CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001978
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 7, 1961

3C�KC I
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 3.3(h)(2)
p,Ir3.5(c)
7 April 1961
Copy No.
CENTRAL
C
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
TOP 5ECRT
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
U
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Sid SECRET :of
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page i)
7 April 1961
2. Congo: Kamitatu believes rapprochement possible
between Gizenga and Leopoldville regime. (Page tt)
3. Communist China: Peiping shows concern over Soviet
military and economic aid to Southeast Asia. (Page ti)
4. Communist China: Heavy oil shipments scheduled from
USSR. (Page tit)
5. Iraq: Almost all political factions now appear opposed
to Qasim regime. (Page tit)
6. Angola: Native uprisings in northern Angola. (Page tit)
7.
Cuba: Castro's forces react to invasion rumors.
(Page iv)
�SEeltEr
z A
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
eir9
NAM1THA
... Phong Sal y ,
i 1 E
1PHONG SALY / --
1, fa?'
'",
..... ' y Dien Bien Phu *------
0
1
A
1
-,
N-..e \ .... . I
1 %_..,....:�.
,1/4 -T-
tyluong Sail Nam Bac
i \ fl� \. %
t i Sam N
/
-',"*".../ I t (
.1."/ ,eua
LUANG; PRABANG
N. 'AM NEUA
Luang Prabang
� � N. ------;2� \."�...,
.....-
........� 11* t
AYABOURY r.--' X I E N G KHOUANG N..
� ......_,�.. muonA soul 4-�,41c2.4,3an
* ?
=---
PVu Khou Nip Xieng Khouang
Muong Kaj,s :.
/
1 I.... Ban Ta Viangei
s....
//. f --- Tha Thoi:
,..Vang Vii,ing sok/. . "Ie. ...., .
VIENTIANE 41:118erikhan$�.
N' .......
Pak Sane 3
f.
NORTHERN LAOS
4riP GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
IWO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
- TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
610406
50 100
I
I
STATUTE MILES
Kam Keutilr-,
t 8
ak Sao
KHAMM UANE"
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
6.4SECRETNS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos:7(Information available as of 0430 EST) The
status of the government's airborne offensive to retake
Muong Kassy is still unclear. Forward elements of
government troops south of that point, which were to
move on Muong Kassy in conjunction with the airborne
attack from the north, are reported in contact with the
enemy. Government troops north of Phou Khoun junc-
tion, however, apparently failed to execute their diver-
sionary attack there when the combined operation was
launchec_y (Backup, Page 1)(Map)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
soiSTOP SECRET
Con,go: Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu, who �
returned on 4 April from a trip to Stanleyville,
was convinced a rapproche- (P.
ment could be reached between Gizenga and the Leopoldville 16,LL,,z.
regime. According to Kamitatu, Gizenga is unwilling to accept' A
the confederation proposed at Tananarive, but would accept a somewhat more more centralized federal structure instead of the
"unitary state" advocated by Lumumba. In addition, ICamitatu
believes Gizenga would accept a subordinate ministerial posi-
tion under virtually any prominent person. Gizenga insisted,
however, that he would agree to such changes only if they re-
ceived parliamentary approval. Jean Bolikango, Ileo's vice
premier, is to confer with Gizenga later this week in western
Orientale.
ammarskjoId feels that the UN representatives in Katanga
have compromised the UN's freedom of action at Elisabethville
airport in their agreement with Tshombe.
the UI Command has been
authorized to send Indian troops to Eligahpthvillp if neepgqgry
to maintain control of the airport.
(Backup, Page ) kmap)
Communist China - Southeast Asia: he Chinese Commu- k
nists are showing concern over the effect Soviet military and
economic aid is having on their position in Southeast Asia. While
e-`")
in Djakarta last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told
his Indonesian counterpart-- who passed the information to the
US ambassador�that Indonesia ought to "go slow" in taking aid
from the Soviet Union. Along the same lines, the Chinese Corn-
munist ambassador to Burma, in a conversation with an Overseas
Chinese businessman, is reported to have attached the "utmost
importance" to finding out whether Ne Win would seek Soviet
military aid during his current trip to the USSR. The ambas-
sador suggested that the Chinese Government would be willing
to provide the Burmese with military aid and m.entionedj
7 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
P SECRET
rofficer-training prograug
(Backup, Page 4)
USSR - Communist China:
Soviet petroleum deliveries to Communist China are
now proceeding on a regular basis under a 1961 contract. The
USSR has scheduled about 416,000 tons of petroleum for ship-
ment to China by rail and sea in April. This figure exceeds by
more than 75,000 tons the volume of such deliveries in April
1960 and is the highest noted in any single month. Although this
year's Sino-Soviet economic and trade agreements are still be-
ing negotiated, the apparent agreement on petroleum deliveries
suggests that progress is also being made toward the settlement
of other trade problems. Without new Soviet credits and techni-
cal assistance, however, Chinese imports of complete plants and
enuinmpnt from 1-1-.e USSR will be drastically reduced this year.
