CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001975
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 3, 1961

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP SECRET
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3 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1.
Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2.
Congo: Further contacts between Leopoldville
and Stanleyville military leaders; Tshombe de-
nounces airlift of Indian troops to Ka,mina.
(Page it)
3.
USSR: Test
on 2 April,
vehicle, probably ICBM,
launched
(Page it)
4.
Indonesia:
Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister
Chen Yi's visit. (Page ii)
5.
France-Algeria: Rebels tone down their previous
declaration canceling scheduled negotiations at
Evian. (Page tii)
6.
Portugal: Salazar noncommittal on reforms urged
by Defense Minister Moniz. (Page tti)
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JI
Phing Saly _
1PHO G SALY" NN,
I P ADien Bien Phu '
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LUANG1PRABANG d"
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--... 1? SAM
Luang Prabang /
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SAYABOURY
NORTHERN LAOS
40' GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
INV
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
0
� - TRAIL
ROUTE NUMBER
50
STATUTE MILES
XIENG KHOUANG
Muon:0 Soul .-Ban Ban
7
Xieng Khouang
1 Ban Ta Viang7
Tha Thom
Vang Vieng
e.-
VJENTIANE V&BorikhaneS
Pak Sane
100
Vientiane
A rd
Kam Keut
KHAMM
ak Sao
UANE
Thakhel<
9
avannakhet
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The Soviet reply on 1 April to the British proposals
on Laos was designed to give the impression of making conces-
sions to Western views,but it evaded the question of a de facto
cease-fire, which the US and Britain have termed a prerequi-
site for the reactivation of the [CC and an international confer-
ence. EAside from accepting the British proposal for a joint
appeal by the Geneva co-chairmen for a cease-fire, the Soviet
note did not advance the USSR's position in any essential re-
spect beyond that stated in its aide memoire of 18 February to
; )!
the UK proposing the immediate convening of the ICC and an in-
ternational conference-0 The Soviet proposal that the "inter- /
ested parties of Laos" should open cease-fire talks provides
further evidence that the bloc will seek to avoid any commit-
ments on a formal cessation of hostilities prior to a conference.
This evasive position on the timing and mechanisms of a cease-
fire seems intended to leave the way open for further military
pressures by the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces aimed at rein-
forcing the bloc's bargaining position.
The warning issued by Chinese Communist Foreign Min-
ister Chen Y1 in Djakarta on 2 April that Peiping is prepared
to respond to any intervention by SEATO forces in Laos by in-
troducing Chinese troops, if requested by Souvanna Phouma,
apparently was timed to generate further pressure on non-Com-
munist governments to accept the bloc's terms for negotiations
as conveyed in the Soviet note.
EGovernment forces, apparently under no effective control,
are continuing their withdrawal southward from Tha Thom.
These troops, with others in the area, have been ordered to
set up defensive positions in the vicinity of Borikhane, about 12
miles north of Pak Sane. These are also tentative indications
of Kong Le - Pathet Lao plans for increased activity in the
Luang Prabang area (Backup, Page 1)
(Map)
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Pig
Banan
Brazzaville�,,
Matadi
Kifona
NDONESIA
300
A tIontic
Ocean
Republic of the Congo
MOBUTU
7,200
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattered _fon
MOE111TU
3,400
isa Akeb
13uTba
MOBUTU -, Bajg....ko
800
EQUATFU�R-7,
Scattered Forces
EOPOLDVILLE
Leopoldvi
ysville
Ikela,
MALAYA
400
Francquiktr KALON11
1,500
ul uabourg
Bakw
� Boende
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda ri Kasavubu-Mobutu
1-7 Gizenga
Kalorui
Tshombe
1551 United Nations Forces
--- Selected road
Selected railroad
'..nr Selected airfield
0 STATUTE MILES 400
/104032
Luputa
INDIA
arriving
LIBERIA
nleyville
ETHIOPI4
amin,a;
ETHIOPIA
1,800
GIZENGA
7,000
Usurnbura
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
INIGERIA 1,
1,300
*Manono
�
�
Piana Mwanga
Mitwaba
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
7,000
Elisa
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Congo: ongolese military leaders of both the Leopold-
ville and Stanleyville regimes met in the border area of Orien-
tale and Equateur provinces near Bumba on 30 March to hold
preliminary discussions concerning the Tananarive proposals
for creating a loose confederation of Congolese states. At
this meeting--probably planned by General Mobutu--it was
decided that senior officers representing the two factions
would meet separately in Leopoldville and Stanleyville on 6
April to arrive at a "general consensus," and that a joint
meeting would be held at Lisala in Equateur Province on 10
April. Mobutu apparently hopes to attract support for a strong
central government from among Gizenga's military leaders.
