CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001974
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 1, 1961

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1 April 1961
Copy No. C 79
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi hints
desire for improved relations with US to Swedish
ambassador. (Page ii)
3. Congo: Tshombe's forces take Manono; Katanga con-
tinues to receive military supplies from Belgium.
(Page ii)
4. France-Algeria: Rebels cancel scheduled negotia-
tions in Evian. (Page it)
5. Nationalist China: 3,852 irregulars evacuated from
Burma-Thailand-Laos border area since 17 March.
(Page it)
6. USSR: New delta-wing jet aircraft sighted outside
plant in Moscow. (Page tit)
7. Africa: All-African People's Conference issues ex-
treme anti-Western resolutions. (Page tit)
8. Common Market = Greece: Treaty of association
signed on 30 March. (Page tit)
-Ste=
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A
41iRMA
Luang Prabanq
SAYABOURY �
I I
Plru K
ILhoun
Muong Kas
/
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
*I KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
40
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
'i�ROAD
-'3 0
..- -TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
, j 10401 2
50
I I i
STATUTE MILES
4J NA
Phong Saly
I
IPHONG SALY
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Xieng Khouabg
acrn Ta Viang,
s...;�,������?Tha Thom
Vang Vien�
�
VIENTIANE
Pak Sane
Vientiane
H A A N D
Kam Keut
KHAMM
k Sa
UANE
lhakhek
vannakhet
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The capture by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces on 31
March of 11-a, Thom, the government's main base on the south-
ern approach to the Plaine des Jarres, indicates that the enemy
forces intend to improve further their military position in Laos
prior to any cease-fire.
the well-executed attack followed an in-
tensive artillery barrage directed by well-placed spotters.
This action also opens the way for a possible drive southward
against Pak Sane. The loss of Tha Thom will have a strong
psychological impact on the Boun Oum government, particular-
ly on General Phoumi, who is already alarmed over the reported
Communist threat to Thakhek. *A Pathet Lao advance to either
Pak Sane or Thakhek would cut off southern Laos,
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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r-7,4
Banana
INDIA
1711
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3,200
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
850
MOBUTU
Brazzaville,,MCP 7200,
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
300
Luanda
10401
MALAYA
150
emena
Scattered, Forces
MOBUTU
3400
EqUATEI
�Coquilhatville
.111111'" � Boende ETHIOPIA
1,800
MOBUTU
800
Aketi
leyville
Scattered Forces
_LoPot nVILLE
Leopoldvi
ysville
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
(1)
00
United Nations Forces
- Selected road
Selected railroad
=' Selected airfield
STATUTE MILES
ulua ourg
Bakw
4040
Lupu
MOROCCO
IRELAND
655
MALAYA
400
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
Kamina
Elisa
GiZENGA
7 000
Bukavu'
NIGERIA
Kongolo
Albertville
NIGERIA
1,300
*Ma nano
�
Piana
Mitwaba
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
7,000
Usumbura
Mwanga '
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Communist China:* contrast to Peiping's current propa-
ganda attacks on the United States, Communist China's Foreign
Minister Chen Yi told the Swedish ambassador on 21 March that
an improvement in Sino-US relations "must come" and that there
is "no risk of war" between the two countries over Taiwan. De-
spite his concilia.torytone, Chen avoided any suggestion that the
Chinese were disposed to make any concession at this time to
the United States. He implied rather that the next move was up
to Washington, asserting that the United States had not yet re-
ciprocated concessions already made by Peiping, such as the
release of American prisoners after Hammarskjold's visit to
China in 1956.3
rack-
up, Page 4)
Congo: Despite the apparent ease with which Tshombe's
forces took Manono, the BalOa tribesmen in 7thern Katanga
are likely to remain restive.
Katanga apparently continues to receive military supplies
from Belgium.
shipments are coming by air via the UN trust territory of
Ruanda-Urundi and by ship probably through the Angolan port
of Lobito. future
chin7ts are scheduled as far ahead as next August.
