CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001992
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 28, 1961

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lull w
3.3(h)(2)
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28 April 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
111111:11L
BULLETIN
p II
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
28 April 1961
2, Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in
"most hopeful" new phase, (Page tit)
3. USSR: Cruise-type missiles tested by Soviet Navy.
(Page tit)
4. Nepal: Plans of exiled leader in India to oust King
Mahendra. (Five itt)
5, Brazil: Quadros wants to meet President Kennedy
outside US. (Five tv)
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rfil�i
NAM1THA
j A(li,uong Sai
SAYABOURY
Muon Kasiy
/ �
NORTHERN LAOS
Forces in
411.0, KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
*4,1 KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
41110 GOVERNMENT
ROAD
� �TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
an
�����. �
ThOlm
Va ng \e/r.reng
VIENTIANE IKrikhan.
Pak Sane
-3 Kam Keut
Vientiane
50
I 11_1
STATUTE MILES
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I is
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: t he Pathet Lao reportedly have rejected General
PhormIrs�proposal that cease-fire negotiations begin today in
Luang Prabang, and have repeated their suggestion that the -Al
-
talks be held in Xieng Khouang town. Vientiane subsequently
issued a declaration calling for a cease-fire to become effec- ' /, '
tive at noon on the same date. In an effort at compromise, the
Boun Oum government plans today to attempt an informal con-
tact with the Pathet Lao in the yang Vieng area to establish the
time and place for future discussions. Meanwhile, Laotian and
foreign dignitaries, including Prince Sihanouk, are converging
on Luang Prabang for the funeral ceremonies for the late King.
Thus far, there has been no definite word as to whether Sou-
vanna Phouma and Pathet Lao representatives will attenG
4ao major military developments have been reported,
ure on government positions continues
' I
oviet and North Vietnamese flights from Hanoi into Laos
on 27 April included one LI-2 flight to Xieng Khouang and three
LI-2 flights to Phong Saly. Air operations scheduled for 28
April include the flight of five Soviet IL -14s from Hanoi to
Xien Khouang and return.
(Backup, Page 1) (map)
The Watch Committee in a special meeting on 27 April ex-
amined the status of bloc military forces in relation to a possible
overt bloc military intervention in Laos, and issued the following
statemeng
rWe have re-examined the military situation in Laos, North
Vietnam, and Communist China in relation to the recent Commu-
nist military operations in Laos and see no development which
would suggest any direct intervention by outside Communist forces
at this time. We have examined the move between 18 and 22 April
of 20 probable IL-28s from North to South China, and while this
would place them in a better position for operations in Laos, Nyg
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&el that these aircraft would have to deploy further to be ef-
fective in any Laotian operation. We also feel that had the
move been intended for operations in Laos, the deployment
would have been made more direct and to air bases more
suitable for strikes against Laos or naval forces. No other
military movements related to Laos by either Communist
ground or naval forces outside of Laos have been discerned.
It is to be noted, however, that Communist forces have a
capability of intervention with little or no warning.)
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-F1114
Pointe
Noire
Banana
CONS()
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
Luanda
LIBERIA
INDIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
MOBUTU
7 200
Scattered Forces
LEOPOLDVILLE
Leopoldvi
ysville
blic of he Congo
� Gemena
Scattered force
moItuTu
isa Aketi
mba
EQUATEUR
Coquilhatville
� Boende GIZENGA
* 7,000
ETHIOPIA
200 Ikela
�
Francqui
.14\
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
1:3 Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
�Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
�1� Selected airfield
luabourg
Bakw a
0 STATUTE MILES
, ,
400
Luputa
MALAYA
470
LIBERIA
230
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
300
Bukavu
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
NIGE RIA
SManono
ATANGi A
I SHOMBE
7,000
NIGERIA
500
Usunibura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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laird -uuri LA-4 vt, 1
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� Congo: aecretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs
of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu gov-
ernment, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most
hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties
besetting President Tshombe, Hammarskjold observed that the
UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombe low:'
He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo,
he might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man com-
mission for the post of senior UN representativs7
The circumstances surrounding Tshombe's detention at
Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leo-
poldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports
that Interior Minister Munongo has seized power in Katanga
are unconfirmed.