While Gizenga has also opposed the Tananarive proposals, his
military leaders are reportedly meeting with Mobutu's repre-
sentatives without Gizenga's approval and have told Mobutu's
representatives that they are dissatisfied with the civilian lead-
ership in Stanleyville)
Katanga's President Tshombe has denounced the airlifting
of 800 Indian troops from Leopoldville to Kaanina as a deliber-
ate attempt by certain elements in the UN to prevent the for-
mation of a confederation of states in the Congo. A UN offi-
cial indicated that these troops would seek to interpose them-
selves between Tshombe's troops, which took Manono on 30
March, and Baluba tribesmen in northern Katanga who remain
loyal to the Stanleyville regime.
(Backup, Page 7) (Map)
USSR: CA test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched
at 1406 GMT (0906 EST) on 2 April from the Tyura Tam Mis-
sile Test Range to the usual impact area on Kamchatka. No
facilities associated with previous space launchings partici-
pated in this shot. However, the continued deployment of the
Sibir ships as they were for the Sputnik X launching (25 March)
and the activity of Soviet aircraft I
a significant space program event is forthcom-
ing in the near future. The total of generally successful test
Trirtm atinta fn dal-A is 32-11
Communist China - Indonesia: Chinese Communist For-
eign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia, which ended on 2
3 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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April, outwardly restored the cordial Sino-Indonesian relations
which existed before the outbreak in 1959 of the dispute over
the Overseas Chinese. Friendship and cultural agreements
were signed during the visit, and Chen expressed Peiping's
readiness to resume its economic aid program, suspended in
the summer of 1959. The difficulties between the two countries
over the treatment of Chinese living in Indonesia were eased
last December when Peiping agreed to a treaty under which it
renounced its previous claim that Chinese living in Indonesia
were still Chinese citizens. Tinder the treaty, local Chinese
were required to choose withintwo years either Indonesian or
Chinese citizenship. (Backup, Page 8)
France-Algeria: The announcement on 1 April by the
rebel provisional Algerian government (PAG) that it is still
ready to negotiate with the French, provided formal talks are
held only with its representatives, is an attempt to force fur-
ther concessions from Paris. The French are claiming that
negotiations will merely be postponed briefly. A top assist-
ant to French Minister for Algeria Joxe on 1 April labeled
the PAG's declarations a maneuver to get France to take a
position on the PAG's claim to be the exclusive representa-
tives of Algeria, and predicted that the rebels might try to
draw the French into further secret preliminary talks.
Portugal: LOn 28-29 March Minister of Defense Botelho
Moniz, in a second approach to Premier Salazar this month,
stressed again the urgency of reforms both in Portugal andin
Portuguese policies in Africa--reforms which the military
believe are essential.
Oalazar listened
attentively and courteously but was noncommittat
(Backup, Page 10)
3 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I �,
II
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Laos
The primary objective of the Soviet note probably was to
provide minimum satisfaction to US and British views suf-
ficient to get negotiations under way and to forestall any in-
crease in Western military assistance to Vientiane without
undertaking any commitments which would reduce the bloc's
bargaining strength and freedom of maneuver. Moscow's
agreement to a joint appeal by the Geneva co-chairmen for a
cease-fire does not concede any basic points on the crucial
issue of the timing of a cease-fire. This unyielding stand
suggests that the bloc leaders are confident they can gain
eventual Western agreement to negotiations under conditions
favorable for advancing bloc objectives in Laos without sac-
rificing any of the advantages which derive from the military
initiative and successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces.
In line with the bloc's official pronouncements and propa-
ganda over the past two months, the Soviet note placed pri-
mary emphasis on Britain's agreement to a 14-nation confer-
ence. Moscow claimed credit for having pressed this ap-
proach since last December and sought to reap further ad-
vantage by proposing that the conference be convened early
in April in Phnom Penh,
Although Moscow professed to agree with Britain's call
for the "earliest termination of hostilities," the Soviet reply
was deliberately evasive in dealing with the mechanism pro-
posed by the UK for arranging a cease-fire. The note ignored
the fundamental US-UK position that reactivation of the ICC
and an international conference are conditional on the achieve-
ment of a de facto cease-fire. It implicitly rejected the West-
ern position that a conference cannot be held until the effec-
tiveness of a ce se-fire is verified by both the Geneva co-
chairmen and the ICC.