(Map)
France-Algeria: The rebel Algerian provisional govern-
ment's (PAG) 31 March announcement that it will cancel the
scheduled negotiations with the French follows by one day the
coordinated official announcements in Tunis and Paris that
talks would begin on 7 April at Evian. The PAG position is
apparently a reaction to French Minister for Algeria Joxe's
confirmation that France has begun talks with other Algerian
groups, despite recent rebel warnings that such action would
Jeopardize negotiations. (Backup, Page 5)
1 Apr 61
Nationalist China: EChinese Nationalist irregulars num-
bering 3,852, including some dependents, have been evacuated I
from the Burma-Thailand-Laos border area since 17 March
jj
.4,
DAILY BRIEF
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The operation is slowing and will soon end, since Taipei has
evacuated the major part of the irregulars responsive to Na-
tionalist control, presumably including the 1,000-man Taiwan-
trained special force sent to the area in 1960. Most of the
approximately 3,000 to 4,000 irregulars remaining in the area
have never been responsive to Taipei, and few will choose to
go to Taiwan without greater pressure from Thai and Lao au-
thorities9 (Backup, Page 7)
USSR: A new large jet aircraft, probably a bomber, was
recently seen outside the Fill bomber production plant in Mos-
cow. This aircraft, which was not complete, had delta wings
and a supersonic configuration. The fragmentary information
on this aircraft available to date suggests that it may be a fur-
ther development of an aircraft designated Bounder, with im-
proved performance characteristics. The Bounder, a jet
bomber, was seen at this same plant in August 1958 but was
not put into series production. These recent observations
make it clear that the USSR is continuing research and devel-
opment in heavy bomber aircraft. Additional information is
Pxne eted horthr whieh will nprmit a mnrp rIptailpel analimiCt
Africa: The anti-Western resolutions issued on 30 March
by the Third All-African People's Conference in Cairo were
even more extreme than the declarations of the previous meet-
ings in 1958 and 1960. Delegations to the conference, which
met from 25 to 30 March, were nongovernmental and consisted
of 50 groups representing political parties and trade unions
from 34 African states and territories. One resolution attacked
American "Peace Corps" plans as designed to "reconquer and
economically dominate Africa." The conference also called for
the resignation of Secretary General Hammarskjold and the re-
organization of the UN Secretariat. Although the conference
does not represent the views of most responsible African
officials, the resolutions reflect the opinions of a sizable and
increasingly vocal body of Africans.
Common Market - Greece: ale treaty of association be-
tween the Common Market and Greece which was signed iii]
1 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
111
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a_3russels on 30 March may serve as a pattern for such agree-
ments with other countries. Still subject to ratification by
the Common Market's council of ministers, the agreement pro-
vides material benefits to Greece by way of extensive develop-
mental aid and potential new export outlets. Preliminary talks
on Turkish association with the Common Market are expected
to resume on 10 April. Tunisia, Israel, and some of the newly
independent countries in Africa have alLan-A3mr-P-----inte---r-e-Rt-in
ssociation with the Common Market}
(Backup, Page 8)
1 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Laos
5rior to news of the Tha Thom reverse, the Laotian
Government apparently had been on the verge of appealing
for help from SEATO on the basis of reports of a Commu-
nist thrust developing in the Kam Keut area to cut Laos in
half. King Savang,
said he had advised the government against taking
such a "premature" step. Savang expressed the view that
any appeal to SEATO should await the Soviet reply to the
British, but his appeal to Brown to advise General Phoumi
to go slowly in this matter indicates that the King does not
have full command of the situation. Savang, emphasizing
the importance of preventing the enemy from using a cease-
fire to improve its military position, said any cease-fire
should involve withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops
[The presence of the substantial enemy forces which are
reported converging on Thaldiek has not yet been substantiated,
but all efforts to confirm or deny Laotian field reports are
seriously handicapped by the fact that aerial reconnaissance
is frequently ineffective in this heavily wooded area and by
the lack of Western observers on the ground.
