Iranian Prime Minister  
3.3(h)(2) 
On 17 April, the Shah of Iran informed US Am-
bassador Grady that he will back Prime Min-
ister Ala on any and all measures to crush 
activities of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and 
to destroy the effectiveness of the Fedayam Islam (a fanatic Moslem 
organization). Despite what the Ambassador had been told earlier re-
garding the Shah's alleged plan to ask for Ala's resignation and to in-
stall Seyyid Zia Ed Din Ta,batabai in his place, Grady noNi states that 
the Shah shows no evidence of such an attitude. Grady added that. 
while the Shah might later have to call on Seyyid Zia, he had definite 
reservations concerning him. 
Comment: The Shah's continued confidence in 
Prime Minister Ala is an encouraging sign for stability in Iran. Ala's 
task will remain difficult, however, and agitation for his replacement 
will undoubtedly continue. Apparently, the report that the Shah planned 
to replace Ala with Seyyid Zia at this time is little more than a rumor 
circulated by Seyyid Zia's supporters in an effort to procure the pre-
miership for their candidate. 3.3(h)(2) 
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WESTE,RN EURO.PE 
5. Abductions of Austrians in .Aprilnovir total six; 
US Minister Donnelly in Vienna reports that 
the current epidemic of Soviet abductions, 3.3(h)(2) 
which began on 5 April and which is troubling 
Austrian Interior Minister Helmer, has in-
volved six victims to date, all of whom were obscure persons. The 
abductors have included Communist members of the 'Austrian criminal 
police (acting under Soviet orders), commandeered Austrian police ac-
companied by Soviet officers, and, in one case, an unknown agent in 
civilian dress. 
Comment: A descripti n of the victims re-
veals no discernible pattern in these abductions, apart from the fact 
that at least three of the victims had some prior contact with US per-
sonnel in Austria. The Soviets may therefore have wished to warn the 
Austrians against too close association with the US or they may have 
desired to obtain particular information which they believed the victims 
possessed. 
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