Moscow's reply failed to spell out the authority and func-
tions of the proposed ICC meeting in New Delhi. It said only
that the commission should call a meeting as soon as pos-
sible and present its report to the co-chairmen. Moscow
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---
stipulated only that the renewal of ICC activity should in no
way impede the convocation of a conference. This formula
suggests that the bloc would seek to restrict the ICC to a
fruitless debate, at least during the period before an inter-
national conference. This attitude would be consistent with
the bloc's long-standing position that the changes in the Lao-
tian situation since the 1954 Geneva conference make neces-
sary the drafting of "fresh instructions" for the ICC and that
only an international confe nee would have the authority to
work out such directives. Moscow's concept of the role the
_Arr�slinuld_nerfconference was set forth
the commission meeting in
New Delhi would discuss how to resume its activities, con-
sider what further powers it would require to take effective
action, and report to the co-chairmen
Moscow's position that cease-fire talks should be left to
the "interested parties of Laos" provides further evidence
that the USSR is unwilling to agree to any approach which
would indicate Soviet responsibility for or control of the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet note reaffirmed the
USSR's recognition of Souvanna Phouma as the only "legal
government", of Laos, but it agreed with the British proposal
for negotiations "among the different political tendencies in
Laos on measures for strengthening nation 1 unity of the coun-
try." Moscow also agreed that if the opposing factions fail to
reach agreement before a conference opens, the conference
itself should render help to the Laotians in reaching an agree-
ment. The stated objective of such consultations is the forma-
tion of a "neutral government of national unity"--a further in-
dication that the bloc will insist on substantial Pathet Lao rep-
resentation in a broadened government.
Chen Yi's statement in Djakarta, in addition to warning of
possible Chinese intervention in Laos, sought to sharpen the
sense of urgency over the crisis by pointing out that "China
was compelled to participate in the Korean war after US forces
went to our border." While in Burma last week en route to
-SECRET
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Indonesia, Chen carefully evaded a question on SEATO inter-
vention which would have afforded a similar opportunity for
making a specific threat of Chinese counteraction.
Peiping is also seeking to exploit the presence of Chinese
Nationalist irregulars in the Laos area to arouse concern over
the possibility of Chinese intervention. Chen Yi used his Dja-
karta press conference to cite the alleged threat posed by these
troops, and Peiping has increased its propaganda attention to
this issue over the past few days. It has warned that the alleged
move by the irregulars to join Laotian Government forces near
Vientiane is an "extremely serious development" and has claimed
for the first time that the irregulars have conducted raids into
China from Laos.
An article in Peiping's People's Daily on 1 April, issued be-
fore the Soviet reply to the British proposals but undoubtedly
with foreknowledge of its contents, took a much harsher line to-
ward the US, but its substantive comments were not inconsistent
with the Soviet note. The article avoided direct reference to a
cease-fire or reactivation of the ICC but repeated Peiping% stand-
ard position that an enlarged Geneva conference is the only way
to reach a settlement.
In his recent talks with British officials in London, Souvanna
Phouma stated that as soon as a cease-fire is called for, he
would request his followers to support it. He expected conform-
ity from the Pathet Lao, as well as Kong Le forces- -which he
regards as still separate. Souvanna professed concern that a
gap between a cease-fire and the re-establishment of the ICC,
and an even longer delay before the convening of an international
conference, might enable General Phoumi to improve his posi-
tioq
/outlining his idea of an interim Laotian government, Sou-
vanna stated that it would be drawn from his "supporters with
Kong Le," plus former members of his cabinet now serving with
Premier Boun Oum and two or three members from both the left)
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rand the right. British officials felt Souvanna seemed to ap-
preciate the desirability of limiting leftists to lesser posts.
They found him overconfident on the outcome of early elections
in Laos and attempted to convince him that elections should be
delayed at least a year to consolidate his own position. The
British told the American Embassy that they were impressed
by Souvanna's attitude and that, despite the risks in dealing with
him, they believe he is the only Laotian offering any promise
of bringing about a political settlement and of leading a neutral
Laos.:/
ouvanna, now in Paris, plans to leave there on 12 April
ES
and to visit Belgrade, Warsaw, Moscow, and Peiping before
returning to Phnom Penh)
In Laos, King Savang and Phoumi returned to Luang Prabang
from Vientiane on 2 April without waiting for details of the Soviet
reply. Before leaving, Phoumi told Ambassador Brown that
a cabinet meeting on 1 April had authorized him to appeal for
SEATO intervention if the Soviet reply to the British note proved
unfavorable. Although Phoumi assured Ambassador Brown he
would not act without prior consultation, similar assurances of
consultation by Laotian officials were ignored when Laos ap-
pealed for UN assistance in September 1959.
