CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001976
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: April 5, 1961

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5 April 1961
Copy No. C 62,
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
101)--SEC-RET__
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%OF U 4.31PIGNIONM4-__
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
'n this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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Napo'
-srelysz,
Nolo
5 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Congo: Relations still tense between Tshombeis forces
and UN in Elisabethville. (Page ti)
4. USSR=India: Soviet presidium member Suslov to attend
Indian Communist party congress. (Page itt)
5. Ceylon = Communist China: Annual rice=rubber barter
agreement renewed. (Page ttt)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 April 1961
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Banana*
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
300
Luanda
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
850
MOB UTU
Leopold�i
hysville
Gemena
Lis
Scattered .Force
MOBUTU
3,400
Rumba
moBUTU B
800
� Boende
Scattered Forces
GHANA
1600
MALAYA
750
Francqui KALONJI
1,500
4uabourg
Bak nga
Luputa
INDIA
800
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
F-1 Kasavubu-Mobutu
IRELAND
655
L j Gizenga
1-1 Kalov
I I Ishombe
610405 2
100
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
� Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
.7".. Selected airfield
0 STATUTE MILES
400
Usumbura
LIBERIA
ETHIOPI
Albertville
�Manono
SWEDEN
65()
TSHOMBE
7,000
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E61Z F1
Congo: An agreement to return to the status quo at
Elisabethville airport, with Katangan troops and a pwedish
0
UN contingent exercising joint control, apparently has
papered over the immediate cause of the 3 April confronta- otat_tc, 72.2d
tion between UN and ICatangan forces. The incident seems /
to have been set off by the Katangans, who attempted to
--4.0,-(1e.,.a
block the airport runway and were apprehended and disarmed /
by the Swedes. Tshombes regime remains apprehensive that A.4,,,,,t� 3
the UN will attempt to airlift Indian troops into southern Ka-
tanga from Kamina. This distrust has been communicated
to the civilian population and the armed forces, and civilian
demonstrations against the UN occurred on 4 April.
a2 a discussion in New York with American and British
officials, Hammarskjold indicated that he is hopeful rela-
tions between the UN and the Leopoldville regime will im-
prove. He remains adamant, however, that UN military
units must be readmitted to the port of Matadi in the near
future. He disclosed that in an effort to meet Congolese ob-
jections, his representative in Leopoldville was being in-
structed to suggest that the force in the port might be lim-
ited to 100 Nigerian police for the time being. He said he
was asking for an early answer and stated that if no favor-
able reply were received he would bring the question be-
fore the Security Council.
Soviet presidium nThber Brezhnev told the Swiss
ambassador recently that the USSR has little interest or
hopes in the Congo but is going to use the issue as a means
of obtaining its objectives concerning the UN Secretariat,
Including the removal of Secretary Gen3ral Hammarskjold.
(Backup, Page 3)
(Map)
5 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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USSR-India: M. A. Suslov, member of the Soviet party
presidium and secretariat in charge of liaison with foreign
Communist parties, is reportedly scheduled to attend the
Indian Communist party's sixth congress which opens on 7
April. The decision to send Suslov, who has played a cen-
tral role in the Sino-Soviet dispute and particularly in the
drafting of the resolution at the November 1960 conference
of Communist parties, is probably related to the deepening
split between those elements of the Indian party oriented to-
ward Moscow and the group which generally follows the Pei-
ping line. Suslov may also be bringing new instructions to
the Indian party, reflecting the Soviet Union's concern that
India's foreign policy has been shifting toward the West in
the past few months. Soviet Ambassador to India Benediktov
recently commented to Indian Foreign Secretary Dutt on the
growing rapport between the Indian and US governments and
bluntly inquired if this represented a change in India's policy
toward the USSR?'
Ceylon Communist China: Colombo and Peiping on 4
April signed the annual protocol to their second five-year
rice-rubber barter agreement (1958-62). The 1961 proto-
col calls for a return to the higher level of trade which ob-
tained from 1953 through 1959. The resumption of previous
trade levels stems more from Ceylonese economic necessity
than from the neutralist Ceylonese Government's policy of
increasing the bloc's small share of the island's trade. Last
year Colombo eventually had to buy considerably more rice
from China than the reduced amount specified in the annual
contract. The Chinese rice commitment to Ceylon--set at
200,000 tons for 1961 is to be met by re-exports of the
rice Peiping is purchasing from Burma.