support Laotian claims of North Vietnamese assistance in the
recent fighting in the Kam Keut area.
on 10 March over
30 trucks transported provisions and ammunition from Vinh,
North Vietnam, to Ithammouane Province via Route 8. Presi-
dent Diem of South Vietnam has also received unconfirmed re-
ports that North Vietnamese units are moving into Laos in the
direction of Thakhek-3
Phoumi apparently remains convinced that the situation in
southern Laos is serious. He feels he does not have sufficient
forces to stop a major attack in this region, and says he is pre-
paring for the necessity of evacuating Thakhek and Savannakhet.
In a review of the security situation with Ambassador Brown on
30 March, Phoumi seemed greatly depressed and said he was
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distressed by the fact that American officials continually dis-
count enemy strength in Laos0
new developments
in bloc assistance to the Pathet Lao during the past few days.
Both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have expressed opposition
to Western formulations that would freeze the present military
lines in Laos. On 31 March the Pathet Lao termed a "de-
ceitful trick" the idea of having a cease-fire precede a con-
ference. On the same day, Hanoi charged the US with an at-
tempt to "gain time" to bolster Vientiane forces and "prevent
the expansion of patriotic forces."
an a conversation on 29 March with Ambassador Stevenson,
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated the generally mod-
erate line he had taken in his previous discussion with Presi-
dent Kennedy. Gromyko urged "patience" from both sides and
voiced his hope that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would
take measures to aggravate the situation in Laog-op
(Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz of Poland recently told
Ambassador Stevenson that while he was certain the Soviet
Union wanted a detente with the West, the position of the Chi-
nese Communists was causing acute difficulties. Winiewicz
attributed the delay in Moscow's acceptance of a cease-fire
In Laos to difficulty in obtaining Chinese approval and argued)
TOP SECRET
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hat Khrushchev needs successes to demonstrate the effective-
ness of his peaceful coexistence line to the Chinese. These re-
marks probably were calculated to underscore Soviet moderation
and restraint in the Laotian crisis and to provide a justification
for the USSR's apparent unwillingness to agree to a formal cease-
fire in Laos prior to an international conference. Similar state-
ments regarding Sino-Sovtet divergence on policy in Laos were
circulated by Soviet spokesmen in mid-January. With a view to
discouraging the US from carrying out any action which might
have expanded the conflict, bloc spokesmen at that time also
warned privately that Peiping would send troops into Laos if
US forces were introduced:3
A commentary published in the Peiping People's Daily today
charges that the US has "still not abandoned its policies of war
and aggression in Laos," and reiteFates the line that "convocation
of an enlarged Geneva conference" is the "only way" to a peace-
ful solution. The article calls for an end to "brinkmanship
policy" and for the evacuation of "all troops and arms of the
United States and its vassal countries, as well as the Kuomintang
remnant bandits."
Charging Vientiane and US "connivance," Communist China
has also for this first time accused Chinese Nationalist irregular
troops of raiding into China from Laos. A Chinese Communist
domestic broadcast on 31 March claimed that the irregulars
crossed into Yunnan Province on 14 March and fired on resi-
dents before being driven off. The broadcast did not threaten
retaliatory action, stating only that this act "has amused the
anger of the people and alerted their vigilance."