On 31 March, the day Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces captured
Tha
town,
troops there were demoralized by eavy
ment, that one battalion had already withdrawn, and that the re-
maining tronns were weak. tfhe withdrawal of government
troops was "mass
hysteria" resulting from heavy firing from overwoKing neights'q
ordered them to push the attack on the
Since the fall of Tha Thom, there have been indications that
Meo guerrillas to the north--now in a more isolated position--
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have come under increasing enemy pressure. The Moos' effec-
tive harassment of Pathet Lao troops in recent weeks has made
them a prime target.
the time was ripe for concentrated psychological
tactics, as the Laotian Army appears considerably demoral-
ized. Operational headquarters were instructed to send per-
sons into the villages and spread reports of impending attacks
by Kong Le - Pathet Lao troops. These reports, headquarters
contended, will be passed to Laotian Army intelligence units
in the villages, resulting in disruption of government activity
and possibly abandonment of the area. This technique has
been used with considerable success in the past, and the cur-
rent instructions for an intensified effort provide further in-
dication of the enemy's intent to expand its territorial hold
prior to any negotiated settlement.
ELaotian government officials in Luang Prabang are in-
creasingly concerned over the prospect of an attack there.
Kong Le - Pathet Lao
troops as of late March were attempting to flank government
forces north of the Phou Khoun junction and move toward the
royal capital; additional troops were said to be heading toward
Luang Prabang from the Nam Bac area. Although these re-
ports are unconfirmed, the disquieting effect on Luang Pra-
bang army headauarters
"the present situation is critical. The
enemy is spread everywhere...' .Several recent Soviet
transport flights to Nam Bac ancf the scheduling on 2 April of
seven IL-14s to the Phong Saly area are further possible indi-
cations of a developing threat to Luang Prabang. The flights
to Phong Saly would be the first substantial airlift mission to
this areaa
__.Vientiane is claiming that several battalions of North
Vietnamese troops are involved in the Kam Keut - Lak
Sao are
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There is, however, no firm information on
the scope of enemy activities in central Laos-:3
Hanoi has dismissed as an "impudent lie" Vientiane's
charge that North Vietnamese troops took part in the fighting
at Tha Thom. It claims that Vientiane made the accusation
to cover up intervention in Laos by the US and its allies.
IA Soviet IL-18 and one AN-12 arrived at Haiphong on 31
March. The IL-18 has returned to the USSR. ond AN-12
was scheduled to arrive at Haiphong on 2 April?
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Nor cONFIDENTIAL
Situation in the Congo
The UN Command, which recently reinforced several
garrisons in northern Katanga, hopes to arrange a cease-fire
between the contending forces there. Clashes are reported
to have occurred recently between the Katanga gendarmerie
and Baluba tribesmen near Kabalo, about 100 miles north of
Manono. A UN official stated that UN troops will attempt to
prevent further advances by either side, but will use force
only as a last resort.
Tshomb6 is particularly incensed over UN intervention
in Katanga at this time; the presence of additional UN troops,
besides posing a threat to future operations by his forces,
might also adversely affect the already questionable loyalty
of some of the tribal chiefs in the area. Concerned that some
of these chiefs might be planning to withdraw from the Katanga
"state" and form separate provinces, Tshombe is said to be
planning a visit to the troubled areas in an attempt to dissuade
them from taking this action.
GLIobutu apparently feels that if the Lisala meeting is suc-
cessful, he will be able to cope with any opposition to his plan.