(Backup, Page 5)
Iraq: Qasim's prestige has deteriorated considerably fol- X'
lowing the antiregime demonstrations at the end of March. His _d_L/4.1.2-1
violent suppression of the strike disorders has alienated much
of the urban populace, and his attempt to make the western- ,
owned Iraq Petroleum Company the scapegoat for the disorders
has not deceived the public. Nearly all political factions, includ-
ing the Communists, now appear to be in opposition to the regime.
Resentment against Qasim is growing in the army, which little
relished its role in suppressing demonstrations with which it in
large part sympathized. (Backup, Page 6)
Angola: 5,Tative uprisings in northern Angola are continu- c
ing. Thousands of native refugees from Angola are reported tob_j_i_di
have entered the Congo at Matadi following Portuguese military,,
efforts to create a 25- to 30-mile no-man's land on the Angola -v--et
side of the bordelfg Portuguese authorities are taking repressive /
measures against both white and native religious groups suspecte
of involvement in last month's outbreaks. AcAy
7 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
111
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
SECRET
�CUBA
DI MILES 100
anel HAVANA
, ?7-7-4-
10-14A,1,3A
A4. M k
'PEL� 0
f Pinar dal Rio
Mend-cgs -SV I L
DIE
-ISLE OF/
PINES
UNITED
GULF OF MEXICO
MEXICO . HONDURAS
ATLANTIC OCEAN
TDOMg.E.0
CRIA CARIBBEAN SEA
EL SALVADOR
coNTA RICA cOL0NNA
TANANA/
r-
�
VENEZUELA
Trinidad �0
Tunas da Zane-
6
o CARIBBEAN SEA
( CASTRO
..mr" TROOP MOVEMENTS RORCES )
10 AA PRACTICE INCREASED
� APRIL 6 INSURGENT OUTBREAK
SELECTED ROADS
H*4011n,
"../' ,-----2,4 +a 14,v,
1 Nicaro
N. O. R, I,E 11; T E nieR, a....
Manzanillo' 4_ A a
' .-...---' "Y.M�.4. - d'OCINNENNanii, en IlirAL
51555A HAESTINA ,..--'$:.1.g. ;'60antanamo _
,
(ANTI -CASTRO)
(U.S. NAVAL
610407 3
-SEeitEr
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
NSTOP SECRET
three nationalist organizations are
planning a Conference of the Peoples of the Portuguese
Colonies from 14 to 16 April in Casablanca to "unify the
struggle against Portuguese imperialism. "
(Backup, Page 7)
*Cuba:
"very urgent" troop movements in Las Villas
and Pinar del Rio Provinces, an increase in antiaircraft
firing practice to ten hours daily at a base near the north
coast port of Martel, and the outbreak of new insurgent ac-
tivity in Pinar del Rio Province. Early on 6 April, 500 men
were dispatched to eastern Pinar del Rio where a group, tak-
ing arms and supplies with it, had joined an insurgent move-
ment, a captured
insurgent said his group expected an imminent landing in
Pinar del Rio, reports
of imminent "invasions" of Cuba by anti-Castro groups in ex-
ile, but were contradictory as to the exart date and nice of
the expected landings
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
TWYDrre A ',MI Orrrfiff A /TM' 0
cpuoiloutic-autiation m t,ogimunist unina: uurrent
culties with Special Reference to the Food Situation, the
Regime's Remedial Efforts, and Estimated Economic and Po-
litical Consequences of the Difficulties. U. S. I. B. SNIE 13-61.
4 April 1961.
7 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
TOP SECRET
ii
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
-*wittla�SEC�RET Nftio
Laos
[King Savang continues reluctant to take a direct political
role in Laotian affairs.
he is willing to have an inter-
national conference, at which Pathet Lao presence will be
"inevitable," but stated that he would not nominate the Lao-
tian delegation. The King stated flatly that it would be uncon-
stitutional for him to serve as prime minister or directly to
appoint a prime minister, which was a matter for the assem-
bly; gained the impression that he feels such
a role would eliminate him as the country's last "stabilizing
factor." The king's remarks revealed that he does not exclude
Souvanna Phouma as premier. He looks to outside assistance
to stop foreign intervention, believing that the Laotians could
then settle their own internal problems4
Although Peiping has made no independent comment on
the idea of a cease-fire in Laos, it has mentioned the subject
several times since the Soviet note was handed to the British�
The most recent instance was in Peiping's rebroadcast of
Prince Souphannouvong's 5 April statement endorsing the So-
viet note and expressing Pathet Lao willingness to enter ne-
gotiations for a cease-fire.