(Backup, Page 4) (Map)
I
USSR: The Soviet Navy has conducted tests of cruise-type
missiles in an area off the coast of the Southern Maritime Dis-
trict in the northern Sea of� Japan since early January0
nine missiles have
been launched since 2 January. Two of these were failures; the
other seven traveled a distance of about 225 n.m. at speeds be-
tween 700-750 knots and at altitudes between 1,000-3,300 feet.
a new submarine
of undetermined class--pendant 608--launched the first of the
missiles in this series on 2 January 1961. Two missiles were
launched apparently simultaneously on both 16 and 26 April, and
an additional four missiles--two of which aborted--were launched
within eight minutes on 16 ApriL Although submarine 608 was in
the launch area on both days, conclusive identification of the ship
or ships launchingihese eight missiles has not been made
Nepal: LEollowing recent conversations in New Delhi with
Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Congress party re Ok
sistance leader Subarna Shumshere
28 Apr 61
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rbplans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid-June.
uia arna, who has been in Indii since the King's takeover in
Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are depend-
ent on the success of his efforts during the coming month to ob-
tain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been dis-
turbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured
Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of sunnort which New
Delhi will give Subarna is at present unclearj
(Backup, Page 5)
Brazil: resident Quadros is apparently seeking a meet-
ing with President Kennedy outside the United States. At his
meeting with President Frondizi on 21-22 April it was suggested
that the approaching conference of the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council, which is to discuss the Alliance for Progress,
be held in Uruguay and that President Kennedy be invited to at-
tend. Brazilian Foreign Minister Arinos indicated to Ambassa-
dor Cabot on 26 April that a meeting between the US and Brazil-
ian Presidents migeht nrnvp hpinfni nn t e Cuban question
(Backup, Page
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles, U. S. I. B. NIE 11-5-61.
25 April 1961.
Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany.
U. S. I. B. NIE 11-7-61. 25 April 1961.
Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium.
U. S. I. B. NIE 11-9-61. 25 April 1961.
28 Apr 61
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Noppo
Situation in Laos
North of Phou Khoun junction, on Route 13, enemy ar-
tillery and mortar fire continues to harass government troops
occupying blocking positions on the southern approach to Luang
Prabang. However, ground reconnaissance revealed the ar-
rival in this area by 26 April of a 20-truck enemy convoy, and
the local government commander is expecting an imminent at-
tack. probably
_
the same convoy of 20 vehicles--including two-and-one-half-ton
trucks and armored cars--heading west along Route 7 from the
Plaine des Jarresn Below yang Vieng, shelling of the govern-
ment battalion just north of the Nam Lik continues, and there
are some indications that the enemy will attempt a flanking
movement)
il�iorth of Luang Prabang, the former garrison force at Muong
Sal is withdrawing southwest from that post without apparent
enemy pursuit. However, the enemy force, estimated at three
battalions with artillery and mortar support, is considered capa-
ble of advancing virtually unopposed toward Luang Prabang at
any time of its choosing. MAAG personnel evacuated from Muong
Sai report that the accuracy and timing of the enemy artillery,
mortars, and heavy weapons during the attack indicated that
highly trained troops were involved. In the Pak Sane area, the
ene h s undert en small-scale probing attacks on Borikhanej
receipt of re-
quested supplies dropped from nine Soviet aircraft on 25 April.
The items received included rice, flour, canned goods, cloth,
medicine, radio batteries, and nearly a thousand each of com-
bat uniforms, shorts, and pairs of boots. Although requests for
weapons and ammunition had been included
such items were not mentioned as received.
information needed to prepare plans for negotiations lists the
areas held by Vientiane and Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces, re-
spectively, in the provinces of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang,
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Nam Tha, and Sayaboury. Positions listed as occupied by Vien-
tiane forces were as follows: Luang Prabang Province--Luang
Prabang and Muong Sai (since captured); Nam Tha Province--
four small towns; Sayaboury Province--four small towns. All
remaining areas, including all of Phong Saly Province, were
1 imed to be controlled by anti-Vientiane forces.
viet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin on 25 April indi-
cated the USSR's displeasure with the UK's announcement fol-
lowing the joint cease-fire appeal that it would not attend the
conference without prior verification of an effective cease-fire.
Pushkin's remarks apparently were designed to lay the ground-
work for placing the blame on the West for any postponement
or collapse of the Geneva conference scheduled to begin on 12
May. The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's position that only
the Laotians themselves could work out cease-fire arrangements
and that this was not the responsibility of either the UK or the
Soviet Union]
Communist propaganda is already seeking to place on the
US and Vientiane the onus for any failure to reach a truce in
Laos. Hanoi on 27 April quoted a Pathet Lao radio charge that
the Phoumi Boun Oum forces have "launched new attacks" and
that the Vientiane government does not really want a cease-fire.
Hanoi also quoted Khamsouk Keola, acting premier of the Xieng
Khouang "government," as warning that in the face of defeat the
"US and its followers" have called for negotiations to gain time
to "consolidate their forces and launch a new attack."
Enlarging on the Peiping government's statement of 26 April,
a People's Daily editorial commented on the "aspects" involved
� in "bringing TEOut" a cease-fire. The Chinese called for a "check"
on assistance to Phoumi, the withdrawal by the US and its allies
of all military personnel and equipment in Laos, and the expul-
sion of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Insisting that a cease-
fire can "only" be achieved through negotiation between the "par-
ties concerned," the Chinese indicated that the prospects for a
cease-fire would depend on the attitude of the Vientiane author-
ities.