TOP SECRZ
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SECRET
Peiping Underlines Basis for Better Relations With US
[The initiative for the conversation with the Swedish am-
bassador came from Chen Yi, who said that he was disap-
pointed by a recent editorial in a leading Swedish newspaper
which criticized the Chinese Communist attitude at the last
Sino-US meeting in Warsaw. Concerned that the editorial
might reflect official views in Stockholm, Peiping prob-
ably felt that a high-level exposition of its position was de-
sirable to discourage any shift in Sweden's attitude of studied
neutrality toward Sino-US relation]
On his remarks, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stressed the
friendship of the Chinese and American people and said that
the Peiping regime was prepared to "show patience" until
there is a change in the US position. Peiping probably does
not expect an early improvement in Sino-US relations and
Chen himself last November suggested that it might well
take a decade
Cchen deplored what he described as the failure of the
Kennedy administration to show an "attitude of understand-
ing" toward Peiping, citing the fact that it had not "softened"
the US stand on Taiwan Or Chinese representation in the UN.
Current Chinese propaganda attacks the new. American ad-
ministration as "more aggressive" than the previous one and
says it is busily preparing for both general and local war9
The Chinese Communists make it clear that they regard
the withdrawal of, US support from Chiang Kai-shek as one of
the very first steps to any improvement in Sino-US relations.
They appear to reason that the American position in the Far
East is weakening and that there is no necessity for conces-
sions on their part. Peiping may, in fact, be stiffening its
terms for an improvement in Sino-American relations. Chen,
was recently quoted as insisting that the US withdraw from
Taiwan before Peiping takes a UN seat. The Chinese had
previously insisted only on the prior withdrawal of Chiang
Ka AhPki A renresentativen
�SECRET-
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SECRET Nes
French-Algerian Negotiations Canceled
This week's announcement of French plans to consult with
"other tendencies" before and during the negotiations with the
PAG probably was an attempt by Paris to define the limits of
De Gaulle's concession on his original demand for a round-
table conference. Substantive issues have until now been
glossed over, and the rebels may have overestimated the de-
gree of French acceptance of their proposals.
c Joxe's top assistant, Bruno de Leusse, said on
30 arch- -prior to the new rebel move--that he believed the
PAG's first effort at Evian would be to attempt to gain recog-
nition as a government, but that France had no intention of
making such a concession. In contrast to his personal view,
however, he said that the French Government was convinced
that as early as September 1959--following De Gaulle's offer
of self-determination�the PAG had decided to liquidate itself
as a government following negotiations in order to participate
as a political party in elections after self-determination.
The PAG leaders have been deeply suspicious of French
good faith since the failure of talks at Melun last June.. They
have long insisted that they were the sole spokesmen for the
Algerian people, and undoubtedly felt that their prestige would
suffer if after Joxe's statement they went to Evian without clear
assurance that Paris would engage in substantive negotiations
only with them. They may also feel that their desire to be
regarded during negotiations not merely as representatives
of a rebel force but as the acknowledged leaders of Algeria,
capable of making binding decisions conerning the country's
future, would have been jeopardized by the present conditions.
Moreover, the bomb killing early on 31 March of the mayor
of Evian, presumably by French rightists, may have caused
the PAG leaders to doubt that the French Government is in a
position to assure their safety on French territory-.)
The PAG was probably particularly angered by Joxe's
implication that the French intend to consult with Messali
Hadj and other leaders of the Algerian National Movement
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(MNA), and the French may have miscalculated the depth of
the PAG resentment. The MNA, established by Messali two
years after the rebellion began, has been active mainly in the
Algerian colony in France, where it has fomented an exchange
of assassinations with Algerians loyal to the PAG. Within Al-
geria, however, its influence has been minimal, and virtually
all Algerians who have actually fought against the French owe
allegiance to the PAG.
There is also the possibility, however, that "hard" ele-
ments among the rebel leadership may have seized this op-
portunity to break off negotiations, hoping thereby to stifle
any tendency among the mnripraips to comnromise with France
-stantive issues.
�SECRET-
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Evacuation oi uninese Nationalist Irregulars
C_T_he Chinese Nationalists are planning to send Lt. Gen.