A 6 April Pathet Lao broadcast states emphatically that
the "cease-fire should be conducted simultaneously with the
meeting of the 14-nation conference." Repeating previous
Pathet Lao insistence that Western support must be withdrawn
from the Vientiane government before a cease-fire can be
aghieved, the broadcast strongly implied that the Communists
will not accept the US position that a cease-fire must precede
ra_cord7rence.
'51he Soviet airlift of supplies into Laos from North Viet-
nam continu) Most of the Chinese Communist transports
TOP SECRET
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
-.'TOF SECRET
which flew to Hankow from locations in north and east China
on 4 and 5 April have now returned to their bases. Although
the reason for these flights is unknown, it does not appear
that they were in connection with an airlift operation associ-
ated with Laos.
TOP SECRET
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
%-10P SECRET Nee
Situation in the Congo
Gizenga reportedly distrusts Kasavubu and regards Ileo
as a nonentity. He is said to believe that Ileo has no desire
to reconvene parliament, a belief shared by some Congolese
in Leopoldville. The Gizenga regime's creation of a "presi-
dential college" in Stanleyville to replace ICasavubu apparent-
ly is an attempt to bypass the President and his associates
while simultaneouly strengthening Stanleyville's own bargain-
ing position.
Gizenga apparently is willing, however, to work� with
such Leopoldville figures as Bolikango and Interior Minister
Cyrille Adoula. Kamitatu said he even volunteered to go in-
to Equateur Province to meet a Leopoldville representative.
Kamitatu also stated that an ambassador from Mali
would present his credentials to Gizenga--who would be ac-
ting as head of the "presidential college"--on 6 April.
the Malian envoy was in
Khartoum in late March and was scheduled to proceed to
Juba in southern Sudan. From there he apparently was to
travel overland into the Congo. There has been no indica-
tion that he actually arrived in Stanleyville.
Although a number of other neutralist Afro-Asian
states have recognized Gizenga's regime as the legitimate
Congo government, none of them has yet installed an ambas-
sador in Stanleyville.
TOP SECRET
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
/61.1 ---SteR&T- Nal
Peiping Concerned Over Soviet Aid tot'Southeast Asia
bere has been some evidence of past Sino-Soviet com-
petition in aid programs to the underdeveloped Asian nations,
both Communist and non-Communist. Thus, in the case of
aid to the Asian satellites, China's offer of a $50,000,000
credit to Outer Mongolia last May was followed in September
by an offer of Soviet aid three times as large. A Chinese
credit of $105,000,000 extended to North Korea last October
was countered by the USSR's canceling $190,000,000 of North
Korea's debt in November. When the Soviet Union made an
offer of $112,000,000 to North Vietnam in December, the
Chinese responded with a $157,000,000 credit in January.]
lin the case of Burma, China extended an interest-free,
long-term credit of $84,000,000 last January, the largest
ever made by Peiping to a non-Communist country. In March,
the commercial counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon
is reported to have declared that the USSR would have to re-
dress the balance vis-a-vis Communist China either through
increased loans or grant aid. U Nu has declared that Burma
would turn to the Soviet Union or Communist China for arms
only if adequate supplies were not forthcoming from either
the US or the U1.9
fioviet military and economic assistance extended to In-
donesia amounts to almost $900,000,000,far in excess of Com-
munist China's economic aid program, which has been bogged
down since the outbreak of the Sino-Indonesian dispute in1959.
During his visit to Indonesia last week Chen Yi expressed Pei-
ping's willingness to resume its aid]
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 CO2001978
*us SECRET Newr
Soviet Petroleum Shipments to China Proceeding on Regular
Basis
Monthly schedules for Soviet petroleum and petroleum
products (POL) shipments to China were noted regularly in
communications intelligence through July 1960. From that
time until recently,
only fragmentary information on the amounts being e ivered.
Although the USSR continued to supply China with some petro-
leum in the latter half of 1960, reports of shortages during
that time indicate that the amounts supplied were not suffi-
cient to meet Peiping's requirements and small quantities were
imported from nonbloc sources for the first time.
Moscow's repeated requests in late 1960 for a decision
from Peiping on China's POL import needs for 1961 suggest
that the difficulties in this trade developed primarily from
Peiping's uncertainty over its entire economic position, es-
pecially its ability to maintain a level of exports commensu-
rate with its import program.
Trade negotiations for a protocol covering 1961 commod-
ity deliveries have been continuing in Moscow between top-level
Soviet and Chinese trade officials, and these negotiations re-
portedly will be concluded shortly. There has been no infor-
mation, however, on the results of the talks conducted by the
Soviet economic delegation which left Peiping on 27 March
for Mongolia to negotiate an aid protocol with Ulan Bator.