5 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
A Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 April contended
that convening of the conference should not be made condi-
tional on a prior cease-fire verified by the ICC as proposed
by the British. Moscow radio also acknowledged that an
early truce in Laos would help create a favorable atmosphere
for negotiations. The broadcast, however, repeated the po-
sition taken in the Soviet note of 1 April that a cease-fire
should be concluded by the Laotian "parties" themselves. The
broadcast also urged that a "coalition government represent=
ative of a united Laotian people" be formed prior to the in-
ternational conference but "with the help of the member coun-
tries of that conference."
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Situation in the Congo
The tension in Elisabethville is unlikely to interiere witn
Tshombdis reported plans to move on Kabala in the northern
part of ICatanga, although the operation may be dela ed some-
what.
white andIMTtihare been airlifted to Kon-
golo, north of Kabala, and a move southward is imminent.
Hammarskjold stated on 3 April that in his opinion, the pres-
ence of Indian troops at Kamina had brought Tshombe's offen-
sive to a halt and a resumption of the operation was unlikely.
However, the commanders in northern Katanga are likely to
base their estimate of UN military effectiveness on the re-
fusal of the Nigerian troops at Manono to intervene in the bat-
tle there. The operation thus may be undertaken despite the
enlarged UN force in Katangaj
Elammarskjold said he believed that the Congolese in Leo-
poldville were becoming apprehensive of Tshombe's ambitions
and are happy to see the UN exerting pressure on Katanga. The
24-hour time limit set by Hammarskjold for a reply from Leo-
poldville probably is a bargaining position and subject to modi-
fication. Hammarskjold does feel, however, that a prompt
settlementaf the Matadi dispute is a prerequisite for an
im-
riin-i1tinnbeLweeieJNandLeopoldvill
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USSR Ruortedly Will Send a Top Leader to Indian*
Party Congress
-,guslov, a leading Soviet ideologist, led delegations to the
French Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1959 and to
the Italian Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1960.
He also visited Great Britain as a guest of the British Par-
liament in 1947, toured the Brussels World Fair in 1958,
and revisited England "informally" at the invitation of the
British Labor party to promote Anglo-Soviet relations. His
prospective trip to India, the first he has made to an Asian
country, points up the seriousness with which the Soviet
leaders view the inroads Chinese concepts have made in a
party in which USSR has long had the predominant influenc_9
there will be no Chinese delegates at
the party congress. The Chinese had apparently intended to
have the delegation to the just concluded World Peace Coun-
cil meeting in New Delhi remain in India to represent them
at the congress. The Indian Government�apparently de-
liberately discriminating against Peiping--reportedly turned
down the delegation's requests for visa extensions while ap-
proving visas for other foreign delegates. Nehru's govern-
ment, while highly critical of any foreign influence in Indian
political affairs, may hope that the Soviet Communist party,
in contrast to the Chinese party, will exercise a moderating
influence on the Indian party-.1
alle last Indian Communist party congress was held in
April 1958 at Amritsar, where the party formally adopted a
"peaceful, parliamentary approach to power." Chronic fac-
tionalism among the Indian Communist leaders soon led to a
renewed struggle over party policy, and the dissension was
accentuated by the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. A
series of executive meetings in February failed to break the
deadlock between the moderate and extremist groups. Lead-
ers of the various factions are preparing for a showdown fight
at the national congress in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, but
the final outcome is more likely to take the form of a corn-
promise designed to hold the party together for the elections
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(laxly next year. Susloves presence will increase the pressure
on rival leaders to compromise their differencesj
Li. recent months, Indian policies on the Congo, on the
reorganization of the UN Secretariat, and on Laos have re-
sulted in a deterioration of Indo-Soviet relations.
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TONFIII3E-PSIVAL No?
Colombo and Peiping Sign 1961 Rice-Rubber Contract
The first five-year barter agreement was negotiated in
late 1952. The conservative, pro-Western United National
party government then in office was motivated solely by eco-
nomic factors: at that time rice was difficult to obtain and
world rubber prices were low.
Colombo has continued the exchange during the past eight
years because the arrangement has provided a reliable source
of nearly half the island's annual rice import requirements and
a steady market for one of its three exports. Since 1953 all
the annual contracts except last year's have involved a minimum
exchange of about 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Cey-
lon's rubber.
Negotiation of the yearly contract takes place alternately
in Colombo and Peiping and normally is a routine process, al-
though there occasionally have been protracted disputes over
prices. The lengthy discussions on the 1960 contract marked
the only occasion when the talks have taken a somewhat polit-
ical turn; a few officials in the conservative caretaker regime
in power in Ceylon at that time hoped to reduce the island's
dependence on the pact, as well as to free for sale at better
prices some of the rubber committed to China at fixed prices.
Burma is the other ehipf snurep nf the island's rice im-
ports.
TOTTPti3ENTIAL_
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investibation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
TDNF1DEN-T-IAL,
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