Lai Ming-tang, vice chief of the General Staff, to Thailand
early in April to make a final appeal to the irregulars to go
to Taiwan. Lai believes that if the momentum of the evacua-
tion is allowed to fall off, many of the irregulars attached to
the area or under slack discipline will evade evacuation. He
said that there were several hundred irregulars in scattered
groups still in Burma, and they would not leave unless driven
out by Burmese armed force
EThere are 1,500 to 2,000 men under the command of
Yunnan General Than who recently withdrew from Burma into
Thailand, they have been relatively in-
dependent of Chinese Nationalist control and thus far have re-
fused evacuation. Many have married and settled in Burma,
but also have villages in Thailand where they go to escape
Burmese Army efforts to clean up the area. Great pressure
is almost certain to be reauired to evacuate a significant num-
ber of these. General
Dawee, the Thai representative on the evacuation mission, be-
lieves that over 1,500 Chinese in Laos have also refused evac-
uations
/Thai cooperation with the nationalists so far appears ef-
fect e. Prospects have developed for Burmese-Thai military
cooperation in removing the irregulars who have refused evac-
uation. General Dawee
will accompany General Lai to the villages and if necessary
use force to disarm Tuan's group. General Dawee asked the
Burmese to reinforce the border area to keep the irregulars
from withdrawing into Burma-7:3
to
large group of irregulars remaining in the area will
tend to obscure the benefits of the successful evacuation and
recall to the Burmese the incomplete previous evacuation in
1953 and 1954. However, with the special forces removed, it
appears unlikely that the remnants will be capable of more than
banditry unless in the future Tai ei resumes efforts to resupply,
build up, or control the irregulars.
TOP SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL
110.4
Common Market and Greece Sign Association Agreement
c Greece's association with the European Common Market
(EE t) has been the subject of laborious and frequently acri-
monious negotiations since June 1959. Much of the difficulty
has derived from Athens' demands for developmental aid and
a privileged position for Greek exports, and from Italian con-
cern over potential Greek competition in agricultural products.
There has also been some political opposition among the six
EEC countries--notably in the Netherlands and West Germany
--to the principle of associations with individual countrie
These difficulties are fully reflected in the resulting agree-
ment, which is said to run to more than 100 articles and which
provides in general for an eventual Greek-EEC customs union.
Greek industrial exports will benefit from the tariff reductions
in the Common Market, and special provision has been made
for increased EEC purchases of tobacco, the major Greek ex-
port item. Certain Greek industries will receive extended
tariff protection from EEC competition, and over the next five
years Greece will receive $125,000,000 in long-term develop-
mental loans. The major disadvantage to Greece appears to
be Italy's successful insistence on "safeguards" against imports
of Greek citrus fruit by the other five EEC countrie-q
While Athens has accordingly looked on the association
agreement primarily in terms of its economic benefits, its
importance to the EEC is principally political. Negotiations
with other potential associates in the Mediterranean area
Turkey, Tunisia, and possibly Israel--have been in
abeyance pending conclusion of the Greek agreement. Prob-
ably even more important, the agreement comes at a tithe
when the EEC is increasingly preoccupied with its future as-
sociative ties with Africa, since the convention which -linked
the African territories of the EEC colonial powers with the
Common Market expires in 1962. Many of these now-inde-
pendent territories seem interested in continuing their EEC
ties but will almost certainly insist on formal association
agreements such as that concluded with Greecre-3
(he Greek agreement may also strengthen the Common
Market in its continuing rivalry with the European Free Trade
�eefifil5ErNITAL-
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�eefffrit/ENTTAT Noe
association (EFTA or Outer Seven). EEC officials have long
insisted that bilateral association with the Common Market is
a real alternative to the EEC-EFTA merger sought by the
Seven, and can now point to Greece as an instance of its feasi-
bility. This example could conceivably become especially at-
tractive to such EFTA countries as Austria which are increas-
ingly restive over the lack of an EFTA agreement with the EEq
CONFIDENTIAL
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111�0' �e0.PatHDEffft7M�
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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