This delegation presumably discussed various aspects of So-
viet aid to China while in Peiping and visited many industrial
sites where Soviet technicians had been working prior to
their departure last summer. Reliable reports of Moscow's
unwillingness to extend emergency economic assistance to
help ease the current food crisis in China suggest the USSR
is driving a hard bargain in these negotiations.
SECRET
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
'-'TOP SECRET
The Iraqi Situation
The Iraqi public now sees little to distinguish the Qasim
regime from the royalist one it replaced in July 1958, Polit-
ical parties are moribund, large numbers of political prisoners
of all tendencies are in jails throughout the country, and the
army is being used to crush protest demonstrations. In addi-
tion, the prosperity of the Nun i Said regime has been lost, while
immunity, from arbitrary governmental actions has diminished -
markedly. As Qasim is being personally blamed more and more
for the country's ills, his ability to play off one political group-
ing against another is being weakened.
The riots which began with the taxi and bus drivers' strike
at the end of March have served to increase and, to some ex-
tent, coalesce the opposition to his regime. For the first time
since the 1958 revolution, Communists and nationalists, although
they did not cooperate, demonstrated against the regime at the
same time. So many have been arrested in the aftermath of the
disorders that prisoners are being sent to provincial jails.
Qasim's loss of popularity and prestige is forcing him to
rely more and more on the army, which is now the key to his
continuance in power. Reports of anti-regime plotting in the
army are growing. Most senior army officers are said to be
giving lip service to Qasim in order to ward off suspicion while
the remain in a position to carry out action against him.
UAR support for anti-regime elements has been stepped up
during the past month, This
support has been aimed at forming a "national league" of anti-
Qasim political elements, as well as increasing contacts with
certain dismissed Iraqi army officers.
TOP SECRE71
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
."u/TOP SECRET
Angola
Portuguese authorities in Angola are suspicious of both
Catholic and Protestant groups. On 1 April they arrested
Monsignor Manuel Mendes das Neves, the vicar general in
Angola, claiming that he might be the "supreme chief of the
subversive organization responsible for the terrorist attacks."
The authorities have accused Protestant missions in northern
Angola of being intimately connected with last month's upris-
ings because the attacks were better organized in areas where
these missions are most active. Portuguese have staged vio-
lent demonstrations against Protestant missions in Luanda
and destroyed a clinic.
the coming conference
in Casablanca will be co-sponsored by the pro-Communist
African Revolutionary Front for the National Independence of
Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN) based in Guinea, the African
Independence party of Portuguese Guinea, and the Goa League.
Invitations have been sent to leading nationalist organizations
representing Angola, Goa, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea,
Sao Tome, and Timor; observers from various Afro-Asian
organizations have also been invited. The sponsors hope to
adopt a resolution to form a solidarity committee "to organ-
ize the struggle" against Portuguese imperialism "on all
fronts." The Leopoldville-based Angola Peoples Union ,(UPA)
which played a maior role in the March uprisings, apparently
was not invited.
[L'ortuguese officials who recently visited Angola report-
edly were astonished at the extent of participation by natives
in the March uprisings. They admitted that Portugal was un-
prepared for such events and stated they were convinced that
Lisbon would have to institute major economic and social re-
forms if it hoped to retain this overseas province)
The over-all impact of the incidents on Angola's economy
may be grave; coffee production, which accounts for nearly half
of the province's foreign exchange receipts, is expected to de--
cline by about 10 percent because of damaged plantations and a
labor shortage during the harvest season. Lisbon recently sent
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
%480130P�SEeRET Ns.*
warnings to all banking institutions regarding the
need for strict compliance with regulations controlling foreign
exchange transactions. Stock quotations on firms operating in
Angola and Mozambique have declined sharply on the Lisbon
stock exchange.
On 31 March, immediately following alleged attacks by
natives on isolated posts in northern Angola, the Portuguese
Government announced plans for creating in its African prov-
inces a civil defense organization, comprising a corps of Por-
tuguese volunteers in each province under the direction of the
governor general and intended to help maintain order.
in Luanda, the local military com-
mander and the governor general are at odds over treatment
of the insurgent natives, with the former advocating mass shoot-
ings. On 3 April the American consul in that capital reported
indications that civilian authorities had been carrying out large=
scale reprisals against natives in various localities in Angola.
In Lisbon on 4 April a Portuguese Government spokesman
used a NATO anniversary celebration to renew attacks on US
policies in Africa, declaring that the US desire to maintain an
alliance in Europe was inconsistent with US policy in Africa
hostile to Portugal, particularly when Portugal's very existence
in the world community depended on its survival in Africa.
P SECRET
7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
� � � 0 ����
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978