Although Chinese Communists did not label these "aspects"
as explicit conditions for a cease-fire, they clearly regard them
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as legitimate points for consideration in cease-fire negotiations.
They afford the Communists excellent gambits for delaying an
effective truce while the military situation continues to develop
In their favor.
Representatives of India, Canada, and Poland delegated to
serve on the reconvened International Control Commission for
Laos began assembling in New Delhi for their first formal meet-
ing on 28 April. During preliminary exchanges on 27 April, dif-
ferences apparently arose immediately over the same issues
which hamstrung the commission prior to its adjournment in
July 1958. Free movement of truce inspectors within rebel-
held territory continues to be a key question, with. the Cana-
dian and Polish representatives taking strongly opposing posi-
tions based on their past experience in ICC negotiations. New
Delhi has reappointed Samarendranath Sen, former ICC repre-
sentative in Laos and currently high commissioner in Australia,
as Indian member. While Sen is reputed to be an intelligent
and capable official, he is inclined to be rigid and legalistic in
adhering to the official Indian Government line; in his role as
chairman of the commission, often playing a mediatory role,
Sen probably will tend to equate the positions of the two sides
in the Laotian conflict supported by the bloc and by the Wr7
rPsnPetivPhr and tn avoid taking sharn issn with either.

--SESRET--
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The pituation in the Congo
rijammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a
"most hopeful" phase stems in part from his satisfaction at
the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombea's failing polit-
ical fortunes. Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasa-
vubu's ascendancy over Tshombe will improve prospects for
agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that
he had received confirmation of the existence of a military
agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga. force_!i
Lliammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part in-
tended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the
intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this
should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal re-
turns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's
return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious con-
ditions to permit Hammars4731d to remove him without seeming
to bow to Congolese pressure.
� The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged
Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombe''s re-
lease from detention in Coquilliatville. He also asked the United
States to make representations to Hammarskjold, urging that
Tshombe's immediate release was required to prevent a coup in
Katanga by "more intractable elements."
--SECRET
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*re'
Nepali Congress Exiles Planfiing Stepped-up tampaign Against
King
riollowing Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's
actions in December, he appeared willing to adopt a wait-and-
see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while
affording the exiles a haven in India. Nehru has maintained
contacts with the exiles via his own Intelligence Bureau and
through leaders of the Indian Praja Socialist party, who are
old Nehru colleagues and historically close to the Nepali
Congress party leadership
2ehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he
may be moving toward more direct support of the Nepali
Congress party. One report indicates that at their meeting
early in April, Nehru interposed no obstacles to Subarnes
plans to promote non-violent agitation from India.
suggests Nehru did not express disapproval
ot resort to violence as well. In addition,
Krishna Menon gave no indication he would keep
arna from importing arms, although Menon refused any
direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali
Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders
abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase
from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party)
There is little doubt that at� this time only active Indian
support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party
effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a
Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to
intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress
party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are
more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping
that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation,
will so erode the King's position that the need for active Indian
intervention will be obviate
�SEeRET--
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Brazilian President Pursues Noncommittal Foreign Policy
Quadros has previously indicated that he believes a mod-
erate loosening of Brazil's traditionally close ties with the
United States would help him increase his own and his coun-
try's international power position. auadros is apparently
pursuing this objective in expressing interest in meeting Pres-
ident Kennedy but unwillingness to visit the United State_ED.
Eesident Frondizi says he told Quadros during their
meeting on 21-22 April that the Brazilian President could not
continue his unpredictable foreign policy declarations without
consulting friends. He said he told Quadros that such actions
might win him some domestic political support for one or two
years but would alienate the friends who had the resources to
help him rebuild Brazil's economy. Quadros finally agreed,
according to Frondizi. The joint communiqu�ffirmed their
joint stand in "repelling the direct or indirect interference of
extra-continental factors" in the western hemispherS
Brazilian observers, including those who are close to
Quadros' advisers, describe the joint declaration as strongly
pro-Western and say that it reflects primarily the views of
Frondizi, particularly on the Cuban question. In an apparent
effort to maintain an equivocal position on Cuba, Quadros
issued well-publicized instructions to the Brazilian UN dele-
gation to vote for a pro-Castro Mexican resolution on the
landings in Cuba and for a Brazilian addition calling for an
investigation of their character and origin.
Uruguayan President Haedo has endorsed the Brazilian-
Argentine suggestion for the meeting of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council and has expressed the hope that
it can be postponed from its tentatively suggested June or
July scheduling to coincide with the Uruguayan national holi-
day in August.
The Brazilian Embassy in Washington reported on 24 April
that it had the impression that President Kennedy would like
to attend the meeting personally but that he is "in favor of
holding it in Rio de Janeiro."
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NW,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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