He is said to believe that if he moves troops into northern Ka-
tanga, he could pressure Tshomb6--his principal opponent--
into accepting a federal form of government. Mobutu report-
edly is convinced that the UN Command would welcome his aid
in "bringing Tshomb6 to heel" and that Tshomb6's "Belgian
mercenaries" would not oppose a unified army. In addition to
the pressure Mobutu could exert on the Leopoldville politicians
with a unified army, he believes he can also count on the sup-
port of Foreign Minister Bomboko and Interior Minister Adoula,
who are known to share his opposition to a Congo confederacy]
{Mobutu is less optimistic regarding a military arrangement
with the Stanleyville faction. Although willing to compromise
with General Lundula, Mobutu distrusts Gizenga, whom he con-
siders "more dangerous than Lumumba." Nevertheless, he be-
lieves a unified army can be realized by removing Gizenga from
power--.:3
CONTIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Sino-Indonesian Relations Outwardly Improved by Chen Yi's
Visit
Peiping, which purports to be the protector of all Over-
seas Chinese, made strong representations on their behalf
after Djakarta in 1959 ordered the closing of all stores owned
by aliens (mostly Chinese) in rural areas. Chinese Commu-
nist Embassy personnel defied Indonesian restrictions by
traveling through the countryside inciting local Chinese to
resist Indonesian attempts to remove them.
Although it felt constrained to intervene in favor of the
Overseas Chinese, Communist China was probably disturbed
over the adverse effect its intransigent attitude toward Indo-
nesia had on its carefully developed pose as a good neighbor.
Peiping called off its propaganda attacks against Djakarta last
August, and relations have been gradually improving since
then.
Chinese economic assistance to Indonesia totaled $48,000,-
000 before relations became strained by the Overseas Chinese
issue. A $30,000,000 Chinese credit offered just before the
outbreak of the dispute was never accepted by Indonesia. The
planned visit of an Indonesian industrial mission to China later
this month will provide an opportunity to discuss economic aid.
The Indonesian press was generally cordial to Chen Yi
during his week's stay�apparently at the instigation of Presi-
dent Sukarno, who has been attempting to play down all other
sources of international friction in order to focus attention on
Indonesia's claim to Netherlands New Guinea. Nevertheless,
Chinese-Indonesian relations are unlikely to be significantly
affected. Foreign Minister Subandrio, still smarting from the
treatment he received in Peiping in 1959, deliberately refrained
from any welcoming remarks on Chen Yi's arrival at the Dja-
karta airport. The government restricted Chen's travels in
--CONFIDENTIAL-
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*AreitCONFIDENTIALNoe
Indonesia, and the length of his visit in the country was cut
by two days.
Although the treaty of friendship declared that the two
countries would "settle the issues in dispute through delibera-
tions in the spirit of real friendship and good will through dip-
lomatic channels and by other peaceful means," relations might
again become embittered if Djakarta renews its attem7ts to re-
move Chinese from rural areas.
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Portuguese Defense n tl1/441�i4Wi�urg� es Premier Salazar to Re-
shuffle Cabinet
an addition to Moniz' two oral approaches to Salazar, a
letter drafted by Moniz and endorsed on 25 March by 17 key
generals--including the heads of the security police and the
rdhasbensenttothemier.
omz
letter pointed out Portugal's rapidly worsening position at
home and abroad and emphasized that nothing was being done
tsi halt this condition except an unproductive propaganda cam-
paign against the UN and against those nations which disagree
with Portuguese policy:3
EMoniz stressed that Portugalfaced the possibility of re-
volt in all its African provinces and Timor, as well as Indian
"aggression" against Goa, and said the military felt they
could not cope with a situation of such magnitude. After as-
serting that sweeping internal changes would be necessary to
pave the way for essential constructive changes in foreign pol-
icy, the letter called on Salazar to revamp the cabinet com-
pletely and not just replace present ministers with "burned
out" former ministers:)
{The e letter reportedly was sent to Salazar without any ul-
timatum that he follow its recommendations or step down. If
Salazar fails to act, however, the military would feel obliged
to consider further action. Army Chief of Staff Camara Pina
was the only participant in the 25 March meeting who failed to
give his endorsement. It is said to have been under discussion
by the military for some time, and was also approved by the
former President, Marshal Craveiro Lopes')
[Another approach to Salazar was made early in March by
General Beleza Ferraz, chief of staff of the armed forces,
who is close to Moniz. Ferraz reportedly broached the idea
that the premier had better step aside if he could not quickly]
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Nam,
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nd solutions to Portugal's pressing African problems. The
chief of staff is said to have lost his nerve and withdrew the
suggestion when Salazar said he was willing to resign
the cabinet "remodeling"
expected during the week of 20 March had been postponed be-
cause of the departure of the overseas minister for Angola on
23 March and the scheduled visit of French Foreign Minister
t'nnvp r1 MUrVille to Lisbon early in Apri
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No/ '410,1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001975
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001975